



NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE GAMBIA

APPROVED REPORT

OF THE SPECIAL SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE INQUIRY INTO THE SALE AND DISPOSAL OF ASSETS IDENTIFIED BY THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES OF PUBLIC BODIES, ENTERPRISES & OFFICES AS REGARDS THEIR DEALINGS WITH FORMER PRESIDENT YAHYA JAMMEH AND CONNECTED MATTERS.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

New Assembly Building, Reginald Pye Lane,

APRIL 2026

BANJUL, THE GAMBIA

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CHAIRPERSON'S FOREWORD

1. It is my honour, on behalf of the Special Select Committee on the Inquiry into the Sale and Disposal of Assets Identified by the Commission of Inquiry into the Financial Activities of Public Bodies, Enterprises and Offices in their dealings with Former President Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh (otherwise referred to as the 'Janneh Commission'), to present this Report to the National Assembly.
2. This inquiry was mandated by the Assembly to re-establish a complete and authoritative account of how public assets, including lands, vehicles, livestock, aircraft, monies, and other properties, were managed, preserved, disposed of, or otherwise treated during and after the work of the Janneh Commission. The Committee approached this responsibility with the seriousness it deserves, conscious that public trust in institutions depends on the integrity with which public assets are administered.
3. Over the course of our work, the Committee received and reviewed a substantial body of evidence, including testimonies from senior public officials, legal practitioners, receivers, technical experts, board chairpersons, directors of government agencies, and members of the defunct Janneh Commission.
4. We examined documentary exhibits sourced from multiple public institutions, reviewed administrative and legal instruments, and scrutinised financial records, Cabinet-level memoranda, and correspondence relevant to the disposal of assets. These testimonies and documents formed the evidential foundation of the Committee's findings and recommendations.
5. The Report reveals a number of systemic weaknesses. Witness testimony consistently pointed to *fragmented institutional arrangements, poor documentation culture, and lapses in inter-agency coordination*. At several junctures, evidence disclosed serious governance failures, including instances where disposals occurred without proper legal authority, where oversight responsibilities were unclear or unexercised, and where critical public assets continued to be handled through informal practices inconsistent with the standards expected in a modern democratic State.
6. The Committee also observed significant variance in institutional performance. Certain agencies, such as the Central Bank of The Gambia, demonstrated strict adherence to statutory mandates and financial governance norms. In contrast, others exhibited profound gaps, ranging from missing files and incomplete asset registers to improper reliance on verbal directives and undocumented decisions.
7. Equally troubling were the inconsistencies between the records of various Government Institutions entrusted with the custody and control of all movable and immovable properties. These discrepancies contributed to uncertainty about the true status of several properties and assets.

8. In discharging its mandate, the Committee was guided by the Assembly’s constitutional role to uphold transparency, demand accountability, and strengthen public governance systems. Our purpose has been forward-looking: to identify gaps in existing frameworks, to recommend reforms that will prevent a recurrence of the failures identified, and to reinforce institutional safeguards for the future.
9. This Report, therefore, serves not merely as a record of what transpired, but as a blueprint for strengthening the legal, administrative, and financial architecture that underpins public asset management in The Gambia. It is the Committee’s firm conviction that the recommendations contained herein will support the Government in enhancing compliance mechanisms, improving asset-disposal procedures, and ensuring that public resources are managed in a manner consistent with the highest standards of accountability.
10. I wish to extend my profound appreciation to all witnesses who appeared before the Committee, many of whom provided extensive documentation and cooperated fully with the inquiry. I also commend the Committee’s Lead Counsel and legal team, investigators, technical staff, Communication & ICT, and the Secretariat for their diligence, professionalism, and unalloyed commitment throughout this demanding exercise.
11. Finally, I acknowledge the Members of the Committee whose dedication, impartiality, and collective resolve were instrumental in completing this task. The work presented in this Report reflects our shared commitment to strengthening public institutions and advancing the public interest in line with the constitutional values of accountability, transparency, and good governance.
12. I respectfully submit this Report for the consideration of the august National Assembly.

HON. ABDOULIE CEESAY

*Chairperson, Special Select Committee on the Inquiry into the Sale and Disposal of Assets
and Properties of Former President Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh*

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

1. Hon. Abdoulie Ceesay - Chairperson
2. Hon. Madi MK Ceesay - Vice Chairperson
3. Hon. Omar Jammeh - Member
4. Hon. Alhagie Mbow - Member
5. Hon. Sheriff Sarr - Member
6. Hon. Kebba Lang Fofana - Member
7. Hon. Suwaibou Touray - Member

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

13. The Special Select Committee (the Committee) expresses its profound appreciation to all institutions, individuals, and stakeholders whose cooperation and contributions enriched its work.
14. The Committee acknowledges, with deep gratitude, the Office of the Clerk of the National Assembly for the comprehensive administrative, logistical, and procedural support provided throughout the duration of the Inquiry. The professionalism, diligence, and institutional stewardship of the Clerk and staff were indispensable to the orderly conduct of hearings and the effective functioning of the Committee.
15. The Committee expresses special appreciation to the Legal Team for their rigorous examination of witnesses, meticulous review of evidence, and invaluable professional guidance throughout the proceedings.
16. The Committee equally appreciates the Secretariat and Investigative Team for ensuring that proceedings were conducted efficiently and in accordance with established parliamentary standards. The Committee further extends its sincere thanks to the offices of the Auditor General and the Inspector General of Police, who provided staff and personnel to the Committee during the inquiry.
17. The Committee is equally grateful to the Office of the President, the Judiciary, Attorney General's Chambers and Ministry of Justice, the Financial Intelligence Unit, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Tourism and Culture, the Ministry of Agriculture, and all associated government agencies, The Gambia Tourism Board, The Gambia Civil Aviation Authority, The Gambia Livestock Marketing Agency, the Department of Parks and Wildlife Management, the Accountant General's Department, and the Central Bank of The Gambia.
18. Their testimonies, records, and institutional insights were essential to clarifying the legal, administrative, and financial landscape that shaped the management and disposal of the assets, which the Committee was mandated to inquire into.
19. The Committee also acknowledges the cooperation of former public officials, Commissioners of the Jannah Commission, receivers, and private citizens who appeared before it. Their willingness to provide testimony, often accompanied by extensive documentation, significantly enhanced the Committee's understanding of the factual and operational complexities that characterised the disposal of assets identified by the Commission.
20. Finally, the Committee recognises the constructive engagement of the general public, civil society organisations, and the media, especially the dedicated parliamentary reporters, whose sustained interest in the proceedings underscores the centrality of transparency and public accountability in democratic governance.

21. The Committee is humbled by the collective effort that made this Inquiry possible. It is the Committee's considered hope that this report will contribute meaningfully to strengthened accountability in our governance machinery.

ACRONYMS

AGIB	Arab Gambian Islamic Bank
AG	Attorney General
AGD	Accountant General's Department
AML	Anti-Money Laundering
AMRC	Asset Management and Recovery Corporation
APRC	Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction
AU	African Union
CBG	Central Bank of The Gambia
CFA	Communauté Financière Africaine (West African Franc)
CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
CRF	Consolidated Revenue Fund
DLS	Department of Lands and Surveys
DPWM	Department of Parks and Wildlife Management
EUR	Euro
FBN	First Bank of Nigeria
FIB	First International Bank
FIU	Financial Intelligence Unit
FPAC	Finance and Public Accounts Committee

GAMICO	African Mining International Company Limited
GAMTEL	Gambia Telecommunications Company
GCAA	Gambia Civil Aviation Authority
GFFI	Gambia Feed Industry
GBP	British Pound Sterling
GIEPA	Gambia Investment and Export Promotion Agency
GIL	Green Industries Ltd
GLMA	Gambia Livestock Marketing Agency
GMD	Gambian Dalasi
GPA	Gambia Port Authority
GPPA	Gambia Public Procurement Authority
GRA	Gambia Revenue Authority
GTB / GTBank	Guaranty Trust Bank
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IGP	Inspector General of Police
JSC	Judicial Service Commission
KFF	Kanilai Worni Family Farms
KGI	KGI International
KMC	Kanifing Municipal Council

LRR	Lower River Region
MCG	Mineral Company of The Gambia Ltd
MOFEA	Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
MSA	Maintenance Service Agency
NALA	National Agency for Legal Aid
NAWEC	National Water and Electricity Company
NPF	National Provident Fund
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
PAYE	Pay As You Earn
PEGEP	Girls Empowerment for Girls Education Project
PHB	Bank PHB (Gambia) Ltd
PIU	Police Intervention Unit
PSC	Public Service Commission
RTGS	Real-Time Gross Settlement
SIS	State Intelligence Services
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
SSHFC	Social Security and Housing Finance Corporation
TDA	Tourism Development Area
TRRC	Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission
USD	United States Dollar

WCR	West Coast Region
WL / WPL	West Port Logistics Ltd
WW	West Wood Gambia Ltd
XOF	CFA Franc (West African CFA Franc)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

22. This report presents a comprehensive account of the work of the Special Select Committee (the Committee) on the inquiry into the sale and disposal of assets associated with former President Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh. It captures the Committee's activities, findings, and recommendations, detailing the processes and procedures undertaken to assess the legality, transparency, and administrative propriety of the disposal of assets identified by the Janneh Commission and subsequently forfeited to the State. The report highlights the Committee's use of public hearings, witness interviews, statement-taking, documentary analysis, site inspections, and forensic and comparative assessments, all conducted to ensure evidence-based, transparent, and fair conclusions.
23. The report is divided into seven chapters, each addressing a key dimension of the Committee's work. Chapter One deals with the establishment of the Special Select Committee, its mandate, and the strategic and methodological framework guiding its work. It outlines the Committee's approach to witness hearings, evidence management, institutional engagement, and physical verification of assets. The chapter further explains the scope and limitations of the inquiry, the principles underpinning the Committee's operations, and the rationale for examining not only asset disposals but also the administrative and procedural context in which those disposals occurred, thereby laying the foundation for the analysis and findings that follow.
24. Chapter Two examines the establishment of the Janneh Commission and its Secretariat. It details the appointments of Commissioners, Lead Counsel, and Secretariat staff, noting both professional qualifications and challenges relating to public perception, conflicts of interest, and administrative alignment. The chapter further highlights gaps in institutional compliance with preservation orders, unclear reporting structures, the absence of formal administrative manuals, and financial dependence on the Ministry of Justice.
25. In Chapter Three, the report discusses the operations, investigations, and work undertaken by the Commission in relation to the assets of the former President, including livestock, wildlife, vehicles, tractors, aircraft, landed properties, and other assets. It highlights the systematic approach adopted to identify, record, and categorise assets, the operational and procedural challenges encountered, including inconsistencies in valuation, coordination gaps, inadequate enforcement of court orders, and logistical constraints, and the resulting losses, particularly in livestock and wildlife. The chapter also presents in detail the numerous bank accounts held by the former President and his associates across multiple commercial banks, and examines irregularities in livestock sales, deficiencies in documentation, and financial discrepancies. It further documents the appointment of the Receiver/Trustee and the establishment of an Inter-Ministerial Taskforce at both ministerial and technical levels to address third-party claims in accordance with the Commission's recommendations.
26. Chapter Four examines the transition from the Commission's investigative mandate to executive action through the issuance of the White Paper, which, under the Constitution, is the instrument by which the Government accepts, modifies, or rejects the Commission's findings and

recommendations. It explains how the Cabinet-level Ministerial Committee, otherwise called the Ministerial Taskforce, supported by a Technical Committee of Permanent Secretaries, was established to implement accepted recommendations, particularly those relating to the disposal and management of high-value assets. The chapter situates the Special Select Committee's mandate within this post-Commission phase, emphasising its role in scrutinising whether the Executive's commitments in the White Paper were translated into concrete, lawful, and transparent administrative action.

27. Chapter Five examines the post-Commission phase of asset sales and disposals, focusing on the role of the Receiver/Trustee and the financial flows arising from the management and liquidation of forfeited assets. It details the appointment of Alpha Barry of Alpha Kapital Advisory as Receiver in 2019, the scope of assets placed under receivership, and the banking arrangements through which sale proceeds and business revenues were processed. The chapter analyses the movement of funds through the Receiver's Ecobank and Megabank accounts and into the Central Bank's Asset Recovery Account, establishing the total proceeds realised from asset disposals, companies, dividends, and shares, and assessing compliance with the Receivership Agreement requiring timely remittance of proceeds to the State.
28. Chapter Six addresses the gravest institutional challenge encountered during the inquiry, namely, acts of contempt that directly obstructed and undermined the authority of the National Assembly in the exercise of its oversight mandate. It sets out the constitutional and procedural framework governing contempt and documents two (2) serious cases in which witnesses deliberately misled the Committee, interfered with evidence, and sought to frustrate the truth-seeking process. Through the cases of Sergeant Adama Jagne and Mr. Alieu Jallow, the chapter demonstrates how the Committee applied due process and exercised its constitutional powers to protect the integrity, dignity, and authority of parliamentary proceedings.
29. Chapter Seven examines the institutional deficiencies exposed by the inquiry, identifying systemic weaknesses in legal, administrative, and governance frameworks that undermined the effective preservation, management, and disposal of forfeited assets. It analyses failures in inter-agency coordination, weak compliance with court orders, inadequate record-keeping, unclear lines of responsibility, and the absence of robust oversight mechanisms, and situates these deficiencies as the underlying causes requiring structural and legislative reform.
30. Finally, the report provides, at the conclusion of each chapter, a set of targeted recommendations addressing the specific issues, findings, and institutional weaknesses identified therein, thereby ensuring that the Committee's work is directly translated into actionable reform proposals. In addition, a comprehensive list of all witnesses who appeared before the Special Select Committee during the public hearings, as well as the investigators who conducted statement-taking, is attached as an Appendix to this Report.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

- 36.** The Special Select Committee (the Committee) was established by the National Assembly through a Motion laid on Wednesday 14th May 2025, by the Majority Leader and Member for Kantora, Billay G. Tunkara, praying for the Assembly to establish a Special Select Committee, pursuant to section 109 (2) of the Constitution and Order 95 (5) of the Standing Orders of the National Assembly. The Committee’s mandate, as determined by the Motion, was to inquire into the sale and disposal of the assets identified by the Janneh Commission and forfeited to the State. The Assembly unanimously approved the Motion on the same day. The appointment of seven National Assembly Members to the Special Select Committee was confirmed by the Assembly on Thursday, 15th May 2025, through the laying of a motion by the Committee of Selection, as required by the Standing Orders (see Appendix A).
- 31.** Pursuant to the Motion for establishment, the Committee met and commenced its work on 22nd May 2025, within seven days of its establishment and appointment of Committee members. The Committee’s priority engagements included the creation of a strategy on how to approach the inquiry and the development of a strategic workplan to guide the Committee, the investigative team, and the legal team in the execution of their duties. This was followed by the identification of a list of potential witnesses and persons of interest involved, either directly or indirectly, in the sale and disposal of assets of former President Jammeh. Rules of Procedure were also made pursuant to Standing Order 95(5) to guide the conduct, proceedings, and deliberations of the Committee in the discharge of its mandate. These Rules were adopted by the Committee prior to commencement of its hearings.
- 32.** Per the Committee’s mandate, the inquiry into the sale and disposal of the assets of former President Jammeh involved examining the legality and administrative propriety of the processes used in disposing of the assets, assessing compliance with public finance and public procurement legislations, and [NJ1] scrutinising the valuation, pricing, and procurement methods applied by the Commission and the Receivers to determine whether the sales and disposals were transparent, competitive, and in the public’s interest.
- 33.** The Committee was further tasked with identifying and profiling purchasers of the assets, investigating potential conflicts of interest, abuse of office or procedural irregularities, and evaluating the management and accounting of proceeds to ensure that all revenues were properly paid into public accounts.
- 34.** In doing so, the Committee received a considerable volume of documentary evidence, which included witness statements and official correspondences. These were mainly from the Executive, state institutions, and private individuals. The evidence received was catalogued and marked in accordance with the thematic areas considered by the Committee. However, there were numerous duplications in the documentary evidence due to the high volume of records and overlap in the mandates of the institutions and individuals engaged by the Committee during the inquiry.

35. The Committee's hearings began on the 14th of July 2025 and ended on the 26th of November 2025, spanning over four months. All of the Committee's hearings were held in public as the Committee never found it necessary to receive evidence in private.
36. The Committee, through its investigations and public hearings, heard evidence from the Executive, the Chairperson and Commissioners of the defunct Jammeh Commission (the Commission), the former Lead Counsel to the Commission, the Receivers of former President Jammeh's assets, and other officials who were directly responsible for the sale and disposal of assets of former President Jammeh.
37. In the course of its inquiry, the Committee also undertook site visits to verify assets and assess their condition, and to corroborate documentary and testimonial evidence it received from witnesses. These visits covered key locations, including the State House (Banjul), the Kanifing Garage, Kotu Garage (formerly MSA), the Futurelec building, and several landed properties in Banjul, the Kanifing Municipality, the West Coast Region, as well as the Mansakonko Area Council in the Lower River Region, under the receivership of the Receiver/Trustee. The Committee also visited former President Jammeh's farms in Banjulinding, Farato, and Sifoe, as well as his principal residence in Kanilai, to ascertain the existence, status, and condition of assets purported to belong to, or be associated with, the former President.

METHODOLOGY

38. The Committee adopted a rigorous, transparent, and evidence-driven methodology to ensure that its findings and recommendations are grounded in verified facts, credible testimony, and comprehensive institutional records. The approach combined formal parliamentary procedures with internationally recognised inquiry standards, incorporating both qualitative and quantitative assessments of evidence.
39. The Committee's methodology was anchored on the following principles:
 - (a) That all actions undertaken were carried out strictly in accordance with the 1997 Constitution, the National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act 1962, the Standing Orders of the National Assembly (Revised), and all other applicable laws and regulations governing parliamentary oversight and committees' oversight functions.
 - (b) That proceedings of the Committee were conducted openly and transparently, save where the Committee determined that confidentiality was necessary to safeguard sensitive information, protect witnesses, or preserve the public interest.
 - (c) That all witnesses appearing before the Committee were treated with utmost respect and afforded a full and fair opportunity to present their oral and written evidence, submit relevant documents, and respond to or clarify issues arising from their testimony.

40. Consequently, the findings and conclusions made in this report are based on carefully evaluated and corroborated evidence, including oral testimony, documentary materials, and submissions from relevant institutions, assessed through a process of verification and triangulation to ensure accuracy and reliability.
41. The Committee convened 74 sittings from 14th July to 26th November 2025, during which it received evidence from more than 70 witnesses. Of these, 35 witnesses appeared under oath/affirmation and were subjected to structured questioning led by the Committee’s Counsel and followed by Hon. Members. Several witnesses were recalled for clarification, and supplementary testimonies were admitted where necessary.
42. The Committee equally undertook a comprehensive review and analysis of extensive documentary material, submitted to the Committee by various state institutions including but not limited to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA), the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG), the Gambia Tourism Board (GTBoard), the Gambia Livestock Management Authority (GLMA), and the Department of Lands and Surveys (DLS). Documentary evidence was equally received from individual witnesses. The documents received include the following:
- (a) judicial records, comprising rulings of the High Court and the Court of Appeal,
 - (b) records from the defunct Janneh Commission, including interim orders and the final reports of the Commission;
 - (c) extensive documentation from the Executive, including Cabinet records and ministerial correspondence;
 - (d) documents from the former and current Receivers, including contracts of engagement, periodic reports, approved fee structures, and financial statements. The Committee also examined bank statements, account mandates, payment instructions, transfer authorisations, and asset management records, including asset registers, logbooks, valuation reports, and auction and disposal records; and
 - (e) land administration documents, including land files, lease agreements, cadastral maps, and records of allocations from the Tourism Development Area (TDA).

SITE VISITS AND PHYSICAL VERIFICATION

37. The Committee undertook, or directed the undertaking of, the following verification and inspection measures:
- (a) physical inspections of land parcels that were the subject of dispute, investigation, or inquiry;
 - (b) verification of custodial status and locations of vehicles, machinery, livestock, aircraft, and other movable assets placed under receivership or otherwise brought under State control;
 - (c) inspection of storage, archival, and record-keeping facilities housing institutional records, official files, and other materials relevant to the inquiry; and

(d) on-site assessments of Tourism Development Area (TDA) sites and other properties formerly owned by, vested in, or otherwise linked to the State.

38. These measures were undertaken to provide a sound, factual, and contextual basis for the assessment, verification, and correlation of oral testimony and documentary evidence considered by the Committee, and to enhance the accuracy, reliability, and credibility of the Committee's findings.

COMPARATIVE AND FORENSIC ANALYSIS

39. To strengthen the reliability of conclusions, the Committee applied:

- (a) chronological reconstruction of asset movements and decision-making processes;
- (b) chain-of-custody tracing for livestock, vehicles, tractors, aircraft, and land files
- (c) value-for-money assessments comparing valuations, sales, and recovery outcomes; and
- (d) cross-institutional comparison of submissions to identify discrepancies, omissions, and contradictions.

40. Legal analysis of statutory mandates, procedural adherence, and compliance with court orders. Where valuation inconsistencies arose, the Committee examined comparable market prices, expert opinions, and sectoral standards.

INTER-AGENCY ENGAGEMENT AND FOLLOW-UP REQUESTS

41. The Committee engaged multiple institutions, directing them to:

- (a) produce files or supplementary documentation;
- (b) provide verification of prior decisions, Cabinet directives, and administrative actions; and
- (c) Submit updated records from the Attorney General's Chambers, Accountant General's Department, Central Bank, Gambia Tourism Board, Office of the Sheriff, and Receivers' offices.

42. In cases of incomplete compliance, repeat summonses and formal directives were issued.

EVIDENCE MANAGEMENT AND RECORD HANDLING

43. All testimonies and documents were:

- (a) recorded, transcribed, and archived by the Secretariat;
- (b) coded and indexed into thematic categories such as land, vehicles, tractors, livestock, aircraft, financial flows, receivership, and institutional governance; and
- (c) subject to internal peer review by Committee Members and Counsel to ensure analytical accuracy.

DETERMINATION OF FINDINGS

44. Findings were derived through a structured process, which involved:

- (a) identification of key factual issues;
 - (b) evaluation of conflicting testimony;
 - (c) corroboration across multiple sources;
 - (d) assessment of procedural compliance; and
 - (e) consultation with legal counsel and technical specialists.
45. Only issues supported by evidence were included in the final findings.

FORMULATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS

46. Recommendations were developed through:
- (a) gap analysis of institutional practices;
 - (b) identification of legal, administrative, and policy deficiencies;
 - (c) deliberations among Committee Members, supported by Counsel and Secretariat staff.
47. The Committee ensured that its recommendations are time-bound, actionable, and institution-specific.

SCOPE AND LIMITATION

43. The Committee's core mandate was to examine the sale and disposal of assets identified by the Commission and subsequently sold or disposed of either by the Commission or by the Government. However, to properly discharge this mandate, the Committee found it necessary to examine the institutional, administrative, and procedural framework within which those sales and disposals occurred.
44. The Commission's establishment, the structures that supported its work, the rules and internal arrangements that guided its operations, and the processes used for identifying, preserving, valuing, and managing assets all form the foundation upon which any disposal exercise ultimately rests. It is, therefore, unavoidable that before assessing the sales themselves, the Committee must analyse the systems, decisions, and operational context that shaped and influenced the disposal outcomes.
45. Accordingly, this report considers the establishment and functioning of the Commission, the administrative arrangements, particularly within the Secretariat that operationalised its mandate, and the procedures used to identify, preserve, value, and dispose of assets associated with the former President and his close associates. It also reviews the preparation and submission of the Commission's Final Report, the Government's consideration of that report through the White Paper, and the subsequent work of the Cabinet Inter-Ministerial Taskforce charged with implementing asset disposals after the Commission concluded its work. In doing so, the analysis examines the financial flows generated by these disposal activities, the accountability mechanisms employed, and the status of remaining assets still under government control.
46. The Committee notes that its work was constrained by several important limitations. First and foremost is the scarcity of time in relation to the enormity of the Committee's mandate. Other limitations included several institutions either failing to provide complete documentation or

submitting records that were partially missing, resulting in gaps that hindered a full reconstruction of events. The Committee also received conflicting testimonies, particularly regarding the chain of custody of assets, valuation processes, and the rationale for disposal decisions.

47. Furthermore, the way sale proceeds were handled and deposited, coupled with the absence of a comprehensive financial reconciliation of those events, limited the Committee's ability to trace asset-related proceeds with certainty. While these limitations shape the depth of available evidence, they do not dilute the Committee's findings, which are grounded in the most reliable and corroborated material before it.

CHAPTER TWO

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION AND SECRETARIAT

48. The Committee finds that the process leading to the Commission's establishment began well before the issuance of the Legal Notice No. 15 of 2017 dated the 12th day of July 2017 (the Legal Notice). On the 18th day of May 2017, the Government, acting as claimants, initiated a civil suit against the former President in Attorney General v Alh Yahya A.J.J Jammeh, suit No HC/168/17/CO/09/F1, in which the State made several applications seeking freezing orders under the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorist Financing Act, 2012.
49. These applications aimed to secure and preserve a substantial range of assets allegedly connected to the former President, pending a full investigation into their acquisition and usage. On 22nd May 2017, the High Court granted an interim injunction (Order), thereby providing legal authority to a Receiver, Augustus Prom, and other state institutions to assume control over the assets in order to prevent their dissipation.¹ The Committee notes that on the issue of the assets of the former President and his close associates, the Executive engaged in two parallel processes, one situated in the courts and the other created by executive action, each dealing with the same subject matter.
50. Pursuant to the Order, custody and control of various categories of assets were directed to designated departments and institutions. The Registrar General was entrusted with the custody and control of all movable and immovable properties; the Gambia Livestock Marketing Agency was placed in charge of livestock; and the Department of Parks and Wildlife Management assumed responsibility for wildlife assets. Augustus Prom, as the Receiver, was granted custody and control of all the companies listed in the annexure to the order of the High Court, forming part of the evidence received by the Committee².
51. These institutional assignments were intended to impose structure, accountability, and continuity in the preservation of properties that would later fall under the Commission's mandate. Although the Order clearly safeguarded all assets under its scope, evidence reviewed by the Committee reveals that compliance by some institutions and individuals was significantly inadequate. Specifically, the Registrar General did not comply with the Court's order, but rather merely conducted an inventory exercise limited to recording a few properties.
52. Similarly, the Committee also found that the Department of Parks and Wildlife and the Gambia Livestock Marketing Agency failed to comply with the Court's Order. However, following a letter from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Gambia Livestock Marketing Agency bringing the Court Order to their attention, the Agency wrote back to the Ministry seeking clarity on the Court Order and raised concerns about their capacity to take custody and control of the livestock.

¹ Exhibit MoJ 5A

² MoJ 5A and MoJ 5C

53. These lapses resulted in weaknesses in preservation, gaps in oversight, and an uneven standard of recordkeeping during this pre-Commission period. The Attorney General's Chambers and Ministry of Justice, as the Government's principal legal adviser and the office that conducts litigation on its behalf, bore the immediate responsibility for ensuring that the High Court's preservation order reached all institutions and individuals designated to act under it. Having initiated the proceedings that resulted in the injunction, the Ministry was obliged to ensure that all institutions cited in the Order were duly notified of their responsibilities and that each institution received a copy of the Order.
54. This responsibility extended to confirming that the entities entrusted with safeguarding the specified assets had been appropriately informed and placed in a position to take the necessary steps to comply with the Court's directive. The Ministry's failure to ensure full and timely notification of the Order contributed to gaps in institutional awareness and action, thereby undermining the protective purpose for which judicial intervention was sought.
55. At a broader level, the Government retained the overarching duty to ensure that all institutions complied with the Court's directives and that the freezing Order operated as intended. Having sought judicial protection of public assets, the Government was required to provide effective oversight, coordinate institutional responsibilities, and ensure that the agencies entrusted with custody and control of the assets adhered to the measures prescribed by the Court. In assessing the Government's performance, it is instructive to contrast its approach with that of certain individual custodians, most notably Augustus Prom, who took concrete steps to secure the assets under their control and custody by expending resources, maintaining physical protection of the assets, and ensuring that they were properly safeguarded.
56. Their conduct demonstrates that compliance with the freezing order was both feasible and achievable where diligence and active oversight were exercised. The Government's failure to establish a coherent supervisory framework, or to reinforce compliance expectations among the responsible institutions, allowed significant lapses to persist, contributing to the dissipation, destruction, and theft of assets that they expressly sought to protect through the Court Order.
57. Consequently, the Committee notes that the Commission did not begin its work in a vacuum; rather, it inherited a universe of assets already frozen, categorised, and placed under institutional custody through the operation of the Court Order of 22nd May 2017. The Legal Notice, which established the Commission, contained the same assets annexed in the Court Order, demonstrating a clear continuity between the judicial preservation effort and the administrative mandate later assigned to the Commission.
58. This alignment ensured that the Commission's jurisdiction rested on an asset base that had already been subjected to judicial orders of custody and control, enabling the Commission to focus on verification, investigation, and eventual disposition rather than the initial identification or seizure of property.

59. In this regard, the Committee finds that the establishment of the Commission represented the second phase of a broader Government response. The High Court freezing Order safeguarded the assets, created a legal barrier against dissipation, and established an initial chain of custody. The Commission's establishment thereafter created the institutional mechanism required to examine the origins of those assets, determine their lawfulness, and make recommendations for recovery or disposal.
60. Although the Commission derived a significant advantage from the High Court's freezing order, it, however, inherited the deficiencies that stemmed from the failure of some of those custodians to discharge their responsibilities as ordered. Consequently, the Commission commenced its mandate within an environment already weakened by gaps in compliance with the Court's freezing Order. Those early shortcomings in preservation and oversight influenced the Commission's starting conditions and had implications for the effectiveness of its initial operational approach.
61. Taken together, the Committee is of the opinion that the establishment of the Commission cannot be properly understood without recognising the foundational role of the civil case commenced by the Government against the former President. The Commission's creation, therefore, represented not a standalone administrative act but the continuation and consolidation of measures first initiated through judicial intervention.
62. Following the issuance of the Legal Notice the Commission of Inquiry was formally constituted pursuant to Section 200 of the Constitution and Section 2 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. These provisions empower the President of the Republic to establish commissions of inquiry into matters of public importance and grant such commissions the authority to conduct full and impartial investigations, summon witnesses, compel the production of documents, and exercise powers akin to those of a High Court judge.
63. The statutory scheme allows the President to define the scope, appoint commissioners, prescribe procedures, and determine whether hearings should be held publicly or privately. The Commission's mandate and jurisdiction were therefore grounded in constitutional and statutory authority and closely aligned with the asset universe already preserved under the High Court injunction.
64. The Committee finds, based on the evidence of the Attorney General at the time, the Commission's Chairperson, the Secretary, and the Lead Counsel, that an inception meeting was convened immediately after the Commission's establishment. During this meeting, the Commissioners, Lead Counsel, and the Secretary were briefed on administrative expectations, procedural arrangements, and the general scope of work.
65. Critically, they were also informed of the ongoing civil suit and the freezing orders already granted by the High Court. This ensured that all principal actors within the Commission began their work with full awareness of the judicial proceedings, the custodial arrangements set by the Court, and the parallel responsibilities arising from the earlier judicial intervention.

66. The Commission's Terms of Reference (ToR), as provided in paragraph 2 of the Legal Notice, reflect a broad and detailed mandate. The Commission was tasked with investigating the withdrawal and use of public funds from the Central Bank and other public institutions, examining the conduct of the former President and his associates in relation to public finances, asset acquisition, executive interference in procurement and public enterprise management, and identifying any wrongdoing or misappropriation. The ToR also called on the Commission to recommend recovery mechanisms and preventative reforms.
67. The President appointed three commissioners through paragraph 1 of the Legal Notice. These appointments were:
- (a) Mr. Sourahata B.S. Jannah (designated as Chairperson), via a letter dated 12th day of July 2017, referenced AG/C/364/01/PART 1 (4),³
 - (b) Ms. Abiosseh George, via a letter dated 12th day of July 2017 AG/C/364/01/PART 1 (1)⁴, and
 - (c) Mr. Bai Mass Saine, via a letter dated 12th day of July 2017 AG/C/364/01/PART 1 (3)⁵
68. In line with paragraph 5 of the Legal Notice and Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, the President also appointed Mr. Alhaji Mamadi Kurang as Secretary to the Commission via a letter dated 12th July 2017, referenced AG/C/364/01/PART 1 (5). All the above appointment letters were issued by the Ministry of Justice and were signed by the then Solicitor General and Legal Secretary, Mr Chernoh Marenah.
69. Paragraph 6 of the Legal Notice empowered the Attorney General to appoint the Lead Counsel to the Commission. Mrs. Amie N.D. Bensouda, a senior legal practitioner, was appointed as Lead Counsel via a letter from the Attorney General's Chambers dated the 12th day of July 2017 (AG/C/364/01/PART 1 (2)) and signed by the then Solicitor General, Mr. Chernoh Marenah.
70. It is the evidence of the former Attorney General, Mr. Abubacarr M. Tambadou, that appointments to the Jannah Commission were guided by a clear set of criteria, including longstanding professional experience, integrity, technical competence, and a proven record of service, and that it was the considered judgment of the Executive, operating during a transitional period, that the Commission should be staffed predominantly by professionals from the private sector who possessed the independence, credibility, and depth of expertise necessary for such a sensitive assignment.
71. Notwithstanding this testimony, the Committee makes two observations concerning appointments that bear upon the principles of public confidence and public perception, which are essential to the integrity of any commission of inquiry, as it is the hallmark of transitional justice.

³ MoJ 3D

⁴ MoJ 3A

⁵ MoJ 3C

72. Firstly, the Committee observed that the Secretary to the Commission did not come from an administrative background within the public service. The Committee considers that, in a process of this nature, appointing a senior administrator with public service orientation, while still meeting the substantive criteria, would likely have strengthened institutional alignment, administrative continuity, and operational clarity.
73. Secondly, there is the issue of a perceived conflict of interest in relation to the appointment of Lead Counsel, whose law firm, Amie Bensouda & Co LLP, was representing Social Security and Housing Finance Corporation (SSHFC), which would become subject of the Commission's inquiry, as listed in the Legal Notice as a key institution to be investigated by the Commission. It was therefore apparent from the outset that a conflict of interest could arise in the course of the investigation led by the Lead Counsel.
74. The Committee found that, while Mrs. Bensouda was serving as Lead Counsel to the Commission, Amie Bensouda & Co LLP was engaged by SSHFC to recover monies on its behalf, and that she even appeared in the matter of Attorney General v. Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh (ibid) on the 29th day of June 2017 in furtherance of those instructions. In a more striking instance, the Committee found that even after Mrs Bensouda's appointment as the Lead Counsel, Amie Bensouda & Co LLP filed several applications and continued to appear against Augustus Prom, the Receiver appointed by the Court on the 22nd day of May 2017. Counsel Anna Njie, then Senior Associate at Amie Bensouda & Co LLP, who assisted Mrs. Bensouda and even led witnesses before the Commission during public hearings, represented the firm in Court at the time.
75. When the Committee confronted her with these facts, Mrs. Bensouda maintained that there was no conflict of interest because, in her view, the Commission's objectives and the Corporation's interests were aligned. However, the Committee does not find this view tenable. The Committee is of the view that the Commission's objective is to make full and impartial findings and not to serve any particular interest, whether private or public, because such would place the entire Commission in a biased position. If Mrs. Bensouda's position were to be tenable, it would mean that the Commission approached its inquiry with a prejudiced mind. The Committee finds that due consideration was not given to public perception of bias and conflict of interest, whether real or perceived, and as a result, the position of lead Counsel indeed created both real and perceived bias.
76. Furthermore, both Mr. Tambadou and Mrs. Bensouda testified that conflicts were to be addressed if and when they arose. However, the Committee considers that given the importance of maintaining public confidence, any perception of conflict of interest should have been identified and addressed openly by the Executive from the inception of the Commission.
77. As regards the institutional structure of the Commission, the Committee received evidence from Ms. Ramatoulie Sarr, Assistant Secretary to the Commission, who provided a functional description of the Commission (Ms. Sarr later assumed the role of Secretary to the Commission). Ms. Sarr stated that the Chairperson of the Commission was placed at the top, with the two other commissioners operating at an equal level in terms of authority. Below them, the legal and

investigation teams, as well as the Secretariat, operated with concurrent functional authority but in distinct domains: legal/investigative and administrative, respectively.

78. The Committee learned that Commissioners collectively made decisions, with the Chairperson presiding but not exercising superior substantive authority. The Lead Counsel led the presentation of evidence, and the Secretariat provided administrative and logistical support to the Commission. However, despite the unanimity of testimonies received by the Committee on roles and responsibilities, the Committee finds that the Commission lacked a formally documented organogram clearly defining reporting lines or a functional handbook guiding internal administrative procedures. The absence of such foundational administrative tools resulted in ambiguity over functional hierarchies and operational responsibilities.
79. The Assistant Secretary also testified that she did not receive any terms of reference upon her appointment, which further blurred the lines of responsibility within the Secretariat, contributing to operational uncertainty during key phases of the Commission's work.
80. The Committee finds that the administrative and financial design under which the Commission was operating was inherently inefficient and ill-suited to the scale and sensitivity of its mandate. The Commission operated entirely through the Ministry of Justice's budgetary processes, relying on Ministry approvals for routine expenditures and logistical requirements, including office supplies, fuel, transportation for field operations, and other basic operational needs. This arrangement exposed the Commission to delays, bureaucratic bottlenecks, and a certain level of micromanagement at the administrative level that compromised the spirit of functional independence required for a body tasked with investigating matters of significant public importance.
81. While the Commission's work was carried out on behalf of the Executive and for the benefit of the State, the Committee considers that its administrative and financial dependence risked encroaching upon its functional independence. The Committee notes, however, that subsequent commissions have benefited from more robust administrative and financial arrangements and urges the Government to maintain this improved practice such that future commissions of inquiry are structurally, administratively, financially, and functionally independent.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Government should ensure effective central coordination across all Ministries, Departments, and Agencies to guarantee timely information-sharing, consistency of action, and unified governmental response in matters connected to a Commission of Inquiry.
2. A policy should be developed to ensure all Ministries, Departments, and Agencies have access to a designated legal officer or legal person responsible for preliminary legal advice, internal coordination, and structured engagement with the Ministry of Justice. In the same vein, all MDAs are encouraged to have a legal officer, as most have Accountants.

3. Appointments of Commissioners, Lead Counsel, and Secretaries, including senior staff, must be subject to strict conflict of interest screening, with mandatory written declarations of actual, potential, or foreseeable conflicts recorded at the point of appointment. A form for declaration should therefore be developed and adopted.
4. The Commissions of Inquiry Act should be amended to guarantee the financial and administrative independence of commissions through secure, predictable, and timely funding mechanisms.
5. The roles of Commissioners, Lead Counsel, Secretariat, and all other staff should be clearly defined to prevent overlap of authority and conflicts in the course of duty.
6. The Commissions of Inquiry Act should be comprehensively reviewed and amended to address coordination, appointments, conflicts of interest, funding, and institutional structure.

CHAPTER THREE

OPERATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND WORK DONE BY THE COMMISSION

82. The Commission's work on asset identification and investigation was guided by a systematic approach to identifying and recording assets. The Legal Notice establishing the Commission, Legal Notice No. 15 of 2017, included a list of assets which served as the starting point for the Commission's investigations. As the Commission progressed in its work, additional assets beyond those enumerated in the Legal Notice were discovered.
83. The Committee resolved to categorize the assets in a structured manner to facilitate its analysis and reporting. This approach allowed the Committee to systematically review, assess, and present its findings in a coherent framework aligned with its Terms of Reference. For the purpose of this report, the assets are categorized as follows:
- (a) Livestock
 - (b) Wildlife
 - (c) Tractors and Vehicles
 - (d) Aircraft
 - (e) Commercial Bank Accounts
 - (f) Companies, Shares and Equity holdings
 - (g) Landed properties; and
 - (h) Other Assets
84. This categorisation provides clarity in evaluating the Commission's operations, investigative methods, and the subsequent management of each type of asset. In reviewing the Commission's handling of the various categories of assets, the Committee noted several operational challenges that shaped the pace and quality of the Commission's work. These included early inconsistencies in asset valuation, coordination overlaps, discrepancies across asset lists, difficulties in accessing certain properties, and deterioration of some assets before they could be valued or disposed of.
85. These cross-cutting issues affected multiple asset classes and recur throughout the evidence before the Committee. The detailed implications of each challenge, as they relate to livestock, wildlife, tractors, vehicles, aircraft, and other asset categories, are examined below.

WILDLIFE AND LIVESTOCK

86. The Committee considers it necessary to preface its report on this category of assets by noting that the Commission did not provide a comprehensive report on livestock as a standalone class of asset. Nevertheless, the evidence before the Committee establishes that the Commission did engage substantively with matters relating to livestock and wildlife during the course of its inquiry. This is particularly demonstrated in Volume 1, page 21 of its Report, where the Commission expressly states as follows:

“We toured part of the land at the back of the complex. We saw cattle assembled in an area, as well as hyenas kept in an enclosure. There were orchards and farms spread

in the vast space. We were told that a horse or donkey or other animal would accidentally be found here and there, but it was obvious to us that the zoo (ostriches, lions, camels, etc.) that Jammeh loved to show off to visitors was no more.”

87. However, despite these observations, the Commission did not examine how this class of assets was acquired, where the funding came from, or whether their acquisition complied with the law nor make a justification why the assets should be forfeited to the State. The Committee therefore notes that this omission represents a significant gap in the Commission’s investigations.
88. The High Court Order⁶ dated the 22nd day of May 2017, directs The Gambia Livestock Marketing Agency (GLMA) to assume custodial responsibility for the livestock deemed to be owned by the former President pending the conclusion of the investigations initiated by the Attorney General. The Court further prohibited the former President, his agents, and associates from dealing with **“all livestock and other animals held or in [his] possession”**.
89. In the same Order, the Court placed all wildlife and other animals “in the control and custody of The Gambia Wildlife Services”. The Committee believes that the reference to “The Gambia Wildlife Services” by the Court was intended to refer to the Department of Parks and Wildlife Management under the Ministry of Environment, Climate Change and Natural Resources. It is on this basis that the Committee summoned and heard testimonies from representatives of the Department of Parks and Wildlife.
90. Though the Court Order sought to safeguard all assets under its scope, including the livestock and wildlife, compliance and enforcement of the Order were inadequate.
91. GLMA testified that the Agency was not served with the High Court Order dated 22nd May 2017. Instead, they received a letter dated the 2nd day of June 2017, reference EA/157/409/02/1/ (56)⁷ from the Ministry of Agriculture, which sought to bring the Order to their attention, but the Ministry did not attach a copy of the said Order.
92. Evidence received by the Committee shows that GLMA sent a formal response to the Ministry of Agriculture via a letter dated the 5th day of June 2017, reference GLMA/DTFS/03/ (091)⁸, requesting a copy of the Court Order and seeking clarification on ‘modalities’ for implementing the said Order. However, the Ministry did not respond to the letter, nor did GLMA follow up on the matter. Consequently, there was no formal assumption of custody and control of the livestock by GLMA in the manner the Court intended. The Court’s directive, therefore, failed to trigger the institutional chain of custody, leaving the livestock without a legally recognized custodian.
93. The Committee received evidence that prior to the Attorney General seeking a freezing order of assets associated with the former President, the livestock, in particular, were under the custody and

⁶ MoJ 5A

⁷ GLMA2

⁸ GLMA3

control of personnel of The Gambia Armed Forces and in different locations, i.e., in Kanilai Farm, Farato, and Banjulinding. The Committee also received evidence that some livestock were kept in Sifoe but were subsequently moved to Banjulinding.

94. During the High Court December 2017 to January 2018 vacation session, the Attorney General filed an application before the late Hon. Justice Buba Jawo seeking the release and sale of the livestock. The application was based on an affidavit sworn to by the former Registrar of Companies, Mr. Alieu Jallow, who deposed that “the livestock could not reasonably await the conclusion of the Commission’s inquiry”. Based on this, the Court granted the application.
95. The late Justice Buba Jawo, in granting the application, directed the Sheriff of The Gambia “**to conduct the sale, and all proceeds of the sale be kept by the Hon. Sheriff in an interest-bearing account pending conclusion of the Commission of inquiry or further orders of the Court**”. The Order further directed that “**The Gambia Livestock Marketing Agency shall assist the Sheriff in the valuation of the livestock.**”
96. However, it is important to note that the application in suit No. HC/168/17/CO/09/FI was made in furtherance of an Order by the Commission dated 11th day of December 2017, in relation to the livestock belonging to the former President, and which fell under the purview of the assets they were tasked to investigate. Thus, the application before the Court was to seek leave of the High Court to dispose of the livestock, given that they were already subject to a preservation order.
97. The evidence received by the Committee indicates that the total number of livestock was neither stated nor estimated in the suit filed against the former President (supra). This is despite the fact that at the time of filing the application in Court for the sale of the livestock, the process of inventory of the assets belonging to the former President had already begun.
98. The Committee received evidence showing that following the High Court’s preservatory Order, the Office of the Sheriff via a letter dated 1st day of June, 2017 (without any reference), gave a general notice of the Order to “All Servants, agents and all concerned”, cautioning “not to dispose off or deal or tamper with any of the properties” associated with the former President. However, when prompted by the Committee, Hon. Sheriff B. Tabally, the former Sheriff of the High Court and now Justice of the High Court, could not explain to the Committee if and how the Notice was served on the concerned persons who may have had custody of the assets of the former President, particularly the livestock.
99. The Committee could not ascertain when the Commission first acted in relation to the livestock. However, the Committee received evidence in which the Lead Counsel to the Commission, via a letter dated the 8th day of October 2017, reference COM/CL/VOL1/70, requested a report listing the movable and immovable properties of the former President from the then Acting Registrar General, Mr. Alieu Jallow.

- 100.** Mr. Jallow responded to the request via a letter dated 17th day of October, 2017⁹ in which he informed the Lead Counsel that “**some of the figures, especially those relating to livestock, are not constant**”.
- 101.** Attached to Mr. Jallow’s response (SBS-C-21) is a report which contains information relating to the movable and immovable properties, including data on livestock/wildlife, which is reproduced below:

LIVESTOCK/ANIMALS

56.	Cattle in Kanilai	634
57.	Horses	8
58.	Zebras	9
59.	Hyenas	7
60.	Rams	37

*NOTE: This is an extract from **SBS-C-21**, Mr. Jallow’s response on the 17th day of October, 2017 referred to in paragraph 101.*

- 102.** Mr. Jallow further stated in the report that the tabular inventory submitted to the Commission represents “inventory taken in Kanilai only”, and that the “inventory process is still in progress” with the Commission to be “furnished with the details once the exercise is completed.” The report also states that the “cattle are divided into five herds and the figure hereinabove mentioned is the grand total for the five herds on the day of the Inventory”. The Committee received evidence that assets inventory in Kanilai, particularly the inventory of the livestock, was never completed, nor was any subsequent update provided to the Commission.
- 103.** Mr Jallow’s report also included the results of his team’s visit to the former President’s farms in Farato and Banjulinding, where they reported finding the following livestock:
- In Farato:**
- (a) “Seventeen (17) Heads of Cattle” and
 - (b) “Thirteen (13) sheep.
- In Banjulinding:**
- (a) “Thirty-three (33) cattle
 - (b) Fifteen (15) goats, and
 - (c) Two (2) sheep
- 104.** The Committee received evidence that prior to all these events, Mr. Alieu Jallow wrote to the Chief of Defence Staff on behalf of the Solicitor General, via a letter dated the 5th day of July, 2017,

⁹ SBS-C-21

referenced AG/C/238/Part1(14), reporting “missing items at Farato and Banjulinding Farms”. Mr. Jallow informed the Chief of Defence Staff that “during a meeting held with the respective farm managers, the Taskforce was informed that Major Gibril Jammeh, then the farm manager, had ordered the slaughter of over four hundred cattle immediately after the departure of the former President,” among other items. In the said letter, Mr. Jallow, on behalf of the Solicitor General, requested the Armed Forces to investigate the alleged theft of the cattle.

- 105.** Evidence of the alleged theft or slaughter of the 400 cattle in Farato was corroborated by Mr. Yaya Camara, a former member of the Gambia Armed Forces and now caretaker of the Farm. When the Committee visited the Farato Farm on the 2nd September 2025, Mr. Camara revealed that immediately following the former President’s departure, Gibril Jammeh visited the farm several times and ordered the killing of several cattle. Mr. Camara testified that he suspected Gibril Jammeh acted on his own volition. He confirmed, from his personal record and recollection, that Mr. Jammeh slaughtered and sold no less than four hundred.
- 106.** The Committee further received evidence that following the alleged slaughtering of the cattle in Farato, the Commission, through Lead Counsel Mrs. Bensouda, wrote to the Managing Director of GLMA, via a letter dated 6th October 2017, reference COM/CL/Vol 1/71¹⁰, requesting an “update on the livestock of Ex-President Yahya Jammeh” based on the fact that the Court Order of 22nd May 2017 gave custody and placed control of the livestock on the agency. In response to the said letter, GLMA, through its Director, wrote to the Commission on the 11th October 2017, via a letter referenced GLMA/DTFS/02/ (140), informing the Commission of the course of events as narrated in this report.
- 107.** In his evidence, Mr. Ebrima Cham, former Deputy Director at GLMA, told the Committee that following the letter of 11th October 2017 to the Commission, reiterating the agency’s position on the Court Order, the Lead Counsel of the Commission, Mrs. Bensouda, summoned the agency to explain their inaction to the court Order. Following his engagement with the Lead Counsel, she instructed that, given the urgent situation facing the livestock, the Commission’s Secretary, Mr. Mamadi Kurang, should coordinate with the agency to assist the Commission in tagging and valuing the livestock. Mr Cham testified that the Commission also provided the Agency with fuel coupons and logistical arrangements, including a convoy escorted by paramilitary officers.
- 108.** Mr. Cham further stated that these events led to GLMA's participation in the tagging and valuation exercise, on the Commission’s invitation, from the 24th to the 30th December 2017. That the agency viewed its role as technical support to the Commission rather than a formal custodial takeover of the livestock. The Director of GLMA and the Chairperson of the Agency’s Board both testified that while GLMA actively participated in the tagging and evaluation exercise, the Agency was instructed by Mr. Alhagi Mamadi Kurang not to keep records of the exercise. The Committee rejects this assertion as an insufficient justification for failing to keep records of the exercise,

¹⁰ GLMA5

especially given that GLMA is an Agency whose administrative activities should be documented.

109. The Committee heard testimony indicating that the Kanilai properties and many animal holdings were under military control for significant periods. This military presence impeded civilian agencies' ability to exercise control, secure the herds, or preserve evidence of movement and mortality. The net effect was prolonged ambiguity over authority and the physical security of animals.
110. The Committee received evidence that participants at the 24th to 30th December 2017 valuation and tagging exercise included five GLMA personnel, along with several members of the Commission's Secretariat, one Sheriff Bah from the Office of the Sheriff, and several private livestock dealers who were invited to assist, including Abubacarr Korta and Buba Konta. Evidence provided by GLMA alluded to operational challenges faced due to limited capacity, which was a result of the Agency lacking functioning scales and professional valuation equipment. The Committee received evidence that private dealers were used to estimate the value of the cattle.
111. In his testimony, Mr. Mamadi Kurang informed the Committee that the valuation exercise undertaken by the Commission relied almost entirely on visual estimation, which he described as "eyeballing" and categorisation by size.
112. The cattle were grouped into different stalls, mostly based on size and categories such as "small", "medium", "large", and "extra-large", and assigned a flat price per group or a price per kilogram estimated from visual weight multiplied by a meat-price rate provided by GLMA. No functioning scales were used. GLMA personnel repeatedly insisted before the Committee that weighing of the cattle was not impractical in the field and that existing scales procured in 2011 by the Agency were non-functional at the time of the exercise.
113. In his evidence, Mr. Kurang provided the Committee with an alleged valuation report of the exercise the Commission undertook jointly with GLMA. The said report is neither dated nor signed. The purported report of the exercise was simply a tabulation of identified cattle with tags, type of livestock, sex, their estimated weight, prices, and their locations as demonstrated in the table below:

SERIAL NO.	TAG NUMBER	TYPE OF LIVESTOCK	SEX	ESTIMATE D WEIGHT/K G	PRICE RANGE	LOCATION
1.	1768	Cow	Female	40	7200	Kanilai

114. Aside from the tabulation illustrated above, the report was not accompanied by any explanatory text. It was not clear to the Committee when the report was prepared. However, the Committee received evidence that via an email dated 29th December 2017, Mrs. Bensouda requested Mr Kurang to "provide the list and valuation of the tagged animals". In response via an email dated the 8th day of January 2018, Mr. Kurang forwarded the "details of the tagging and valuation exercise

conducted in collaboration with the Registrar of Companies and Livestock Marketing (referring to GLMA).”

115. In the same email, Mr. Kurang gave the following summary:

- (a) “4 days in Kanilai recorded 558 cattle @ D9,784,980 (Nine million seven hundred and eighty-four thousand nine hundred and eight dalasi)
- (b) 1 day in Farato recorded 59 cattle valued @ D920,700 (Nine hundred and twenty thousand seven hundred dalasi)
- (c) The team only managed a head count at Banjulinding of 25 cattle, tagging could not be done as the range was bushy and cattle could not be.... [text missing].”

116. Even though Mr. Kurang’s email suggested the tagging and valuation exercise in Kanilai was completed, Mr. Ebrima Cham, the then Deputy Director of GLMA, informed the Committee that the tagging exercise in Kanilai could not be completed due to the hostility of the animals because they were left to roam freely, and the lack of adequate logistical arrangements. For those reasons, as Mr. Cham testified, the valuation team decided to divide the livestock into different herds and categorised them based on their size.

117. The Committee observes that from Mr. Kurang’s email, a total of 642 cattle were recorded for the three farms, i.e., Kanilai, Farato, and Banjulinding. The Committee equally observes that only cattle were recorded and reported in the exercise. Other breeds of livestock, such as goats, sheep, and ducks, among others, were not included in the inventory.

118. The Committee further observes from the valuation report that different breeds of cattle were not identified, even though Mr. Cham testified that the cattle were not of the same breed. Equally, as concerns the weight and the estimated pricing of the cattle, there were implausible entries in the report that the Committee found to be grossly unreliable¹¹. When Mr. Cham was confronted with the figures of the exercise, he vehemently refuted their accuracy.

119. The Committee observes that several cattle were reported to weigh between 8 and 60kg, and only as high as 200 to 250kg. The Committee finds these figures unconvincing. A total of 643 cattle were reportedly weighed for 5115kg, and the price amounted to D920,700.00. The Committee finds these figures to be unreliable.

SALES PROCESS

120. The High Court Order, dated 3rd January 2018, gave the Sheriff of the High Court the legal responsibility to conduct the sales of the livestock. Normal sales procedures by the Sheriff require that the sales should be advertised (as appropriate), conducted with transparency, documented in a sales return/register, and the proceeds should be banked under controlled signatory arrangements.

121. Witness testimony and documentary review reveal several material irregularities, including:

¹¹ MoJ 8F

- (a) The absence of public advertisement of the auction in the ordinary channels; the sale did not follow regular notification protocols.
- (b) Operational control on the ground was effectively exercised by private actors and the Registrar General; the Office of the Sheriff ceded operational mechanics to personnel who lacked legal authority to run the auction.
- (c) Sales were conducted irregularly by Mr. Alieu Jallow without lawful authority. Mr. Jallow unlawfully conducted a valuation and set prices far below market value. Mr. Jallow also allowed Mr. Amadou Kora to participate in conducting the sales by assisting in determining the values of the cattle without authority.
- (d) Sales frequently used spot pricing and offline bargaining rather than open competitive bidding tied to a valuation.
- (e) The committee noted that cash proceeds were collected in the field, placed in a physical iron briefcase, and disbursed or banked with delay; receipts issued were handwritten payment tickets rather than formal sales receipts.
- (f) The committee found that there was no reliable buyer register; the number of animals sold does not reconcile with the number purportedly valued and tagged; deposits to the banking account do not reconcile with cash tallies noted in field receipts.
- (g) Acknowledgement of receipt of payment was documented on an A4-size paper issued to buyers to serve as proof of payment, which at some point was stopped because, according to Justice Tabally's testimony, they ran out of paper.

122. Procedural mechanisms that the Sheriff's Office ought to have followed, such as independent verification of numbers, use of valuation thresholds, retention of buyer details, immediate banking, and use of GTR Receipts, were not followed. The Sheriff signed off sales returns without reconciling field records or subjecting them to forensic verification. The then Sheriff of the High Court, Honourable Justice Sheriff B. Tabally, accepted full responsibility for procedural failures, including lack of valuation, absence of advertisement, and inadequate interagency coordination. He expressed regret for the deviations from proper procedure.

123. The Committee finds that the sale deviated materially from statutory auction and sale protocols. The combination of informal cash handling, lack of advertisement, presence of interested private parties running operations, and defective record-keeping created a high risk of undervaluation.

POST-SALE: PROCEEDS, RECONCILIATION, AND LOSSES

124. After the sale, neither the Jannah Commission nor GLMA received a comprehensive, verifiable report reconciling the animals tagged/valued, animals delivered to the auction ground, animals sold, and proceeds collected and banked. The Sheriff never provided a final reconciled report to the Commission. Banking records show transfers to a dedicated account established for sale proceeds.

125. Given the difference between the initial livestock count (1,476–3,456) and the final valuation count (516–724), and with approximately 400 animals allegedly slaughtered during the impasse, there

remain substantial unaccounted losses. Some animals appear to have been moved clandestinely, slaughtered without lawful authority, or otherwise lost without an administrative record. The absence of a national livestock register or traceability system compounded the inability to reconcile.

126. Due to informal field cash handling and lack of complete sales return documentation, the Committee could not reliably confirm the total proceeds generated from the sales, whether all proceeds were fully banked, or whether sale receipts were attributed to the correct animals and buyers. This undermines any straightforward path to financial recovery without a forensic audit.
127. From the foregoing, the absence of a coherent post-sale reconciliation, coupled with missing livestock and informal cash practices, prevented accountability for sale proceeds and made asset recovery extremely difficult.

ANALYSIS OF THE CATTLE SALES RECORDS

128. A review of the cattle sales records by the Committee reveals significant numerical inconsistencies and gaps that call into question the accuracy and reliability of the livestock disposal process. According to the Sales of Livestock Report, a total of 725 cattle were reportedly sold across the three farms: Kanilai, Farato, and Banjulinding. However, when the individual farm figures are aggregated, 625 cattle at Kanilai, 67 at Farato, and 32 at Banjulinding, the total amounts to 724 cattle, leaving an unexplained discrepancy of one cattle. Although numerically minor, this inconsistency is indicative of the broader issues of poor record-keeping and unreliable reconciliation of cattle inventories during the sales process.
129. In monetary terms, the Committee noted that the records state that the cattle sales generated D8,302,000.00, which was deposited into the Trust Bank account designated under the court order for proceeds relating to former President Jammeh's assets. However, the bank statement reflects a total deposit of D8,303,000, resulting in a difference of D1,000. While this may be attributable to a clerical or inputting error, it nevertheless underscores the broader systemic problem of incomplete financial reconciliation and the absence of a verifiable audit trail for proceeds collected during the auctions.
130. More concerning discrepancies arise in relation to the Kanilai sales figures. In the matter of *The State vs. Yahya A. J. J. Jammeh*, the Kanilai sales record reflect that 445 cattle were sold. Yet the Livestock Report claims that 625 cattle were disposed of at Kanilai. This indicates a substantial discrepancy of 180 cattle unaccounted for, with no documented explanation for the variance. Such a gap not only raises questions about the accuracy of the inventory but also opens the possibility of unrecorded sales, misappropriation, or loss of cattle prior to or during the auction. The total proceeds from the cattle sales in Kanilai amounted to D6,102,000.00 as per the records submitted to the Committee (Exhibit MOJ 8F).
131. Furthermore, the analysis could not extend to the Farato and Banjulinding farms beyond numerical comparisons. This is due to the fact that bank statements and detailed sales records for these two locations were not included in the document submitted to the Committee. As a result, the financial

integrity, pricing, valuation, and reconciliation of sales from these farms remain unverifiable. Their omission further demonstrates the fragmented and incomplete documentation practices that characterised the livestock disposal process.

- 132.** Overall, the Committee finds that the numerical inconsistencies, missing bank documentation, and unexplained variances, particularly the large discrepancy in the Kanilai cattle, demonstrate systemic lapses in inventory management, accounting transparency, and procedural compliance. These findings reflect broader deficiencies in the administration and oversight of the livestock sales under the High Court Order. The Committee highlights the need for comprehensive forensic reconciliation to establish the true number of cattle sold and the actual proceeds that should have accrued to the State.
- 133.** Further compounding the concerns regarding the integrity of the livestock sales is an internal memo dated the 30th day of November 2023 (Exhibit OHS 12) from Honourable Justice Sheriff B. Tabally to the Judicial Secretary, shedding light on the subsequent handling of the auction proceeds. The memo reveals that Mr. D. Binga Esq, the then Director of Civil Litigation at the Ministry of Justice, requested the details of the auction and its proceeds from Honourable Justice Sheriff B. Tabally. Honourable Justice Sheriff B. Tabally provided the bank details via text message.
- 134.** According to the memo, D. Binga Esq. then informed Honourable Justice Sheriff B. Tabally that he had instructed the bank to transfer the entire funds to a designated account, acting on the instructions of his superior. Subsequently, Honourable Justice Sheriff B. Tabally received a text alert from the bank indicating that all funds, including the principal and accrued interest, had been moved or withdrawn from the account.
- 135.** This chain of events raises serious questions about the security and proper management of the funds, especially considering the pre-existing issues of incomplete documentation and questionable inventory control. The Committee notes that transfer of the auction proceeds further undermines the transparency and accountability of the entire process, necessitating a thorough investigation into the whereabouts and ultimate disposition of the funds.
- 136.** Below is the Committee's attribution of responsibility and recommended actions, drawing on testimony and documentary evidence.
- 137.** Sheriff B. Tabally, then Sheriff of the High Court - Primary responsibility: The Sheriff had the legal duty to execute the High Court Order with procedural safeguards in accordance with the section 6,7 and 8 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, and the Public Finance Act 2014, Financial Regulation 2009. Testimony shows failure to advertise, failure to secure transparent bidding, improper custody of proceeds, failure to reconcile numbers, and allowing unauthorised persons to manage sales. Based on a report submitted to the Committee, the following are the persons who purchased the cattle belonging to the former President:

RECORD OF SALES IN THE MATTER OF THE STATE Vs. YAHYA AJJ JAMMEH (KANILAI FARM)

No.	Date	Names	Address	Description	Qty	Amount (D)
1	30-1-18	Alhagie Ceesay	Brikama	2 cows 1 calf	3	36,000.00
2	30-1-18	Ida Njie	Abuko	1 calf	1	2,000.00
3	30-1-18	Amadou Manneh	Manjai	6 cows	6	64,000.00
4	30-1-18	Momodou Sowe	Abuko	1 small cow	1	5,000.00
5	30-1-18	Momodou Ceesay	Abuko	1 cow 1 calf	2	14,000.00
6	30-1-28	Abubacarr B. Korta	Brikama	2 bulls 5 cows	7	105,000.00
7	30-1-18	Buba Darboe	Brikama	2 cows	2	27,000.00
8	30-1-18	Alhagie Sowe	Abuko	1 small cow	1	11,000.00
9	30-1-18	Baboucarr Njie	Salagi	3 calves	3	8,000.00
10	30-1-18	Alh. Madike Jallow	Abuko	2 calves	2	32,000.00
11	30-1-18	Alpha Barry	Abuko	3 bulls	3	30,000.00
12	30-1-18	Momodou Ceeay	Abuko	2 calves	2	7,000.00
13	30-1-18	Amadou Jallow	Sukuta	3 cows	3	48,000.00
14	30-1-18	Babucarr Njie	Salagi	2 cows 1 calf	3	33,000.00
15	30-1-18	Samba Sowe	Abuko	1 small bull	1	13,000.00
16	30-1-18	Kebba Danso	Bakoteh	2 bulls 2 cows	4	68,000.00
17	30-1-18	Musa Yorke	Jambur Madina	1 small cow 1 small	2	11,000.00
18	30-1-18	Peace Trading	Tallinding	2 cows 1 calf	3	33,000.00
19	30-1-18	Demba Jallow	Abuko	4 calves	4	11,000.00
20	30-1-18	Alhagie Sowe	Abuko	1 small cow 1 small bull	2	33,000.00
21	30-1-18	Amadou Jallow	Sukuta	1 cow	1	14,000.00
22	30-1-18	ALH. Madike Jallow	Abuko	1 cow	1	13,000.00
23	30-1-18	Peace Trading	Tallinding	3 cows 1 calf	4	45,000.00
24	30-1-18	Musa Yorke	Jambur Medina	1 Small bull	1	3,000.00

RECORD OF SALES — KANILAI FARM (23-01-2018)

No	Date	Name	Location	Description	Qty	Amount	Total
1	23-1-18	Kisima Tambadou	Kanifing	2 cows	2	D24,000.00	D24,000.00
2	23-1-18	Madika Jallow	Abuko	1 cow	1	D12,000.00	D12,000.00
3	23-1-18	Abubacarr Korta	Brikama	1 small sickly cow	1	D12,000.00	D12,000.00
4	23-1-18	Muhammed Dem	Fass Tabai	1 calf	1	D12,000.00	D12,000.00
5	23-1-18	Abubacarr Korta	Brikama	2 cows	2	D24,000.00	D24,000.00
6	23-1-18	Tammeh Sowe	Abuko	1 small cow	1	D12,000.00	D12,000.00
7	23-1-18	Omar Mbakeh	Abuko	2 bulls	2	D24,000.00	D24,000.00
8	23-1-18	Musa Sowe	Sibanour	30 cows	30	D360,000.00	D360,000.00
9	23-1-18	Babucarr Dem	Abuko	2 cows 2 calves	4	D48,000.00	D48,000.00
10	23-1-18	Madike Jallow	Abuko	1 cow 1 calf	2	D24,000.00	D24,000.00
11	23-1-18	Abubacarr Korta	Brikama	2 cows 1 calf	3	D36,000.00	D36,000.00
12	23-1-18	Alhagie Sowe	Abuko	2 small bull	2	D24,000.00	D24,000.00
13	23-1-18	Alhagie Sowe	Abuko	1 cow 1 bull	2	D24,000.00	D24,000.00
14	23-1-18	Dorro Bah	Abuko	1 cow	1	D12,000.00	D12,000.00

15	23-1-18	Momodou Ceesay	Abuko	2 bulls	2	D24,000.00	D24,000.00
16	23-1-18	Samba Bah	Abuko	1 bull	1	D12,000.00	D12,000.00
17	23-1-18	Alhagie Gorgi Sey	Abuko	1 bull	1	D12,000.00	D12,000.00
18	23-1-18	Alhagie Ceesay	Brikama	1 bull	1	D12,000.00	D12,000.00
19	23-1-18	Abdoulie Jallow	Abuko	2 small bull	2	D24,000.00	D24,000.00
20	23-1-18	Amat Tijan Kandeh	Abuko	1 small bull 1 small cow	2	D20,000.00	D20,000.00
21	23-1-18	Peace Trading	Tallinding	2 cows 3 calves	5	D91,000.00	D91,000.00
22	23-1-18	Lamin Camara	Marakisa	2 small cow	2	D6,000.00	D6,000.00
23	23-1-18	Amat Tijan Kandeh	Abuko	1 cow	1	D16,000.00	D16,000.00
24	23-1-18	Foday Jawo	Maninabah	2 small cow	2	D10,000.00	D10,000.00
25	23-1-18	Njie Dampha	Jarra Soma	1 cow	1	D11,000.00	D11,000.00
26	23-1-18	Yaya Barry	Abuko	1 small	1	D18,000.00	D18,000.00
27	23-1-18	Njie Dampha	Jarra Soma	1 cow	1	D11,000.00	D11,000.00
28	23-1-18	Yaya Barry	Abuko	1 small	1	D18,000.00	D18,000.00

**RECORD OF SALES IN THE MATTER OF THE STATE VS. YAHYA A.J.J JAMMEH
(KANILAI FARM) - DATE: 17/01/2018**

No.	Date	Name	Location	Description	Qty	Amount	Total
1.	17-1-18	Lamin Sonko	Banjulinding	2 Small Bulls	2	D12,000.00	D12,000.00

2.	17-1-18	Momodou Sowe	Abuko	2 Small Cows	2	D20,000.00	D20,000.00
3.	17-1-18	Alhagie Sowe	Abuko	1 Small Cow	1	D6,000.00	D6,000.00
4.	17-1-18	Mamma Manneh	Tumara	1 Bulls	1	D23,000.00	D23,000.00
5.	17-1-18	Kissima Tambadu	Sukuta	2 Cows 2 Calves	4	D40,000.00	D40,000.00
6.	17-1-18	Abdoulie Jallow	Abuko	1 Cow	1	D14,000.00	D14,000.00
7.	17-1-18	Saidou Sowe	Abuko	1 Cow	1	D14,000.00	D14,000.00
8.	17-1-18	Alhagie Leigh	Abuko	1 Small Bull	1	D12,000.00	D12,000.00
9.	17-1-18	Modou Gaye	Jallow Kunda	1 Small Cow	1	D18,000.00	D18,000.00
10.	17-1-18	Muhammed Sillah	Kanifing	1 Cow 1 Small Cow	2	D25,000.00	D25,000.00
11.	17-1-18	Lamin Sonko	Banjulinding	1 Calf	1	D6,000.00	D6,000.00
12.	17-1-18	Modou Jallow	Abuko	1 Small Cow	1	D10,000.00	D10,000.00
13.	17-1-18	Pa Modou Ndong	Latrikunda	2 sickly calves	2	D6,000.00	D6,000.00
14.	17-1-18	Alh Momodou Njie	Brufut	1 sickly cow	1	D10,000.00	D10,000.00
15.	17-1-18	Alhagie Jeng	Abuko	1 cow 2 bulls	3	D83,000.00	D83,000.00
16.	17-1-18	Demba Jallow	Abuko	1 Bull	1	D30,000.00	D30,000.00
17.	17-1-18	Alh. Gorgi Sey	Abuko	1 bull 1 cow	2	D35,000.00	D35,000.00
18.	17-1-18	Ida Njie	Abuko	2 Small Bulls	2	D28,000.00	D28,000.00
19.	17-1-18	Alieu Jawo	Dewury	1 small cow 1 small bull	2	D16,000.00	D16,000.00
20.	17-1-18	Alhagie Samba Bah	Kaur	1 bull 1 cow	2	D32,000.00	D32,000.00
21.	17-1-18	Yaya Jallow	Taaokoto	2 F cow	2	D31,000.00	D31,000.00
22.	17-1-18	Muhammed Sillah	Kanifing	2 cows, 3 small cows	5	D62,000.00	D62,000.00
23.	17-1-18	Alfusaney Minteh	Old Jeswang	1 bull 1 small	2	D31,000.00	D31,000.00

				cow			
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**RECORD OF SALES IN THE MATTER OF THE STATE VS. YAHYA AJJ JAMMEH
(KANILAI FARM)**

No.	Date	Name	Nil	Different	Qty	Amount (D)	Amount (D)
1	10-1-18	Musa Sow	Nil	Different	94	D13,000.00	D1,500,000.00
2	10-1-18	Alh. Modou Cham	"	"	60	D960,000.00	D960,000.00
3	10-1-18	Alhajie Jeng	"	4 F Cows	4	D32,000.00	D32,000.00
4	10-1-18	Abdoulie Jallow	"	2 F Cows	2	D32,000.00	D32,000.00
5	10-1-18	Samba Kandeh	"	1 bull	1	D27,000.00	D27,000.00
6	10-1-18	Faburama Fadera	"	3 bulls	3	D60,000.00	D60,000.00
7	10-1-18	Musa Sogur	"	4 F Cows	4	D40,000.00	D40,000.00
8	10-1-18	Abdoulie Jallow	"	2 F Cows	2	D20,000.00	D20,000.00
9	10-1-18	Cherno Jallow	"	2 F Cows	2	D30,000.00	D30,000.00
10	10-1-18	Mamading Fatty	"	1 F Cow	1	D14,000.00	D14,000.00
11	10-1-18	Faburama Fadera	"	2 F Cows	2	D28,000.00	D28,000.00
12	10-1-18	Pa Camara	"	1 F Cow	1	D20,000.00	D20,000.00
13	10-1-18	Musa Sogur	"	1 bull	1	D30,000.00	D30,000.00
14	10-1-18	Alagie Jeng	"	4 F Cows	4	D60,000.00	D60,000.00

15	10-1-18	Faburama Fadera	"	1 F Cow	1	D15,000.00	D15,000.00
16	10-1-18	Ansumana S. Singhateh	"	2 Small Cows	2	D10,000.00	D10,000.00
17	10-1-18	Musa Sogur	"	1 F Cow	1	D15,000.00	D15,000.00
18	10-1-18	Alfusainey Minteh	"	3 F Cows	3	D45,000.00	D45,000.00
19	10-1-18	Pa Modou Sowe	"	1 Cow 1 Calf	2	D38,000.00	D38,000.00
28	10-1-18	Musa Sow	"	11 Calves	11	D10,000.00	D10,000.00

**RECORD OF SALES IN THE MATTER OF THE STATE Vs. YAHYA AJJ JAMMEH
(KANILAI FARM)**

No.	Date	Name	Address	Description	Qty	Amount (D)	Total (D)
1	30-1-18	Alhagie Ceesay	Brikama	2 cows 1 calf	3	36,000.00	36,000.00
2	30-1-18	Ida Njie	Abuko	1 calf	1	2,000.00	2,000.00
3	30-1-18	Amadou Manneh	Manjai	6 cows	6	64,000.00	64,000.00
4	30-1-18	Momodou Sowe	Abuko	1 small cow	1	5,000.00	5,000.00
5	30-1-18	Momodou Ceesay	Abuko	1 cow 1 calf	2	14,000.00	14,000.00
6	30-1-28	Abubacarr B. Korta	Brikama	2 bulls 5 cows	7	105,000.00	105,000.00
7	30-1-18	Buba Darboe	Brikama	2 cows	2	27,000.00	27,000.00
8	30-1-18	Alhagie Sowe	Abuko	1 small cow	1	11,000.00	11,000.00
9	30-1-18	Baboucarr Njie	Salagi	3 calves	3	8,000.00	8,000.00
10	30-1-18	Alh. Madike Jallow	Abuko	2 calves	2	32,000.00	32,000.00
11	30-1-18	Alpha Barry	Abuko	3 bulls	3	30,000.00	30,000.00
12	30-1-18	Momodou Ceeay	Abuko	2 calves	2	7,000.00	7,000.00

13	30-1-18	Amadou Jallow	Sukuta	3 cows	3	48,000.00	48,000.00
14	30-1-18	Babucarr Njie	Salagi	2 cows 1 calf	3	33,000.00	33,000.00
15	30-1-18	Samba Sowe	Abuko	1 small bull	1	13,000.00	13,000.00
16	30-1-18	Kebba Danso	Bakoteh	2 bulls 2 cows	4	68,000.00	68,000.00
17	30-1-18	Musa Yorke	Jambur Madina	1 small cow 1 small	2	11,000.00	11,000.00
18	30-1-18	Peace Trading	Tallinding	2 cows 1 calf	3	33,000.00	33,000.00
19	30-1-18	Demba Jallow	Abuko	4 calves	4	11,000.00	11,000.00
20	30-1-18	Alhagie Sowe	Abuko	1 small cow 1 small bull	2	33,000.00	33,000.00
21	30-1-18	Amadou Jallow	Sukuta	1 cow	1	14,000.00	14,000.00
22	30-1-18	ALH. Madike Jallow	Abuko	1 cow	1	13,000.00	13,000.00
23	30-1-18	Peace Trading	Tallinding	3 cows 1 calf	4	45,000.00	45,000.00
24	30-1-18	Musa Yorke	Jambur Medina	1 Small bull	1	3,000.00	3,000.00

OBSERVATIONS

138. The Committee observes from the evidence received regarding the cattle sale records transactions that the sales were conducted on four separate dates across multiple farm locations:

- (a) January 10, 2018 (Banjulinding) - 20 recorded transactions
- (b) January 17, 2018 (Farato Farm) - 23 recorded transactions
- (c) January 23, 2018 (Kanilai Farm) - 28 recorded transactions
- (d) January 30, 2018 (Kanilai Farm) - 24 recorded transactions

139. The Committee notes with concern that the documentation provided to it is incomplete and contains numerous errors that fundamentally undermine its reliability as an accurate record of State asset disposal. Evidence before the Committee shows that the several requests for information on the sales by investigative journalists and rights groups triggered the Solicitor General and Legal Secretary to write to the Judicial Secretary, via a letter dated 29th November, 2023, reference AG/C/364/01 Part (4) (AD), to ‘request for a report on the sale of some of the assets forfeited during the proceedings of the Janneh Commission’. In response, the Office of the Chief Justice, via the Judicial Secretary, wrote to the Solicitor General on the 4th day of December, 2023, letter referenced ZE 48/89/01 TMP (177), informing that “following your request, a report is being prepared and will be submitted to you in due course”. The Committee notes, therefore, that at the

time of the request, a report of the sale had not been written, almost four years after the sale took place. Thus, the Committee finds this report to have been prepared retrospectively, in anticipation of demands for accountability in the sale of the livestock belonging to the former President.

THE JANUARY 10, 2018, BANJULINDING SALE

- 140.** The Committee finds that one of the most apparent irregularities in the entire cattle sale documentation appears in the January 10, 2018, Banjulinding sale record. Entry No. 1 records the following transaction:
- (a)** Buyer: Musa Sow
 - (b)** Quantity: 94 cattle
 - (c)** Listed Amount: D13,000.00
 - (d)** Listed Total: D1,504,000.00
- 141.** This entry presented many questions to which the Committee could not find satisfactory answers, thus making it impossible for the Committee to reconcile with any legitimate transaction, as demonstrated below.
- 142.** If 94 cattle were sold for a total of D1,504,000.00, the unit price per animal would be D15,957.45 per head. However, the "Amount" column lists D13,000.00 per head. In addition, the Committee observes that the report does not explain the meaning of the dual "Amount" columns. For example, if the D13,000.00 represents a per-unit price (which would be the only logical interpretation that brings it closer to market rates), then $94 \text{ cattle} \times D13,000.00 = D1,222,000.00$, D1,504,000.00 as recorded in the Report. A discrepancy of D278,000.00 exists between the calculated total and the recorded total; a difference that would ordinarily represent the value of approximately 18-21 additional cattle at market rates. This difference implies that cattle were sold at varying prices, and further shows inaccuracies in the sales report.
- 143.** The Banjulinding sale record includes two unusual columns titled "Nil" and "Different." Entry No. 1 lists both as "Nil" and "Different" for Musa Sow's purchase, while subsequent entries use ditto marks ("") suggesting "same as above." The Committee received no explanation of what these columns signify. However, it suggests that this transaction may have involved different classes or breeds of cattle not separately itemized, different pricing structures not reflected in the totals, or different terms or conditions not disclosed in the documentation. The Committee finds that the largest single transaction in the entire disposal process is that of the 94 heads of cattle, allegedly amounting to D1,504,000.00.
- 144.** Entry No. 2 in the same Banjulinding sale presents a similar pattern, this time involving one Alh. Modou Cham, who is recorded to have transacted as follows:
- (a)** Buyer: Alh. Modou Cham
 - (b)** Quantity: 60 cattle
 - (c)** Listed Amount: D960,000.00

(d) Listed Total: D960,000.00

145. The Amount and Total columns are identical, suggesting that D960,000.00 represents the total price for 60 cattle, which, if divided by 60, equals D16,000.00 per head. This pricing is different from Musa Sow’s transaction. The D960,000.00 price represents yet another pricing structure, making it evident to the Committee that no consistent pricing methodology was applied across transactions in the sale of the livestock. That different cattle were valued at wildly different rates without any justification, and the prices seemingly arbitrarily assigned without reference to actual market values.

146. The remaining 18 entries in the January 10, 2018 Banjulinding sale show small purchases ranging from 1-4 cattle each, with prices that are still below market price but in some cases, appear to be more reasonable: For example,

- (a) 4 F Cows were sold for D32,000.00, averaging D8,000 per head
- (b) 2 F Cows were sold for D32,000.00, averaging D16,000 per head
- (c) 1 Bull sold for D27,000.00
- (d) 3 Bull sold for D60,000.00, averaging D20,000 per head, and
- (e) 4 F Cows sold for D40,000.00, averaging D10,000 per head.

147. The Committee attempted to establish rational pricing patterns across all four sale dates and found that no consistent valuation methodology was applied. The following table illustrates the extreme variations in pricing for ostensibly similar animals:

BULLS	
Lowest price:	D3,000 (30-Jan, Musa Yorke, 1 small bull)
Highest price:	D30,000 (10-Jan, Musa Sogur, 1 bull; 17-Jan, Demba Jallow, 1 bull)
Price variation:	1,000% (10-fold difference)
COWS	
Lowest implied price:	D138.30 per head (if 10-Jan, Musa Sow calculation is based on D13,000/94)
Highest single cow price	D20,000 (10-Jan, Pa Camara, 1 F Cow)
Most common range	D10,000 - D16,000
Price variation	14,469% (145-fold difference from lowest to highest)
SMALL COWS	
Range	D5,000 (30-Jan, Momodou Sowe) to D18,000 (17-Jan, Modou Gaye)
Price variation	260%
CALVES	
Range:	D2,000 (30-Jan, Ida Njie, 1 calf) to D16,000 per calf implied (23-Jan, Muhammed Dem, 1 calf sold for D12,000, but calves elsewhere sold in batches at higher per-unit rates.

- 148.** The documentation does not explain these massive price variations. The Committee notes that legitimate livestock sales typically employ standardized valuation criteria, including the following, which the former Technical Director of GLMA, Mr. Cham, accepted:
- (a) Breed, different cattle breeds command different prices
 - (b) Age - Mature animals vs. young stock vs. calves
 - (c) Sex - Bulls typically command premium prices
 - (d) Weight - The primary determinant of cattle value
 - (e) Health status - Sick or injured animals sell at discounts
 - (f) Reproductive status - Pregnant cows, breeding bulls command premiums
- 149.** The sale report contains virtually no information on any of these factors, except for occasional designation of "small" cattle (suggesting either young age or small breed), and two instances of "sickly" animals (17-Jan: "2 sickly calves" and "1 sickly cow"). Therefore, the Committee finds it incomprehensible that livestock sales of this magnitude, involving hundreds of cattle worth millions of dalasi, would be conducted without veterinary health certificates, weight measurements or estimates, breed identification, age, or standardized pricing matrices. The Committee is of the view that the absence of this basic information, combined with the extreme price variations observed, shows that prices were likely to have been deliberately suppressed, and arbitrary sales conducted to benefit certain purchasers.
- 150.** The Committee further observes that the largest volume purchases received the lowest per-unit prices, which is contrary to typical livestock market dynamics where bulk purchases often command premiums (not discounts) because they provide immediate liquidity to sellers.
- 151.** On January 23, 2018, Musa Sow purchased 30 cows for D360,000, at a cost of D12,000 per head. Other single cow purchases made on the same day cost between D12,000 to D16,000 per head. It is the Committee's observation that this inverted pricing structure, where buying in bulk yielded lower per-unit costs, suggests either deliberate preferential pricing for large-volume buyers or a corrupt arrangement whereby larger bribes or kickbacks enabled larger discounts.
- 152.** The Committee cannot reconcile what logical pricing rates were applied to these transactions. The Committee can only conclude that these transactions were either fraudulently documented to conceal the actual prices paid, or conducted at prices so far below market value as to constitute a de facto gift of State assets to certain purchasers whose true identities are not ascertained.
- 153.** The Committee also identified numerous individuals who made multiple purchases across different sale dates, as shown below:

Purchaser Name (Location)	Date	Animals Purchased	Number of Animals	Price (Dalasi)
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ABUBACARR KORTA (BRIKAMA)				
	30-Jan	2 bulls + 5 cows	7	105,000
	23-Jan	1 small sickly cow	1	12,000
	23-Jan	2 cows	2	24,000
	23-Jan	2 cows + 1 calf	3	36,000
	Total		13	177,000
ALHAGIE SOWE (ABUKO)				
	30-Jan	1 small cow	1	11,000
	30-Jan	1 small cow + 1 small bull	2	33,000
	17-Jan	1 small cow	1	6,000
	23-Jan	2 small bulls	2	24,000
	23-Jan	1 cow + 1 bull	2	24,000
	Total		7	98,000
AMADOU JALLOW (SUKUTA)				
	30-Jan	3 cows	3	48,000
	30-Jan	1 cow	1	14,000
	Total		4	62,000
MADIKE JALLOW / ALH. MADIKE JALLOW (ABUKO)				
	30-Jan	2 calves	2	32,000
	30-Jan	1 cow	1	13,000
	23-Jan	1 cow	1	12,000
	23-Jan	1 cow + 1 calf	2	24,000
	Total		6	81,000
PEACE TRADING (TALLINDING)				
	30-Jan	2 cows + 1 calf	3	33,000
	30-Jan	3 cows + 1 calf	4	45,000
	23-Jan	2 cows + 3 calves	5	91,000
	Total		12	169,000
MUSA YORKE (JAMBUR MADINA/MEDINA)				
	30-Jan	1 small cow + 1 small [animal]	2	11,000
	30-Jan	1 small bull	1	3,000
	Total		3	14,000
ABDOULIE JALLOW (ABUKO)				
	17-Jan	1 cow	1	14,000

	10-Jan	2 F cows	2	32,000
	10-Jan	2 F cows	2	20,000
	23-Jan	2 small bulls	2	24,000
	Total		7	90,000
FABURAMA FADERA				
	10-Jan	3 bulls	3	60,000
	10-Jan	2 F cows	2	28,000
	10-Jan	1 F cow	1	15,000
	Total		6	103,000
MUSA SOGUR				
	10-Jan	4 F cows	4	40,000
	10-Jan	1 bull	1	30,000
	10-Jan	1 F cow	1	15,000
	Total		6	85,000
MUHAMMED SILLAH (KANIFING)				
	17-Jan	1 cow + 1 small cow	2	25,000
	17-Jan	2 cows + 3 small cows	5	62,000
	Total		7	87,000
ALHAGIE JENG (ABUKO)				
	17-Jan	1 cow + 2 bulls	3	83,000
	10-Jan	4 F cows	4	32,000
	14-Jan	4 F cows	4	60,000
	Total		11	175,000
LAMIN SONKO (BANJULINDING)				
	17-Jan	2 small bulls	2	12,000
	17-Jan	1 calf	1	6,000
	Total		3	18,000
MOMODOU SOWE (ABUKO)				
	30-Jan	1 small cow	1	5,000
	17-Jan	2 small cows	2	20,000
	Total		3	25,000
IDA NJIE (ABUKO)				
	30-Jan	1 calf	1	2,000
	17-Jan	2 small bulls	2	28,000
	Total		3	30,000
		GRAND TOTAL	94	1,214,000

154. The Committee finds that the majority of repeat buyers are from Abuko or nearby areas (Brikama, Tallinding, Sukuta). It is therefore evident that sales were not adequately publicized to limit

competition to a local network and give preferential treatment to certain buyers. This view is supported by the fact that 6 out of the 14 repeat buyers identified above are from Abuko alone.

- 155.** The Committee notes with particular concern that the name "Musa Sow" appears multiple times in the documentation:
 - (a)** 10-Jan-2018 (Banjulinding): Musa Sow purchased 94 cattle for D1,500,000 (entry 1)
 - (b)** 10-Jan-2018 (Banjulinding): Musa Sow purchased 11 calves for D10,000 (entry 28)
 - (c)** 23-Jan-2018 (Kanilai): Musa Sowe (different spelling) from Sibanor purchased 30 cows for D360,000 (entry 8)
- 156.** The Committee has not been able to determine with certainty whether these entries represent the same individual making multiple large purchases, different individuals with the same or similar names, or a single individual deliberately using slight name variations to obscure the total value of purchases.
- 157.** If these are the same individual, then "Musa Sow/Sowe" acquired 135 animals for D1,870,000. This would represent by far the largest concentration of purchases by any single buyer, accounting for approximately 13-15% of all cattle sold across all four sale dates.
- 158.** The Committee notes that the sale records are deficient in numerous respects critical to establishing a proper audit trail. For example, the information does not include national identification numbers or other identity verification, vague addresses, no phone numbers or other contact information, nor was there any signature or thumbprint evidence that buyers acknowledged receipt of purchased animals.
- 159.** Similarly, the Committee notes serious deficiencies in the payment method. For example, no payment method documentation (cash, check, bank transfer, etc.) was in place. Money was allegedly directly received from the purchasers and kept in a "safe" by officials of the Sheriff's Office, sometimes for several days before depositing the sum in the bank.
- 160.** No official receipts or invoices were issued to the buyers. It is the evidence of the former Sheriff of the High Court, Justice Tabally, and then Registrar of Companies, Mr. Alieu Jallow, that handwritten receipts were issued to some buyers before they ran out of "papers". There were no valuation reports or methodology, no photographic documentation, and no record of when animals were actually transferred to buyers
- 161.** The Committee equally observes several irregularities in the numbering of sale entries. In the January 17, 2018 (Farato Farm) entry, the numbering sequence runs 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, then restarts at 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. The Committee could not establish whether these were two separate sale sessions on the same day that were later combined into one record or a deliberate manipulation of the numbering to obscure the total number of transactions.

- 162.** The same could be noted in the January 10, 2018 (Banjulinding) sales. The sequence jumps from entry 19 to entry 28, skipping entries 20-27. No explanation is provided for this gap, which represents 8 missing entries.
- 163.** All of these support the Committee's findings that the report presented to it was prepared retrospectively, in anticipation of demands for accountability in the sale of the livestock belonging to the former President, and does not represent a complete and accurate record of all livestock sales conducted.
- 164.** The report contains signature blocks showing the following information:
- (a) Recorded By: Alagie Kassama (Bailiff)
 - (b) Witnessed by: Alieu Jallow Esq. (MOJ)
 - (c) Witnessed by: Tombong Jawo (SIS)
 - (d) Witnessed by: Seedy Fatty (Deputy Sheriff)
 - (e) Witnessed by: Modou Musa Ceesay (Bailiff)
 - (f) Endorsed by: Sheriff B. Tabally (Sheriff of The Gambia)
 - (g) Date: 10/1/18
- 165.** The Committee finds the date placed on the report as grossly misleading based on the fact that there is no record of the report in any file of the Sheriff's Office, whose officials purportedly prepared the report. Justice Tabally, the then Sheriff of the High Court, during testimony, also conceded that the report was prepared well after the sales were completed, and he was called upon to endorse the report.
- 166.** The Committee finds it particularly troubling that Mr. Alieu Jallow Esq. appears as a witness on the January 10th record even though, as the Acting Registrar General, he was responsible for coordinating the inventory of the former President's assets. His dual role as both the official responsible for assets inventory and a witness to sales of those same assets represents a clear conflict of interest and absence of proper separation of duties.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- 167.** The Committee recommends as follows:
- 1.** That the Hon. Justice Sheriff B. Tabally be referred to the Judicial Service Commission and to the IGP, respectively, for investigation and appropriate action for causing economic loss to the state, negligence and dereliction of duty, and for any other offence.
 - 2.** Alieu Jallow should be reprimanded for participating in the operations at the sale ground without a clear legal mandate, contributing to the breakdown in the official process, leading to irregularities.

3. That Alieu Jallow be referred to the appointing authority and to the IGP for investigation and appropriate action against him for economic loss to the state, and for any other offence.
4. That Mr. Ebrima Cham, the Chairperson of the Board of Directors of GLMA, be strongly reprimanded by his appointing authority for negligence and dereliction of duty.
5. That officers at the Sheriffs' Departments who took part in the sale, in particular, Seedy Fatty (Deputy Sheriff) and Modou Musa Ceesay (Bailiff), be subjected to administrative disciplinary action by the JSC, and criminal investigation by the Inspector General of the Police within 60 days of the report.
6. The Government should undertake a comprehensive investigation into the sale and disposal of cattle associated with former President Yahya AJJ Jammeh, including a thorough investigation of all individuals allegedly involved, notably Major Alieu Sowe, and Corporal Modou S. Bah.

WILDLIFE

168. Evidence received by the Committee shows that Kanilai Game Park hosted a wide range of exotic and indigenous wildlife, including Zebras, Elands, Hyenas, Crocodiles, Ostriches, Pythons, Tortoises, Bushbuck, a Camel, and Peacocks. Although it was a private facility belonging to the former President, it functioned largely outside the statutory oversight of the Department of Parks and Wildlife Management (DPWM) and was effectively controlled by military personnel, restricting access to civilians and DPWM staff.
169. The High Court Order dated the 22nd day of May 2017 directed several institutions to take custody and control of assets identified for the purpose of preservation. The Order expressly assigned custodial and execution functions to these institutions. As stated above, the Court Order placed all wildlife "in the control and custody of **"The Gambia Wildlife Services."** which does not exist; the appropriate statutory body is the Department of Parks & Wildlife Management (DPWM).
170. However, the Director of DPWM testified that they were not aware of the Court Order, but they took the initiative to take over the animals in Kanilai, because the issue of Wildlife is within their purview, and given the fact that they had either seen or heard reports that the animals in Kanilai were dying. Thus, DPWM did not formally gain access to the Wildlife because there was no formal change of custody of the wildlife, and no documented acceptance of custody by DPWM.
171. When DPWM eventually accessed the Park in early 2017, they found several species present, including zebras, elands, approximately twelve hyenas, over one hundred crocodiles, two pythons, and other local wildlife. Ostriches reported to have been in the park were missing and believed to have escaped, died, or been taken. The Department also encountered evidence of severe neglect: carcasses, malnourished animals, and an absence of any coordinated feeding programme.

- 172.** The surviving species required urgent veterinary care and feeding, which were not available in sufficient quantity or quality at the time. This confirms that the protective purpose of the Court Order was not achieved in practice. The deterioration and death of wildlife represent an irreversible loss to the State's biodiversity assets.
- 173.** Throughout this period, the Park remained under the control of military personnel, despite the statutory responsibility resting with DPWM. The absence of a formal handover, the non-transmission of the Court Order, and the limited operational capacity of DPWM collectively contributed to the poor management and ultimate decline of the wildlife resources. Furthermore, the Jannah Commission, whose primary focus was on financial assets and livestock, did not incorporate wildlife or the Kanilai Game Park into any valuation or asset recovery programme. This left a significant category of State assets outside the protective architecture created by the Commission, resulting in a regulatory and administrative vacuum in the management of these animals.
- 174.** From the foregoing, the Committee finds that although the High Court Order legally vested custodial authority in the appropriate public bodies, it was not effectively operationalised. Thus, the wildlife was not handled in ways consistent with the Order's protective purpose because there was no secure custody transfer. Accordingly, the problem was not the ambiguity in the Court Order itself, but the failure of the Ministry of Justice to transmit, communicate, and implement the Order, thereby preventing DPWM from assuming timely custody and operational control.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1.** The Committee recommends that the Kanilai Wildlife Park and all associated wildlife assets be immediately placed under the full and exclusive custody of the Department of Parks and Wildlife Management (DPWM) through a formal written handover.
- 2.** The Committee recommends that DPWM be provided with the necessary budget, veterinary resources, and personnel to rehabilitate the wildlife facilities and ensure proper feeding, health care, and welfare standards for all remaining wildlife.
- 3.** The Committee recommends a multisectoral approach to transform Kanilai Park into a tourist nature attraction site.
- 4.** The Committee recommends that the Government prohibit any future operation of wildlife assets as private or personalized facilities and ensure that all wildlife resources remain under statutory management by the State and subject to transparent regulation.

VEHICLES AND TRACTORS

- 175.** Prior to the establishment of the Commission, a preliminary nationwide exercise was initiated at the instance of the Inspector General of Police and the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs to identify and document vehicles associated with the former President. This assignment was

undertaken by a team of selected personnel from security institutions who were led by the head of the Vehicle Control Unit, then Chief Superintendent, and now Commissioner Nfamara Saidu. Bah.

- 176.** The team’s work resulted in the first systematic inventory of vehicles, recording 94 government vehicles from the previous regime and 8 vehicles that were purchased by the incumbent government from the period beginning the 1st of January 2017 to 27th February 2017. The freezing order obtained by the Government preceded the establishment of the Commission and effectively placed the identified assets under formal restraint, with custody and control assigned to specific individuals or institutions. As a result, when the Commission commenced its work, it encountered a state of affairs in which the relevant assets were already immobilised, documented, and held at designated locations.
- 177.** This pre-existing framework, including inventories of vehicles and equipment prepared under the injunctive order, provided the Commission with an established framework for its work, enabling it to identify, locate, and verify assets without first having to obtain or make its own preservation orders.
- 178.** Following the Commission’s establishment, a further inventory exercise was undertaken through a task force constituted by the Commission. This second team, again involving Commissioner Saidu. Bah, staff from the Office of the President, and officers from other institutions, were tasked with verifying, consolidating, and updating the earlier records. Vehicles identified through these processes were subsequently gathered and placed at designated holding locations to facilitate inspection, security arrangements, and valuation. For operational purposes, the vehicles were categorized. The table below sets out these categories, together with the respective locations where the vehicles were held, as well as the number of vehicles against each category and location.

NO.	LOCATION	ROAD WORTHY	NOT ROADWORTHY	SCRAP	LUXURY VEHICLES	ARMORED VEHICLES	TOTAL
1.	Kanilai	22	16	59			97
2.	Kotu (Mother/family’s residence)	06	NIL	NIL			06
3.	Maintenance Service Agency, Kotu	13	82	62			157
4.	Futurelec Building, Bertil Harding Highway	NIL	21	NIL			21
5.	JFPH	07	NIL	NIL			06

6.	Buginha	02	01	NIL			03
7.	Barra Banna Plantation	02	NIL	03			05
8.	Bafuloto	02	NIL	NIL			02
9.	Individual	69	1	NIL			70
TOTAL		122	120	124			368

179. The Committee further notes that approximately 33 vehicles, which were procured from TK Motors, were subsequently associated in certain records with the APRC, a political party associated with the former President. Notwithstanding this political attribution, evidence before the Committee, including invoices and delivery notes issued to the Office of the President and marked as part of Exhibit VC3, establishes that these vehicles were purchased using public monies drawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. The Controller of Government Vehicles correspondingly recorded these vehicles as Government of The Gambia property. The Committee therefore finds that these vehicles constituted State assets, and that their political association did not displace that fact. The absence of a clear determination of ownership prior to disposal reflects a failure to properly interrogate title and classification before asset alienation.

180. Although the Commission dealt extensively with vehicles and issued several directives relating to their identification, valuation, and disposal, the full operational details of these activities were not reflected in the final report submitted to the President. Evidence before the Committee confirms that records, reports, and updates on vehicle and tractor disposals were, for the most part, prepared and submitted internally to the Commission during its work. The absence of these matters from the final report therefore creates a notable gap in the overall account of how this category of assets was managed, particularly given their scale and significance.

181. In this regard, the Committee observes that a central element of the Commission’s mandate was not merely the recovery and disposal of assets, but the careful identification and classification of such assets, including a clear distinction between assets personally owned by the former President, whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, and assets belonging to the State. This distinction was fundamental to the integrity of the work and subsequent report of the Commission to the Executive.

182. The Committee finds that this distinction was not sufficiently undertaken or documented in respect of the vehicles disposed of by the Commission. Where assets were, in fact, owned by the State, they ought to have reverted to the State, thereby enabling the Government to determine their appropriate retention, reallocation, or disposal in accordance with national priorities and established public asset management frameworks. The failure to make this determination prior to disposal represents a material shortcoming in the Commission’s handling of this asset category.

183. Further underscoring this concern, the Committee received an asset declaration form submitted to it by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and signed by the former President on 18th day of October 2016, in which several vehicles, including vehicles forming part of the presidential convoy,

were declared under the category of assets but expressly identified as Government of The Gambia vehicles. . This declaration constitutes a direct acknowledgment by the former President himself that these vehicles were State-owned assets.

- 184.** Additionally, evidence before the Committee confirms that the inventory of vehicles relied upon by the Commission was largely derived from records compiled by the Government Vehicle Controller, Commissioner Nfamara Saidybah, who maintained an official inventory of government vehicles as part of his duties (see Paragraph 5 of the Exhibit VC 1)¹². The substantial reliance on this inventory further supports the conclusion that most, if not all, of the vehicles disposed of by the Commission, excluding the tractors (addressed separately) were State assets. The Committee therefore finds that the Commission proceeded to dispose of vehicles on the basis of an inventory of government property, without first resolving the critical question of ownership or affording the State the opportunity to determine their ultimate use or disposition.
- 185.** Nevertheless, Volume One of the Commission’s Report states at page 21 that proceeds from the public auctions of vehicles, including tractors and related equipment, were deposited into an account opened by the Commission at the Central Bank of The Gambia and managed by the Accountant General’s Department. This indicates that, while operational details were not included in the final report, the Commission did establish formal banking arrangements for the receipt of proceeds arising from these disposals, thereby accounting for the asset category without any activity report.
- 186.** Phase One of the Commission’s disposal of tractors and agricultural equipment was undertaken under the supervision of the first Executive Secretary, Mr. Alhaji Mamadi Kurang, and represents the stage of the disposal exercise that exhibited the greatest procedural structure. According to Mr Kurang’s testimony, the process began with a comprehensive valuation undertaken by an external valuer, Mr. Njie (deceased), whose first name was not known at this time, who conducted in-person inspections and produced a detailed technical assessment of each tractor, including photographs, operational condition, expected mechanical lifespan, and precise identifiers such as chassis numbers.
- 187.** At this stage, the Committee considers it necessary to address the manner in which the tractors were procured. Evidence before the Committee, as reflected in Volume 4 of the Commission’s Report, indicates that the Mahindra tractors were procured by the Government of The Gambia through a sovereign line of credit agreement executed on 8th day of November 2005 between the Government and the Exim Bank of India for the purpose of agricultural mechanisation. The agreement with Mahindra Limited was for the purchase of 500 tractors by the state, with repayment of the loan, principal and interest falling to Gambian taxpayers. The Commission’s own findings cast doubt on any assertion that KGI International purchased the tractors, noting instead that KGI was placed in operational control of the project following a presidential directive.

¹² Witness Statement of Nfamara Saidy Bah

- 188.** The Committee further finds that the Commission did not ascertain, reconcile, or account for the full complement of tractors procured under the agricultural mechanisation project. While evidence confirms that the Commission proceeded to sell and otherwise dispose of a number of tractors, no comprehensive or reconciled inventory was produced demonstrating how all five hundred tractors were identified, traced, and ultimately accounted for. The figures emerging from the evidence, covering tractors sold, delivered, gifted, or otherwise released, do not reconcile to the total number procured. In the absence of a consolidated inventory, completion report, or final reconciliation schedule, the Committee concludes that the Commission sold and disposed of tractors without accounting for all 500 units. This failure represents a material deficiency in asset accountability and reporting, particularly in respect of assets financed through public borrowing and intended for a national development programme.
- 189.** Mr. Kurang explained that he later prepared an internal extract of this valuation report, consolidating the reserve prices and locations for the tractors; the extract forms part of the evidence before the Committee and is marked as AMK8. On the issue of the reserve prices, Mr Kurang testified that “these are values derived from the valuer; they form your reserve price, the minimum you expect,” clarifying that the Commission relied on independently generated technical assessments and did not interfere with the valuation process. He further stated that the valuer used his engineering knowledge on age, condition, and the power of the tractors.
- 190.** The forty-four (44) tractors, including agricultural equipment auctioned in Phase One, were located across Banjulinding Police Station, Brikama Police Station, Sibanor Police Station, Bwiam, Somita, Sukuta, Kanilai, and the Kotu Workshop (Formerly MSA). The Commission established guidelines that disposal must occur through transparent public auctions, grounded in the reserve prices as a minimum acceptable benchmark.
- 191.** Mr. Kurang explained that this served as a safeguard to ensure that public assets were not sold below what had been independently justified, and he also emphasised ethical protections, stating: “We cannot buy because we have the advantage of prior information.” The testimony reveals that Phase One of the Commission's vehicle sales benefitted from an early awareness of potential conflicts of interest and the need for internal safeguards against insider advantage.
- 192.** Administrative routines at this stage were comparatively coherent. Testimony indicates that communications addressed to the Commission were routed through the Secretary to the Chairperson, while investigation-related materials were logged by Secretariat staff and transmitted to Lead Counsel. Mr. Kurang described this as “standard practice,” noting that correspondence never bypassed the Chairperson or Counsel and that internal circulation of material followed a predictable workflow. Despite this relative clarity, his testimony also reflected that only he received a secretary-specific Terms of Reference, while the Commission did not supply equivalent TORs to staff and did not establish a formal operational manual. This absence of comprehensive administrative documentation later contributed to blurred responsibilities during more complex stages of the Commission’s work.

- 193.** A further element relevant to the Committee’s assessment of Phase One is the High Court freezing order issued on the 22nd May 2017, referenced as MOJ 5A, which preceded the establishment of the Commission. The order, obtained at the instance of the Attorney General under the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorist Financing Act, froze all assets associated with the former President and placed responsibility for the custody of immovable property, including vehicles, on the Registrar General.
- 194.** As previously determined, this Order was intended to preserve assets and prevent depletion before the Commission commenced its work. However, evidence before the Committee shows that the Registrar General did not assume effective custody or control over the vehicles as directed. Although a task force led by the Controller of Government Vehicles was deployed to conduct inventory exercises at multiple locations, no systematic collection, securing, or centralisation of the vehicles occurred under the Registrar General’s authority.
- 195.** By the time the Commission commenced operations, the vehicles were dispersed across numerous sites and had to be gathered anew and parked at designated locations identified earlier in Chapter 1 of this report. The Committee therefore finds that the Registrar General did not comply with the custodial obligations imposed by the freezing order, resulting in an early lapse in asset preservation during the pre-Commission period.
- 196.** The Committee also notes that the High Court freezing order of May 2017 (MOJ 5A) operated as a preservatory mechanism prior to the commencement of the Commission and vested custody of moveable property, including vehicles, in the Registrar General. That order was subsequently varied by directions issued under the authority of the Commission to undertake valuations and the sale of vehicles once it began its work. Noting the Committee’s incapacity to comment on the propriety of this variation, it must, however, be stated that the sequence of events highlights an area of institutional overlap. The Executive, acting through the Attorney General as plaintiff in *Attorney General v. Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh* obtained a preservatory injunction from the Judiciary, while a separate Executive mechanism, i.e., the Commission, later assumed functions that affected the operation of that Order.
- 197.** The evidence received by the Committee supports the fact that the Commission was aware of the suit against the former President and the subsequent freezing orders made therein. This is evidence on record from the testimonies of the Honourable Attorney General and Minister for Justice at the time, the Chairperson of the Commission, the Lead Counsel, and even the first Executive Secretary. While this report does not attempt to resolve the constitutional implications of such intersections, the Committee observes that arrangements of this kind are not ideal.
- 198.** Consequently, the Committee considers this highly undesirable and inconsistent with clear institutional boundaries. It is the Committee’s view that the State institutions, especially the three arms of the State must complement one another. This underscores the need for clearer delineation of institutional authority in the future, so that judicial preservation orders and executive

investigative mechanisms operate in a manner that avoids duplication, uncertainty, or inadvertent derogation from one another.

- 199.** A significant deficiency in Phase One arose in relation to buyer identification, anti-money laundering (AML) safeguards, and the traceability of transactions. Under questioning from Counsel, Mr. Kurang confirmed that buyers were not required to present identification documents such as ID cards; no registers were maintained to capture the identities or particulars of purchasers; and no AML-compliant mechanisms were put in place to ensure traceability of the origin of funds or to prevent anonymous purchases.
- 200.** He stated plainly: “No, we did not take those details.” When asked whether a buyer register existed, he testified: “We did not have such a register.” And when Counsel probed whether any AML or identification protocol operated during Phase One, he answered: “No, we did not have that.” These admissions demonstrate a material gap in the disposal methodology. Even though Phase One’s transparency safeguards around valuation and reserve prices were comparatively stronger than in later phases, the absence of identification requirements and traceable records represents a structural weakness, limiting the ability of any oversight body to reconcile sales fully or to verify whether politically exposed persons or associates participated in the auctions.
- 201.** A further procedural weakness identified in Phase One was the manner in which cash generated from tractor sales was handled. Testimonies confirm that proceeds from the auctions were received and held directly by the Secretary Alhaji Mamadi Kurang, rather than through a designated finance officer or a structured financial management mechanism.
- 202.** While the Committee recognises that this arrangement reflected the administrative limitations under which the Secretariat operated at the time, it nonetheless presented a clear governance vulnerability. Concentrating custody of cash in the hands of a single official, without dedicated financial oversight, dual control safeguards, or immediate transfer protocols, created risks both for accountability and for the protection of the public funds involved. The Committee therefore considers the cash-handling arrangements in Phase One to be a significant procedural lapse that did not accord with basic principles of financial control expected in the management of recovered State assets.
- 203.** The Committee further notes that the first phase of tractor sales, conducted from the 23rd to 26th June 2018, generated proceeds amounting to GMD 10,523,000 from the sale of 43 tractors and a disc plough. This figure reflects the recorded payments for the tractors and implements disposed of during this period, based on the reserve price valuations and the documentation submitted in evidence. As recorded earlier, the proceeds were received and held directly by the Secretary to the Commission.
- 204.** Notwithstanding the order by the Commission to sell vehicles, the exercise was abruptly terminated following direct intervention from the Office of the President. Testimony and documentary evidence show that the Secretary to the Cabinet, acting on instructions originating from the highest

level of the Executive, went physically to the Kotu MSA garage and halted the ongoing tractor sales. This intervention precipitated an altercation between him and the Secretary.

205. Though the incident effectively interrupted the Commission's orders and plans for sale, it must be noted that the Commission responded by issuing a formal letter asserting its independence and emphasising that decisions on asset disposal were for the Commission to determine internally, and that any concerns from the Executive should be addressed through formal submissions rather than through direct intervention at operational sites. The Secretary General replied with a strongly worded communication requesting an apology from Mr. Kurang. The exchange of letters thus forms a critical part of the Phase One chronology, marking both the Commission's insistence on institutional autonomy and the Executive's expectation that its concerns be acted upon.
206. The Committee received evidence supported by contemporaneous correspondence emphasising that the strong reaction from the Office of the President and the request for an apology from Mr Kurang, which he failed to do by virtue of his silence, lead to Mr Kurang's eventual departure from office as Executive Secretary.
207. However, the Committee was also presented with a counter-narrative advanced in testimony by Commission staff and officials from the Ministry of Justice. This narrative suggested that the working relationship between the Secretary and the Lead Counsel had deteriorated to such a degree that the Commissioners were compelled to decide which one of the two to retain, ultimately opting to retain the Lead Counsel. The Chairperson of the Commission testified that, given the circumstances at that stage of the Commission's work, the decision before the Commissioners was which of the two officials could be relieved with the least disruption to the Commission's functions.
208. On the evidence before it, the Committee cannot conclusively attribute the Executive Secretary's departure to a single cause. Instead, the Committee finds that both the severe internal relationship issues and the Executive's intervention formed part of the factual circumstances in which the decision was taken.
209. Testimony from the then Secretary General indicated that, at the material time, the "urgency" and "importance" of a direct instruction from the President were treated as the prevailing considerations, rather than legality or procedural propriety. Read together, the evidence demonstrates that Executive intervention materially disrupted Phase One and contributed to the cessation of its processes.
210. Phase One, therefore, reflects a contrast between an initially organised and transparently structured disposal exercise, underpinned by independent valuation and clear reserve price mechanisms, and an abrupt, externally induced termination that affected the continuity and administrative stability of the Commission's work.
211. Following the interruption of Phase One in June 2018, the Commission did not resume disposal activities until October of that year. The Committee finds that this prolonged pause materially

contributed to the deterioration, theft, and cannibalisation of vehicles and equipment. During these months of inaction, assets remained exposed across multiple locations without consistent or effective security arrangements, resulting in significant loss of value and the removal of parts.

- 212.** The Committee further observes a clear contradiction between the Commission's stated intention to preserve and secure assets and its failure to re-establish timely control and continuity of sales after the Executive interruption. Although the Commission justified asset sales as necessary to prevent dissipation and preserve value, the extended halt, during which it awaited no concrete directive, directly undermined that objective. The interruption not only delayed essential sales but also allowed conditions that accelerated the very losses the Commission sought to avoid.
- 213.** The Committee also finds that the Commission and the personnel responsible for onsite custody were negligent in permitting the assets to remain exposed to foreseeable risks, and that this negligence materially contributed to the loss of parts and overall value.
- 214.** When sales recommenced on 1st October 2018, the Secretariat circulated a process flow on a Commission letterhead setting out the Phase Two arrangements; the Committee will attach this document to the report for the record. The process flow document aligns with evidence received from Commissioner Abiosseh George that a set of operational guidelines was prepared for Phase Two and that the reserve price was not to be departed from. Although the document is unsigned and its precise authorship cannot be ascertained from the copy before the Committee, the document's contents corroborate aspects of Commissioner George's testimony and reflect an intention to reintroduce structured procedures for the October exercise.
- 215.** Evidence received by the Committee indicates that, by this stage, the second Executive Secretary, Ramatoulie Sarr, delegated on-the-ground responsibility to two assistant secretaries because she could not be physically present at both regional teams while discharging other duties at Commission headquarters. Ms Sarr also stated that both her assistants, Kebba Bojang and Fatou Drammeh, reported operationally to the Lead Counsel, which had the effect of sidelining her authority and undermining the normal supervisory structure.
- 216.** This arrangement reflected, and further contributed to, an already strained working relationship in which her role as head of the Secretariat was neither fully recognised nor respected. This delegation, and the associated reporting practice, reduced the Secretariat's central oversight of field operations and limited the Secretary's direct supervision of auction processes.
- 217.** Two teams were established for the tractor auctions: Team One, led by Assistant Secretary Kebba Bojang, covering the West Coast and Lower River regions; and Team Two, led by Assistant Secretary Fatou Drammeh, covering the North Bank and Central River regions. Neither team was supplied with valuation reports or reserve-price guidance for the tractors; the absence of valuations removed an objective pricing benchmark and prevented meaningful reconciliation post-sale. Team One disposed of 43 tractors; Team Two disposed of 52 (with some records indicating up to 59). The combined total reported sales of tractors for Phase Two amounted to GMD 13,083,000.

- 218.** Unlike Phase One, where internal purchasing was expressly proscribed, Phase Two saw significant insider participation in the auctions. Whereas Phase One’s controls had sought to prevent staff and insiders from buying assets, the Committee’s review indicates that multiple buyers in Phase Two were persons linked to disposal operations and to Commission activities, which created a clear perception, and risk, of conflict of interest.
- 219.** Although cashiers from the Accountant General’s Department were present during Phase Two (an improvement in cash handling relative to the first phase), this single procedural improvement did not remedy the more systemic failures: no valuations for tractors, inconsistent buyer-identification and receipt practices across teams, uneven reporting templates, and weak central oversight. Those systemic weaknesses substantially limited the Committee’s ability to trace asset movements, reconcile proceeds, and confirm that disposals maximised value for the public.
- 220.** The vehicle auction phase (14–24 January 2019) was preceded by a formal valuation of 317 vehicles by Mr. Momodou Kunta Mamburay. However, the Committee’s review shows that implementation of the sales departed from the standards implied by that valuation. Vehicles were held across several sites, most significantly at MSA Kotu, where evidence received by the Committee and public testimony indicate widespread cannibalisation, unauthorised removal of parts, and unauthorised access to storage sites.
- 221.** The Committee additionally notes that a number of vehicles were disposed of at low prices, including a few notable sales, such as a vehicle described as Toyota Car (M10) at GMD 4,000.00 and a vehicle described as Toyota Land Cruiser (MK84) at a sales price of GMD 5,000.00, etc. These outcomes reflect a failure to preserve value and are attributable to the combined effects of prolonged delays, deterioration of assets, weak custody arrangements, and procedural lapses identified in various instances within this report.
- 222.** The Committee notes that vehicle parts were removed in many cases before formal auction procedures commenced, that components were sold or diverted informally, and that personnel with access to the vehicles (including security staff and other officers) were implicated in these irregularities. Testimony and related material further indicate that custody arrangements at the Maintenance Service Agency facility in Kotu were implemented through ad hoc security deployments with unclear reporting lines, which exacerbated opportunities for tampering and removal of vehicles from the facility.
- 223.** The Committee further finds that several vehicles, particularly buses, were withdrawn from the Maintenance Service Agency facility without formal authorisation from the Commission. No written approvals, movement registers, or post-withdrawal accountability records were produced to justify these removals. The unauthorised withdrawal of vehicles represents a serious breach of custody and control and underscores the extent to which asset management during the pendency of the Commission was undermined by weak oversight and unclear authority.

224. Taken as a whole, the Committee finds that Phase Two’s deficiencies were systemic rather than isolated. Delegation of field responsibilities without robust contemporaneous reporting, the absence of valuation anchors for tractor sales, inconsistent recordkeeping across teams, and inadequate custody protocols combined to create significant risks to asset preservation and value recovery. The Commission’s failure to reassert effective operational control promptly after the Executive intervention contributed materially to those outcomes.

**COMPREHENSIVE LIST FOR THE AUCTION OF VEHICLES AND ASSETS 14 January
2019 — 9 February 2019**

225. The Committee received evidence to the effect that the following constitute the report of the auction of the vehicles and other assets associated with the former President.

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	NAME OF BUYER	RESERVE PRICE (D)	AMOUNT PAID (D)
14/01/2019	3554952	Mitsubishi pajero mkm6	Hijinkey Kanyi	80,000	87,000
14/01/2019	3554953	Wingle pickup mkm9	Essa Darboe	30,000	75,000
14/01/2019	3554954	Nissan HD8 mkm3	Kebba Sanyang	50,000	80,000
14/01/2019	3554955	Wingle pickup mkm13	Ousman Ceesay	30,000	91,000
14/01/2019	3554956	Toyota Land curser TLC mkm16	Saidou Jallow	50,000	90,000
14/01/2019	3554957	Mmlm 12is/Benz Truck	Saidou Jallow	50,000	60,000
14/01/2019	3554958	Mitsubishi pickup L200 mkm17	Saidou Jallow	50,000	80,000
14/01/2019	3554959	Tata Bus mkm1	Buba Saho	40,000	50,000
14/01/2019	3554960	Toyota Highlooks pickup mkm5	Jahoil Company	40,000	72,000
14/01/2019	3554961	Hummer H3 mkm	Jahoil Company	80,000	135,000
14/01/2019	3535662	M/Benz (BJL 7457 F)	Momodou Abdoulie Jallow	100,000	206,000
14/01/2019	3535663	M/Benz Truck Tipper	Ousman Marneh	90,000	200,000
14/01/2019	3535664	Tipper Truck	Buba Bojang	90,000	350,000
15/01/2019	3554962	MIT/L200 sportero	Kaba Kassama	10,000	40,000

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	NAME OF BUYER	RESERVE PRICE (D)	AMOUNT PAID (D)
		m52			
15/01/2019	3554963	Lin-con m95	Ebrima Jallow	5,000	15,000
15/01/2019	3554964	M94 Lincon	Ebrima Jallow	15,000	20,000
15/01/2019	3554965	TATA CON M64	Kebba Bojang	20,000	106,000
15/01/2019	3554966	M82 MISIBISI pajero	Kaba Gassama	50,000	60,000
15/01/2019	3554967	Huda Saloon mkm7	Tafa Faal	30,000	60,000
15/01/2019	3554968	Nissan ARMANDA scarp m38	Momodou mambureh	20,000	20,000
15/01/2019	3554969	Nissan VAN m78	Musa Ceesay	25,000	52,000
15/01/2019	3554970	BMW M61	Ebrima Barry	10,000	18,000
15/01/2019	3554971	MIT/pajero m71	Ebrima Jallow	5,000	10,000
15/01/2019	3554972	Toyota Land curser TLC mkm15	Hijinkey Kanyi	50,000	60,000
15/01/2019	3554973	Ford m97	Borry Jaiteh	10,000	22,000
15/01/2019	3554974	Ford m43	Borry Jaiteh	25,000	30,000
15/01/2019	3554975	BJL 4756 f	Musa Jassej	80,000	150,000
15/01/2019	3554976	Pickup L200 MIS	Musa Jobe	40,000	50,000
15/01/2019	3554977	Ford GulfSTREAM Ambulance m116	Dr Adama Sallah	25,000	100,000
15/01/2019	3554978	Hyundai satafin m86	Alhagie Admed Secka	10,000	39,000
15/01/2019	3535666	Hyundai car	Saihou Barrow	20,000	30,000
15/01/2019	3535667	Hyundai car	H. S. Kanyi	10,000	20,000
15/01/2019	3535668	Hyundai car m84	H. S. Kanyi	20,000	20,000
15/01/2019	3535669	Nissan Car	Saihou Jaw	20,000	25,000
15/01/2019	3535670	M/car (105)	Salifu Corr	80,000	105,000
15/01/2019	3535671	M/car (safulao)	Omar Jallow	10,000	20,000
15/01/2019	3535672	Hyundai Car (M49)	Sulayman Sallah	5,000	10,000
15/01/2019	3535673	M/Car (L200)	Saidou Jallow	15,000	25,000
15/01/2019	3535674	Toyota/LC(M68)	Saidou Jallow	45,000	60,000

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	NAME OF BUYER	RESERVE PRICE (D)	AMOUNT PAID (D)
15/01/2019	3535675	Toyota HY Car	Saidou Jallow	10,000	15,000
15/01/2019	3535676	Toyota HY car (pick up)	Saidou Jallow	10,000	20,000
15/01/2019	3535677	Hyundai car (m65)	Saidou Jallow	10,000	30,000
15/01/2019	3535678	LC-Car m46	Saidou Jallow	40,000	40,000
15/01/2019	3535679	Toyota HY car Pickup	Saidou Jallow	15,000	16,000
15/01/2019	3535680	Hyundai car m55	Saidou Jallow	15,000	17,000
15/01/2019	3535681	Hyundai Terrican	Saidou Jallow	10,000	15,000
15/01/2019	3535682	Hyundai Terrican	Saidou Jallow	10,000	31,000
15/01/2019	3535683	Ford car	Wuyeh Tarawally	20,000	12,500
15/01/2019	3535684	Hyundai car m76	Wuyeh Tarawally	10,000	12,500
15/01/2019	3535685	Hyundai car	Ebrima Kasira	10,000	15,000
15/01/2019	3535686	Hyundai car m66	Ebrima Kasira	5,000	10,000
15/01/2019	3535687	Sheri Hy car	Ebrima Kasira	10,000	20,000
15/01/2019	3554979	Toyota Land curiser	Alhagie Conteh	15,000	15,000
15/01/2019	3554980	Toyota land Rover m110	Babucarr Sanneh	10,000	10,000
15/01/2019	3554981	Hyundai m101	Babucarr Sanneh	10,000	12,000
15/01/2019	3554982	Truck Tipper 121 misi	Kebba Sanyang	50,000	100,000
15/01/2019	3554983	Mit/conder m60	Jahoil Company	80,000	121,000
15/01/2019	3554984	Hyundai m93	Momodou Jallow	5,000	12,000
15/01/2019	3554985	Hyundai m117 corster	Musa Jassey	50,000	90,000
15/01/2019	3554986	Nissan NAVARA m40	Kebba Bojang	10,000	20,000
15/01/2019	3554987	Magnum Truck m144	Omar Jallow	50,000	66,000
15/01/2019	3554988	Man Truck m149	Omar Jallow	20,000	48,000
15/01/2019	3554989	Van vehicle durch m98	Sam Chinedu	15,000	20,000
15/01/2019	3554990	Volvo truck m143	Pa Modou Ndong	75,000	80,000
15/01/2019	3554991	MSA Motor Car m92	Ebrima Gillen	5,000	11,000

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	NAME OF BUYER	RESERVE PRICE (D)	AMOUNT PAID (D)
15/01/2019	3554992	G Vitan sunki m88	Sarjo Jabang	10,000	26,000
15/01/2019	3554993	Toyota paprado m158	Ebrima Kasira	2,000	7,000
15/01/2019	3554994	Nissan van scrab m35	Ismaila Barry	5,000	10,000
15/01/2019	3554995	Caravan Gult stream	Mark Goddard	50,000	75,000
15/01/2019	3554996	m113 Caravan vehicle	Mark Goddard	50,000	75,000
15/01/2019	3554997	BEDFORD Truck m161	Omar Jallow	20,000	53,000
15/01/2019	3554998	Nissan pickup m154	Ebrima Narra	2,000	10,000
15/01/2019	3554999	Toyota TLC m26 V8	Samba Bah	80,000	50,000
15/01/2019	3555000	Landcruiser	Hayib Touray	70,000	75,000
15/01/2019	3535689	Ram Truck (m131)	Alhagie Conteh	100,000	150,000
15/01/2019	3535690	Ram Truck (m126)	Alhagie Conteh	75,000	150,000
15/01/2019	3535691	Benz Truck	Babucarr Gaye	25,000	59,000
15/01/2019	3535692	Truck m122	Haruna Baldeh	75,000	150,000
15/01/2019	3535693	Motor car	Swaebou Sanneh	45,000	80,000
15/01/2019	3535693	pgaso Truck (M151)	Omar Gaye	40,000	45,000
15/01/2019	3535694	Toyota Land Cruiser (M111)	Saidou Jallow	40,000	40,000
15/01/2019	3535695	M/Montro (M41)	Saidou Jallow	20,000	33,000
15/01/2019	3535696	Bedford Truck (TN66)	Ebrima Barry	10,000	32,000
15/01/2019	3535697	Nissan Titanic (M155)	Ebrima Barry	10,000	15,000
15/01/2019	3535698	Nissan Titanic	Semba Saibou	2,500	12,000
15/01/2019	3535699	Nissan Motor Vehicle	Semba Saibou	20,000	50,000
16/01/2019	3565351	Ford m21	Ousman Ceesay	20,000	30,000
16/01/2019	3565352	Hyundai santafee	Micheal secke	5,000	10,000
16/01/2019	3565353	Renualt magnu m139	Alhagie saidu othman	35,000	75,000
16/01/2019	3565354	Mebenz5 320 m42	Baba sahor	60,000	35,000
16/01/2019	3565355	Misibisi pajero m57	Ebrima Jallow	30,000	30,000
16/01/2019	3565356	Mit/L200 mk13	Ebrima Jallow	20,000	35,000

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	NAME OF BUYER	RESERVE PRICE (D)	AMOUNT PAID (D)
16/01/2019	3565357	Livego mini truck m163a	Momodou Jallow	5,000	35,000
16/01/2019	3565358	International yellow bus m138 A	Ebrima Barry	10,000	20,000
16/01/2019	3565359	Nissan armada m20	Alhagie admad secka	20,000	35,000
16/01/2019	3565360	Benz Truck scrap m36	Matarr faal	50,000	20,000
16/01/2019	3565361	Nissan Aramada M19	Saidou jallow	20,000	70,000
16/01/2019	3565362	Toyota Land cruiser	Saidou Jallow	65,000	80,000
16/01/2019	3565363	TOYOTA Land cruiser m107	Saidou Jallow	80,000	80,000
16/01/2019	3565364	BEDFORD M136	Ebrima Jallow	25,000	63,000
16/01/2019	3565301	Bedford Truck	Modou Faal	20,000	58,000
16/01/2019	3565302	Hyundai Sonata (m142)	Modou Gaye	8,000	8,000
16/01/2019	3565303	Toyota Car m10	Ebrima Jallow	1,000	4,000
16/01/2019	3565304	Man bush C003257	Ramatoulie Jallow	80,000	140,000
16/01/2019	3565305	W-Cream Truck	Foden double (sarr Corr)	75,000	150,000
16/01/2019	3565306	Volvo truck	Ousman Ceesay	100,000	100,000
16/01/2019	3565307	Green Bush Volvo	Ramatoulie Jallow	35,000	55,000
16/01/2019	3565308	M/carter m10	O C Chris	20,000	31,000
16/01/2019	3565309	Hummer motor car m44	Omar Jallow	3,000	17,000
16/01/2019	3565310	Green Truck m132	Alhagie Conteh	100,000	150,000
16/01/2019	3565311	Scrap truck m127	Kebba Bojang	50,000	50,000
16/01/2019	3565312	Ford motor car m67	Dr Adama Sallah	20,000	42,000
16/01/2019	3565313	Caravan Golf treaw m115	Baba Saho	75,000	150,000
16/01/2019	3565314	Toyota coster	Baba Saho	30,000	40,000
16/01/2019	3565315	Nissan Civilian	Baba Saho	10,000	20,000

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	NAME OF BUYER	RESERVE PRICE (D)	AMOUNT PAID (D)
16/01/2019	3565316	Toyota coster	Saho Surr	25,000	225,000
16/01/2019	3565317	Empty case of a truck	Saidou Jallow	70,000	40,000
16/01/2019	3565318	Toyota land curiser m27	Ramatoulie Jallow	40,000	55,000
16/01/2019	3565319	Green bush Volvo	Musa Ceesay	40,000	50,000
16/01/2019	3565320	Volvo truck m128	Saho Jaw	10,000	50,000
17/01/2019	3565323	Benz Truck m124	Musa Ceesay	10,000	45,000
17/01/2019	3565322	M/Benz m162	Musa Ceesay	2,000	19,000
17/01/2019	3565324	Nissan Titanic m153	Alh Hamet Secka	50,000	40,000
17/01/2019	3565321	Toyota Land cruiser m25	Alh Hamet Secka	1,000	7,000
17/01/2019	3565325	M/Gland m157	matarr faal	50,000	75,000
17/01/2019	3565326	Tata motor vehicle m36	Sarjo Cham	50,000	80,000
17/01/2019	3565365	Benz Truck scrap m120	Musa Bala Jobe	80,000	90,000
17/01/2019	3565366	Land rover B JL 95771	Mustapha A R Jobe	15,000	25,000
17/01/2019	3565367	Pajero Mitsubishi m34	Musa Ceesay	50,000	55,000
17/01/2019	3565368	JAC pickup m127	Musa Ceesay	75,000	44,000
17/01/2019	3565369	JAC pickup m126	Lamin Dampha	20,000	44,000
17/01/2019	3565370	Hyundai CON m166	Lamin Dampha	20,000	44,000
17/01/2019	3565371	Hyundai Custer m168	Lamin Dampha	20,000	51,000
18/01/2019	3565372	Nissan Titanic mk37	Chenedu samuel	25,000	17,000
18/01/2019	3565373	Hyundai m51	Dickson Ojeaburu	40,000	50,000
18/01/2019	3565374	Land Cruiser	Saidou jallow	70,000	55,000
18/01/2019	3565375	Land Cruiser	Saidou jallow	75,000	60,000
18/01/2019	3565376	Hyundai sat mk50	Mam Burry	25,000	20,000
18/01/2019	3565377	Scrap truck m125	Seedy Colley	10,000	55,000
18/01/2019	3565378	Green Bus Volvo 08	simon nwobo	60,000	55,000

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	NAME OF BUYER	RESERVE PRICE (D)	AMOUNT PAID (D)
18/01/2019	3565379	Green Bus Volvo 09	simon nwobo	60,000	55,000
18/01/2019	3565380	Scrab Toyota and cruiser m59	Karablie Jammeh	4,000	20,000
18/01/2019	3565381	Chevrolette 3500 m53	Dr Adama Sallah	50,000	40,000
18/01/2019	3565382	Foilett scrap mk20	Bubacarr Baden	10,000	5,000
18/01/2019	3565383	Nissan Titanic mk79	Sankung Kanteh	50,000	61,000
18/01/2019	3565384	Benz Jeep mk35	Babou ngum	5,000	5,000
18/01/2019	3565385	Beenz Jeep mk70	Babou ngum	5,000	5,000
18/01/2019	3565386	Chevrolette mk68	Borry Jaiteh	30,000	50,000
18/01/2019	3565387	BMW mk56	Jahoil Company	30,000	40,000
18/01/2019	3565388	Boughton mk82	Ismaila Jarju	5,000	5,000
18/01/2019	3565389	Land rover	Omar jallow	15,000	20,000
18/01/2019	3565390	Balford truck m170	Momdou Jallow	20,000	35,000
18/01/2019	3565391	SMA mk42	Jim Cham	5,000	8,000
18/01/2019	3565392	BMW 73011 SH 1225 100 CAR	Muntaga Sallah	200,000	200,000
18/01/2019	3565393	Benz saloon SH 10 s 350	Muntaga Sallah	250,000	250,000
18/01/2019	3565394	Hyundai t mk12	Musa Jobe	25,000	10,000
18/01/2019	3565395	Toyota Land Cruiser mk44	Saidou Jallow	50,000	25,000
18/01/2019	3565396	MIT/L200 mk13	Saidou Jallow	10,000	20,000
18/01/2019	3565397	Suzuki van mk73	Mustapha Jallow	10,000	15,000
18/01/2019	3565328	Benz mk70	Ebrima Jallow	30,000	40,000
18/01/2019	3565329	M/pickup m41	Ebrima Jallow	20,000	40,000
18/01/2019	3565330	Schovel Machine scrap	Kebba Bojang	15,000	20,000
18/01/2019	3565331	Pickup I200 mk66	Omar Jallow	5,000	5,000
18/01/2019	3565336	M/Benz Truck	Jahoil Company	30,000	30,000

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	NAME OF BUYER	RESERVE PRICE (D)	AMOUNT PAID (D)
18/01/2019	3565338	Ford motor car mk69	Muhammed Jaiteh	30,000	40,000
18/01/2019	3565339	Ford van mk9	Njundu Jasseh	30,000	30,000
18/01/2019	3565340	Iveco mk3	Lamin Saidykan	60,000	53,000
18/01/2019	3565341	Toyota Land cruiser pickup	rabiaboudid	40,000	100,000
18/01/2019	3565342	Nissan titanic mk61	Alh Hamet Secka	30,000	50,000
18/01/2019	3565343	Toyota Viotor Vehicle	Seedy Touray	20,000	35,000
18/01/2019	3565344	(J4500) super Ruxery Coach & Pickasar head	Jahoil Company	2,100,000	2,885,000
18/01/2019	3565345	Tiggo mk46	Abdoulie Jobe	40,000	35,000
18/01/2019	3565346	Tiggo mk48	Seedy Touray	40,000	55,000
18/01/2019	3565347	Benz 609 mk9	Ebrima Jallow	5,000	40,000
18/01/2019	3565348	M/Benz mk55	Omar Jallow	30,000	5,000
18/01/2019	3565349	International Benz mk6	Saidou jallow	20,000	30,000
18/01/2019	3565350	Small Cartapillar scrap mk15	Saidou jallow	10,000	70,000
18/01/2019	3565399	Misibis pajero m43	Borry Jaiteh	3,000	20,000
18/01/2019	3565400	Hyunda mk78	Ebrima Jallow	50,000	20,000
18/01/2019	3579501	Hyundai mk78	Saidou Jallow	40,000	25,000
18/01/2019	3579503	Nissan mk33	Ebrima Jallow	40,000	35,000
19/01/2019	3579504	Haval white G/Wall	Buba Tamba	20,000	30,000
19/01/2019	3579505	Haval Hardy Body mk63	Buba Tamba	20,000	30,000
19/01/2019	3579507	Mit/L200 mk13	Alhagie Secka	25,000	20,000
19/01/2019	3579507	Nissan Titanic mk67	Ansumana Kebbeh	15,000	45,000
19/01/2019	3579508	Hyundai Accest	Omar jallow	40,000	57,000
19/01/2019	3579509	Misibisi Pajero 02	Omar jallow	40,000	85,000
19/01/2019	3579510	BMW mk53	Omar Jallow	30,000	20,000

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	NAME OF BUYER	RESERVE PRICE (D)	AMOUNT PAID (D)
19/01/2019	3579511	Ford EX M18	Saidou jallow	30,000	50,000
19/01/2019	3579651	Koripressor (E200)	Abdoulie Jatta	45,000	60,000
19/01/2019	3579652	M/Benz m123	Micheal secka	40,000	6,000
19/01/2019	3579653	Hyundai scarp	Alieu Gaye	40,000	9,000
19/01/2019	3579654	S.M.A mk45	Alieu Gaye	20,000	9,000
19/01/2019	3579655	Hyundai mk11	Yaya Jallow	5,000	5,000
19/01/2019	3579657	2MA mk11	Saidou Jallow	5,000	20,000
19/01/2019	3579659	Toyota Land Cruiser mk84	Saidou Jallow	5,000	50,000
19/01/2019	3579660	Nissan Hand Body mk81	Saidou Jallow	5,000	50,000
19/01/2019	3579661	M/Benz L200 mk40	Saidou Jallow	30,000	50,000
19/01/2019	3579519	Cartapillar k1	Omar Jallow	100,000	125,000
19/01/2019	3579520	Toyota Land Cruiser TFLU74 7A4509115	Nfamara Saidybah	10,000	20,000
19/01/2019	3579521	Iveco-magirum 110-17 truck SH2	Abubacarr saidybah	50,000	50,000
19/01/2019	3579522	Volvo truck-container SH11	Musa Balla Jobe	150,000	200,000
19/01/2019	3579523	Yellow nissan petrol B9008506	Madi Jatta	150,000	125,000
19/01/2019	3579524	Yellow nissan petrol B9008506	Satella Odimmegwa	150,000	150,000
19/01/2019	3579525	TL criser m30	Hadim Gai	75,000	75,000
19/01/2019	3579526	S106MM m22	Hadim Gai	100,000	200,000
19/01/2019	3579527	Nissan patrol m81	Babou Ngum	30,000	20,000
19/01/2019	3579691	Truck	Nfamara Saidybah	50,000	75,000
19/01/2019	3579692	Great Wall k34	Ramatoulie Jallow	1,000	5,000
19/01/2019	3579693	M/Benz cily bus	Ramatoulie Jallow	150,000	125,000
19/01/2019	3579694	DAF m140	Saidou Jallow	30,000	45,000

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	NAME OF BUYER	RESERVE PRICE (D)	AMOUNT PAID (D)
19/01/2019	3579695	TL scrab m63	Yaya Jallow	30,000	25,000
19/01/2019	3579696	TL scrab m109	Yaya Jallow	8,000	15,000
19/01/2019	3579697	Bed ford	Yaya Jallow	10,000	15,000
19/01/2019	3579698	TLC scrab che 1007756	Yaya Jallow	20,000	40,000
19/01/2019	3579699	Ssanjo Musu	Yaya Jallow	25,000	25,000
19/01/2019	3596700	TLC m137	Yaya Jallow	2,500	10,000
19/01/2019	3579601	Scrab mk14	Yaya Jallow	20,000	15,000
23/01/2019	3579603	Hyundai Terracan mk77	Ansumana Kebbeh	20,000	30,000
23/01/2019	3579528	Hyundai santafe m59	Edrissa Cham	4,000	1,000,000
23/01/2019	3579529	Cater pillar	Hadim Gai	700,000	1,000,000
23/01/2019	3579530	Mini truck iveco	Hadim Gai	70,000	100,000
24/01/2019	3579531	Ford excursion mk58	Saidou jallow	30,000	75,000
24/01/2019	3579532	Ford excursion	Buba Bojang	80,000	150,000
24/01/2019	3579533	TATA double cabin mk76	Nuha Marena	70,000	60,000
24/01/2019	3579534	G/wall haval 6355129	Babucarr Sanneh	20,000	35,000
24/01/2019	3579535	M/Benz 260 m79	Badou Manneh	20,000	10,000
24/01/2019	3579536	M145 volvo	Mike Secka	50,000	4,000
24/01/2019	3579537	M91 SMACA82 182 CAR scrab	Ebrima Jallow	3,000	150,000
24/01/2019	3579538	M118 Bedford truck TM 66	Jahoil Company	50,000	20,000
25/01/2019	3579604	Tata pick up kanilai	Bakary Colley	5,000	21,000
25/01/2019	3579605	Bed ford k 26	Ebrima Jallow	15,000	22,000
25/01/2019	3579606	Bed ford k 22	Ebrima Jallow	15,000	6,000
25/01/2019	3579607	k 40	Ebrima Jallow	1,000	8,000

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	NAME OF BUYER	RESERVE PRICE (D)	AMOUNT PAID (D)
25/01/2019	3579608	k 33	Ebrima Jallow	1,000	3,000
25/01/2019	3579609	k 31	Yaya Jallow	200	5,000
25/01/2019	3579610	T L C Mk24	Yaya Jallow	5,000	5,000
25/01/2019	3579611	Hyundai mk 24	Yaya Jallow	5,000	5,000
25/01/2019	3579614	TLC mk22	Yaya Jallow	4,000	5,000
25/01/2019	3579615	Hyundai terracan mk23	Yaya Jallow	5,000	5,000
25/01/2019	3579616	Hyundai scarb mk24	Yaya Jallow	5,000	5,000
25/01/2019	3579617	Hyundai mk 18	Yaya Jallow	10,000	5,000
25/01/2019	3579618	TLC mk21	Yaya Jallow	3,000	5,000
25/01/2019	3579619	TLC m45	Yaya Jallow	3,000	5,000
25/01/2019	3579620	Bed Ford mk28	Yaya Jallow	3,000	5,000
25/01/2019	3579621	Hummer m24	Yaya Jallow	50,000	20,000
25/01/2019	3579622	Nissan patrol m31	Yaya Jallow	5,000	10,000
25/01/2019	3579623	TLC PB	Yaya Jallow	10,000	10,000
25/01/2019	3579626	Land Rover mk30	Ansumana Kebbeh	15,000	10,000
25/01/2019	3579627	Truck m146	Micheal secka	30,000	40,000
25/01/2019	3579628	Mini-excavator with scraps	Omar Jallow	70,000	100,000
25/01/2019	3579631	Hummer m23	Yaya Jallow	30,000	20,000
25/01/2019	3579632	Volvo city bus	Yaya Jallow	30,000	30,000
25/01/2019	3579634	K75, Mk10, mk4, mk31, mk25	Samuel Chineadu	45,000	64,000
25/01/2019	3579635	TLC m33	Yaya Jallow	40,000	40,000
25/01/2019	3579636	TLC m28	Yaya Jallow	40,000	40,000
27/01/2019	3579637	Iveco Tipper Truck k42	Buba Tamba	200,000	200,000
28/01/2019	3579640	M/Benz Saloon SH9	Muntaga Salah	100,000	125,000
28/01/2019	3579641	M/Benz SH14	Muntaga Salah	200,000	150,000

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	NAME OF BUYER	RESERVE PRICE (D)	AMOUNT PAID (D)
28/01/2019	3579642	Q56 SH16	Muntaga Salah	75,000	75,000
28/01/2019	3579643	Volvo Inolo Truck	Yaya Jallow	15,000	30,000
28/01/2019	3579644	Magrib ead right hand m35	Yaya Jallow	150,000	130,000
29/01/2019	3579645	Toyota dyna 3 ton truck SH5	Muhammed kebben	20,000	20,000
29/01/2019	3579646	K39, K41, K19 all scrab	O C Chris	15,000	25,000
29/01/2019	3579647	SH18, SH20, SH21	Hadim Gai	400,000	515,000
30/01/2019	3579648	M148, TM Truck scrab	Micheal secka	20,000	20,000
30/01/2019	3579539	Renualt magnu head and trailer k43	Lamin Kinteh	400,000	350,000
30/01/2019	3579540	Man head and trailer k44	Lamin A Camara	400,000	350,000
30/01/2019	3579541	Nissan Armanda SH 15 scrab	Momodou Kunta Mambureh	10,000	10,000
30/01/2019	3579542	Iveco magirus 110-17 truck SH2	Amadou Bamba Krubally	50,000	50,000
30/01/2019	3579543	Benz tipper truck	Nfansu Touray	20,000	25,000
30/01/2019	3579544	Range Rover	Ebrima Sanka Darboe	30,000	50,000
6/02/2019	3579545	20 Fit container	Saho surr	10,000	18,000
6/02/2019	3579546	40fit container	Saho surr	20,000	30,000
6/02/2019	3579547	006-40FIAPNU 8045463	OC Chris	225,000	350,000
6/02/2019	3579548	20 fit container	Babuoucarr Njera	10,000	16,000
6/02/2019	3579549	Container empty	Ramatoulie Jallow	15,000	18,000
6/02/2019	3579551	44951 ECNUI	Hadim Gai	50,000	80,000
6/02/2019	3579552	Pipe PPC	Hadim Gai	8,000	10,000
6/02/2019	3579553	40fit scrab container	Rematoulie Jallow	20,000	30,000
6/02/2019	3579554	CVTU 40fit	Ebrima Barry	15,000	34,000

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	NAME OF BUYER	RESERVE PRICE (D)	AMOUNT PAID (D)
6/02/2019	3579555	Empty container scrab	Jahoil Company	15,000	20,000
6/02/2019	3578556	Empty container scrab	Jahoil Company	20,000	20,000
6/02/2019	3579557	Scrab excavator	Jahoil Company	30,000	25,000
6/02/2019	3579558	Scrab machine	Jahoil Company	30,000	50,000
6/02/2019	3579559	Chain saw 1	NAWEC	30,000	40,000
6/02/2019	3579560	Chain saw 1	NAWEC	550,000	700,000
6/02/2019	3579561	2 water pump	NAWEC	200,000	250,000
6/02/2019	3579562	Compressor	NAWEC	225,000	300,000
6/02/2019	3578563	Bore Hole pipes 104	NAWEC	30,000	50,000
6/02/2019	3579564	2 jack hover F EDELL	NAWEC	10,000	15,000
6/02/2019	3579565	SaltBags ceavah	NAWEC	50,000	60,000
6/02/2019	3579566	1 set of greerche 6ku	NAWEC	10,000	15,000
6/02/2019	3579567	MAE 280443 20 FIT Empty container	NAWEC	20,000	35,000
6/02/2019	3579569	40 FIT 763126-1	A hgie admat Secka	80,000	115,000
6/02/2019	3579570	4 holer and 35 seeders	O. Chris	10,000	15,000
6/02/2019	3579571	Toyota helooks scrabs	A hacie admat Secka	4,000,000	7,000,000
6/02/2019	3579572	5 containers with content (machine)	Jahoil Company	100,000	180,000
6/02/2019	3579574	5 x 40FIT containers	Jahoil Company	250,000	335,000
6/02/2019	3579575	OIAU-264058-3 20fit Container	Jahoil Company	100,000	200,000
6/02/2019	3579576	28 Tyers	Jahoil Company	125,000	175,000
6/02/2019	3579577	Watter irrigation pipes	Jahoil Company	50,000	80,000
6/02/2019	3579578	TRU-42648540 fit container with Almin	Jahoil Company	40,000	80,000
6/02/2019	3579579	2 magnum generators	Jahoil Company	400,000	700,000
6/02/2019	3579580	9 electric hanier	Jahoil Company	100,000	135,000

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	NAME OF BUYER	RESERVE PRICE (D)	AMOUNT PAID (D)
7/02/2019	3579581	Galloper scrap mk16	Ansumana Kebbeh	5,000	5,000
7/02/2019	3579582	Hyundai teralane scrab mk7	Ansumana Kebbeh	10,000	10,000
7/02/2019	3579583	2 mixer	Karablie Jammeh	5,000	8,000
7/02/2019	3579584	Kitchen Utensils	Karablie Jammeh	20,000	25,000
7/02/2019	3579585	9 Corepiles iron	Bala Musa Jobe	2,000	2,500
7/02/2019	3579587	Utensils, 1 compressor and 2 ppc pipes	Hadim Gai	100,000	125,000
7/02/2019	3579588	2 damage water pump	Hadim Gai	250,000	450,000
7/02/2019	3579589	Cutting disk	Muhammed Sillah	8,000	10,000
7/02/2019	3579590	ELCULLER	Muhammed Sillah	10,000	15,000
7/02/2019	3579591	Fish reel	Momodou Jagana	2,000	3,000
7/02/2019	3579592	Bolt lups of scrab	O. Chris	4,000	5,000
7/02/2019	3579593	40 fit container	Chuka Joof	20,000	31,000
7/02/2019	3579594	40fit container	Musa Jallow	20,000	31,000
7/02/2019	3579595	40 fit container	Musa Jallow	20,000	31,000
7/02/2019	3579596	Empty container CRXU	Buba Sanneh	10,000	15,000
7/02/2019	3579597	Scrab generator	Omar Jallow	100,000	150,000
7/02/2019	3579598	Sriui-6421 container	Jerreh Sonko	10,000	10,000
7/02/2019	3579600	Donkey cart	Ansumana Keboeh	3,000	3,000
8/02/2019	3565451	2 x 33 KVA Generators	Muhammed Sillah	150,000	250,000
8/02/2019	3565455	2 scrab generator and scrab machine	Omar Jallow	30,000	40,000
8/02/2019	3565456	1 compressor, 2 containers, 1 range machine	Jahoil Company	100,000	130,000
8/02/2019	3565457	Pipes	Jahoil Company	70,000	100,000

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	NAME OF BUYER	RESERVE PRICE (D)	AMOUNT PAID (D)
8/02/2019	3565458	2 scrab machine, one scrab trailer	Hadim Gai	40,000	60,000
8/02/2019	3565459	Scrab truck k2	OC Chris	5,000	5,000
8/02/2019	3565460	1 small generator	Ansumana Kebbeh	15,000	20,000
8/02/2019	3565461	Barbwires	Hadim Gai	40,000	50,000
8/02/2019	3565462	1 mercendez benz E200	Alhagie m Jallow	150,000	200,000
8/02/2019	3565463	Mercedenz benz E200	Matoma Jammeh	150,000	200,000
8/02/2019	3565464	Empty scrab Barrel	L. D Sanyang	5,000	6,000
8/02/2019	3565465	Empty scrab trailer	Ebrima Joof	5,000	10,000
8/02/2019	3565466	Scrab container, 2 scrab generators and machinery	Omar Jallow	100,000	135,000
8/02/2019	3565467	Tata Nissan mk34	Chinedu Sameul	4,000	5,000
8/02/2019	3565468	Two outboat machine	Modou. S Janneh	50,000	70,000
8/02/2019	3565469	Outboat hornder 135 cut boat engine	Alan Fisher	30,000	40,000
8/02/2019	3565470	CFXU empty container scrab 52602-Q	Muhammed Dukureh	10,000	15,000
8/02/2019	3565471	Freezer container	Jahoil Company	30,000	40,000
8/02/2019	3565472	Freezer container	Jahoil Company	40,000	60,000
8/02/2019	3565473	Meredez benz	Ahagie m Jallow	150,000	200,000
8/02/2019	3565474	City bus kanilai	Sheik mbakeh Faal	120,000	125,000
8/02/2019	3565475	2 scrab containers, 2 scrab metal buses	Ebrima Krubally	15,000	20,000
8/02/2019	3565476	5 scrab city buses	Ebrima Krubally	180,000	200,000
9/02/2019	3565477	3 water pump hp 1	Hadim Gai	10,000	15,000
9/02/2019	3565478	Barbwires	Karablie Jammeh	10,000	15,000
9/02/2019	3565479	4 containers with tiles and bohoid pipes	Ebrima Krubally	350,000	500,000

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	NAME OF BUYER	RESERVE PRICE (D)	AMOUNT PAID (D)
9/02/2019	3565480	M-Benz	Ablie Sanneh	250,000	300,000
OFFICIAL TOTALS (per source document)				D 29,313,250	D 44,438,500

226. The Committee notes that there are 350 receipt entries from the auction report, covering 140 buyers, with records of an official aggregate reserve price of D29,313,250 and total amount realised of D44,438,500. The auction is reported to have generated receipts approximately 51.6% above the combined reserve valuations.

D 44,438,500 OFFICIAL TOTAL RAISED <i>Per source document total row</i>	D 29,313,250 OFFICIAL RESERVE TOTAL <i>Combined minimum bid values</i>	51.6% PREMIUM ABOVE RESERVE <i>Official paid vs. official reserve</i>	140 TOTAL UNIQUE BUYERS <i>Across all auction days</i>	350 TOTAL LOTS CAPTURED <i>Extracted receipt entries</i>
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227. The auction spanned seventeen distinct selling days between 14 January and 9 February 2019, with activity concentrated in early-to-mid January for vehicle lots and shifting toward equipment, machinery, and containers in the February sessions.

DATE	LOTS	RESERVE	AMOUNT PAID	PREMIUM	NOTABLE
14 Jan 2019	13	D 780,000	D 1,576,000	+102%	Tipper Truck (D350,000 paid — 289% above reserve)
15 Jan 2019	73	D 1,976,500	D 3,223,000	+63%	Largest single day by lot volume; dominated by Hyundai/Toyota vehicles
16 Jan 2019	34	D 1,257,000	D 2,053,000	+63%	Toyota coster sold for D225,000 vs D25,000 reserve (+800%)
17 Jan 2019	13	D 443,000	D 619,000	+40%	Land Cruiser and Benz trucks; Musa Ceesay is active
18 Jan 2019	48	D 3,827,000	D 4,844,000	+27%	Largest reserve day; J4500 Coach

DATE	LOTS	RESERVE	AMOUNT PAID	PREMIUM	NOTABLE
					sold for D2,885,000
19 Jan 2019	37	D 1,576,500	D 1,956,000	+24%	Caterpillar K1 and heavy haulage lots; Yaya Jallow bulk acquisitions
23 Jan 2019	4	D 794,000	D 2,130,000	+168%	Highest premium day; Hyundai Santafe sold for D1,000,000 vs D4,000 reserve
24 Jan 2019	8	D 323,000	D 504,000	+56%	Mixed lots; Ford Excursion sold for D150,000
25 Jan 2019	26	D 445,200	D 494,000	+11%	Largely bulk scrap lots; Yaya Jallow acquires 18 items
27 Jan 2019	1	D 200,000	D 200,000	0%	Single lot: Iveco Tipper Truck k42 — sold at exact reserve
28 Jan 2019	5	D 540,000	D 510,000	-6%	The only day on which aggregate paid fell below aggregate reserve
29 Jan 2019	3	D 435,000	D 560,000	+29%	SH18/SH20/SH21 lot sold for D515,000
30 Jan 2019	7	D 930,000	D 855,000	-8%	Head-and-trailer lots sold below reserve; mixed results
6 Feb 2019	33	D 6,848,000	D11,181,000	+63%	Highest-value day; Toyota scraps alone raised D7,000,000
7 Feb 2019	18	D 599,000	D 929,500	+55%	Equipment lots: water pumps, containers, generators
8 Feb 2019	23	D 1,489,000	D 1,981,000	+33%	Mercedes-Benz units, city buses, machinery
9 Feb 2019	4	D 620,000	D 830,000	+34%	Final day; containers and pipes; Ebrima Krubally D500,000 lot

TOP BUYERS BY TOTAL EXPENDITURE

228. The Committee observes that a striking concentration of purchasing power is evident. Just five buyers, A. Hagie Admat Secka, Jahoil Company, Hadim Gai, Saidou Jallow, and NAWEC, together accounted for the overwhelming majority of value transacted.

#	BUYER	LOTS	RESERVE	PAID	PREMIUM	OBSERVATIONS
1	A. Hagie Admat Secka	1	D 4,000,000	D7,000,000	+75%	Single lot (Toyota helooks scrabs) — highest-value transaction in auction
2	Jahoil Company	23	D3,910,000	D5,633,000	+44%	Most active corporate buyer; acquired vehicles, coaches, generators, containers
3	Hadim Gai	12	D 1,843,000	D2,680,000	+45%	Heavy equipment specialist; caterpillar, water pumps, SH lots
4	Saidou Jallow	33	D 1,035,000	D1,467,000	+42%	Highest lot count; predominantly vehicles across multiple auction days
5	NAWEC	9	D 1,125,000	D1,465,000	+30%	State utility; recovered own equipment (chain saws, pumps, pipes, compressors)
6	Edrissa Cham	1	D 4,000	D1,000,000	+24,900%	Paid D1,000,000 for Hyundai santafe reserved at only D4,000 — most extreme premium
7	Omar Jallow	16	D 663,000	D 946,000	+43%	Diverse lots: vehicles, containers, generators, scrap machinery
8	Ebrima Krubally	3	D 545,000	D 720,000	+32%	Bulk lots: city buses and container/pipe lots
9	Ebrima Jallow	17	D 281,000	D 541,000	+93%	Broad portfolio: Bedford trucks, scrap motors, Benz units
10	Yaya Jallow	27	D 533,700	D 530,000	-1%	Second-highest lot count; bulk scrap & TLC lots, mostly at or near reserve
11	Buba Bojang	2	D 170,000	D 500,000	+194%	Tipper Truck at D350,000 (289% above reserve); TATA CON at D106,000
12	Alhagie Conteh	4	D 290,000	D 465,000	+60%	Ram Trucks and Land Cruiser; strong competitive

#	BUYER	LOTS	RESERVE	PAID	PREMIUM	OBSERVATIONS
						bids
13	Ramatoulie Jallow	6	D 321,000	D 398,000	+24%	Trucks and containers; steady bidder
14	Muntaga Sallah/Salah	5	D 825,000	D 800,000	-3%	High-end SH-series vehicles; some bought below reserve
15	Lamin Kinteh	1	D 400,000	D 350,000	-13%	Head-and-trailer k43 — acquired below reserve price

229. Volume-based analysis reveals a different story. Saidou Jallow (33 lots) and Yaya Jallow (27 lots) dominated by quantity, yet their average spend per lot was comparatively modest, D44,455 and D19,630 respectively. By contrast, Jahoil Company's 23 lots averaged D244,913 each.

BUYER	LOTS	TOTAL PAID	AVG PER LOT	PROFILE
Saidou Jallow	33	D 1,467,000	D 44,455	Vehicles across all Jan dates; mix of Toyota, Hyundai, scrap lots
Yaya Jallow	27	D 530,000	D 19,630	Bulk scrap, TLC units, Bedford lots; many bought at minimal reserve prices
Jahoil Company	23	D 5,633,000	D 244,913	Corporate buyer: coaches, generators, containers, machinery
Ebrima Jallow	17	D 541,000	D 31,824	Wide variety of vehicle types; consistent bidder across January
Omar Jallow	16	D 946,000	D 59,125	Vehicles and equipment; Cartapillar K1 at D125,000
Hadim Gai	12	D 2,680,000	D 223,333	Specialist heavy equipment; highest avg spend among top 10 individual buyers
NAWEC	9	D 1,465,000	D 162,778	State utility recovering its own assets sold through the Janneh Commission
Musa Ceesay	6	D 265,000	D 44,167	JAC pickups, Nissan, Benz trucks
Ramatoulie Jallow	6	D 398,000	D 66,333	Trucks and containers; reliable mid-tier bidder
Ansumana Kebbeh	6	D 120,000	D 20,000	Scrap vehicles and Hyundai units; low average spends

RESERVE VS. SALE PRICE, OVERALL PICTURE

259 Lots Sold ABOVE Reserve <i>74% of captured entries</i>	44 Lots Sold AT Reserve <i>13% of captured entries</i>	47 Lots Sold BELOW Reserve <i>13% of captured entries</i>	~97% Avg Premium (above-reserve lots) <i>Mean % above reserve price</i>
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230. The Committee notes that the majority of lots, 74%, were sold above their reserve prices. A significant minority of 47 lots (13%) sold below reserve, which warrants scrutiny, as reserve prices are typically treated as floor values in public auctions. The practice of accepting bids below reserve requires either explicit authorisation by the Commission, which was hardly the case.

231. As shown below, lots were sold at prices dramatically below their set reserve values. Several of these involve vehicles in apparent working condition being acquired at a fraction of reserve.

ITEM	BUYER	RESERVE	PAID	DEFICIT %	DATE
M145 Volvo	Mike Secka	D 50,000	D 4,000	-92%	24 Jan 2019
M/Benz m123	Michael Secka	D 40,000	D 6,000	-85%	19 Jan 2019
Hyundai scarp	Alieu Gaye	D 40,000	D 9,000	-78%	19 Jan 2019
S.M.A mk45	Alieu Gaye	D 20,000	D 9,000	-55%	19 Jan 2019
M/Benz SH14	Muntaga Salah	D 200,000	D 150,000	-25%	28 Jan 2019
Renault Magnu head & trailer k43	Lamin Kinteh	D 400,000	D 350,000	-13%	30 Jan 2019
Man head and trailer k44	Lamin A Camara	D 400,000	D 350,000	-13%	30 Jan 2019
JAC pickup ml27	Musa Ceesay	D 75,000	D 44,000	-41%	17 Jan 2019
Toyota TLC m26 V8	Samba Bah	D 80,000	D 50,000	-38%	15 Jan 2019

ITEM	BUYER	RESERVE	PAID	DEFICI T %	DATE
Toyota Land Cruiser mk44	Saidou Jallow	D 50,000	D 25,000	-50%	18 Jan 2019

MOST EXTREME ANOMALIES: ITEMS SOLD FAR ABOVE RESERVE

232. While competitive bidding is desirable in public auctions, certain transactions show premiums so extreme as to suggest that most of the assets were undervalued or that other factors influenced the bidding process.

ITEM	BUYER	RESERVE	PAID	PREMIUM	DATE	NOTES
Hyundai Santa Fe M59	Edrissa Cham	D 4,000	D1,000,000	+24,900%	23 Jan 2019	Reserve of D4,000 for a Hyundai SUV is implausibly low — likely a clerical error in the reserve setting
M91 SMACA82 182 CAR scrab	Ebrima Jallow	D 3,000	D 150,000	+4,900%	24 Jan 2019	Car scrap valued at D3,000 reserve but sold for D150,000
Toyota Coster	Saho Surr	D 25,000	D 225,000	+800%	16 Jan 2019	A Toyota coaster bus; the reserve appears significantly undervalued
Tipper Truck (3535664)	Buba Bojang	D 90,000	D 350,000	+289%	14 Jan 2019	Strong competition; highest single-item premium on day 1
Toyota helooks scrabs	A. Hagie Admat Secka	D4,000,000	D7,000,000	+75%	6 Feb 2019	Largest single transaction; D3M above reserve — highly competitive
2 magnum generators	Jahoil Company	D 400,000	D 700,000	+75%	6 Feb 2019	Industrial generators; strong demand from Jahoil Company

ITEM	BUYER	RESERVE	PAID	PREMIUM	DATE	NOTES
2 damage water pump	Hadim Gai	D 250,000	D 450,000	+80%	7 Feb 2019	Even 'damaged' equipment attracted strong bids
M/Benz (BJL 7457 F)	Momodou A. Jallow	D 100,000	D 206,000	+106%	14 Jan 2019	Premium Mercedes drew competitive opening-day bidding

233. The Committee also observes several anomalies and distinctions in the receipts captured in the action report. The auction receipts span several distinct numbering series, which likely correspond to different batches or administrative groupings of assets processed through the disposal exercise. Four primary series are identifiable:

RECEIPT SERIES	APPROX. LOTS	DATE RANGE	NATURE OF ASSETS
3554xxx	~30	14–15 Jan 2019	Predominantly motor vehicles, pickups, and buses from the opening two days
3535xxx	~55	14–16 Jan 2019	Vehicles including cars, Hyundais, trucks, Ram trucks, and Benz units
3565xxx	~85	16–18 Jan & 8–9 Feb 2019	The largest series spans mid-January vehicle lots through February equipment lots
3579xxx	~160	19 Jan – 30 Jan & 6–7 Feb 2019	Widest range: vehicles, heavy plant, containers, NAWEC equipment, generators
3596xxx	1	19 Jan 2019	Single anomalous receipt (3596700 — TLC m137, Yaya Jallow, D10,000)

234. Notably, some receipt numbers appear duplicated (e.g., 3535693 appears twice for two separate lots, 'Motor car' and 'pgaso Truck M151'. Similarly, receipt 3579507 appears for two different items.

235. The Committee also notes that the top five buyers by expenditure accounted for a disproportionate share of total auction proceeds. Jahoil Company alone acquired 23 lots across multiple auction days and categories, including the high-value J4500 super Ruxery Coach (D2,885,000), generators (D700,000), and multiple containers and machinery lots.

IMPLAUSIBLY LOW RESERVE PRICES

- 236.** The Committee notes with concern that several reserve prices appear inconsistent with any reasonable market valuation of the assets described. For example, a Hyundai Santafe SUV with a reserve of D4,000 (Edrissa Cham lot, 23 January), a car scrap reserve of D3,000 that sold for D150,000, and multiple Toyota Land Cruisers reserved at D1,000–D5,000. The Committee notes that the reserve prices are either a result of deliberate undervaluation or a systematic failure of the valuation exercise. Further to these, 47 lots sold below even these already-low reserve prices, compounding the concern.
- 237.** Perhaps, the single most statistically anomalous transaction in the entire auction is the purchase by Edrissa Cham of a Hyundai Santafe m59 on 23 January 2019 for D1,000,000 against a reserve of D4,000, a premium of 24,900%. While this could theoretically reflect genuine competitive bidding, the combination of an implausibly low reserve and an exceptionally high sale price creates a transaction profile that warrants independent verification. The identity and background of Edrissa Cham are not established from the receipt records alone.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1.** The Committee recommends that the portfolio, reporting structure, and institutional placement of the Office of the Government Vehicle Controller be formally reviewed and restructured. The Committee therefore recommends that:
 - i. The Office of the Vehicle Controller be placed under a designated Ministry or Department with statutory responsibility for government asset management (e.g., Ministry of Finance), rather than the Office of the President.
 - ii. Its mandate be formally defined by regulation or administrative instrument, clearly outlining functions relating to inventory, custody, documentation, movement control, and reporting of Government vehicles.
 - iii. The Government regularises the reporting structure of the Office by eliminating overlapping lines of authority and designating a single administrative supervisor, thereby preventing ambiguity in accountability as it obtains currently with the Government Vehicle Controller reporting to three superiors, i.e., the Secretary General, the Chief of Staff, and the Inspector General of Police.
- 2.** The Committee recommends urgent administrative reform within the Vehicle Control Office, specifically:
 - i. Introduction of standardised file reference numbers.
 - ii. Use of official letterheads and serialised correspondence.
 - iii. Maintenance of movement registers for all government vehicles.
 - iv. Digitisation of inventory records.
 - v. Basic records management and registry training for all relevant staff.

- vi. Periodic audit of inventory records by an independent internal audit unit.
3. The Committee recommends that any public asset disposal exercise be preceded by a certified baseline inventory and concluded with a comprehensive final reconciliation report accounting for each asset identified at the outset, with any discrepancies formally investigated and resolved prior to closure of the disposal process. Certification should be the duty of the Government Vehicle Controller.
4. The Committee recommends that public auction processes involving public assets incorporate mandatory anti-money laundering and purchaser identification safeguards. Accordingly:
 - i. All buyers must provide verifiable identification.
 - ii. A buyer register capturing full particulars must be maintained.
 - iii. Payments above a defined threshold must be made through formal banking channels.
 - iv. Politically exposed persons must be subject to enhanced disclosure review.
 - v. Auction documentation must be standardised.
5. The Committee recommends that proceeds from the disposal of public assets be processed exclusively through formal financial control systems, and that no individual officer exercise personal custody over such funds. All auction proceeds must be promptly receipted, deposited into a designated account, and reconciled under dual control arrangements. The Accountant General's Department must be involved in every public sale to ensure full traceability, accountability, and adherence to public financial management principles.

AIRCRAFTS

- 238.** The Committee commences its findings on this class of assets by stating that the Commission of Inquiry, in its report, did not deliberate much on the issue of aircraft owned by or associated with the former president. The extent of the Commission's work regarding the aircraft, as reported in Volume 1 & 2 of its report, is limited to the site visit it embarked on to the Banjul International Airport on 23rd November 2017. An extract from the Commission's report on its visit to the airport states as follows:
- “The visit to Yundum Airport was eye-opening. We inspected several aeroplanes which to our laymen's eyes were rather old - one Ilushin 11-62m, two Air Tractor BT-802A; (firefighters), and two Boeings. We were told by Airport official authorities that there was another airplane in Europe for maintenance. One of the planes was luxuriously refurbished and even had a bedroom! It was understood that most of these planes are in the market for sale.” See page 18 of the Janneh Commission Report Volume 1 & 2.*
- 239.** From the report, the Commission found five aircraft at the Banjul International Airport and received evidence that there was an additional aircraft owned by The Gambia that was sent to Germany for maintenance. The Committee confirms this fact from the evidence it received from GCAA and the Minister of Finance. The Commission's report on the additional aircraft in Germany is found on page 35 of its report, where it makes the following recommendations:

“We noted a few aircraft parked at Yundum Airport grounds. We were informed by Gambia Civil Aviation Authority officials that one Boeing aero plane was in Germany for maintenance. We recommend that all the planes be sold in a manner that is feasible, as decided by senior officials of GCAA and the Ministry of Finance selected by the Secretary General, Office of the President.”

240. In an undated status report prepared by GCAA, all six aircraft, their serial and registration numbers, as well as their locations, were listed in a table reproduced below.

AIRCRAFT TYPE	SERIAL NUMBER	YEAR OF MANUFACTURE	REGISTRATION	REMARKS
Ilyushin II-62M	1356234	1985	C5 – RTG	Parked at BIA
Boeing B727 – 100	20533	1971	C5 - GOG	Parked at BIA
Boeing B727 – 100	19252	1966	C5 – GAF	Parked at BIA
Air Tractor 8T – 802A	802A - 0186	2004	C5 – DOA	Parked at BIA
Air Tractor 8T – 802A	802A - 0195	2004	C5 - KSB	Parked at BIA
Challenger CL – 601	3043	1985	C5 – AFT	Being preserved at ACC Columbia Facilities in Cologne, Germany

241. The Committee notes that, though the Commission was informed that most of the aircraft were already in the market to be sold, it still recommended that all aircraft be sold. The Committee is of the view that the Commission, in its report, did not determine whether the aircraft were owned by the former President or the Government of The Gambia. Evidence received from GCAA, GIA, and MOFEA confirmed to the Committee that the aircraft belonged to the State and that the recommendation for the sale of these aircraft was mostly overtaken by the actions of MOFEA.

242. Two of the aircraft (air tractors) were sold on 11th May 2018 by MOFEA to West African Aero Services SARL, with former Minister Amadou Sanneh as signatory, after Cabinet approval was

granted a day before, on 10th May 2018. The process of sale of the two air tractors commenced around the 14th of August 2017. Both air tractors, which were registered in the Gambia Civil Register under the ownership of the Government of The Gambia, were sold for \$240,000.00 (two hundred and forty thousand US dollars), and the proceeds of the sale were paid into the ‘Asset Recovery from Janneh Commission’ account at the Central Bank of The Gambia.

243. The Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs confirmed that subsequently, three additional aircraft were sold for USD 500,000 (five hundred thousand US dollars) to Sankajula Holding Company Limited under very specific terms that the said aircraft be removed from the airport within three months of the finalisation of the sales. Two of these aircraft remain parked at the airport, as confirmed by the Committee during its visit to the Banjul International Airport, despite the conditions of sale. The Minister acknowledged that removal deadlines were not honoured and that no clear documentation existed regarding extensions, waiver of penalties, or enforcement actions. Yet, MOFEA failed to contact the purchaser about the removal of the aircraft.
244. The Committee could not determine where the proceeds of the sale were deposited. The Honourable Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, Mr. Seedy Keita, during his testimony before the Committee, was tasked to peruse the Ministry’s records and provide updates to the Committee about where the funds were deposited, but the Minister has failed to adhere to the directions of the Committee. The Committee has noted inconsistencies in the documentation obtained and the lack of clarity in the entire sale process of these aircraft.
245. Out of the six aircraft mentioned in the Commission’s report, one of them, at the time the Commission of Inquiry visited the airport in 2017, was located in Germany for the purpose of maintenance, and to this day, the said aircraft is still in Germany, and the conditions in which it remains in Germany are unclear to the Committee.
246. The Committee notes that the continued lack of clarity regarding the status of the aircraft arises from the absence of the relevant information requested from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, despite repeated efforts by the Committee to obtain such information in accordance with the Order issued by the Chairperson of the Committee. In this regard, and consistent with section 74 of the Constitution, which partly provides that Ministers are responsible to the National Assembly for the administration of the departments and other business of Government committed to their charge, the Committee underscores the obligation of the Honourable Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs to keep the National Assembly duly informed on matters falling within his ministerial responsibility.
247. In light of the foregoing, the Committee concludes that the Honourable Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs did not discharge his responsibility to the Committee to provide the requisite guidance and clarity necessary for the effective discharge of the Committee’s oversight mandate. Consequently, and in the absence of the requested information from the Minister, the Committee remains unable to ascertain the true status of the aircraft, as the material facts required for its consideration have not been forthcoming.

248. In furtherance of its inquiry, the Committee, during investigations came across evidence from GCAA and MOFEA documenting the sale of one Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot attack aircraft owned by the Government of The Gambia in 2023. However, the Committee notes that the aircraft was not mentioned in the Commission’s report as it was not a part of the assets it identified. The GCAA/MOFEA records indicate that the aircraft was sold to Vittoria Dordi, the general manager of Gold Rock Trading, for \$150,000.

249. The total proceeds from the sale of the five (5) aircraft are \$740,000.00. The Committee has received evidence that the valuation of the abovementioned aircraft was conducted in February 2018 by Viridis Aviation Partners, at the instruction of the then Honourable Minister of Transport, Works and Infrastructure, Mr. Bai Lamin Jobe. MOFEA has not provided this Committee with any information regarding the valuation report. However, the Committee obtained an anonymous submission of the valuation report, part of which is reproduced below.

No	MSN	Registration	Aircraft Type	YOM (year of manufacturing)	Configuration	Indicated Value Range (US\$), ‘000
1	802A-0186	C5-KSB	AT-802A	2004	Agricultural	320 - 450
2	802A-0195	C5-DOA	AT-802A	2004	Agricultural	320 - 450
3	1356234	C5-RTG	IL-62M	1993	VIP	25 - 50
4	19252	C5-GAF	B727-95	1966	VIP	2 – 8
5	20533	C5-GOG	B727-1H2	1971	VIP	320 - 370
6	3043	C5-AFT	CL601	1985	VIP	700 - 900

250. The total indicative value range for all aircraft is between US\$1,687,000 and US\$ 2,228,000.

251. The Committee, having thoroughly examined the oral testimony and accompanying documentary evidence of the Honourable Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, makes the following findings, which reflect systemic governance weaknesses, procedural inconsistencies, and documentation deficits relating to the management, release, and allocation of assets linked to the former President.

252. The Committee finds a significant policy vacuum governing the disposal of State aircraft and high-value movable assets. The Minister confirmed that no unified directive governs how proceeds from aircraft disposals should be handled and that successive transactions used different accounts

without documented justification. The lack of a structured policy exposes State assets to inconsistency, governance risk, and weakened financial control. The Committee notes that the aircraft in Germany lacks supporting documentation regarding maintenance obligations, cost absorption, or intended disposal processes.

253. The Committee finds that the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs did not comply with the Committee's directive requiring submission of documents by 17th October 2025. Despite being the primary addressee of the summons, the Minister did not provide the requested documentation on time and failed to communicate proactively when it became evident that the deadline could not be met.
254. The Committee acknowledges the Minister's apology during his testimony for not complying with the summons issued and his acceptance of responsibility. However, ministerial accountability requires advance communication and compliance, not post-factum explanations.
255. During his testimony on 21st November 2025, the Committee requested additional information, which Hon. Minister Seedy Keita again failed to provide. This lapse constitutes a serious breach of parliamentary expectations, undermines procedural discipline, and hinders the Committee's ability to prepare effectively for the hearing, thereby constituting contempt of the National Assembly.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That henceforth, the sale and disposal of all state assets must be advertised in media platforms of wide coverage and circulation to ensure transparency and accountability.
2. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs shall submit a report detailing the issues surrounding the state aircraft in Germany. The report must include the reasons why the aircraft is still in Germany, the current value of the aircraft, all maintenance and other fees paid by the government since the aircraft was sent to Germany, and the outstanding arrears maintenance and other fees owed by the State for the said aircraft. This report must be submitted to the National Assembly within no later than five weeks after the tabling of their report.
3. That the Government must inform the National Assembly of the actions it plans to take regarding the aircraft in Germany.
4. In the event the aircraft has been sold, then the Government must submit a report to the National Assembly regarding the sale process of the said aircraft, the sale price, and the information of the purchaser.

BANK ACCOUNTS

256. The Committee examined bank accounts previously investigated by the Commission in order to verify their current status, balances, ownership structures, and compliance with established asset

recovery directives. This review covers accounts held at the Central Bank of The Gambia and various commercial banks, to determine whether recoverable funds were properly transferred to the Consolidated Revenue Fund or other designated recovery accounts, and whether the identified accounts were duly closed, regularised, or remain active or dormant. The assessment further seeks to identify any gaps in institutional follow-up, financial accountability, and post-recovery administrative implementation requiring corrective action.

ACCOUNTS IN COMMERCIAL BANKS

257. The Committee received evidence and reviewed commercial bank accounts identified by the Commission as belonging to the former President, and the recommendations made thereof. The Committee observes that the former President held accounts in at least five different commercial banks, including Arab Gambia Islamic Bank (AGIB), Guaranty Trust Bank (GTBank), and Trust Bank Gambia Ltd. The details of the accounts held in each of the commercial banks identified by the Commission are presented below.

ACCOUNTS OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT AND ASSOCIATES AT AGIB BANK Ltd

258. The Committee received and reviewed evidence from AGIB Bank Ltd confirming the existence of two bank accounts held in the name of Kanilai Family Farms, both denominated in Gambian Dalasi (GMD). The records examined indicate that, at the time of reporting, both accounts reflected zero balances. The Committee further observes that the accounts were reported by the Bank as blocked. However, no documentary confirmation was provided to demonstrate that the accounts were formally closed pursuant to the asset recovery process.

259. In the absence of such confirmation, the Committee considers that the blocking of the accounts appears to have served only as an interim administrative control measure rather than a definitive termination of the banking relationship.

260. Evidence received by the Committee shows that on the 14th day of June 2019 the Ministry of Justice instructed the Bank to transfer the sum of D2,122,224.50 to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs' Revenue Account at the Central Bank; AGIB Bank complied with this instruction. The Accountant General subsequently instructed that the funds be moved to the Consolidated Revenue Fund. The table below shows the accounts held by Jammeh and his associates at the AGIB Bank.

NAME OF ACCOUNT	ACCOUNT NUMBER	CLOSING BALANCE	CURRENCY DOMINATIO N	REMARKS
KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	003101210208360262	0.00	GMD	The account was blocked

KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	003101211020836918	0.00	GMD	The account was blocked
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RECOMMENDATION

1. The Committee recommends that the Accountant General take steps to confirm whether the said accounts remain legally open, in restricted status, or have been duly closed in accordance with applicable banking regulations.
2. Where the accounts remain open, the Accountant General instructs the Bank to immediately effect formal closure based on the findings of the Commission and the White Paper, in order to prevent the possibility of future transactions, liabilities, or administrative charges arising in relation to the accounts.

JAMMEH AND ASSOCIATES ACCOUNTS AT VISTA BANK

261. The Committee examined documentary records relating to accounts held at Vista Bank in the names of entities associated with the former President and his affiliates. These records reveal the existence of multiple bank accounts maintained under various company and project names, including Alhamdulillah Petroleum and Mineral Co., Euro Africa Group Limited, Kanilai Family Farm, JV.KGI, KGI International, and its related entities, KGI Boutique, KGI Japanese Rice, and Operation Save the Children. The accounts are denominated predominantly in Gambian Dalasi (GMD), with a limited number held in United States Dollars (USD).
262. The Committee identified several accounts that continue to hold positive balances based on the available records. Notable among these are accounts in the names of Euro Africa Group Limited, which reflect substantial balances both in earlier reporting periods and as recently as 2025, as well as accounts belonging to Kanilai Family Farm and Alhamdulillah Petroleum and Mineral Co., which similarly retain funds. However, the Committee did not obtain documentary confirmation demonstrating that these balances are transferred into the appropriate asset recovery or public revenue accounts.
263. The Committee further observed the presence of numerous dormant or zero-balance accounts across several of the identified entities, including accounts linked to JV.KGI, KGI International, KGI Japanese Rice, Kanilai Family Farm, and Operation Save the Children. While the absence of funds suggests that prior withdrawals, transfers, or administrative actions may occur, the Committee did not receive confirmation that such accounts are formally closed in accordance with applicable banking, regulatory, or asset recovery procedures. The continued existence of dormant accounts without closure presents an administrative and accountability gap, as such accounts remain susceptible to future liabilities or unauthorized activity.

264. In addition, a significant number of accounts reflect negative balances arising from the accumulation of bank charges over time. These include accounts in the names of Alhamdulillah Petroleum and Mineral Co., KGI International and related entities, KGI Boutique, KGI International (Cement), KGI Japanese Rice, and Operation Save the Children. The existence of negative balances indicates that accounts remain operational or administratively open long after the relevant recovery processes, thereby allowing further charges to accrue. This situation underscores weaknesses in the closure, reconciliation, and supervisory follow-up mechanisms expected to accompany asset recovery implementation.

265. Taken together, the evidence reviewed by the Committee points to insufficient institutional follow-up by the Attorney General’s Chamber or by the Accountant General’s Department to confirm that Vista Bank fully complied with directives arising from the asset recovery process. In particular, the Committee found no comprehensive verification ensuring that all recoverable funds were duly transferred to the appropriate State accounts and that all related bank accounts were formally closed or restricted. The table below shows the accounts held by former President Jammeh and his associates at Vista Bank.

NAME OF ACCOUNT	ACCOUNTS NUMBER	CLOSING BALANCE	CURRENCY	REMARKS/OBSERVATION
ALHAMDULILLAH PEROLEUM AND MINERAL CO.	04.101-607950-01	2,313.00	GMD	This account had a balance of 2,313.00 as of 2018.
ALHAMDULILLAH PEROLEUM AND MINERAL CO.	01.108-607950-02	0.67	USD	This account had a balance of 0.67 dollars as of 2017.
ALLAHAMDULILLA PETROLEUM AND MINERAL CO	404014043160169	-4,590.53	GMD	This account is still active and has accumulated charges as of 2025.
EURO AFRICA GROUP LIMITED	00.101-08120-01	653,945.83	GMD	This account had a balance of 653,954.83 as of 2020.
EURO AFRICA GROUP LIMITED	406016300900132	647,735.83	GMD	The account is still active and has a balance of 647,735.83 as of 2025.
JV.KGI	04.101-606055-01	0.00	GMD	This account has zero funds
JV.KGI	04.101-606055-02	0.00	GMD	This account has zero funds as of 2017
KANILAI FAMILY, FARM	05.101-500788-01	0.00	GMD	This account has zero funds
KANILAI FAMILY, FARM	405025289180143	7,909.12	GMD	This account is still active with 7,909.12 as of 2025.
KANILAI FAMILY, FARM	05.102-501136-01	8,263.90		
KGI INTERNATIONAL	04.101-606886-01	0.00	GMD	This account has zero funds
KGI INTERNATIONAL	404014292110207	-3,958.87	GMD	This account accumulated charges as of 2025

KGI INTERNATIONAL	04.101-606887.01	-12,737.02	GMD	This account accumulated charges as of 2020.
KGI INTERNATIONAL	404014292260190	0.00	GMD	This account is dormant
KGI BOUTIQUE	404014293870116	-3,958.87	GMD	This account accumulated charges as of 2025
KGI INTERNATIONAL (CEMENT)	04.101-606886.02	0.00	GMD	This account has zero funds
KGI INTERNATIONAL (CEMENT)	40401429110164	-3,958.87	GMD	This account accumulated charges as of 2025.
KGI BOUTIQUE	0410160691201	0.00	GMD	This account has zero funds
KGI JAPANESE RICE	404014291850244	-3,958.87	GMD	This account is active and has accumulated charges as of 2025
KGI JAPANESE RICE	04.108-606885-05	0.00	USD	This account has zero funds
K GI JAPANESE RICE	404084291850120	0.00	USD	This account is dormant
Operation Save the Children	404014308100105	-7,917.74	GMD	This account is active and has accumulated charges as of 2025.
Operation Save the Children	04.101-607103-01	0.00	GMD	This account had a closing balance of 0.

266. The committee identified accounts that still held balances based on the records reviewed, including:

- (a) Euro Africa Group Limited – GMD 653,945.83 (balance as at 2020)
- (b) Euro Africa Group Limited – GMD 647,735.83 (active with balance as at 2025)
- (c) Kanilai Family Farm – GMD 7,909.12 (active as at 2025)
- (d) Kanilai Family Farm – GMD 8,263.90 (balance recorded; currency not specified in table)
- (e) Alhamdulillah Petroleum and Mineral Co. – GMD 2,313.00 (balance as at 2018)
- (f) Alhamdulillah Petroleum and Mineral Co. – USD 0.67 (balance as at 2017)

267. The Committee did not obtain documentary evidence confirming whether these balances were transferred into the Asset Recovery framework.

268. Several accounts were recorded with zero balances or dormant status, including:

- (a) JV.KGI accounts
- (b) KGI International accounts with zero funds
- (c) KGI Japanese Rice (USD) accounts
- (d) Kanilai Family Farm (selected accounts)
- (e) Operation Save the Children (selected accounts)

269. The Committee did not obtain confirmation that these accounts were formally closed.

270. A number of accounts reflected negative balances due to accumulated bank charges, including:

- (a) Alhamdulillah Petroleum and Mineral Co. – GMD -4,590.53 (active as at 2025)
- (b) KGI International accounts (multiple) with negative balances
- (c) KGI Boutique – negative balance due to charges
- (d) KGI International (Cement) – negative balances
- (e) KGI Japanese Rice – negative balance with ongoing charges
- (f) Operation Save the Children – GMD -7,917.74 (active as at 2025)

271. The continued existence of these accounts indicates that they remained active or were not formally closed.

272. Evidence before the Committee shows that when the Ministry of Justice wrote to the banks instructing them to transfer funds to the MoFEA Revenue Account, some of the banks wrote back to the Ministry asking for the details of the bank accounts they were required to transfer the funds to, and which modalities were to be followed for accounts held in foreign currencies. However, there is no evidence showing that the Ministry of Justice responded to the inquiries issued by the banks. Thus, the funds remained with the banks, who continued to place charges on these accounts.

RECOMMENDATION

1. The Attorney General should provide a detailed written explanation to the Assembly within 30 days of the publication of this report on the status of all identified accounts and the reasons why some remain active, dormant, or subject to continuing charges rather than being closed.
2. That the Accountant General should review without delay all the above-mentioned accounts and have the funds promptly transferred to the designated Asset Recovery Account at the Central Bank.
3. That all zero-balance, dormant, or negatively balanced accounts linked to the asset recovery process should be formally closed or otherwise regularised to prevent future transactions, liabilities, or administrative charges.

JAMMEH AND ASSOCIATES BANK ACCOUNTS AT FBN

273. The Committee confirms the existence of one bank account held at First Bank of Nigeria (FBN) in the name of Kanilai Group International (KGI), denominated in Gambian Dalasi (GMD).

274. The Committee found that several withdrawals were made from the bank accounts on 24th May 2017, two days after the Court ordered the freezing of the bank accounts.

275. The Committee notes that the account reflects a closing balance of GMD 73,942.39. However, the Committee did not obtain documentary confirmation demonstrating that this balance was transferred to the Central Bank. More broadly, the Committee observed insufficient institutional follow-up by the Accountant General to verify whether recoverable balances held at FBN were duly transferred and whether the related account was formally closed or otherwise regularised.

NAME OF ACCOUNT	ACCOUNT NUMBER	CLOSING BALANCE	CURRENCY	REMARKS
Kanilai Group International (K.G.I)	203203000007219	73,942.39	GMD	

RECOMMENDATION

1. The Attorney General should provide clarification on the status of the Kanilai Group International account and whether instructions were issued for the transfer of the sum of GMD 73,942.39 to the Asset Recovery Account at the Central Bank.
2. Any recoverable funds remaining in the account should be transferred without delay to the Asset Recovery Account at the Central Bank, and the account should thereafter be formally closed or appropriately restricted to prevent further transactions or administrative liabilities.
3. The Ministry of Finance, through the Accountant General, should take steps to recover all funds withdrawn from this account after the Court made the freezing Order.

ACCOUNTS OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT AND ASSOCIATES AT ZENITH BANK (GAMBIA) LIMITED

NAME OF ACCOUNT	ACCOUNT NUMBER	CLOSING BALANCE	CURRENCY DENOMINATION	REMARKS
FADI MAZEGI	CA 6020108669	12,593.68	GMD	CLOSED in December 2018
EURO AFRICAN GROUP LIMITED	CA 6010100909	58,515.04	GMD	CLOSED in May 2018

EURO GROUP CONTRA	AFRICAN LTD -	SA 4060001023	7,750.00	POUND	CLOSED in February 2017
KANILAI FARM	FAMILY	CA 6010104742	0.00	GMD	Dormant account
WESTPORT LOGISTICS		SA 4060200069	0.00	POUND	Dormant account

- 276.** The Committee confirms the existence of five bank accounts held at Zenith Bank (Gambia) Limited under various individual and corporate names associated with the former President and his associates. The accounts are denominated in Gambian Dalasi (GMD) and Pound Sterling (GBP).
- 277.** The records reviewed indicate that three (3) of the accounts are reported as closed between February 2017 and December 2018, while two (2) accounts remain dormant with zero balances. The Committee observes that certain accounts marked as closed still reflect closing balances at the time of closure, including Euro African Group Limited (GMD 58,515.04), Fadi Mazegi (GMD 12,593.68), and Euro African Group Ltd – Contra (GBP 7,750.00). However, the Committee did not obtain sufficient documentary evidence confirming whether these balances were transferred into the Asset Recovery Account.
- 278.** The continued existence of dormant accounts, notwithstanding their zero balances, indicates incomplete administrative regularization, while the absence of verifiable proof of transfer limits the Committee’s ability to confirm full compliance with accounts closure directives. Accordingly, the Committee notes insufficient institutional follow-up by the relevant Government authorities to ensure that all recoverable balances are properly transferred and that associated accounts are conclusively closed or regularized.

RECOMMENDATION

1. The Committee recommends that Zenith Bank (Gambia) Limited provide written clarification, supported by documentary evidence, confirming the final disposition of balances in accounts recorded as closed, verify the current status of dormant accounts and proceed with their formal closure where appropriate. Additionally, the Bank is to immediately transfer any outstanding recoverable funds to the Asset Recovery Account at the Central Bank of The Gambia.

FORMER PRESIDENT’S ACCOUNTS AT BLOOM BANK

NAME OF THE ACCOUNT	ACCOUNT NUMBER	CLOSING BALANCE	CURRENCY	REMARKS
PRESIDENT YAHYA A.J.J JAMMEH FOUNDATION SUB ACCOUNT	1011770051890	0.00	GMD	The account has no balance.
President Yahya A.J.J JAMMEH Foundation	101-1770046030	D0.00	GMD	The account has no balance.

279. The Committee confirms the existence of two accounts maintained at Bloom Bank under the name President Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh Foundation and its corresponding sub-account, both denominated in Gambian Dalasi (GMD). Records reviewed by the Committee indicate that both accounts carry zero balances at the time of reporting. However, the Committee did not obtain sufficient documentary evidence to establish whether the accounts are formally closed.

BANK	ACCOUNT NAME	ACCOUNT NUMBER	BALANCE	STATUS
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280. The continued listing of zero-balance accounts without formal closure documentation highlights potential administrative gaps in the completion of asset recovery procedures. The absence of written confirmation regarding closure limits the Committee’s ability to determine full institutional compliance with recovery directives. Furthermore, maintaining inactive accounts without closure may expose the institutions concerned to administrative risks or avoidable charges.

281. The Committee observes inadequate follow-up by the Attorney General’s Chambers to confirm whether all accounts associated with the asset recovery process are formally closed once funds are exhausted or transferred.

RECOMMENDATION

1. The Committee recommends that Bloom Bank provides written confirmation to the Accountant General stating whether the identified accounts are formally closed or remain open with zero balances. Where the accounts remain open, the Committee recommends their immediate closure to prevent future transactions or administrative liabilities.

YAHYA JAMMEH ACCOUNT STATEMENTS AT GUARANTY TRUST BANK (GTBank)

GTB	ALH. DR. YAHYA A.J.J. JAMMEH	005201116793111034	1,277,716.59 - GMD	
1.	ALH. DR. YAHYA A.J.J. JAMMEH	005201300200404417	22,000.00 – USD	
2.	ALH. DR. YAHYA A.J.J. JAMMEH	005201300301403824	12,500.00 – GBP	
3.	ALH. DR. YAHYA A.J.J. JAMMEH	005201304601156192	15,833.33 – EUR	
4.	GAMBIA REVENUE RECOVERY A/C	005101154961711024	6,939,740.08 – GMD	
5.	JFP AND PEGEP OPERATIONS	005103852111411091	1,119.06 – GMD	
6.	JFP AND PEGEP OPERATIONS	005103300200098214	8,340.00 – USD	
7.	KANILAI GROUP INVESTMENT INT	005201109592611011	7,909.41 – GMD	Still having a transaction
8.	MOBILISATION ACCOUNT	005101154675311055	223,134.57 – GMD	
9.	P.E.G.E.P	005301252670511064	796,866.41 – GMD	
10.	P.E.G.E.P	005301252670559079	1,096.14 – GMD	

282. The Committee confirms that the former President, Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh, and his associates maintain 11 bank accounts at Guaranty Trust Bank (GTBank) under different names, including personal accounts, foundation accounts, project accounts, and investment accounts. These accounts are denominated in four currencies: Gambian Dalasi (GMD), United States Dollars (USD), Euro (EUR), and Pound Sterling (GBP).

283. The accounts hold significant balances, with the GMD accounts totalling D2,306,723.12, the USD accounts totalling \$30,340.00, the Euro account €15,833.33, and the GBP account £12,500.00. Notably, the Kanilai Group Investment INT account remains active and continues to record transactions, despite prior instructions from the Commission to transfer all funds and close related accounts.

284. The Committee observes that the continued activity of at least one account reflects weak follow up by the Accountant General to ensure GTBank complies fully with asset recovery directives. There is no documentary evidence that demonstrates all remaining balances were transferred or that

inactive accounts are formally closed, creating potential exposure to further transactions and administrative risks.

285. The Committee observes that in the Order of 22nd May 2017, 15 accounts were listed as belonging to the former President and his associates at the GT Bank. However, during investigations, the Committee received only 10 accounts from the GTBank as belonging to or associated with the former President.

RECOMMENDATION

1. The Committee recommends that GTBank provide a written explanation for why certain accounts, including the Kanilai Group Investment INT account, remain active despite clear instructions from the Commission. The Bank should clarify any impediments to full compliance.
2. The Committee recommends the immediate transfer of all remaining balances to the designated Janneh Commission Recovery Account at the Central Bank, followed by the formal closure of all related accounts to prevent further transactions.
3. The Commission recommends that the Accountant General and Attorney General jointly take measures to investigate the status of those accounts, and to report to the Assembly within 45 days of laying of this report.

ACCOUNTS OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT AND ASSOCIATES AT ECOBANK

NAME OF ACCOUNT	ACCOUNT NUMBER	CLOSING BALANCE	CURRENCY DENOMINATION	REMARKS
Westwood Gambia LTD	0041024903304303	57.09	USD	This account has a balance of 57.09 USD as of 2019.
Westwood Gambia LTD	0040024903304302	-21,972.58	GMD	This account accumulated charges to -21,972.58 as of 2019.
Westwood Gambia LTD	0041024903304301	73.33	EUR	The balance as of 2019 is 73.33 EUROS
Westport Logistics	0041024903330601	316.69	USD	This account has a balance of 316.69 USD as of 2019.

Westport Logistics	0040024903330601	-3,783.16	GMD	This account accumulated charges as of 2019 of -3,783.16
Westport Logistics	0041024903330602	59	EUR	This account has a balance of 59 euros as of 2019.
Royal Africa Securities Brokerage	0010014904027401	-10,763	GMD	This account accumulated charges -10,763 as at 2019
Royal Africa Capital Holdings LTD	0010014904027001	-11,799.61	GMD	This account accumulated charges of -11,799.61 as of 2019.
Palm Grove Africa Development	0010014904029701	-44,324	GMD	This account accumulated charges of -44,324 as of 2019.
Mineral Company of the Gambia	0040014903247801	-15,134.4	GMD	This account accumulated -15,134.4 as of 2019.
Kora Media Corporation	0010014904026901	-10,763	GMD	This account accumulated charges of -10,763 as of 2019.
KGI Japanese rice	0020014902443301	6,743.18	GMD	This account has a balance of 6,743.18 as of 2019.
Kanilai International Cultural Festival/Tribute to Michael Jackson	0040134901645801	19,544.3	GMD	This account has a balance of 19,544.3 as of 2019.
Kanilai Group Investment	0021014903406802	50,000	XOF	This account has a balance of 50,000 CFA Franc as of 2019.
Kanilai Group investment	0021014903406801	923	USD	This account has a balance of 923USD as of 2019.
Kanilai Group investment	0020014903406801	328025	GMD	This account has a balance of 328,025 as of 2019.

Kanilai Family Farm	0028014901586001	0	GMD	This account is dormant
Jammeh Foundation for Peace	0010014901345001	-4,184.04	GMD	This account accumulated charges of -4,184.04 as of 2019.
Atlantic Pelican Gambia LTD	0010014904027201	9,364.42	GMD	This account has a balance of 9,364.42 as of 2019.
Africaada Financial service	0060064903726501	26,000.75	GMD	This account has a balance of 26,000.75 as at 2019.
AFRICAADA Airways	0040014903890401	-3,041.41	GMD	This account accumulated charges of -3,041.41 as of 2019.
MALIGAM International	0010014900876901	1,092.09	GMD	This account has a balance of 1,092.09 as of 2019.

286. The Committee confirms that the former President, Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh, and his associates maintain 22 bank accounts at Ecobank, operated under different company, foundation, project, and proxy names such as Westwood Gambia Ltd, Kanilai Group Investment, Palm Grove Africa Development, Jammeh Foundation for Peace, and Kora Media Corporation. These accounts are denominated in four currencies: Gambian Dalasi (GMD), United States Dollars (USD), Euro (EUR), and CFA Franc (XOF).

287. The Committee observes that nine of these accounts, including those held in the names of Royal Africa Securities Brokerage, Palm Grove Africa Development, Mineral Company of the Gambia, and AFRICAADA Airways, have accumulated negative balances due to bank charges indicating prolonged inactivity and a lack of proper administrative follow-up. The remaining 13 accounts still hold recoverable funds, amounting to GMD390,769.74, \$1,296.78, €132.33, and 50,000 CFA Franc, which have not yet been transferred to the Janneh Commission Recovery Account.

288. The Committee received evidence that when the Ministry of Justice wrote to the Bank instructing it to transfer the funds, the Bank responded that the Order of 22nd May 2017 was still subsisting, and that as a result, they were not in a position to move the funds unless the Court orders otherwise.

289. The Committee notes weak follow-up by the Accountant General's Department to ensure that Ecobank complied fully with the Commission's instructions. No proper verification was conducted to confirm the transfer of funds or the closure of inactive accounts. Consequently, some accounts remain open and continue to accumulate charges, exposing public resources to potential loss.

RECOMMENDATION

1. The Committee recommends that Ecobank provide a written explanation detailing why the accounts were left open or not transferred as instructed, including any impediments to compliance. Furthermore, the Committee directs that all recoverable funds be immediately transferred to the designated Janneh Commission Recovery Account at the Central Bank of The Gambia and that all related accounts be formally closed to prevent further transactions or administrative charges.

ACCOUNTS OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT AND ASSOCIATES AT TRUST BANK

290. The Committee analyzed documentation submitted by Trust Bank Limited covering thirty-one (31) accounts linked to Jammeh and Associates. The review considered account names, account numbers, currencies, closing balances, and recorded transfers to government accounts.
291. The Committee reviewed a total of 31 bank accounts owned by the former President and his associates, in the following denominations.
 - (a) 26 accounts denominated in Gambian Dalasis (GMD)
 - (b) 5 accounts denominated in United States Dollars (USD)
292. The accounts related to a wide range of activities, including personal accounts, presidential and security projects, empowerment initiatives, agricultural ventures, foundations, health programmes, and commercial operations. The Committee observed that all accounts listed in the bank records had their funds transferred to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MOFEA) Revenue Account. The transfers were executed by Trust Bank Ltd on 21st June 2019, in compliance with instructions from the government received through the Ministry of Justice on 14 June 2019.
293. The Committee examined records which indicate that the Accountant General's Department subsequently transferred the funds to the Consolidated Revenue Fund on the same day the transfer was made by Trust Bank Ltd. As of 2025, the accounts show zero operational balances. However, the Committee could not confirm whether all accounts have been formally closed, despite being inactive.

NAME OF ACCOUNT	ACCOUNT NUMBER	CLOSING BALANCE	CURRENCY	REMARKS
HIGHER EDUCATION SUPPORT ACCOUNT	12011567402	\$71,367.08	US DOLLAR	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
HIGHER EDUCATION SUPPORT ACCOUNT	12011567403	\$4,438.02	US DOLLAR	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
MRI PRESIDENTIAL	11280412101	D3,092,522.49	GAMBIAN DALASIS	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue

PROJECT				Account
YAHYA JAMMEH	11212576101	D832,825.22	GAMBINA DALASIS	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
KANILAI FAMILY FARM SUGER BOOK	11212631501	D264,339.20	GAMBIAN DALASIS	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
TAX RECOVERY	1001283850	\$31,764.14	US DOLLAR	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
YAHYA A J J JAMMEH	11212210701	D299,209.08	GAMBIAN DALASIS	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
PRESIDENTS TREATMENT PROGRAMME	11211755801	D587,120.94	GAMBIAN DALASIS	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
SECURITY PROJECT	11212532101	D1,234,184.62	GAMBIAN DALASIS	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
PRESIDENTS WOMEN EMPOWERMENT	11211755601	D223,288.79	GAMBIAN DALASIS	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
CENTRAL ABBATTOIR	11008163601	D186,717.12	GAMBIAN DALASIS	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
AFPRC TRAVEL A/C	11201173601	D679,505.06	GAMBIAN DALASIS	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	11211661201	23,349.24	GAMBIAN DALASIS	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
PAC PEC TASK FORCE	11212627201	D98,130.63	GAMBIAN DALASIS	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
KGI FASION SHOP	11041260601	278,189.60	GMD	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
KANILAI ALTERNATIVE MEDICAL CLINIC	11041197401	48,128.69	GMD	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
PRESIDENT EMPOWERMENT OF GIRLS EDUCATION	10709826603	1,508.28	US DOLLAR	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
KANILAI FAMILY FARMS GARAGE	11062757601	30.74	GAMBIAN DALASIS	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
KANILAI FAMILY	11011529301	40.92	GMD	Monies transferred to the

FARMS WORKSHOP				MOFEA Revenue Account
KGI INTERNATIONAL GENERAL MERCHANDISE	11011807901	33.18	GMD	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
KGI INTERNATIONAL (MAIN)	12011807802	230.10	USD	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
JULY 22 BOOK ACCOUNT	11011418001	9,940.00	GMD	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
PRESIDENT'S EMPOWERMENT OF GIRLS EDUCATION	11209826602	10,574.85	GMD	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
KANILAI FAMILY FARM [CEMENT]	11011512102	186,171.12	GMD	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
KANILAI FAMILY FARM [G L M A]	11011799301	3,989.57	GMD	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
KANILAI FAMILY FARATO/KANILAI]	11011799401	9,550.30	GMD	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
OPERATION SAVE THE CHILDREN	11013037901	48,128.69	GMD	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
DR ALH YAYHA JAMMEH FOUNDATION	11001930501	226,710.72	GMD	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
GAMBIA NATIONAL PETROEUM CORPORATION	11010097601	1,638,422.72		Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account
NATIONAL SECURITY PROJECTS	12012532102	31,764.14	USD	Monies transferred to the MOFEA Revenue Account

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Committee recommends that:

- i. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and relevant regulatory authorities ensure the formal closure of all inactive Jammeh and Associates accounts at Trust Bank Limited.

- ii. The Central Bank of The Gambia must ensure that financial institutions maintain clear documentation confirming account closures to prevent future unauthorized use.
- iii. Government oversight bodies strengthen monitoring mechanisms over dormant or confiscated accounts linked to public resources.

ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS ASSOCIATED WITH FORMER PRESIDENT JAMMEH AT THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE GAMBIA (CBG)

ITEM NO.	ACCOUNT NO.	ACCOUNT DESCRIPTION	DATE OF CLOSURE	AMOUNT TRANSFERRED TO CRF/ OTHER ACCOUNTS IN GMD	OBSERVATIONS/REMARKS
1.	1101003565	Special Security Account	20 th Sept.17	1,444,798.97	The closing balance was transferred to the Office of the President Account by a letter written for the transfer on 21 st March 2017. Account Closed by AGD.
2.	1101005167	Special Security Account NO.2	19 th Oct-17	5,846,416.47	Transferred to the CRF
3.	1101002647	HIPC and Madri Relief	22 nd Nov-17	10,551,746.69	Transferred to the CRF
4.	1101004184	Carnegie Mining Account	19 th Oct-19	110,630.47	Transferred to the CRF
5.	1103001761	Office of the First Lady	17 th Oct-19	-	Dormant Account
6.	1101004892	Office of the First Lady (USD)	17 th Oct-19	-	Transferred to the CRF
7.	1101004892	Fish Landing Account 1	17 th Oct-19	4,479,470.63	Transferred to the CRF
8.	1103001826	National Youth Development Fund	17 th Oct-19	-	Transferred to the CRF
9.	1103001840	International Gateway Account	Oct-17-19	14,831.93	Transferred to the CRF

10.	1103002074	Special Project Fund (Vision 2016)	Oct-17-19	1,149,703.63	Transferred to the CRF
11.	1109000106	State Aircraft Special Account	Oct-17-19	95,756.21	Transferred to the CRF
12.	1101003022	Heavy Minerals Operation BK/AC	May-28-20	754.93	Transferred to the CRF
13.	1101004139	Sand Mining Royalties	May-28-20	118,735.40	Transferred to the CRF
14.	1103001163	Gamico Training Account	May-28-20	317,792.77	Transferred to the CRF
15.	1101002939	Construction Kanilai Rec/STD. Con/Cnt	Jan-15-18	93,700.00	This amount was transferred to the Janneh Commission Recovery Account.
16.	1101003273	Hact Office of the President	Jan-15-18		Dormant account
17.	1101003297	Hact office of the Vice President	Jan-15-18		Dormant account
18.	1101004012	Special Account Office of the President	Jan-15-18	2,330,533.03	Funds were transferred to the Janneh Commission Recovery Account
19.	1101004191	Recovery Monies owed to Public Enterprise	Jan-15-18		Dormant account
20.	1101004191	MoP Account	Jan-15-18		Dormant Account
21.	1101003280	Hact Office of the President PA	Mar-21-18		Dormant Account
22.	1101003149	Green Industries and Denomination	Mar-22-18	300,000.00	This was transferred as per a letter written to the Bank, but the letter seen by the Committee is not clear in description.
23.	1103001778	MoP Petroleum Account	Jun-6-18		Dormant Account
24.	1103001015	Second Divestiture Account	Jul-17-18	3,449,957.74	Closed by AGD

25.	1101003187	SABC engagement Account	Mar-21-18		Dormant Account
26.	2101000066	Citizenship Investor Account		39,828,107.59	A letter was written for the transfer of the fund. The description is not clear as to where it should be.
27.	2101000035	National Education Trust Fund		587,915.38	This is transferred based on the description which was a letter written on 9 th April 2018.
28.	1101004218	Interior Bilateral Aids Account	Feb-15-18	14,045.30	This is the available balance in the account, with no records of movement or transfer of the funds.

- 294.** The Committee received evidence that the Commission investigated 28 accounts at the Central Bank as part of the accounts that the former President and his associates are alleged to have embezzled or misappropriated. Out of these, 15 accounts were closed by the Accountant General as part of the bank account management procedures. The balances in 11 of the closed accounts were transferred to the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF), amounting to a total of D26,135,796.87.
- 295.** The Committee notes that ten accounts remain dormant, showing no transactions since their opening. In addition, the balance in the Special Security Account amounting to D1,444,798.97 was transferred to the Office of the President Account in March 2017, before the closure of the account. Furthermore, funds from the Construction of Kanilai Recording Studio Account and the Special Account of the President totalling D2,424,233.03 were transferred to the Janneh Commission Recovery Account GMD account in January 2018.
- 296.** The review also revealed that transfers relating to the Green Industries Account, Citizenship Investor Account, and the National Education Trust Fund were executed based on written instructions. However, the documentation does not clearly specify the final destination of the transferred funds. The combined value of these transfers amounts to D40,716,022.97, creating uncertainty regarding their proper accounting within the asset recovery framework. Additionally, the Interior Bilateral Aids Account retains a balance of D14,045.30 with no evidence of transfer or movement.
- 297.** Overall, the Committee observes gaps in documentation, unclear transfer descriptions, and the persistence of dormant accounts, which limit full verification of compliance with asset recovery directives and public financial management requirements. These weaknesses highlight the need for strengthened reconciliation procedures, clearer audit trails for fund transfers, and the formal closure or regularization of all inactive accounts to ensure transparency and accountability in the management of public resources.

COMPANIES, SHARES AND EQUITY HOLDINGS

- 298.** The assets listed in the annexure to Legal Notice No.15 of 2017 include a list of 14 companies owned by former President Jammeh. This list of 14 companies also forms part of the annexures to the High Court Order of 22nd May 2017 and was placed under the custody and control of Augustus Prom, a firm of certified chartered accountants registered in The Gambia. Augustus Prom was appointed as the Receiver to take custody and control of the companies and to ensure their proper administration.
- 299.** In addition to the powers granted to Augustus Prom under paragraph 8 of the High Court Order, the firm was also given the power to sell perishable and rapidly depreciating property, including stocks and bonds.
- 300.** The list of the companies annexed in the High Court Order of 22nd May 2017 and Legal Notice No. 15 of 2017 is reproduced below.

No.	COMPANY NAME	SHAREHOLDERS
	KANILAI WORNI FAMILY FARMS LTD	YAHYA JAMMEH 90% ANSUMANA JAMMEH 10%
	KGI INTERNATIONAL COMPANY LIMITED	ZINEB YAHYA JAMMEH KANILAI WORNI FAMILY FARMS LTD
	ROYAL AFRICA CAPITAL HOLDING LTD	ANSUMANA JAMMEH 10% EBRAHIM SANYANG 90%
	AFRICAADA FINANCIAL SERVICES & BUREAU DE CHANGE LTD	ANSUMANA JAMMEH 30% EBRAHIM SANYANG 70%
	AFRICAADA MICRO FINANCE GAMBIA LTD	ANSUMANA JAMMEH 10% EBRAHIM SANYANG 90%
	AFRICAADA AIRWAYS	ANSUMANA JAMMEH 10% EBRAHIM SANYANG 90%
	KORA MEDIA CORPORATION LTD	ANSUMANA JAMMEH 10% EBRAHIM SANYANG 90%

	ATLANTIC PELICAN COMPANY LTD	ANSUMANA JAMMEH 30% EBRAHIM SANYANG 70%
	PALM GROVE AFRICA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD	ANSUMANA JAMMEH 10% EBRAHIM SANYANG 90%
	PATRIOT INSURANCE BROKERS COMPANY LTD	ANSUMANA JAMMEH 75% MOMODOU LAMIN BAH 10% SANNA BAH 10% EBRIMA CEESAY 5%
	MINERAL COMPANY OF THE GAMBIA LIMITED	ANSUMANA JAMMEH 500 shr ANTHONY B M PANNETA 500 shr
	ROYAL AFRICA SECURITIES BROKERAGE COMPANY LTD	ANSUMANA JAMMEH 10% EBRAHIM SANYANG 90%
1	WEST AFRICAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND MARKETING CORPORATION LIMITED	ANSUMANA JAMMEH 10% DR. KENNETH JACKSON 80%
1	AFRICAADA INSURANCE COMPANY	ROYAL AFRICA CAPITAL HLD 99% BIRAN N BAH 1%

301. On 21st July 2017, the High Court of The Gambia delivered another Order (MOJ 5c) placing the custody and control of three additional companies under Augustus Prom. The firm was also given the power to sell perishable and rapidly depreciating property, including stocks and bonds. The names of the three companies are listed below:

- (a) West Wood Gambia Limited
- (b) Maligam International
- (c) Observer Company (Gambia) Limited

302. It is the evidence of both Hon. Tambadou and Mr Louis Prom, Head of Advisory at Augustus Prom, that prior to the firm's appointment, Hon. Tambadou had engaged the firm in discussions to ensure that it was interested and ready to be appointed as Receiver for the companies of the former President. However, the identification of Augustus Prom and their appointment by the Attorney General did not follow established administrative and public procurement practices and procedures.

Hon. Tambadou testified that Augustus Prom was more qualified to carry out this immense task as Receiver for the companies of the former President after having considered the portfolios of both Augustus Prom and Alpha Amadou Barry.

- 303.** During the discussions between Augustus Prom and the then Attorney General preceding his appointment by the High Court, payment of a ten percent (10%) fee on gross revenue of all the companies was agreed upon. This is the exact fee payment that was implemented during the entire duration of the receivership, which lasted from 22nd May 2017 to 17th June 2019, when the last term of the court Order expired, and Augustus Prom applied to the High Court for release.
- 304.** Evidence received from Mr. Louis Prom indicates that once the court appointed the firm, they were engaged in a multiagency meeting held at the Attorney General's Chambers and the Ministry of Justice to coordinate implementation of the High Court Order. The receiver's first course of action was to notify the management and staff of the companies placed under its custody and control, which it did with the support of the Sheriff of The Gambia, who prepared notices of the Order.
- 305.** Mr. Prom stated that after notices were prepared by the Sheriff, site visits to the companies and related sites were conducted by the Receiver with the then Registrar General, Mr. Alieu Jallow, and a representative from the Office of the Sheriff. According to Mr. Prom, the initial site visits were to brief the staff of these companies about the Order and the receivership and to secure premises with the help of The Gambia Police Force, and in certain instances where the personnel of the Gambia Police Force were unavailable, the services of private security firms were employed at a fee.
- 306.** Evidence received from Augustus Prom shows that once the personnel of the companies were notified and briefed, and the assets were secured, all the companies' books were assessed to enable the Receiver to focus on the companies in operation; Kanilai Group International (KGI) and Kanilai Worni Family Farms (KFF), particularly the Abuko Abattoir, were operational at the time of takeover. Aside from these 3 companies, the rest were either dormant, insolvent, or under litigation.
- 307.** The evidence further shows that the Receiver positioned full-time managers for the operational companies and their businesses to oversee and support their day-to-day management, and to enhance report processing of the Receivership.
- 308.** Mr Louis Prom added that shortly after the firm was appointed as Receiver by the Court, applications were filed before the Court seeking leave to bring action against the firm for the recovery of large sums. These applications were brought before the Court by Amie Bensouda and Co LLP on behalf of Social Security Housing Finance Corporation, and later for Futurelec Gambia.
- 309.** Mr. Louis Prom further explained to the Committee that the claims increased in number with the passage of time, and the amounts being claimed for were large sums that the Receivership could not pay. Eventually, Augustus Prom had to notify the Attorney General about competing claims, ownership disputes, and threats of unauthorised asset transfers. However, the Attorney General's

Chambers provided little to no support in resolving competing claims and failed to provide clear instructions or any assistance regarding these arrears and complex litigations.

- 310.** According to Mr. Louis Prom, the firm also consulted the Hon. Chief Justice to seek guidance on how to handle the numerous claims they received; this was allegedly not appreciated by the then Attorney General. Due to the limited support provided by Hon. Tambadou, Augustus Prom eventually engaged the services of a private legal practitioner, Mr. Gibril Bah of Bandirabeh Law firm, who represented the Receivership until they were released by the High Court on 17th June 2019.
- 311.** On 30th September 2017, Augustus Prom submitted its first update report to the High Court and to the Attorney General; the same report was also shared with the Commission of Inquiry to update it on the status of the companies placed under the receivership. Volume one and the subsequent two volumes that followed were detailed and informative on the status of the companies, their assets, and accounts. Volume one focused on the 14 companies annexed in High Court Order delivered on 22nd May 2017 and Legal Notice 15 of 2017, as well the additional three companies listed under paragraph 5 of the High Court Order delivered on 21st July 2017.
- 312.** By an Order dated the 25th September 2017, the Commission of Inquiry appointed Augustus Prom as Receiver for Dunes Resort and Casino. Paragraph 2 of the Order of the Commission of Inquiry states as follows:
- 2. It is further ordered that Augustus Prom shall:*
- (a) Take over custody of the premises comprising the Dunes Resort and Casino;*
- (b) be at liberty to take such steps as are necessary to make the place operational and income earning and to consult with the Attorney General and Minister of Justice and the Director General of The Gambia Tourism Board, if necessary; and*
- (c) agree his fees with the office of the Attorney General and Minister of Justice.*
- 313.** In addition to the Dunes Resort and Casino, the Commission of Inquiry delivered interim orders appointing Augustus Prom as Receiver for two additional companies: Westport Logistics and the BPI Tourism & Service Ltd, and other BP Group Companies (West Forex Ltd & BPI Social Security Development Ltd). The two hotels, Ocean Bay Resort and Sun Beach Hotel, were being managed by BPI Tourism & Service Ltd before the receivership and became part of the businesses managed by Augustus Prom. In total, Augustus Prom managed 17 companies placed under it by the High Court, together with the companies placed under its receivership by the Commission of Inquiry, making it a total of 22 companies.
- 314.** After many months of applying the same fee structure to the companies and hotels placed under its custody and control by the Commission of Inquiry, Augustus Prom later had a dispute with the Commission of Inquiry regarding its fees, leading to the termination of its services as Receiver by the Commission.

- 315.** Mr. Louis Prom testified that KGI International, Central Abattoir under Kanilai Worni Family Farms Ltd (K.F.F.), and the BPI Tourism & Services Company Ltd, which oversaw the management of Ocean Bay Hotel & Resort and Sun Beach Hotels, were the only companies found commercially active. The firm ensured that these companies remained a going concern and continued conducting their business by making improvements in their operations. Mr. Prom further stated that the firm stabilised the operations of KGI and KFF by ensuring the continuous payment of utilities, salaries, and taxes, despite severe liquidity challenges. Two warehouses at the Banjul International Airport containing high-value assets, most notably a gold-dust refinery, were secured but never utilised due to a lack of funds and technical expertise.
- 316.** The Committee received evidence showing that all the other companies in receivership under Augustus Prom were found commercially dormant at the commencement of the receiverships and remained so until the end.
- 317.** Mr. Louis Prom further stated that the receivership faced various challenges with these 17 companies, including claims from different institutions. The names of the companies and amounts claimed are listed below.
- (a) KMC trade licence arrears (D520,000);
 - (b) NAWEC claims (D53 million);
 - (c) SSHFC claims (D1.646 million – later withdrawn);
 - (d) GRA liabilities (D75 million);
 - (e) Banks such as FIB (D12.7 million) with mortgaged properties sold under court order.
- 318.** The Commission of Inquiry had already been established and commenced its work by the time the second Order of the High Court was delivered. As mentioned above, Augustus Prom kept the Court abreast with information relating to the companies listed in MOJ 5A, 5C, and Legal Notice No. 15 of 2017, as well as keeping the Attorney General and the Commission of Inquiry abreast with detailed information about the companies.
- 319.** Evidence received by the Committee from Augustus Prom shows that the receivership under the Commission brought more challenges for the firm. As the firm took custody and control of the hotels, it received inquiries about the control of the two hotels owned by SSHFC. The evidence received shows that various persons, including the then Attorney General, the Commission, and other private companies, tried to force the hand of the receivership to transfer custody and control of the hotels from the receiver to SSHFC and to a private hotel management company called FTI.
- 320.** According to Mr. Louis Prom, SSHFC expressed interest in acquiring hotel properties by sharing correspondence with Augustus Prom, and these correspondences revealed that active pressure was being put on the Receiver to hand over the hotels, which Augustus Prom resisted to avoid lawsuits being filed against the firm for acting in excess of its powers and to avoid being cited for contempt of court. Mr. Prom added that 3 reasons prevented them from transferring and or releasing the

hotels from the receivership: frozen lease agreement, the High Court freezing order, and the existing valid management contract that BPI had for the hotels.

321. The Committee notes that out of all the institutions that were appointed by the High Court, it is only Augustus Prom that secured the assets placed in its custody and control. Augustus Prom was also the only institution that periodically reported to the High Court, keeping it abreast with the developments of these companies and the work being done to keep the operational ones as a going concern. Augustus Prom submitted comprehensive reports detailing due diligence findings, asset management updates, and the status of claims and ongoing litigation.
322. In his testimony before the Committee, the former Attorney General, Hon. Tambadou, informed the Committee that when the commission submitted its report and the White Paper was published, he instructed the then Registrar of Companies to strike off all companies from the records of the Companies Registry. However, he never followed up to confirm whether these instructions were carried out.
323. During his testimony, Alpha Barry confirmed to the Committee that he was part of the people who contacted Augustus Prom and the Head of Advisory Mr Louis Prom, about the Ocean Bay Hotel and the Sun Beach Hotel. He stated that he contacted Augustus Prom several times about the hotels because FTI had engaged him to help find hotels they could lease, as well as land on which they could build hotels. He informed the Committee that he had spoken to Mr Muhammed Manjang, the former Managing Director of SSHFC, who showed keen interest in leasing the hotels to FTI but told him to speak to Augustus Prom as the hotels were under receivership. Augustus Prom then informed him that the hotels could not be transferred due to the reasons stated above.

KANILAI WORNİ FAMILY FARMS (KFF)

324. Evidence received by the Committee shows that Kanilai Worni Family Farms Ltd (KFF) is a large company with subsidiaries and many properties, totalling 57 properties. The evidence further shows that the company did not have a centralized management unit or active head office; the appointed Receiver had no point of reference or directors to interview for corporate and financial records after its appointment. The Committee finds that at this time, apart from the Central Abattoir in Abuko, KFF Ltd, as a holding company, was commercially dormant.
325. Augustus Prom described KFF Ltd as the main holding company of the former President due to KFF Ltd owning 79% of the shares in KGI International Ltd and 79% shares of Sindola Safari Lodge Ltd. KFF Ltd also owns 50% shares of 3 BP Investment Group FZE subsidiaries in The Gambia: West Wood Gambia Ltd (WW), Mineral Company of the Gambia Ltd (MCG), and West Port Logistics Ltd (WL). All 3 of these BP Group companies were found commercially dormant and were placed under Receivership by the High Court on 22nd May 2025.
326. Evidence submitted to the Committee by Augustus Prom shows KFF had 13 corporate accounts at Trust Bank Ltd and Guaranty Trust Bank (Gambia) Ltd (GTBank) with a total credit balance of

GMD 500,909.76 as at 19th June 2019. These bank accounts were part of the accounts frozen by the High Court Orders of 22nd May 2017 and 21st July 2017.

327. As at 17th June 2019, the last day of Augustus Prom's Receivership, KFF Ltd, as a holding company, was facing total liabilities and claims of GMD 345,751,919. These liabilities comprised GMD 75.477 million claimed by the Gambia Revenue Authority for unpaid taxes, GMD 16.815 million loan claim from SSHFC, and GMD 55.706 million claimed by NAWEC for unpaid utilities.
328. KFF Ltd had three claims filed against it at the High Court. The first application was brought by SSHFC claiming GMD 16,815,340 million for an unpaid loan relating to a large steel water tank imported from the United Kingdom. The second and third applications were from Mr. Banta Kaira and his company, Trans-Sahara Trading, claiming commercial properties located on Kairaba Avenue valued at GMD 112.970 million and a large warehouse property located on the Jimpex junction on the Banjul highway valued at GMD 84.230 million.
329. Augustus Prom's recommendation to the Attorney General and the High Court at the end of the Receivership was for some of the company's property to be liquidated by the Hon. Sheriff of The Gambia to cover these liabilities, or for KFF Ltd's shareholders to financially intervene to settle. There was no other viable corporate option to settle the liabilities, as the company's subsidiaries were not in a position to pay off these high current liabilities, and there were no investments such as treasury bills or fixed deposits, noted in the file, which could have been applied to settle liabilities.
330. The Commission, after having investigated extensively into the financial dealings of KFF, recommended that KFF and all businesses under it should be liquidated. The Commission also recommended that a liquidator other than Augustus Prom, the Receiver at the time the Commission submitted its report to the President, should be appointed. The Commission did not advance reasons in its report as to why Augustus Prom should not be appointed to handle the liquidation of KFF.
331. The Commission made further recommendations that all assets held in the name of KFF should be confiscated as proceeds of criminal activity and that said proceeds be used to pay for the misuse of public funds done by former President Yahya Jammeh.
332. The Commission's recommendations were accepted by the Government in its White Paper. However, the liquidation process of the company is yet to commence. The former Attorney General Mr Tambadou told the Committee that he had given instructions for all companies of the former President to be struck off the companies' registry by the Registrar of Companies, but this instruction was not carried out, and the Committee could not verify whether such an instruction was even given. Evidence received by the Committee from the Registrar of Companies shows that the company is still on the registry.

CENTRAL ABATTOIR ABUKO

333. Evidence received by the Committee from Augustus Prom shows that the Central Abattoir located in Abuko was under KFF Ltd when the Receivership came into effect in May 2017. Augustus Prom, however, informed the Committee that there was no paperwork found in the files reviewed

or from information provided by the Registrar of Companies at the time to show whether the Abattoir is a registered subsidiary of KFF or just a business division of KFF Ltd.

- 334.** According to Augustus Prom, the Abattoir was financially resilient during the period of the Receivership despite needing much capital renovations, which were to be funded by the Ministry of Agriculture; the renovations were being finalized by the end of the Receivership. The Receivership did have to prefinance some aspects of the renovations costing GMD 85,075.00 to ensure the Abattoir service could continue whilst works on the main slaughter complex progressed.
- 335.** Augustus Prom informed the Committee that the Abattoir was generating funds through a collection of landing fees, slaughter fees, and shop/canteen rentals, for which the butchers using these shops tend not to pay their rent on time. A small ruminant (e.g., goat and sheep) that is brought to the Central Abattoir to be kept and sold, was charged a landing fee of GMD 25. Out of the GMD 25 paid by the animal dealers, the Abattoir would get GMD15 per small ruminant, while the Livestock Dealers Association receives GMD 10 per small ruminant. Cattle brought to the Central Abattoir to be kept and sold were also charged a landing fee of GMD 50 per cattle. Then the Abattoir receives GMD 30 per cattle from these landing fees, while the Dealers Association gets GMD 20 per cattle. This agreement or rule was in place before the Abattoir was acquired by the former President.
- 336.** The Abattoir also generated income from the slaughterhouse complex. Slaughter fees started from a GMD 100 charge and then increased to GMD 250 per cattle in October 2008, when K.F F. Ltd took over; this fee was maintained to the date the Receivership ended. For small ruminants, the slaughter fee starts from GMD 50 to GMD 100 as currently charged. The Livestock Dealers Association was allowed to collect landing fees, which they split with the Abattoir in line with the above-mentioned rates, and they also collected a movement permit fee of GMD 50 per animal, which was not shared so as to help finance its administrative activities.
- 337.** Evidence received from Augustus Prom showed that the Abattoir had a full-time Receiver's manager and 44 employees, comprising the general manager, revenue collectors, accounts team, cleaners, drivers, butchers, and security guards. The Total Gross Salaries paid by the Abattoir per month during the receivership were GMD 145,900.00. Salaries, including Social Security contribution deductions (NPF & ICF), were being paid monthly when the Receivership took effect. The Pay As You Earn (PAYE) / Payroll Tax deductions were also being filed and paid monthly, which is different from the period preceding the Receivership, when PAYE tax was not being paid.
- 338.** The Receivership opened a corporate account for the Abattoir at Trust Bank Ltd on 21st June 2017, which, up until the end of the Receivership, was still being used for daily deposits from the income received and to issue cheques for administrative and operational expenditure. From evidence submitted by Augustus Prom, the account's credit balance as of 31st May 2019 was GMD 335,012.51. The Abattoir's previous active bank account at Trust Bank Ltd was frozen in line with the 22nd May 2017 High Court Order and had a closing balance of GMD 186,171.12.

- 339.** At the end of the Receivership, Augustus Prom made recommendations to the Attorney General to ensure the long-term viability of the Abattoir as follows:
- (a) Livestock traffic will need to be increased, for which an estimated 40% to 50% was lost to the unofficial Abattoir site located across the road in Abuko from early 2017.
 - (b) Long-standing landing fees and slaughter service fees increased by at least 100%, in addition to being paid on time by the livestock dealer, and
 - (c) Additional refurbishment works will be completed with a view to enhancing operational efficiency.
- 340.** The Commission recommended that the Government appoint an independent consultant who will review the operations of the Abattoir with a view to preparing it for privatisation, taking into account the interests of all relevant stakeholders, private and public. The Commission further recommended that the sum of D16,000,000, being the purchase price paid by KFF for the property, shall be credited to the Ex-President's liabilities as a recovery of stolen assets and that the leases of the Abattoir shall all be rescinded and public lands illegally annexed by the Ex-President and fenced shall revert to the State for its original use i.e. livestock management services.
- 341.** The Government, in its White Paper, did not accept the recommendations the Commission made regarding the Abattoir. The Abattoir is part of the assets placed in the custody and control of Alpha Barry of Alpha Kapital Advisory after his appointment as the Receiver/Trustee.
- 342.** According to Alpha Barry, some renovation work was conducted when he took over as Receiver for the Abattoir. He also informed the Committee that a total of D10, 470, 917.00 was banked from slaughter fees but he did not provide any details on how the fees were being collected and how administrative expenses of the Abattoir were being paid. Mr Barry's report on the abattoir did not also provide concrete information about whether salaries of the employees of the abattoir were being paid, whether relevant taxes were being paid to GRA, or whether NPF & ICF were being paid to SSHFC on behalf of the employees.
- 343.** The Abattoir was eventually handed over to the Ministry of Agriculture by the Receiver/Trustee at the direction of the Ministry of Justice on 26th August 2019.

SINDOLA SAFARI LODGE

- 344.** Sindola Safari Lodge is a fully equipped 40-bedroom hotel located at the former President's home village in Kanilai, Foni District, West Coast Region of The Gambia. Sindola Safari Lodge Ltd is a subsidiary of KFF Ltd, which owns 79% of the shares and 21% owned by Zineb Yahya Jammeh (Trustee of Muhammed Jammeh and Mariam Jammeh). At the commencement of Augustus Prom's Receivership, the Lodge had been closed since January 2017 due to the political impasse, but it was reopened in March 2018.

- 345.** The Lodge was sub-leased for one year to Unison Services Company Ltd for GMD 3,000,000.00 commencing from 15th February 2018 with a view to reopening the Lodge and generating income from the lease rental. Unison, owned by Mr Burama Njie, was the only company that presented an offer to sub-lease the Lodge. Mr Njie has extensive experience in the tourism sector, and according to Augustus Prom, after assessing him and his company, they were certain that he was capable of reopening, managing, and generating business for the Lodge, and up until the Receivership ended, Mr Njie had maintained the Lodge well and was generating business for it.
- 346.** The sub-lease was extended for another 12 months by Augustus Prom, commencing from 13 March 2019, for the same annual rental fee, which was paid quarterly and on time. Unison had requested a sub-lease extension for 5 years to attain a higher financial performance and recover its capital investment of GMD 2,361,500 for refurbishment of the Lodge and additional fixed assets such as new exterior lights to enhance security at night and a new swimming pool pump. But this could not be facilitated due to the legal status of the Lodge and the fact that the Receivership was to last for six months, even though the Attorney General had sought for extensions and renewals several times.
- 347.** According to Mr. Louis Prom, the uncertainty surrounding the duration of the Receivership posed a challenge for them because they could not make long-term plans, take actions, or even get into business agreements that would have required long-term investments. The sub-lease gave the Unison Services Company Ltd (sub-lessee) the rights to utilize the hotel's assets (land & buildings, swimming pool, bar & restaurant, conference room, generator, borehole, stores, cold room, staff quarters, etc.), including the two festival houses located just outside the entrance to the Lodge. The sub-lease also required that the trading name, Sindola Safari Lodge, be maintained and that associated statutory filings (GRA and SSHFC) be paid on time by the sub-lessee. The Receivership was also conducting periodic inspections of the Lodge to ensure that it was being run in line with the sub-lease agreement.
- 348.** Sindola Safari Lodge had an active account under the signatory of the Receivership at First International Bank Ltd; the account had a closing balance of GMD 1,175,913.07 at the end of the Receivership. According to Augustus Prom, the sub-lease rental funds were used to pre-finance expenditure of the dormant companies, such as: paying monthly for the private security guards from Marshal Security Services Ltd guarding the Dunes Resort & Casino from November 2017 up to 31st July 2018 at GMD 20,700 a month, before the Resort was handed to the Ministry of Justice for renovations to start for use by the TRRC; guarding the Royal Africa Office in Yundum at GMD 15,525 per month; guarding of the Receiver's office by Prestige Security Ltd at GMD 10,350.00 per month; cleaning services for the Royal Africa Office & warehouse in Yundum at GMD 8000; paying of legal fees for the Observer Co. Ltd case vs Maurice J Gomez at GMD 50,000; inventory service fees, etc.
- 349.** At the end of the Receivership, Augustus Prom reported to the Ministry of Justice that the Sindola Safari Lodge had positive financial prospects from which a niche market in the Gambia's growing tourism industry could be developed. They recommended that the Lodge's sub-lease agreement be

allowed to continue to raise rental income, to keep the lodge open, which will result in effective economic use of its valuable assets and also create employment for the hosting and surrounding villages.

- 350.** The Commission recommended in its report that Sindola Safari Lodge be valued and sold with a reserve price. The government, in its White Paper, did not react to the recommendation of the Commission of Inquiry regarding Sindola Safari Lodge. Evidence received by the Committee from Alpha Barry shows that the Lodge is still operational.

GREEN INDUSTRIES LIMITED

- 351.** Green Industries Ltd (GIL) was launched by the former President in July 2008 with a commercial objective to process and produce an array of products, including uniforms, sportswear, toilet rolls, and baby diapers. The Company had industrial sewing and production machines at the former July 22nd Business Park at the Banjul International Airport, which is currently referred to as the GIETAF Special Economic Zone. According to Augustus Prom and the report of the Commission, these machines and production equipment were later dismantled and transferred to the Gambia Police Force and the Gambia Armed Forces based on verbal instructions from the former President.
- 352.** Augustus Prom also informed the Committee that the Company's large production machines used to produce diapers and toilet rolls were stored at the GIETAF Special Economic Zone up until the Receivership ended. Augustus Prom further stated that when they conducted research at the commencement of the Receivership, the results garnered indicated that the company had a history of staffing disputes, mainly attributed to unpaid salaries, which gave an indication of mismanagement or cash-flow issues.
- 353.** Augustus Prom reported to the Attorney General that Green Industries Ltd was not part of the companies listed for Receivership by Orders of the High Court or the Commission of Inquiry, but assumed that Green Industries could be a subsidiary of KFF Ltd, like Sindola Safari Lodge and KGI Ltd.
- 354.** Green Industries Ltd also had a fashion boutique selling uniforms and garments located at the KGI Ltd-managed retail complex owned by K.F.F. Ltd on Kairaba Avenue near the traffic lights. Reports submitted to the Attorney General, the High Court, and forwarded to the Commission, show that the boutique had been dealing with poor sales not exceeding GMD 10,000.00 per month on average, hence they considered it for closure and further considered renting out the shop it occupied at the complex.
- 355.** Green Industries Limited had a frozen bank account at Trust Bank that was opened in October 2008 with a closing credit balance of GMD 199,718.05 at the time of Augustus Prom's Receivership.
- 356.** At the end of the Receivership, Augustus Prom recommended that winding up procedures should be considered and commenced, considering the dormant state of the company's assets and that a high level of capital will be required to recommence operations. The firm also recommended that the production equipment and clothing materials located at the Banjul International Airport, at the

Banjul Police Hall, and at the Yundum Army Barracks be sold or officially transferred to The Gambia Police Force and the Gambia Armed Forces for further utilization.

- 357.** In its report regarding Green Industries Limited, the Commission found, amongst other things, that the former President, in his financial dealings, used USD859,329.00, which was a grant from Taiwan that should be refunded. The Commission went on to recommend in its report that Green Industries Limited should be liquidated in the same manner as if it were a company registered under the Companies Act and that any money outstanding after its liabilities (outstanding rent and taxes) are settled shall be paid to the State.
- 358.** The recommendations of the Commission were accepted by the Government through its White Paper. However, some of the assets of the Company still remain at the warehouse located at the airport. The Committee visited the warehouse during the course of its investigations and did not find any of the large production machines that were used to produce diapers and toilet rolls there.

KGI INTERNATIONAL LTD

- 359.** According to Augustus Prom's submissions and the Commission's report, KGI's registration and incorporation documents indicate KFF Ltd owns 79% of the KGI shares, and the remaining 21% by Zineb Yahya Jammeh (Trustee of Muhammed Jammeh and Mariam Jammeh). Both entities reported that there was also a board resolution at KGI dated 2nd August 2016, changing the shareholding structure, whereby the new shareholders were General Sulayman Badjie with 60% of the shares, and Woreh Njie with 40%; Woreh Njie also served as the first Secretary of the company.
- 360.** KGI was involved in the retail of commodities and renting commercial properties but since the closure of the KFF Bakery and the Muslim Butcher Shop on 29th September and 30th November in 2018, respectively, due to their poor financial performance arising from high production input cost, KGI solely focused on the collection of commercial rental income from four commercial properties found under its management: the Futurelec Property in Kotu, a retail complex under KFF Ltd located on Kairaba Avenue by the traffic lights next to the Standard Chartered Bank Building, the Soma LRR commercial property, and a retail complex opposite Alliance Francaise on Kairaba Avenue.
- 361.** During Augustus Prom's receivership, KGI International Ltd was undergoing litigation with two applications filed against it by Futurelec Gambia Ltd and Social Security Housing Finance Corporation. Futurelec Gambia Ltd was claiming for the property located in Kotu with an estimated value of GMD 100,000,00.00 and SSHFC was claiming for GMD 22.795 million, including interest for a GMD 10 million loan issued to KGI for the purchase of Tobaski Rams in October 2011. The Futurelec property claim case against KGI and the Receiver was dismissed by the High Court, but the applicants' lawyers, Amie Bensouda & Co LP, filed an appeal, which wasn't heard by the end of the Receivership.

- 362.** At the end of Augustus Prom’s Receivership, the company had 27 frozen bank accounts in the Gambia, at GTBank, Zenith Bank, FIBank, EcoBank, Trust Bank Ltd, with a credit (positive) balance of GMD 4,669,529.79.
- 363.** In their final report to the Attorney General and submitted to the High Court and the Commission, Augustus Prom advised that KGI may end up insolvent if it loses the commercial buildings it is managing and collecting rent from, especially the Futurelec Building, which is under its title. The same observation applied to Dunes Resort & Casino beach property in Kotu, which was bought by the former President through KGI and was occupied by the Truth Reparations and Reconciliation Commission (TRRC) at the time.
- 364.** The Commission recommended to the Executive that KGI and all its business entities should be liquidated and that a liquidator other than Augustus Prom should be appointed. The Commission further recommended that all landed assets held in KGI’s name should be confiscated as proceeds of criminal activity, and the proceeds of the sales should be applied to the recovery of misused public property.
- 365.** The Committee finds that out of the four commercial properties owned by KGI, the Futurelec property in Kotu was sold to the Central Bank of The Gambia at the directives of the Attorney General. Alpha Barry informed the Committee that the property was sold for the total sum of GMD 100,250,000.00, and this is the same amount in the reports he submitted to the Committee. However, the Governor of the Central Bank of The Gambia, Mr. Buah Saidy, informed the Committee that CBG paid GMD 105,250,000.00; the GMD 100 million being the purchase price, and the remaining GMD 5,250,000 being administrative and legal fees.
- 366.** The commercial complex located at Kairaba Avenue near Alliance Francaise de Banjul was sold to Hamidou Jah of Jah Oil Company Ltd at the sum of GMD 15,647,500.
- 367.** The commercial property in Soma LRR was managed by Alpha Barry until he received directives from the Attorney General that the property be handed over to the Ministry of Justice. The Committee, in its site visits, found that the said property has now been handed over to the Mansakonko Area Council. The last of the four properties is located at 16 Kairaba Avenue next to the former Standard Chartered building and was sold at a sum of GMD 41,750,000.00.

ROYAL AFRICA GROUP

- 368.** The Royal Africa Group comprises nine associated companies, namely:
- (a) Royal Africa Capital Holding Ltd
 - (b) Africaada Financial Services & Bureau De Change Ltd
 - (c) Africaada Micro Finance Gambia Ltd
 - (d) Africaada Airways
 - (e) Kora Media Corporation Ltd

- (f) Atlantic Pelican Company Ltd
- (g) Palm Grove Africa Development Corporation Ltd
- (h) Royal Africa Securities Brokerage Ltd
- (i) Africaada Insurance Company Ltd.

- 369.** The shareholding structure for Royal Africa Capital Holding Ltd and eight other associated companies shows Mr. Ebrahim Sanyang (also known as Prince Ebrahim), the Group's Chairperson, as the majority shareholder owning 70% to 90% of the shares for eight of the companies listed, and Mr. Ansumana Jammeh as the minority shareholder owning 10% to 30% of the shares. Africaada Insurance Company Ltd, unlike the other companies, has 99% of the shares owned by Royal Africa Capital Holding, hence a subsidiary, and the remaining 1% owned by Mr. Biran N. Bah. The Group seems to have had a diversified business strategy targeting different industries such as aviation, financial services, media, insurance, etc.
- 370.** The Royal Africa Group was found dormant when Augustus Prom's Receivership came into effect, with its head office located in Yundum on the AU Highway, closed since September 2017 when the Police were requested to secure the site due to Mr. Ebrahim Sanyang's lack of cooperation with the Receiver. The office and warehouse were under 24 hours private guard, by Marshal Security Services Ltd, as contracted by the Receivership for GMD15,525 per month commencing from November 2017, when the police officers had to be reassigned due to manpower shortage.
- 371.** The Group did not own the head office property from which it operated. Evidence received by the Committee from Augustus Prom shows that the head office was owned by Mr. Ansumana Jammeh, and there were no rent arrears owed to him.
- 372.** The Receiver's final recommendation to the Attorney General was for winding up procedures to be considered for these companies since they were already under U.S. sanctions, or that the Chairperson be given a chance to present adequate working capital to finance all of these companies.
- 373.** The Committee notes that the Commission, in its report to the President, did not report on the Royal Africa Group of companies, even though they were part of the companies listed in the annexures of Legal Notice No. 15 of 2017. The Committee further notes that the recommendations of Augustus Prom were not considered by the then Attorney General and that these companies are still on the companies' registry.

PATRIOT INSURANCE BROKERS COMPANY LTD

- 374.** Patriot Insurance Brokers Company Ltd was registered on 7th January 2011, and was owned by Mr. Ansumana Jammeh, who held 75% of the shares (majority shareholder). The other shareholders were Momodou Lamin Bah, 10%, Sanna Bah, 10%, and Ebrima Ceesay, the former managing director, with 5% of the shares. The company had one bank account at Trust Bank.

- 375.** The company was involved in the provision of insurance brokerage services, but was financially struggling in early 2017 when it lost most of its clients. The company had one account at Trust Bank Gambia Ltd that was frozen by the High Court with a credit balance of GMD 240.83. The company had a few assets consisting of two office desks with chairs, two visitor chairs, and two HP Desktop computers.
- 376.** Augustus Prom recommended at the end of its Receivership that winding up procedures be considered for Patriot Insurance Brokers Company Ltd as its financial prospects were not positive, considering that the Company's last two directors/employees (also shareholders) resigned from the company, and it had also lost its clientele, rendering it dormant.
- 377.** The Committee notes that the Commission, in its report to the President, did not report on the Patriot Insurance Brokers Company Limited, even though it was part of the companies listed in the annexures of Legal Notice No. 15 of 2017. The Committee further notes that the Attorney General did not implement Augustus Prom's recommendations on the Company.

WEST AFRICAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT & MARKETING CORPORATION

- 378.** West Africa Resource Development & Marketing Corporation Ltd has a shareholding structure with Mr. Ansumana Jammeh owning 10% of the shares and Dr. Kenneth Jackson with 80%. Evidence received from Augustus Prom shows that this company did not operate or take off after it was registered. Evidence submitted to the Committee shows that Augustus Prom did not have much corporate information about this company and could not obtain any banking history for the company, and they recommend that winding up procedures should be considered.
- 379.** The Committee finds that the Commission of Inquiry, in its report to the President, did not report on the West Africa Resource Development & Marketing Corporation Ltd. The Committee further notes that the recommendations of Augustus Prom were not implemented by the Attorney General.

MALIGAM INTERNATIONAL

- 380.** Evidence received by the Committee regarding Maligam International shows that the company had been dormant since 2004. Augustus Prom reported that it did not have much corporate information regarding the company. After conducting research on the company, Augustus Prom found that Mr. Ansumana Jammeh was in litigation with Bank PHB (Gambia) Ltd in September 2011 regarding financing, and his arrest and prosecution in April 2016 regarding funds received from a foreign company, CONAPRO.
- 381.** The company had a GMD 24,180,928.02 million loan from Zenith Bank Gambia Ltd, which was written off by the bank in 2018; it also had another loan from Mega Bank Gambia Ltd amounting to GMD5,390,000.00, which, up until the end of Augustus Prom's Receivership, was not clarified by the bank as to whether it was still outstanding.

382. Augustus Prom, in its final report, recommended that winding up procedures should be considered for the company since it had no funds in its bank accounts and no capital assets. The Committee finds that the Commission of Inquiry, in its report to the President, did not report on Maligam International, even though it was part of the companies listed in the annexures of Legal Notice No. 15 of 2017. The Committee further notes that the recommendations of Augustus Prom were not implemented by the Attorney General.

OBSERVER COMPANY LTD

383. According to Augustus Prom, they found the Observer Company (Gambia) Limited facing insolvency due to high liabilities, outdated and inefficient printing production equipment, poor client credit policies denting its cash-inflows, and internal staff disputes, all attributable to poor management. The company was closed three weeks after the Receivership commenced due to its tax liabilities.

384. Augustus Prom informed the Committee that when it initially took over, it focused on restructuring the Company by reducing staff numbers, pursuing debtors, terminating the contract of the Managing Director, who lacked the support of managers and staff, reducing liabilities, ensuring printing production continued by pre-financing production materials at some point, improving the financial management system, and paying outstanding salaries.

385. The Observer Company was closed on 23rd August 2017 by the Hon. Sheriff due to outstanding tax liabilities owed to the Gambia Revenue Authority (GRA) amounting to GMD17,437,184.00 Dalasis, plus cost of GMD 100,000.00 as awarded by the High Court to The Gambia Revenue Authority. The Company also owed Fadel H. Khadra, a supplier, GMD 218,275.00, which was awarded to him by the Court as well. By the end of the Receivership, the Hon. Sheriff had attached all of the Company's assets, and the Company had total liabilities and claims amounting to GMD 20,643,712.00, creating an insolvency scenario. The Company was also undergoing litigation with a former employee claiming GMD126,000.00, being salary deduction for 7 years and 7 months, and other miscellaneous sums for unfair dismissal.

386. SSHFC also filed an application at the High Court seeking an Order to bring proceedings against the Receiver claiming for the sum of GMD 1,181,740,82.00 being total arrears of the Company's National Provident Fund (NPF) pension contributions from September 2015 to August 2017, plus 2.0% penalty. SSHFC also claimed for GMD 301,632,24 plus 21.5% penalty in respect of injuries Compensation Fund (ICF) contributions for the period July 1996 to June 2013. SSHFC also claimed GMD 33,070.01 plus 21.5% penalty for ICF for the periods October 2015 to August 2017 with post-judgment interest at the rate of 4% per annum, legal and administrative fees of GMD 101,015.30, plus costs and other reliefs as the Honourable Court deems just. SSHFC engaged the services of Amie Bensouda & Co LLP, the law firm of the Lead Counsel of the Commission, to make these applications on its behalf at the High Court. The application was eventually dismissed by the High Court.

- 387.** The Observer Company had the following frozen balances at the banks:
- (a) Guaranty Trust Bank (G) Ltd, D730.92
 - (b) Ecobank (G) Ltd, D1,870.01
 - (c) Mega Bank (G) Ltd, D340.54
 - (d) Arab Gambia Islamic Bank, D22.97
- 388.** According to Augustus Prom, they were informed by the Hon. Sheriff that Kanilai Worni Family Farms (KFF) owned the office property at Gacem Road in the Kanifing Industrial Area, from which the Observer Company operated.
- 389.** The Committee finds that the property is now being occupied by the National Agency for Legal Aid (NALA). This is an initiative that the Committee finds laudable, as the Committee is of the view that some of the properties can be allocated to ministries, departments, and agencies to occupy as opposed to paying rent to private individuals or entities.
- 390.** Mr. Louis Prom of Augustus Prom Advisory informed the Committee during his testimony that much effort was made by the Receivership and the staff of the Company to reopen the Observer Company including meetings with the Commissioner General of GRA, the Minister of Finance & Economic Affairs and also the Solicitor General & Legal Secretary of the Ministry of Justice on the matter of the closure but without success. The Honourable Sheriff of The Gambia had even given the Receivership some time before liquidation of assets commenced for the situation to be salvaged, but a viable financial solution or a state intervention could not be presented.
- 391.** The Receiver's final recommendation to the Attorney General was for winding up procedures to be considered for the Company because its assessments showed that the company was insolvent and could not pay its debts totalling GMD 20,643,712.00, and its remaining assets were already under the Hon. Sheriff.
- 392.** The Commission, in its report to the President, stated that the Observer Company was purchased by Mr. Amadou Samba from its founder, Mr. Kenneth Best, for the sum of USD 268,000.00, which was paid from the Central Bank of the Gambia Special Deposit 3M Account (part of the Taiwan Loan). The Commission found in its investigations that after the company was transferred to Mr. Samba, he fronted as the owner until Mr. Baba Jobe took over ostensibly as a buyer, but also as a front for President Jammeh. The Commission further found that the money used to purchase the Company was stolen from CBG in contravention of section 245 (1) of the then Criminal Code by Mr. Samba and Ex-President Jammeh jointly and severally.
- 393.** The Commission recommended that Mr. Samba and President Jammeh should be jointly and severally liable for the sum of USD 268,000.00[TM1] with interest at the rate of 4% per annum, which was the interest rate on the Taiwan loan. The Commission also recommended that the Company should be liquidated and any balance outstanding be forfeited to the State after preferred debts had been paid. Further recommendation was made for criminal liability to be assigned to

former President Jammeh and Mr. Amadou Samba as the living principal actors of the Observer Company chronicle.

- 394.** The Committee finds that Mr. Samba has not paid any part of the sum he is jointly and severally liable for, along with the former President, despite the recommendation of the Commission being accepted by the Government in its White Paper. The issue of liabilities owed to the State, as found by the Commission in its investigation, will be discussed later in this report.
- 395.** The Committee finds that the Commission regarding the liquidation of the company had already been overtaken by the circumstances surrounding the company's situation, mainly due to the attachment of the company by the Hon. Sheriff and the subsequent liquidation of its assets.

WEST WOOD (GAMBIA) LTD

- 396.** West Wood Gambia Ltd is owned by Kanilai Worni Family Farms Ltd (KFF) and BP Investment Group FZE, both with equal shares of 50%. The company commenced its operations in June 2014 and was commercially dormant from April 2017; its exclusive timber export license was revoked. The Company was the only entity allowed to export timber from The Gambia; it operated as a monopoly and had several subsidiaries. The Office of the President granted it an exclusive permit for exporting timber despite there being a countrywide ban on the exportation of timber.
- 397.** West Wood Gambia Ltd was not buying the timber from the local operators or exporters but rather providing a consolidated export service for which the shipping documents, such as the bill of lading will indicate West Wood Gambia Ltd. All the timber exporters in the Gambia from June 2014 had to export through West Wood Gambia Ltd for a fixed management service fee of USD \$3,000.00 per container paid in US Dollars cash, plus local charges of GMD 16,700 paid in local currency as per container and used by West Wood to pay Customs, the Department of Forestry and for the Certificate for Endangered Species (CITES).
- 398.** Evidence received from Augustus Prom shows that from 4th June 2014 to 18th March 2017, the Company had exported 13,028 containers of timber, mostly to China, resulting in USD \$ 39,084,000 Million US Dollars in Revenue from the Management Service fees. Out of this revenue, West Wood had paid a total of \$7,810,115.00 Million to KFF Ltd and \$4,939,040.00 plus €202,000.00 to the BP Investment Group as Dividends but there were no Board resolutions in the file to endorse these payments effected from September 2014 to March 2017. Fifteen (15%) withholding tax estimated at GMD 96.355 million (based on 15% of USD 12.977 million of total Dividends, then converted at GMD 49.50 to USD 1.00) was also not applied on these dividend payments in line with Section 90 and Section 92 of the Income and Value Added Tax Act, as amended in 2018. Part of this revenue was also used to provide long term and no interest concessional financing to other BP Group companies in The Gambia such as Westport Logistics for the container cargo scanner, BPI Tourism & Services for the two Hotels (Ocean Bay Hotel & Sun Beach Hotel), Mineral Company of The Gambia Ltd (MCG) for the gold dust refinery plant based at the GIETAF trade zone warehouses located at the airport.

- 399.** Augustus Prom informed the Committee that the company had five expatriate employees who were all associated with the BP Investment Group and resigned from 31 August 2017 since the Company was dormant and under Receivership. There were also three (3) Gambian employees providing basic administrative support, of which two were transferred to Ocean Bay Hotel to help them stay employed, and one was paid redundancy in October 2017.
- 400.** According to Augustus Prom, the company had valuable assets with an estimated value of GMD 28.552 million based on the audited accounts, comprising of used timber processing equipment that were moved on 15th February 2018 from its warehouse as needed by the GIETAF joint venture at the Banjul International Airport trade zone project in time for the inauguration ceremony and was stored at the adjacent warehouse of M.C.G. Ltd (i.e. BP Group Sister Company) which housed the gold dust refinery equipment.
- 401.** The Committee was informed by Alpha Barry that the gold dust refinery has been advertised but has not yet been sold. The Committee, whilst conducting its site visits, found that the gold dust refinery is still stored at the warehouse and has yet to be sold. However, it does take note of Mr. Barry's testimony that he has received a bid for the refinery.
- 402.** Augustus Prom's submissions show that the company also had office space, furniture, and equipment stored at the Ocean Bay Hotel. The office was rented out to a new tenant, West Africa Vigilance Group Company Ltd, for GMD 850,000.00 per annum to generate income for the Hotel.
- 403.** In its final report to the Attorney General, which was also submitted to the High Court and the Commission, Augustus Prom stated it suspect that the vehicles were transferred to BPI Tourism without a Board resolution and a vehicle valuation report when the Directors learnt that West Wood was placed in Receivership in order to continue using them because they also transferred to BPI Tourism with new contracts as consultants shortly afterward. Augustus Prom recommended that the vehicles should have been transferred back to West Wood Ltd. Augustus Prom reported that to have also been informed that there were two old Mercedes Benz C190D sedan vehicles which were also sold with an estimated value of GMD 100,000 for each in February 2017 to a private individual but there was no indication of the Company paying capital gains tax on these asset disposals.
- 404.** The Company's assets included a used bulletproof G-Wagon Mercedes Benz 4X4 black coloured vehicle with an estimated value of USD 200,000.00 that was diverted and parked at State House just before the December 2016 to January 2017 political impasse. Augustus Prom reported that letters were sent to the Secretary General and Head of the Civil Service at the time with supporting documentation, but they never received any feedback and up until the end of the Receivership, the vehicle was not handed back to the company.
- 405.** Augustus Prom received claims from the Gambia Investment & Export Promotion Agency (GIEPA) for an amount of GMD 9,750,000.00 relating to outstanding rental charges for the airport

warehouse which housed the timber processing equipment. A claim of GMD11,101,748.00 was also received by Augustus Prom from Maersk Line Gambia Ltd for demurrage charges relating to container shipments of timber to China. The company had abandoned or forfeited these 40 containers in June 2017, which were then auctioned by the Chinese Customs, but Maersk Line did not indicate the value of the auction proceeds to the Receivership, which would have helped to determine the accurate value of their claim. West Wood Gambia Ltd also had outstanding tax liabilities, which were estimated at GMD 253,764,828.00.

406. According to Augustus Prom's reports, the company's audited financial statements covering 1st July 2016 to 31st July 2017, being the last financial year of its timber exporting operations before the Receiver took over the company, indicated revenue or turnover of GMD 887,629,906.00. Total expenditure was at GMD 525,786,731, resulting in a profit before tax of GMD 367,832,568. A dividend payment of GMD 280,769,811 was paid for the 2016/2017 financial year after a net profit of GMD 257,482,797, resulting in a net loss of GMD 23,287,014.00. The final draft of the said audited financial statements was, however, unsigned by the Directors of the BP Investment Group who were in charge during that period of the Company's operations.
407. The Company's total fixed assets as at 31 July 2017 were valued at GMD 28,552,398.00 and its current assets at GMD121,885,141.00, mostly consisting of loans owed by other sister BP Group companies. The company had liabilities totalling GMD 253,764,828, which was mostly for outstanding corporate income tax.
408. Augustus Prom also reported that West Wood Ltd was owed GMD 121,841,416.00 by sister companies in the BP Group, with the two Hotels under the management of BPI Tourism & Services Ltd owing the most. Ocean Bay Hotel owed West Wood GMD 38,878,26.00, and Sun Beach Hotel owed GMD 62,953,406.00, for which provision was put in place by the Receivership for a minimum sum of GMD500,000.00 a month from both Hotels. These loans were given out by West Wood mostly through cash and on a concessional basis (i.e., no interest applied, a three-year grace period, and a 9–15-year duration). However, board resolutions awarding the loan were not found in files, although there are loan agreements for each Hotel under BPI Tourism.
409. The Company had frozen accounts at Zenith Bank Gambia Ltd with balances of GMD 26,543.18, USD 309.58, 0 Euro, 0 GBP, and four accounts at Eco Bank with negative (GMD2,458.58), USD 57.09, 0 GBP, and 73.33 Euros.
410. The Receiver's final recommendations to the Attorney General were that winding up procedures be considered for the Company due to its dormant status and limited funds, and that its assets be liquidated to help settle its liabilities but also taking into account the loan repayments due from the Group's internal debtors.
411. The Commission reported in detail on the operations and business engagements of West Wood. It looked into West Woods' relations with the Gambia Ports Authority, the Department of Forestry, the Association of Wood Exporters & Forests Users in The Gambia (Timber Association), sister

companies, and other companies owned or associated with the former President. The Commission further reported that Westwood was collecting royalties from the timber export and paying the Department, but it was not able to confirm the exact amount that the Department was supposed to have collected. The Department of Forestry never monitored the activities of Westwood, therefore making them unable to retrieve the total loss of royalties. But, after the Department's consultations with Westwood, it determined that the Company was supposed to pay the amount of 316 containers, which totalled to GMD 2,528,000.00. The said amount was never received by the Department of Forestry despite writing a letter to the company.

- 412.** The Commission's findings showed that the former President banned the export of timber from the country, presumably to curb the trade and protect the nation's natural resources, but eventually created a company to take over and monopolise the timber export for his personal gain and benefit. The Commission found that the Forestry Act did not confer any powers to the former President to issue timber export permits or authorisations. His actions created a demand for timber which led to enhanced deforestation as civilians cut down trees to feed the demand, which it will take the country many years to recover from, and which also undermined the role and ability of the Forestry Department to regulate the timber business and the laws designed to protect our forest resources.
- 413.** The Commission made several recommendations regarding West Wood Ltd. The first being that the company should be liquidated and all its assets and all related companies – Westport Logistics Limited, BPI Tourism and Services Ltd., Mineral Company Ltd. including the scanning machine, should be sold to pay the outstanding tax liabilities owed to GRA. The Commission also recommended that a portion of the funds recovered from the sale should be paid into a forest fund to support a program for the resuscitation of the country's natural forest cover. The Commission further recommended that the exportation of timber should be permanently banned and the Department of Forestry should be supported to protect the remainder of the country's forest reserves. Finally, the Commission recommended the Government should engage the Chinese Government to prevent importation of timber from the Gambia since all of the timber exported was destined for China.
- 414.** The government in its white paper accepted the Commission's findings and recommendations as it relates to Mr Dracos Buziainu and Mr. Nicolai Buziainu and that the companies associated with them and the former President are banned from conducting business in The Gambia. These companies are:
- (a) BPI Tourism and Services Ltd. (BPI)
 - (b) Westwood Gambia Limited (Westwood)
 - (c) Westport Logistics Limited (Westport)
 - (d) Mineral Company of the Gambia Limited
- 415.** The Committee, in its investigations, conducted site visits which included the GIETAF warehouses at the airport and found that West Wood's timber processing equipment is still located at the warehouse. The Committee's visit was facilitated by MOJ, which, however, took a while before it could take place due to MOJ informing the Committee that the keys to the warehouse could not be

found, as they were in the custody of the former Director of Civil Litigation, Mr. D. Binga. However, during the visit to the warehouse, Mr. Abdoulie Joof of Alpha Kapital Advisory, representing the Receiver during the visit, informed the Committee that he had visited the warehouse before and used keys provided to him by his colleague Ms. Chilel Jawara and he returned them to her after his visit. The Committee finds it concerning that the keys to a warehouse containing valuable assets cannot be safely kept by the Ministry of Justice, leading to the door being broken for the Committee to be able to gain access. The Committee also finds it more concerning that the Receiver/Trustee had the keys to the warehouse without the knowledge of the Ministry of Justice.

- 416.** The Committee in its investigations found that the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry regarding the West Wood (Gambia) Ltd, though accepted by the Government, were not implemented. Evidence received by the Committee shows that this company is still on the Companies Registry.

MINERAL COMPANY OF THE GAMBIA LTD (MCG)

- 417.** Mineral Company of The Gambia is owned by Kanilai Wormi Family Farms (KFF) 50% who holds its shares equally with Alhamdoulilah Petroleum & Mining Company Ltd (A.P.AM.) and the other 50% is owned by Amira Overseas Freezone Establishment, which is associated to the BP Investment Group. Mr. Nicolai Buzaianu signed on behalf of Amira and Mrs. Fatou B. Jammeh signed on behalf of APAM and KFF. The company was registered on 10th of October 2013. MCG is affiliated with the BP Investment Group and was registered to carry on the business of exploration, mining, processing, refining, and the import and export of minerals, petroleum, and gas among other things.
- 418.** According to Augustus Prom's reports to the Attorney General, and also submitted to the High Court and the Commission, the firm was informed by the Directors of the BP Group that the company was registered as a hub in the Gambia to attract gold from all the neighbouring countries that are producing gold. With a certain volume of pure gold produced with refining activity for a minimum two years, the Gambia would have been able to apply for a hallmark seal, recognized by all the major banks in the world. This would have presented a major financial opportunity for the country to be internationally recognised, and the Gambia would have been able to stabilize and to reinforce its currency, the Gambian Dalasi, according to its BP Group Directors.
- 419.** The Commission reported that the Company never operated and had only one employee who later resigned due to lack of payment of salaries. The Commission also reported that the shareholders financed the machines, and one of them, Mr. Nicolai Buzaianu, claimed these assets of the Company from the Receiver. The Commission further reported that the MD of the Company, Mr. Anthony Panetta, did not know whether the refinery was used as a refining centre for gold obtained from Badari or other parts of The Gambia.

420. Augustus Prom reported that the Company's gold dust refinery plant had an estimated value of 450,000 Euros (or est. at half a million dollars, USD\$500,000). Augustus Prom further reported that the refinery plant had state of the art modern equipment with a complete testing laboratory to ensure it meets quality standards and is able to melt, refine and test up to 500 kilograms of gold per 12 (twelve) hour shift. The plant also had furnished offices on the first floor, a large vault, and tailored staff showering facilities next to the plant to ensure the smallest gold particles are not lost in the drainage but recycled back into the plant for further processing. The refinery was bought from a European supplier, Italiapianti Orapispa.
421. The Receiver reported that it received claims from the Gambia Investment & Export Promotion Agency (GIEPA) for an amount of GMD 9,750,000.00 relating to outstanding rental charges for the airport warehouse in the GIETAF Trade zone that is housing the installed and integrated gold dust refinery equipment of MCG. Further claims were also received from the National Water and Electricity Company Ltd. (NAWEC) for GMD 3.6 million for utility arrears for the warehouse complex that was shared by both MCG and its associated company, West Wood Gambia Limited, but separated by a wall. The claim was addressed to Green Industries Ltd, the former tenant of the warehouse prior to occupancy by MCG and West Wood. The Directors of West Wood stated that they were initially making payments to NAWEC but stopped as NAWEC was applying these payments towards the arrears balance for which they were not responsible.
422. The Company had frozen GMD, USD, and Euro corporate accounts at Trust Bank Ltd and Eco Bank (Gambia) Ltd. The two Trust Bank accounts have a total of GMD 398,784.52, and the two Eco Bank accounts are at minus (-) GMD5,681.90.
423. The Receiver's recommendation to the Attorney General regarding MCG was that the refinery can be utilised to bring business for the company and generate tax revenue for the State but having considered the Company's current dormant status, limited prospect of its shareholders further investing to restart operations and pending liabilities, the Receiver's final recommendation was that MCG should be wound up and its assets liquidated to help settle its liabilities.
424. The Commission's recommendation was for the Government to liquidate MCG and all its assets be sold, and that a Receiver other than Augustus Prom should be appointed. The Government, in its White Paper, accepted the recommendations of the Commission.
425. The Committee was informed by Alpha Barry that the gold dust refinery has been advertised but has yet been sold. The Committee, whilst conducting its site visits, found that the gold dust refinery is still stored at the warehouse and is yet to be sold. However, it does take note of Mr. Barry's testimony that he has received a bid for the refinery.
426. The fourteen companies discussed above are the companies that were listed on MOJ5A, being Legal Notice No.15 of 2017, through which the President issued the Commission of Inquiry. These companies were the same as the ones listed on the annexures of MOJ 3A, being the Order of the

High Court of the Gambia dated 22nd May 2017. Below are the three companies put under receivership by the Commission of Inquiry.

DUNES RESORT & CASINO

- 427.** The Dunes Resort & Casino was placed under Augustus Prom's Receivership on 25th September 2017 by the Commission after it was discovered by the Commission's investigators. The Resort was purchased by the former President through KGI International Ltd using misappropriated funds from the Gambia National Petroleum Corporation, amounting to USD 8,585,000, as reported by Augustus Prom. The resort was in a neglected state, with deteriorating structures, termite infestation, and facilities in disrepair. Although the suites retained basic furniture and fittings, most air conditioners were damaged, televisions were missing, and the casino area lacked equipment. Other facilities, such as the restaurant kitchen, conference room, offices, and swimming pool, were either broken, empty, or unusable.
- 428.** Reports submitted to the Committee by Augustus Prom show that it had tried to get the resort up and running by engaging the Gambia Tourism Board and operators/investors in the tourism industry in The Gambia. The reports show that most of the operators/investors were interested in purchasing the resort rather than leasing it, which is what Augustus Prom preferred, citing its poor design and condition, which they believed required demolition and rebuilding.
- 429.** Louis Prom, Head of Advisory at Augustus Prom, informed the Committee during his testimony that the firm looked into renovating the resort and received quotations from different construction service providers. The then Attorney General selected the construction company to be awarded the renovation contract, as the Ministry of Justice was funding the renovations; the contract was awarded to Atrium Consulting. Augustus Prom received an offer from the then Attorney General with regard to sub-leasing the resort to the TRRC. Evidence received by the Committee shows that the negotiations started at three million dalasi but were later agreed at a lower price, and an agreement was signed. However, evidence shows that the agreed sum was not paid by MOJ to the Receiver until the end of the receivership. The TRRC occupied the resort to carry out its mandate.
- 430.** The Receiver had recommended in its final report that the hotel be considered for sale upon the conclusion of the TRRC's mandate, and this recommendation was mirrored by the Commission in its final report to the President. The Government did not acknowledge the recommendations of the Commission regarding Dunes, as it did not mention the resort at all in its White Paper.
- 431.** Unfortunately, the Committee could not establish the current ownership and legal status of the resort, as it did not have enough time to inquire and investigate the issues surrounding the current status of the resort. The Committee is aware that the Dunes Resort and Casino has been rebranded and renamed Dunas Boutique Hotel, and it is currently operational. It is not clear to the Committee whether the resort was sold or sub-leased by the Government.

432. Out of all the companies and businesses placed under receivership, Dunes was the only one whose assets were sold during the receivership. Before the Ministry of Justice took over the resort, there was furniture and furnishings at the resort that the TRRC did not need and were lying around on the grounds of the hotel and in some makeshift storage. The sale was conducted through public auction, ordered by the Commission of Inquiry dated 17th September 2018. The items sold were valued by Mr. Ebrima Njie of E.N. Mech Services at the tune of GMD 349,550.00 and were sold for GMD 363,550.00. After administrative expenses were deducted from this amount, it remained GMD 253,868.39, which was handed over to Alpha Barry by Augustus Prom at the directives of the then Attorney General.

Westport LOGISTICS (WPL)

433. Westport Logistics (WPL), like its sister company West Wood Gambia Ltd, is associated with BP Investment Group FZE. Westport was incorporated in April 2014 with 1000 shares valued at GMD 1,000.00 each, with the objective of providing container cargo scanning facilities to The Gambia Port Authority (GPA). The company is owned equally by Kanilai Worni Family Farms (KFF) and BP Investment Group FZE. The company was placed under Augustus Prom's receivership by an Order of the Commission dated 27th February 2018.

434. Augustus Prom reported that the Company was granted an exclusive concession agreement by the former government on a Build, Operate & Transfer (BOT) basis for the company to finance, install, supervise, and maintain security scanning systems at the Port of Banjul and at the Banjul International Airport. The concession agreement was terminated by the Gambian Government at the time, almost a year after it was signed, due to delays regarding authorisations of the importation of the radiation component of the scanner. Renegotiations for a new concession agreement took place, but the former government and the company could not agree on terms and did not finalise a new agreement.

435. According to Augustus Prom, the company's assets were mainly the container cargo scanning equipment valued at 2.39 million Euros, which was mounted on a small-sized Iveco truck. The radioactive part of the scanner was purchased by the company for 50,000.00 euros. The company had two other vehicles, according to Louis Prom, and they were a Nissan Pathfinder and a Kia Sorento. All of these assets were stored at a warehouse at the Gambia Ports Authority storage warehouse, and the keys were handed over to the Attorney General through the then Director of Civil Litigation, Mr Binga D.

436. The Commission reported that Westwood financed Westport Logistics to the tune of 2.6 million euros by paying for the scanning machine and that Westport owed Westwood GMD 20,288,000.00 in a different financing arrangement. The Receiver recommended that the Company be wound up in accordance with the Companies Act 2013 and all its assets be liquidated. The Commission made a similar recommendation. The Government, in its White Paper, accepted the recommendations of the Commission on WestPort and its sister companies.

437. The Committee in its investigations, found that the container cargo scanning machine is still stored at the Gambia Ports Authority storage warehouses and has still not been put to use. However, the Committee did not find the two other vehicles that were part of the assets owned by the Company in the storage warehouse. During the time the Committee conducted its visit to the storage warehouse, it was informed that only the Managing Director of GPA had proper information regarding the scanner, but unfortunately, he was not available to provide the required information to the Committee.
438. The Committee is of the belief that the container scanner is an essential piece of equipment that would greatly enhance the work being done at the Port of Banjul and that the Government should have taken steps to ensure that the equipment was put to use.

BPI TOURISM & SERVICE Co. Ltd

439. BPI Tourism & Service Company Ltd was incorporated on 1st November 2013, and its shareholders are BP Investment Group FZE, a company registered in Dubai owning 95%, and Mr. Dragos – Andrei Buzaianu owning 5%. The Company was placed under Augustus Prom’s receivership by an Interim Order of the Commission dated 4th April 2018 due to the Company’s association with BP Investment Group FZE and the loans it received from its sister company, West Wood Gambia Limited; the loans were utilised for the renovations of the two hotels it managed i.e. Ocean Bay Hotel & Resort and Sun Beach Hotel.
440. Evidence received by the Committee shows that both Ocean Bay Hotel and Sun Beach Hotel were sub-leased to BP Investment Group by Social Security & Housing Finance Corporation (SSHFC) as the owner of the hotels. Ocean Bay was sub-leased on 30th October 2013 for a period of ten years commencing from the 30th of December 2013 and ending on 30th December 2023. Sun Beach was sub-leased on 9th August 2016 for a period of fifteen years commencing on 1st January 2016 to 31st October 2031. BPI was paying 14,000.00 euros a month for Ocean Bay and 10,000.00 euros for Sun Beach.
441. According to Augustus Prom, BPI and SSHFC were in court over the subleases due to payment defaults by the time the Receivership commenced, and the cases continued until the end of the receivership. In addition to this suit, there were other suits instituted against BPI by different people. As mentioned above, the hotels under BPI were some of the few companies that were operational at the commencement of the receivership, and the Receiver made sure to keep the hotels as a going concern.
442. The Committee finds that the BPI Tourism & Service Company Ltd., along with the two hotels it managed, were probably the most complex companies that were placed under receivership during the course of the Commission of Inquiry’s investigations. The complexities of the company involved the numerous persistent requests from the owners of the hotels, SSHFC, for the transfer of the hotels back to them or for the hotels to be put under a different management company. Some of these requests came from the then Minister of Justice himself.

443. Mr. Louis Prom informed the committee that when Augustus Prom was appointed by the Commission of Inquiry as Receiver, fees were not discussed, leaving the firm to apply the same fee structure it had previously agreed with the then Attorney General for the 17 companies placed in its custody by the High Court. After many months into the receivership, the Commission then asked the receiver why it was applying the 10% fee structure to the companies, and must charge a 3% fee structure and refund the rest of the fees charged. Augustus Prom disagreed after having meetings with the Commission and exchanging letters. Their services were later terminated by the commission in February 2019, and Foresight Accountancy and Audit Partners were appointed as receivers for the hotels for a few months until the white paper was published and the hotels were handed back to their owners.
444. The Committee, in its investigations, received evidence showing that all these companies, albeit having been recommended for liquidation by both the Receiver, Augustus Prom, and the Commission of Inquiry, and for banning in the Gambia, are still on the Companies Registry.
445. In his testimony before the Committee, the former Attorney General, Mr. Tambadou, informed the Committee that when the Commission submitted its report and the White Paper was published, he instructed the then Registrar of Companies to strike off all companies from the records of the Companies Registry; however, he never followed up to confirm whether these instructions were carried out.
446. In addition to the seventeen companies and their subsidiaries and business ventures placed under receivership by the High Court of The Gambia and the Commission Inquiry, below is a list of companies and charities that were also identified and investigated by the Commission of Inquiry as it investigated the financial dealings of the former President and his close associates.
- (a) GAMVEG Oil Ltd
 - (b) Maintenance Service Agency (MSA)/Unique Transport Company Limited
 - (c) Jammeh Foundation for Peace
 - (d) President's Empowerment For Girls' Education (PEGEP)
 - (e) Marima Yahya Jammeh Family Trust (MYJ Trust)
 - (f) Operation Save the Children Foundation
 - (g) Operation Save the Baby Foundation
 - (h) GamPetroleum Company Limited
 - (i) Euro Africa Group Limited
 - (j) Gambia-African Mining International Company Limited (GAMICO)
 - (k) Carnegie Minerals (Gambia) Limited
 - (l) Kairaba Beach Hotel
 - (m) Alhamdulillah Petroleum Company Limited
 - (n) HIV, AIDS, and Asthma Treatment Programs
 - (o) Millennium Industrial and General Trading Ltd (registered in Alofi, Niue Island)
 - (p) M. A. Kharafi & Sons
 - (q) Youth Development Enterprise

- (r) Electricity Power Company Limited- KFF
- (s) Millennium Africa Water
- (t) Gambia Food & Feed Industry (GFFI)
- (u) Kanilai Institute of Technology

447. These companies engaged in a wide range of businesses and activities, including but not limited to mining and the downstream petroleum business. The Committee finds that most of these companies are still registered in the Gambia, which is contrary to what is contained in the government's white paper published by the government after the commission submitted its reports.
448. The Committee is deeply concerned that after the current Minister of Justice was appointed, no efforts were made by him to remedy his predecessor's oversight regarding these companies and the liquidation process they were supposed to go through.

OTHER EQUITY HOLDINGS

449. In addition to the companies above, the committee found that there were equity holdings that the former president and his associates had, and these are shares at Comium Gambia Limited, shares at Gam Petroleum, and GT Bank. The shares at GT Bank are held by KGI International; the shares at GP and Comium were held by Muhammed Bazzi.
450. Mr. Barry informed the committee that the shares held by KGI at GTBank are still under his receivership, even though they were valued, but are yet to be sold. The shareholders of the bank were given the first right of refusal to buy the shares, but suitable offers were not made, and this is why the said shares remain unsold. Mr Barry also informed the committee that as of May 2025, he had received a total of GMD 7,073,678.00 as dividends. KGI holds 4,767,556 ordinary shares at the bank, and the shares were valued in 2019 with an estimate of GMD 2.78 to GMD 3.20 per share. The valuation was done by DT Associates.
451. In his report submitted to the attorney general when public interest in the sale and disposal of the assets was raised, Mr. Barry stated that the shares at Comium were held by KGI International, which the Committee finds to be inaccurate because KGI did not hold any shares at Comium. The shares sold at Comium were valued by DT Associates on 31st December 2019 for the estimated amount of GMD 5.2 million to GMD 6.3 million. The shares were sold to the majority shareholder of Comium, C-Mobile Group Holding Limited, for the sum of GMD 5,750,000.00 in December 2020. The sale price was paid in instalments by the company. Mr Barry and Mr Tambadou informed the Committee that the shares were sold at that price because the company was undergoing financial difficulties at the time, and it was not apparent that the company would regain its footing in the ICT industry.
452. The shares at Gam Petroleum (31%.5) were sold by inviting interested parties to submit an expression of interest. The shares were bought by:

- i. Star Oil - GMD 250,625,000.00
- ii. GNPC - GMD 50,000,000.00
- iii. SSHFC - GMD 250,000.00

453. In addition to the funds received from the sale, Mr. Barry informed the committee that he had also received GMD 98,564,351.00 as a dividend for the shares before the sale.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. All of the companies that were recommended for liquidation by the Commission and accepted by the government must be liquidated in the most efficient manner, since most of the assets of the companies have been sold.
2. The government should engage the Gambia Ports Authority to assess the cargo container and to see whether it is needed by the country to ease the work of the Banjul Port. If the assessment shows that the scanner is indeed needed by GPA, then it shall be handed over to them for use. Should the assessment show that the scanner is not needed, then it must be sold by the Minister of Finance in the same manner in which all State assets are sold.
3. If the gold dust refinery has not been sold by the receiver at the time this report is tabled, then it must be handed over to the Ministry of Finance, which shall then facilitate the sale of the refinery.
4. The registrar of companies must implement the provisions of the Companies Act 2013 dealing with companies in the register that do not comply with the filing of annual returns, filing of resolutions, amongst other things.
5. The Government must take active actions to recover the loss incurred by the state caused by the former president and his close associates in their financial dealings as it relates to these companies and their business ventures. The commission of inquiry has clearly identified and outlined the loss incurred and through whom it must be recovered as it relates to these companies. Therefore, the recommendations that are already accepted by the government in its white paper must be implemented.
6. The government should engage the services of international firms or entities specialised in investigating, tracing, and recovering state assets, to investigate and trace any assets the former President may have outside the jurisdiction.
7. The timber processing machinery owned by Westwood should be sold by the Hon. Minister of Finance in the manner in which State assets are to be sold.

LANDED PROPERTIES

LANDED PROPERTIES IDENTIFIED

454. The Committee, in discharging its mandate in relation to former President Jammeh’s landed properties, relied primarily on the Commission’s official findings as set out in **Volume 3: Special Landed Properties – (A) Ex-President Jammeh Acquired Properties**. This Volume constitutes the primary record of the immovable properties (real properties) identified by the Commission as belonging to, or associated with, the former President and his close affiliates.
455. It therefore served as the principal evidential baseline against which the Committee reconstructed the list of properties subject to the Commission’s inquiry, and against which the Committee measured all subsequent transactions, whether purported sales, transfers, allocations, or disposals, affecting those properties during the period under review.
456. On page 5 of the said report, the Commission reported investigating “the ownership (title) of 266 properties and their manner of acquisition...” The Commission further reported the following on the same page:

The number of properties investigated by the local government area is as follows:

1. Banjul City 22
2. Kanifing Municipality 43
3. West Coast Region 117
4. Lower River Region 9
5. Central River Region 23
6. North Bank Region 14
7. Upper River Region 8

Of these, 10 are Islands, 8 are forest parks, 26 are wildlife reserves and Wetlands, and 10 are hills. The Commission’s inquiry also extended to properties alleged to be owned by President Jammeh outside the country. Two (2) properties were investigated, one in the United States and another in the Kingdom of Morocco.

457. Relying on these figures, the Committee summoned for evidence and testimonies from several stakeholders in the land management regime, members of the cabinet, and officials who were identified by the Committee to have had responsibilities in the management and disposal of landed properties identified by the Commission. The said witnesses are listed in “**Annex B**” of this report. In addition, the Committee ordered the production of several pieces of documentary evidence relating to the landed properties identified by the Commission. The said material evidence would be identified and discussed below.

458. Through Volume 3 of the Commission’s report, the Committee was able to identify the following landed properties per administrative areas, as shown in “**Annex C**”; the annexure lists the properties identified by the Commission and the recommendation made for each landed property.
459. In addition to the Commission’s report, the Committee also considered the preliminary measures taken by the Government to preserve some of the assets associated with the former President, including landed properties. Evidence before the Committee shows that the Government filed a suit against the former President in the High Court in **suit No. HC/168/17/MK/056/F1, The State vs Yahya AJJ Jammeh** (received in evidence by the Committee as MOJ2A), seeking to prevent undue interference in the assets belonging to the former President and his associates.
460. In filing the said suit, the Government identified several landed properties, to which the Court, in granting a freezing Order to the assets dated 22nd day of May 2017, annexed a list of landed properties marked “**Annexure 1**”, listing a total of 131 properties. The Court subsequently granted another Order, dated the 21st day of July 2017, which contained an additional list of **45** landed properties, marked as “**Annexure 2**”, bringing the list of landed properties identified by the Government in the suit brought against the former President to 176 landed properties. The properties Annex in the two High Court Orders of 22nd May 2017 and 21st July 2017, respectively, are attached herein as “**Annexed D.**”
461. The Committee, however, observes that **Legal Notice 15 of 2017**, which established the Commission, only included the list of 131 landed properties annexed in the first Order of the Court. Mr. Alieu Jallow, then acting Registrar of Companies, who led the taskforce at the Ministry of Justice in finding out landed properties that belonged to the former President, and who was subsequently appointed by the Court to take custody and control of both movable and immovable properties (landed properties), informed the Committee that he did not formally transmit the list of landed properties to the Commission when it commenced its investigation, even though the Commission had by a letter dated the 12th day of September 2017, asked the Solicitor General “that the properties be identified” to its investigators, led by the late ASP Dello Baldeh.
462. The Committee equally looked at the Government’s response to the findings and recommendations made by the Commission contained in the Government White Paper published on the 13th September 2019. The Government’s policies as it relates to the landed properties can be found on page 7 of the White Paper.
463. The Committee notes that the White Paper, on page 8, recounts that the “Commission” found that, “Former President Jammeh, during his tenure as head of State, acquired two hundred and eighty-one (281) landed properties throughout the country” The Committee notes that the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce Committee, which was established by Cabinet to administer the disposal of the landed properties, reported 288 landed properties. The role and or involvement of the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce is discussed below in this report.

464. The Committee observes that these discrepancies in the figures of the landed properties being reported could be a result of an error in numbering, and sometimes joint listing of landed properties annexed to each other but allocated with different leases. For this reason, the Committee undertook the task of computing the landed properties investigated and or identified by the Commission, and came to a total figure of 291 landed properties. This figure does not include properties later discovered by the Executive to have belonged to the former President and not reported by the Commission.

PROPERTIES FROZEN UNDER THE HIGH COURT ORDERS, NOT INVESTIGATED BY THE COMMISSION

465. The Committee observes that the High Court, in its Order of 22nd May 2017, identified and froze 131 landed properties across The Gambia, pending the investigation initiated by the Attorney General.

466. The Committee notes that there are 180 in the tow high Court Orders that froze this class of assets. The First Order, delivered on the 22nd day of May 2017, annexed 131 properties. The second Order delivered on the 21st day of July 2017, annexed 49 properties. As discussed earlier, while the 1st Order formed part of the Legal Notice establishing the Commission, the 2nd Order was not included. The Committee examined the list of 131 properties against all 291 properties in **Annex C**, the total landed properties reported by the Commission, using the serial/registration number associated with each property to determine which property was included in the list of properties by the High Court and not investigated by the Commission.

467. The Committee resolved that a property was deemed 'not investigated' where:

- (a) Its exact serial number does not appear in Annex B; or
- (b) the same serial number appears in Annex B, but for a materially different location, suggesting a different property.

468. While the Committee observes that some of the names of the landed properties contained in **Annex B** suggest that they may be the same as those contained in the Orders of the High Court, there is no mechanism for confirming the same aside from relying on the lease or serial registration numbers associated with them.

469. The Committee found that about 57 landed properties were not investigated by the Commission, even though they were listed in the Court Orders. They are as follows:

No.	Serial / Registration No.	Registered Name	Locations	Court Order	Note
1.	P11/2007	Yahya Jammeh	Barra	First Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B

No.	Serial / Registration No.	Registered Name	Locations	Court Order	Note
2.	P12/2008	Yahya Jammeh	Barra	First Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B (two P12/2008 entries)
3.	P12/2008	Yahya Jammeh	Essau	First Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B (two P12/2008 entries)
4.	P20/2008	Yahya Jammeh	Barra	First Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
5.	P25/2009	Yahya Jammeh	Essau	First Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
6.	P9/2013	Yahya Jammeh	Basse	First Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
7.	P17/2013	Yahya Jammeh	Kaur Lower Saloum	First Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
8.	P31/2013	Yahya Jammeh	Kallimu Foni	First Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
9.	P14/2014	Yahya Jammeh	Barra Ginack Island	First Court Order	Annex B has Barra Ginack Island with a different serial P9/2010
10.	P42/2014	Yahya Jammeh	Bana Tenda, Jimara District	First Court Order	Annex B has Bana Tenda with a different serial, P30/2014
11.	P10/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Pallang Mandika	First Court Order	Annex B has only one Pallang Mandinka (P9/2015)
12.	P16/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Nyamina Dankunku, Niani	First Court Order	Annex B Dankunku uses a different serial P16/2005
13.	P31/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Dankuku Nyamina	First Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
14.	P32/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Dankuku	First Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B

No.	Serial / Registration No.	Registered Name	Locations	Court Order	Note
15.	P33/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Dankuku	First Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
16.	P34/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Elephant Island, Jarra East	First Court Order	Annex B has Elephant Island-Jassong with a different serial P25/2008
17.	P66/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Kanilai Cashew Garden	First Court Order	Annex B has Kanilai Cashew Garden with a different serial P56/2015
18.	K145/1987 805/2014 Vol. 77 KD	Kanilai Family Farms Ltd	Kanilai Family Farms Ltd	First Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
19.	K318/2008	Yahya Jammeh	Tanji, Kombo South	First Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
20.	K354/2009	Yahya Jammeh	Kololi KSMD	First Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
21.	K356/2009	Yahya Jammeh	Busumbala	First Court Order	Annex B has Busumbala with a different serial, K246/1994
22.	K398/2010	Yahya Jammeh	Coastal Layout	First Court Order	Annex B has Coastal Layout with different serial 151/2013
23.	K174/2012	Kanilai Family Farms	Mile 2, Banjul (5,750.69 sq m)	First Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B; different from K175/2012 Jengdula
24.	210/2012 Vol.76 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Kairaba Avenue, Fajara	Second Court Order	Annex B 210/2012 Vol. 75 KD is at Fajara South Atlantic - different location
25.	648/2011 Vol.74 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Cape Point, Kombo Saint Mary Division	Second Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B

No.	Serial / Registration No.	Registered Name	Locations	Court Order	Note
26.	442/2011 Vol.74 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Kairaba Avenue, Kombo Saint Mary Division	Second Court Order	Annex B 442/2011 is at 78A Daniel Goddard St - different location
27.	103/2012 Vol.75 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Kairaba Avenue, Kombo Saint Mary Division	Second Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
28.	102/2012 Vol.75 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Kairaba Avenue, Kombo Saint Mary Division	Second Court Order	Annex B 102/2012 Vol.13 CD is at Jengdula Night Club - different
29.	158/2010 Vol.73 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	2 Fitzgerald Street	Second Court Order	Annex B 158/2008 Vol.71 is at 18A Picton Street - different serial and location
30.	999/2008 Vol.71 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Nyambia Forest, Farato Village	Second Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
31.	517/2011 Vol.74 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Kairaba Avenue, Kanifing	Second Court Order	Annex B 517/2011 Vol.14 CD is at 64 OAU Boulevard - different location
32.	659/2008 Vol.71 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Kanilai Village	Second Court Order	Annex B 659/2008 is at Cape Point, Bakau - different location
33.	658/2008 Vol.71 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Kanilai Village	Second Court Order	Annex B 658/2008 is at Kotu West Layout - different location
34.	661/2008 Vol.71 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Kanilai Village	Second Court Order	Annex B 661/2008 is at Kotu Layout Kololi Plot 188 - different location
35.	660/2008 Vol.71 KD	Kanilai Family	Kanilai Village	Second Court Order	Annex B 660/2008 is

No.	Serial / Registration No.	Registered Name	Locations	Court Order	Note
		Farms			at Brusubi Phase 2 - different location
36.	233/2008 Vol.71 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Pipe Line	Second Court Order	Annex B 233/2008 is at Kanifing Industrial Estate - different location
37.	232/2008 Vol.71 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Pipe Line	Second Court Order	Annex B 232/2008 is at Kanifing Industrial Estate - different location
38.	14/2012 Vol.95 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Kairaba Avenue	Second Court Order	Annex B 14/2012 Vol.75 KD is at Bakau Newtown - different volume and location
39.	436/2010 Vol.75 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Bakau	Second Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
40.	456/2011 Vol.74 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Kairaba Avenue	Second Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B (Annex B has 455/2011 at Brufut)
41.	657/2008 Vol.74 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Kanilai Village	Second Court Order	Annex B 657/2008 Vol.71 is at Kololi Village (Former local treatment) - different
42.	656/2008 Vol.71 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Kanilai Village	Second Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
43.	708/2003 Vol.71 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Kanilai Village	Second Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
44.	707/2003 Vol.71 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Kanilai Village	Second Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
45.	998/2003 Vol.71 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Farato	Second Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
46.	164/2003 Vol.71 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Yarambamba	Second Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B (Annex B

No.	Serial / Registration No.	Registered Name	Locations	Court Order	Note
					has 164/2008 - different year)
47.	163/2003 Vol.71 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Yarambamba	Second Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B (Annex B has 163/2008 - different year)
48.	162/2003 Vol.71 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Yarambamba	Second Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B (Annex B has 162/2008 - different year)
49.	160/2003 Vol.71 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Yarambamba	Second Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B (Annex B has 160/2008 - different year)
50.	161/2003 Vol.71 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Yarambamba	Second Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B (Annex B has 161/2008 - different year)
51.	272/2015 Vol.78 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Fajara	Second Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
52.	373/2001 Vol. 74 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	18 Picton Street	Second Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B (Annex B has 18A Picton with serial 158/2008)
53.	609/2011 Vol.74 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Cape Point	Second Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B (Annex B Cape Point lacks SR)
54.	89/2012 Vol.74 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Brufut	Second Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
55.	151/2013 Vol.76 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Coastal Layout	Second Court Order	No matching serial in Annex B
56.	174/2013 Vol.76 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Kanifing East	Second Court Order	Annex B 174/2013 is at Bakau Katchikali - different location

No.	Serial / Registration No.	Registered Name	Locations	Court Order	Note
57.	485/2013 Vol.76 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	Sukuta Central	Second Court Order	Annex B 485/2013 is at 16 Kairaba Avenue - a different location

470. However, the Committee notes a significant discrepancy; a cross-reference of the properties investigated by the Commission against the full list of properties frozen by the High Court Order revealed that 57 of the properties contained in the annexure to the High Court Order were not investigated by the Commission.

471. The following table sets out the 57 properties identified by the Committee as having been frozen under the High Court Order but not investigated by the Commission. The properties are listed as they appear in the annexure to the High Court Order, with their official serial lease registration numbers, the name of the registered lessee, and their location.

472. The Committee is concerned, and indeed finds it inexplicable that any of the above properties were not investigated and reported by the Commission.

473. The Committee equally notes that both the Commission and the Government categorized the landed properties as outlined below, and it was according to the categorization that the Government reacted to the landed properties identified by the Commission and listed in “**Annex B.**”

- (a) Properties acquired by outright purchase
- (b) Properties seized and/or appropriated from 3rd parties
- (c) Public land grants by the State and District Authorities, including lands in the TDA
- (d) Public land grants by the State and District Authorities (General)
- (e) Community allocations of land
- (f) Land in the process of being leased
- (g) Properties with pending claims
- (h) Properties acquired through judicial sales

474. For properties acquired by outright purchase, “*the Government accepts these findings insofar as they relate to the properties acquired by outright purchase by former President Jammeh.... And “the said properties are hereby forfeited to the State.”*” See paragraph 24 of the White Paper. However, in respect of properties acquired by outright purchase, the Government rejected the recommendation made by the Commission in respect of the following properties:

- (a) Ndebaan Clinic
- (b) Central Abattoir
- (c) Farato Farms
- (d) Kanilai Farms

- (e) Santangba Sanyang
- (f) Banjulinding Farms
- (g) Barra Coconut Plantation

475. In respect of properties seized and/or appropriated from third parties, public land grants by the State and District Authorities (TDA), public land grants by the State and District Authorities (General), and Community allocations of land, the Government accepted the recommendations of the Commission in its entirety. *See page 12, and paragraphs 26 to 35 of the White Paper.*
476. The Government equally accepted the recommendation of the Commission that “all processes commenced for the allocation and leasing of land to former President Jammeh should be discontinued.” See paragraph 41 of the White Paper.
477. The Government further partially accepted the recommendation of the Commission, as it relates to properties with pending claims at paragraphs 43 and 44 of the White Paper, in the following terms:
- 43. The Government accepts the findings **in so far as they relate to properties that were in the possession of former President Jammeh but which are the subject of pending 3rd party claims**. Accordingly, the Government accepts the recommendation of the Commission that the said 3rd party claims be referred for resolution by another forum.*
- 44. Consequently, the Government has now established an **Inter-Ministerial Taskforce at both the Ministerial and technical levels to handle all such 3rd party claims. The Ministerial Taskforce comprises the Attorney General & Minister of Justice, the Minister of Local Government and Lands, the Minister of Tourism and Culture, and the Minister of Agriculture.** The technical Taskforce, which acts as the advisory body to the Ministerial task force, comprises **the Solicitor General and the Permanent Secretaries at the Ministries of Local Government and Lands, Tourism and Culture, Agriculture, and Finance.** In determining these 3rd party claims, the Government Taskforce shall have regard to the Commission’s other recommendations contained in Volume 3, pages 287-288, of the Report regarding resolution of these claims.”*
478. The Committee notes that the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce was established by the White Paper for the sole purpose of handling “**3rd party claims...**” In addition to paragraph 44 establishing the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce, the Committee received evidence indicating that the former Minister of Justice, Honourable Abubacarr M. Tambadou, proposed to the President, among other things, to establish an Inter-Ministerial Taskforce. The said proposal to the President of the Republic was made via a confidential letter dated the **9th day of May 2019, referenced AG/C/27/03/Part I (49).**
479. However, the Committee further observed that the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce, as proposed by the former Minister of Justice, had a broader mandate than merely handling “3rd parties’ claims”. The Taskforce’s mandate included compilation of “a comprehensive list of properties belonging to the former President”, recommending “the use for each landed property after forfeiture”, “dealing with third-party claims”, among others.

- 480.** The Committee is of the view that the authority of the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce Committee, as sanctioned by the White Paper, should and must be distinguished from the propositions that emanated from Cabinet for the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce via the letter by the former Attorney General and Minister for Justice.
- 481.** The authority of the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce, as established by the White Paper, is of a binding effect and could be likened to that of the Commission, in relation to hearing and making determinations on 3rd parties' claims. This is so because the provisions of the White Paper are enforceable in court. On the other hand, other issues relating to the broader mandate outlined in the letter of the 9th day of May 2019 are purely administrative in nature.
- 482.** From the evidence received, it is clear that the Inter- Ministerial Taskforce acted beyond the scope and mandate given to it by the White Paper, and in effect, adopted the mandate drawn for it by Cabinet.
- 483.** The Committee observes that the Commission, in making recommendations for another “forum” to determine 3rd party claims, identified and categorized landed properties with 3rd parties' claims. However, evidence before the Committee shows that the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce did not stick to the landed properties determined by the Commission to have 3rd parties claim, but proceeded to hear and make a determination on landed properties on which the Commission already made a clear and definitive recommendations on, and created an avenue for other parties to have an opportunity to be reheard by the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce.

NEWLY DISCOVERED PROPERTIES OF FORMER PRESIDENT YAHYA AJJ JAMMEH

- 484.** The Commission, in its report, noted that investigations into certain properties were not conclusive and that further investigation was required, particularly for the following identified landed properties:
- (a) Kerr Serign Njagga, page 79 of Vol. 3 of the Commission's report,
 - (b) 72 Karaiba Avenue, serial Registration 166/2004 Vol. 77 KD
 - (c) Kairaba Avenue – M Section Fajara. (Without plot No.), 2,694.47. Sq Metres. Seized from Banta Kaira. Lease SR No. K197/1999
 - (d) Lamin Kerewan- Swami Layout; and
 - (e) Gifanga Village
- 485.** The Committee did not receive any evidence of further investigation undertaken by the Executive, as it concerned the above-listed landed properties. However, the Committee received evidence that sometime in January 2022, under the sanction of the President of the Republic, the Office of the Attorney General was tasked with investigating the alleged discovery of properties not identified by the Commission but believed to belong to the former President. The said properties were identified by officials of the Attorney General's Chambers, and reported to the Office of the President, via a

letter dated the 21st day of June 2022, and reference (AG/C/364/01/PART 4(104)), as shown in the table below. The Committee notes that the Ministry of Justice discovered 12 landed properties in 2022 previously not identified by the Commission. Although the list of the newly discovered landed properties is not ordinarily the focus of the Committee, the Committee deems it necessary to report on this crucial finding.

NO.	LOCATION / PROPERTY	DESCRIPTION	STATUS / NOTES
1	Cape Point, Bakau (Plot 1)	Plot formerly owned by the former President, located near Calypso	Reported to the President as heavily encroached on both northern and southern sides; fencing foundations were observed
2	Cape Point, Bakau (Plot 2)	Plot formerly owned by the former President's mother	Reportedly sold to a Lebanese purchaser. The identity is unconfirmed.
3	Lamin CDC	Approximately 10 hectares stretching from Lamin CDC to the Airport	Fully fenced but partially demolished due to encroachment; it is guarded by one Major Tamba; evidence of demarcation and possible sale
4	Farato Mango Garden	Land behind Mingdaw Senior Secondary School with mango trees	Fully fenced and gated; confirmed ownership by the former President; not presented to the Commission
5	Farato Nyambai Forest Strip	Land behind NAWEC transmitters near Nyambai Forest, about 2 km from the highway	Owned by the former President; not presented to the Commission; subject to High Court litigation involving NAWEC
6	Senegambia	Empty land opposite Lawyer Sheriff Tamedou's residence	Allocated to the former First Lady; signs of construction; not presented to the Commission
7	Brusubi Tranquil	Gated residential complex	Initially linked to the former President; searched and sealed by court order; prima facie ownership established by third parties (Amadou Kora & Fatou Darboe)
8	Brufut-Tanjai Axis	Large tract of land	Included in Commission report; seriously encroached upon by real estate companies; bulldozer activity observed.
9	Brufut (Before Sheraton Hotel)	250 sqm beachfront plot	Presented to the Commission; fenced but encroached upon with ongoing building developments
10	Brufut Gardens (Taf Estate)	An incomplete storey building opposite the Sheraton Hotel	Not presented to the Commission; identified as belonging to the former President
11	Brufut (After Sheraton Hotel)	Portion of land near the Sheraton lease area	Allegedly taken from Sheraton and given to Laurent Gbagbo's wife; contains abandoned containers; ownership disputed
12	Batokunku	Extensive land area	Subject of Commission: heavily encroached; alleged illegal demarcation and sand mining

			activities
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RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The Committee recommends that within six months from the adoption of this report, the Ministry of Lands, in collaboration with the Attorney General's Chambers and the Accountant General's Department, shall establish and maintain a single, consolidated Asset register of all landed properties associated with the former President Yahya AAJ Jammeh and his associates and forfeited to the State. The said register shall include:
 - i. comprehensive particulars of each property: location, coordinates, size, boundaries, lease registration numbers, title status, encumbrances, current occupants, and valuation;
 - ii. Be digitized and made publicly accessible through a dedicated government portal for three years, and
 - iii. Be updated quarterly with all transactions, transfers, or changes in status.

2. It would appear to the Committee that certain landed properties were deliberately not brought to the attention of the Commission. This issue requires further investigation. To this, the Committee recommends that the Government, through the Inspector General of Police, investigate fraudulent acts relating to the concealment of landed properties belonging to the former President. Any official found to have deliberately withheld, or concealed property information be immediately suspended, and accordingly charged and prosecuted.

3. The Committee recommends that the Government commission, within three months, a comprehensive nationwide land audit of landed properties identified by the Jammeh Commission to have belonged to the former President or his associates and forfeited to the State, to be conducted by a reputable audit firm with specialization in asset recovery. The audit shall:
 - i. Verify the physical existence, boundaries, and current status of all properties identified by the Commission, and all newly discovered properties,
 - ii. Investigate all discrepancies between the Commission's findings and the figures of landed properties reported in the White Paper,
 - iii. Trace all properties (if any) discovered after the Commission's report and establish how they were concealed.
 - iv. Report its findings directly to the National Assembly within six (6) months.

4. The Government of The Gambia should, as a matter of urgency, commission a supplementary administrative investigation into all sixty-three (63) properties identified in this Report as

having been frozen under the High Court Order but not investigated by the Jannah Commission, and report to the Assembly within 90 days.

5. The investigation should determine, in respect of each property, the circumstances of its original acquisition and its current status.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS IN THE DISPOSAL OF LANDED PROPERTIES

486. The framework for the management and disposal of assets belonging to the State is primarily provided for in the Assets Management and Recovery Corporation Act, 1992 (AMRC). The Act established the AMRC as a corporation that, if granted the authority, could take over the public assets recovery and sale process. Furthermore, pursuant to Section 3(e) of the Public Finance Act, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs is mandated to promote effective management of assets and liabilities of the Government.
487. The Committee received evidence from the former Attorney General and Minister for Justice, Honourable Abubacarr M. Tambadou, that the decision not to entrust the responsibility of disposing of the landed properties identified by the Commission to the AMRC was informed by the fact that the AMRC was itself a subject of investigation by the Commission. The Committee observes that AMRC, as an institution, was not at all investigated by the Commission due to “insufficient time to conduct a thorough investigation”. However, the Commission recommended the following on page 37 of Vol. 1 and 2 of its report:

(19) Assets Management & [Recovery] Corporation (AMRC)

*Of all the Public Enterprises the Commission was mandated to investigate, **only the AMRC escaped our scrutiny**. This must not be interpreted as a clean bill of health stamped by us in favour of AMRC. We simply did not have sufficient time to conduct a thorough investigation of Assets Management and Recoveries Corporation. We, therefore, recommend as follows:*

- (a) that a small Committee of public servants be set up to conduct investigations into the past affairs of AMRC concerning land and commodity transactions.*
- (b) That the Committee shall determine whether AMRC’s existence is still justified and, if so, whether the AMRC Act is ripe for major amendments with a view to enhancing the efficiency and accountability of the Corporation.*

488. There is no evidence before the Committee that the Executive carried out any further investigation into the affairs of the AMRC as recommended by the Commission. In fact, there is no specific reaction to this particular recommendation in the White Paper. It is noted, however, that the White Paper came with a disclaimer at paragraph 14 in the following terms:

For the avoidance of doubt, this White Paper does not, and neither is it intended to, reflect all the findings and recommendations of the Commission. It only contains the key findings and recommendations that the Government wishes to highlight from the Report.

- 489.** Nevertheless, the Committee is of the view that though present and former personnel at the said institution, like most institutions, were personally investigated by the Commission and some apportioned personal liability, the said investigation and liability placed on personnel associated with the institution does not justify the exclusion of the institution from assuming a statutory responsibility conferred on it by law.
- 490.** This Honourable Assembly passed the Asset Management and Recovery Corporation Act as Act No. 23 of 1992; the Act has been amended several times since its enactment. The Committee has thoroughly reviewed the records of Bills considered and Acts passed by this Assembly, and there is no indication of a repeal or any initiation to that effect. This Committee is therefore of the view that the AMRC still exists as a state institution and more so an institution poised to take charge of the activities rendered by the Inter-Ministerial Committee, and especially the Receiver appointed to dispose of the land.
- 491.** The Committee received evidence from both the former and current Attorney General and Ministers for Justice, former and present Cabinet secretaries, and members of the Cabinet, all of whose evidence revealed that the administrative process adopted by the Executive in disposing of assets identified by the Commission, particularly the landed properties, was in two-fold, i.e., through the appointment of an Inter-Ministerial Taskforce with a sub-Technical Committee mandated to advice on “3rd parties claims”, and to advice/report to cabinet on other matters as it relates to the landed properties, and the appointment of a Receiver to dispose of some of the landed properties.
- 492.** The Membership of the Inter- Ministerial Taskforce was as follows:
- | | | |
|---------------------------|---|---|
| (a) Abubacarr M. Tambadou | - | Attorney General and Minister for Justice |
| (b) Musa Drammeh | - | Minister of Lands |
| (c) Hamat NK Bah | - | Minister of Tourism, Arts and Culture |
| (d) Amie Faburay | - | Minister of Agriculture |
| (e) Muhammed BS Jallow | - | Secretary General |
- 493.** Evidence before the Committee shows that the Ministry of Justice, under the leadership of the former Attorney General and Minister for Justice, Mr. Tambadou, spearheaded the Ministerial Taskforce and the disposal of the landed properties.
- 494.** Membership to the said Taskforce was established under paragraph 44 of the White Paper, except for the exclusion of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, which only participated in the Technical Committee composed of the Permanent Secretaries to the abovementioned ministries. The exclusion of the then Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, Mr. Mamburay Njie, from the

Inter-Ministerial Taskforce/Committee was due to alleged conflict-of-interest concerns, as Mr. Njie was adversely mentioned and reprimanded as recommended by the Commission.

495. The Committee heard testimony from Hon. Tambadou to the effect that both the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Task Force and the exclusion of the Minister of Finance were discussed and approved by Cabinet.
496. However, the Committee is in receipt of evidence on the working relationship between the two Ministers, regarding the conduct of the assets recovered from the Jannah Commission, which it considers imperative to discuss herein.
497. Though it would seem to the Committee that the decision to exclude the Ministry of Finance was that of Cabinet, the Committee did not receive a Cabinet conclusion to that effect despite making a request for the same. Notwithstanding this fact, evidence before the Committee shows that the Ministry of Finance, through then Minister Mambury Njie, had insisted that the statutory role of the Ministry of Finance in the asset management and sale process should be respected and complied with. In a letter dated 1st November 2019 referenced MF/C/107D (77), Hon. Mambury Njie drew the attention of the Inter-Ministerial Committee (through Hon. Musa Drammeh, then Minister of Lands and Regional Government, former Hon. Attorney General and Minister for Justice, and the former Minister for Tourism Hon. Amat NK Bah) to an abnormality in the handling of the proceeds of the sale of State assets recovered by the Commission. In the said letter, Hon. Mambury Njie cautioned that ***“the sale proceeds from the Assets and dividends from the Jannah Commission recommendations are being paid to a recovery account at a commercial bank”*** and that the “Ministry wishes to re-iterate that this is not in line with the requirement of the Public Finance Act 2014, Section 7(1)(a) and(b) states that the “pursuant to the provisions of section 190 of the Constitution and, there shall be a Consolidated Revenue Fund into which shall be paid:

- (a) All revenues or other public monies raised or received for the purpose of, or on behalf of the Government, including tax revenues, non-tax revenues, grants, and loans;
- (b) Any other monies raised or received on trust for or on behalf of the Government.

Further, the Ministry pointed out that “on the same subject, the Accountant General’s Department had earlier written a letter reference DE 2/217/01/ (45) (here attached) dated 11th October, 2019 to the Attorney General

498. The Committee received evidence that on the 16th December 2019, the former Minister of Finance, Mambury Njie, wrote to Hon. Tambadou, via a letter referenced MF/C/33/ (90), expressing disappointment due to ***“disregard for the role of MOFEA”*** by the Attorney in the sale of assets recovered from the Jannah Commission. In the same letter, Hon. Njie strongly urged Hon. Tambadou to respect the statutory responsibility of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs in “promoting fiscal transparency and effective management in respect of revenues, expenditures, assets and liabilities of the Government”. This correspondence was followed by a response from

Hon. Tambadou dated 23rd December 2019 (Ref: AG/C/27/03/Part I (61)) and a further letter from Hon. Njie dated 6th February 2020 (Ref: MF/C/33/ (94)) in which the two Ministers traded strong disagreements on the omission of the Ministry of Finance in the asset's recovery process. The Committee observes, with concern, that the contents of these exchanges reflected deep personal resentments between the Ministers at the time, which undoubtedly adversely affected inter-ministerial collaboration and the effective discharge of their respective responsibilities as it relates to the asset recovery process.

499. The Committee finds the letter of the 6th February 2020, methodically documents the Ministry of Justice's violations of the Public Finance Act 2014, to be of great importance, because it demonstrates not only the scope of irregularities in the disposal of the assets, but also Hon. Tambadou's apparent unwillingness to comply with statutory requirements.

500. In the said letter, Hon. Njie began by addressing what appears to have been Hon. Tambadou's defense of his actions as falling within his discretionary powers. The Minister of Finance firmly rejected this argument, asserting: *"You stated in your letter that you exercised your discretion to appoint a Receiver '(Alpha Kapital) for the management and liquidation of the forfeited assets', may I remind you that discretionary power does not mean that you have unlimited and unnecessary discretion, nor does it mean that you must be free from all limitations in the exercise of the discretion conferred. Discretion must be exercised according to the rules of reason and justice within the limit to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself."*

501. The Committee observes that Hon. Tambadou appeared to believe that his role as Attorney General placed him above the normal constraints of public finance law, and this was the basis and precise concern raised by the Minister of Finance, Hon. Njie. It is for this reason, the Committee notes, that compelled Hon. Njie to address what he characterized as Hon. Tambadou's fundamental misunderstanding of the Ministry of Finance's role. He noted that Hon. Tambadou had stated in his response that "the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MOFEA) with the responsibility over State revenues, should of course, concern itself with monies being recovered and that is why monies generated from the assets recovery exercise are being transferred to an account designated by the MOFEA," which response the Minister of Finance characterised as deeply problematic, and responded in the following terms: -

"It is clear from your letter that you are of the view that the role of this Ministry is limited to monies being collected only. May I inform you that the key role of this ministry includes but not limited to the management of government financial assets, propose economic and financial policy, and coordinate and supervise these actions as empowered by law specifically the Public Finance Act. This is why, it is of paramount importance to involve this Ministry in all aspects of assets recovery..."

502. Hon. Njie's letter then follows a detailed matrix documenting specific violations of the Public Finance Act 2014. The Committee finds this systematic presentation of evidence particularly

compelling for reasons that it demonstrates that the irregularities were not isolated incidents but rather a pattern of deliberate non-compliance with statutory requirements, especially as it relates to sections 3(1)(e), 3(1)(h), 6(2), 6(3), and 6(4) of the Public Finance Act.

- 503.** In addition, section 150 of the Constitution mandates that all public revenues "shall be paid" into the Consolidated Fund. Similarly, Section 12(1) of the Public Finance Act provides that "All Government receipts on accounts of loans, grants, and departmental revenues, together with other tax or non-tax revenues shall be paid into the consolidated Revenue Fund."
- 504.** The letter of Hon. Njie further revealed a shocking irregularity, when he drew the attention of Hon. Tambadou: " ...to the fact that all monies previously recovered were in fact being lodged in a commercial bank account without the knowledge, consent or advise of this Ministry contrary to the provisions of the law. It is only after letters from this Ministry putting you to task concerning the monies, that you started lodging the money in the account provided by us. This improper activity carried out by your office would not have happened if this Ministry was rightly involved as you would have been accordingly advised." And, "...additionally, interests accrued or commissions charged from such deposits may result in huge financial losses for the Government's resource mobilisation and income generation process and transparency."
- 505.** The Committee took note of Hon. Njie's reference to section 13 of the Public Finance Act, which provides that- *"A person shall not open a bank account in any domestic or foreign bank without the authority of the Accountant General in consultation with the Permanent Secretary, except for commercial bank accounts which must be approved by the Minister on the recommendations of the Accountant General."* As regards this section, Hon. Njie challenged Hon. Tambadou, that *"The Act of opening a bank account for public funds without the authority of the Accountant General who is also the Receiver General and in this case the opening of a commercial bank account without the authority of the Minister of Finance is a violation of the Public Finance Act 2014. In light of the foregoing, I ask you Honourable Colleague to provide any contrary evidence that shows that authorization was sought and granted for the Receiver to open an account with a commercial bank to lodge the public funds received from the assets recovery process of the Jannah Commission."*
- 506.** The Committee notes that no evidence has been presented to suggest that such authorization was ever sought or obtained.
- 507.** Further, Hon. Njie continued to highlight several violations of the Public Finance Act, this time, referring to section 18, which provides that *"A public officer who receives public money shall promptly bank it in accordance with this Act unless he or she is instructed in writing by the Minister to do otherwise."* Hon. Njie emphasized: *"The duty of the Receiver to deposit the public monies promptly into the Central Bank account without any variation cannot be clearer. A deviation from this must be based on the written authorization of the Minister of Finance."* Again, no evidence has been presented to the Committee of any such written authorization from the Minister of Finance. Hon. Njie continued to refer Hon. Tambadou to sections 20, 65, 68, and 76 of

the Public Finance Act, as being violated, and drew his attention to the need to comply with the same.

508. Beyond the violations pointed out by Hon. Njie's letter, the Committee notes that it reveals what appears to have been an attempt by Hon. Tambadou to intimidate the Minister of Finance into silence. Hon. Njie stated: "Honourable Colleague, allow me to reiterate that your personal prejudices about me should remain what it is, personal, and should not negatively influence your obligation to be professional in your dealings with the Office of the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs. Your personal prejudice does not and should not justify your blatant refusal to engage the office of the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs in its legislative mandate." More troublingly, Hon. Njie revealed: *"This, Honourable Colleague, is a call of caution for you to comply and act within the realms of the law. Do not, therefore attempt to frighten me into submission and restrict my participation in the assets recovery process by your threats of initiating criminal proceedings against me."*

509. Hon. Njie further continued to state the following:

"What baffles me though, is that it is undeniably a paradox that in the same letter where you accuse me of an alleged earlier conduct that 'could amount to aiding and abetting and/or complicity in criminal acts', you feel justified to insist that I remain silent while you violate the same law you swore to uphold and safeguard. Are you being fair to insist that I make myself vulnerable to future allegations of complicity in your irregularities with the law?"

510. That Hon. Tambadou apparently threatened criminal proceedings against the Minister of Finance for insisting on compliance with the Public Finance Act is deeply concerning to the Committee because it evidences an attempt at wrong use of official positions, as Attorney General, to silence legitimate concern from a Cabinet colleague. (reference to the letter)

511. The Committee observes that Hon. Tambadou only began to comply with certain legal requirements after being repeatedly challenged by the Ministry of Finance. This is particularly noted in the same letter in which Hon. Njie stated: -

"Though a sober reflection on your letter by any discerning mind will reveal that all you had done is to adopt a diversionary tactic in which you cleverly and concertedly cast aspersions on my person as the reason for not fully complying with the law and an attempt to disguise the fact that in this recovery process you are only partially complying with the law and that some of these acts of compliance were done only after the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs sent advisory letters to your office such as the inclusion of the MoFEA Permanent Secretary in the technical committee established to deal with the disposal of landed properties, the sharing of the Receiver's progress reports with the Presidency, and the matter of the Ministry of Justice being the recipient of enquiries from the National Assembly."

512. Interestingly, Hon. Njie concluded his letter in the following terms: "*I am satisfied that I have fulfilled my duty as Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs by calling you out on the need to comply with the Law as you lead the Assets Recovery Process of the Janneh Commission. History will be the ultimate Judge, not I.*"
513. Mr. Tambadou further testified that the Inter-Ministerial Committee met several times to deliberate on issues relating to the landed properties identified by the Commission. He informed the Committee that the Ministerial Committee relied on the Technical Committee to carry out its mandate, and that the said Technical Committee produces reports which the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce reviewed and adopted. He also testified that the Cabinet was fully briefed about the activities of the Ministerial Committee.
514. This Committee is in receipt of both the Technical and Inter-Ministerial Committee reports. It is the observation of the Committee that both reports remained unsigned, and none of the witnesses were in a position to produce a signed copy to this Honourable Committee. When the Committee posed to the Secretary to the Cabinet why an unsigned report of the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce was tabled and discussed at cabinet, he was unable to explain but admitted that it was both unusual and improper. On the contrary, it is the evidence of the former Attorney General that there exists a signed copy of the report, though he too was unable to provide the signed copy to the Committee when presented with the opportunity.
515. The Inter-Ministerial Taskforce report is annexed herein and marked "ANNEX E".
516. The evidence before the Committee demonstrates that by February 2020, the irregularities surrounding the management and disposal of the recovered assets, as discussed above, had already been comprehensively documented.
517. It is against this background that the Committee considers it significant that approximately four months after the exchange between Hon. Njie and Hon. Tambadou, the latter vacated office. While the Committee considered that, a change in the holder of the office of Attorney General should have ordinarily presented an opportunity for institutional correction, evidence before the Committee shows that the structures, decisions, and all the abnormalities in the disposal processes previously objected to including the exclusion of the Ministry of Finance, and the operation of recovery accounts outside the Treasury framework, were not materially altered upon the assumption of office by the succeeding Minister, Hon. Dawda A. Jallow.
518. The persistence of the same administrative arrangements after a change in the office holder demonstrates the failure of the succeeding Minister to reverse, regularise, or halt processes already rightly identified as unlawful, thus validating and perpetuating them. Consequently, responsibility for the violations relating to the handling and disposal of forfeited landed properties cannot be confined only to the period of Hon. Tambadou's tenure. The continuation of the same arrangements under his successor indicates an institutional failure within the Office of the Attorney General.

- 519.** The Committee finds that personal prejudices between the ministers adversely affected the proper discharge of their respective responsibilities and that Hon. Tambaou presided over a systematic pattern of violations of the Public Finance Act 2014.
- 520.** Drawing from the evidence presented before the Committee, the Committee equally finds that, in addition to the personal resentment between the two Ministers, the exclusion of the Ministry of Finance was a deliberate strategy on the part of Hon. Tambaou that perpetuated ongoing violations of the Public Finance Act, 2014. The Committee finds that this exclusion enabled the circumvention of financial controls and scrutiny, and facilitated the pursuit of ulterior objectives incompatible with principles of transparency.
- 521.** The Committee similarly finds that by opening commercial bank accounts without authorization and bypassing the Accountant General, Hon. Tambaou created parallel financial systems that operated outside constitutional and statutory frameworks provided in the Public Finance Act.
- 522.** The Committee finds the threats of criminal proceedings against the Minister of Finance for insisting on compliance with the Public Finance Act to be distasteful, unethical, and constitute an abuse of the Attorney General's position and an attempt to obstruct legitimate oversight by a colleague minister.
- 523.** The Committee is thus compelled to conclude that Hon. Tambaou's conduct fell far short of the standards expected of the Attorney General and Minister for Justice, the principal legal adviser to Government, charged under section 72(2) of the Constitution with ensuring that all government actions comply with the law.
- 524.** The Committee finds that the disposal of certain landed properties was undertaken without clear statutory or regulatory frameworks governing the sale of forfeited immovable assets.
- 525.** In several instances, the Committee finds no evidence of formal authorization, Cabinet approval, or legally delegated authority underpinning the sale or transfer of landed properties.
- 526.** The Committee further finds that the procedures adopted failed to meet the minimum standards of due process, fairness, and accountability required in the disposal of public land.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- 1.** The Committee recommends that the Executive conduct further investigation and initiate legal proceedings (where necessary) against former Attorney General and Minister for Justice, Hon. Abubacarr M. Tambaou, for possible violation of the Public Finance Act, among other things.

2. The Committee recommends that the Hon. Attorney General and Minister for Justice, Hon. Dawda A. Jallow, be reprimanded for perpetuating and validating unlawful administrative arrangements established by his predecessor.
3. The Committee recommends that the Assets Management and Recovery Corporation (AMRC) be immediately reconstituted and strengthened to assume its statutory functions within six months, or bring before the Assembly, within 3 months, a Bill to repeal the AMRC Act.

APPOINTMENT OF ALPHA AMADOU BARRY, ALPHA KAPITAL ADVISORY

527. The Committee received evidence indicating that Mr. Augustus Prom was appointed as Receiver by the High Court suit No HC/168/17/CO/09/F1, Attorney General v Alh Yahya A.J.J Jammeh, to assume custody, management, and control of all the companies listed in the annexures to the High Court Order, which constitutes part of the evidentiary record before the Committee. Augustus Prom's receivership was exercised pursuant to the said orders, and the firm continued to discharge this mandate until June 18th, 2019.
528. The Committee further established that, following the end of Augustus Prom's engagement by the Ministry of Justice, the Attorney General appointed Mr. Alpha Amadou Barry, Chairperson of Alpha Kapital Advisory, a limited liability financial advisory firm incorporated in 2018, as the new Receiver/Trustee for the companies and other assets belonging to and or associated with the former President. Mr. Barry's appointment was effected through a letter dated 13th June 2019, reference AG/C/364/01/P/3/ (70), with the appointment taking effect on the 18th June 2019, and due to last for six months.
529. The evidence before the Committee suggests that Mr. Barry's appointment occurred merely one day after the termination of Augustus Prom's receivership engagement by the Ministry of Justice.
530. The Committee also heard the testimony of the former Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Mr. Abubacarr Tambadou, who stated unequivocally that he was vested with the prerogative, conferred on him directly by the President, to designate and appoint a receiver of his choosing to manage, preserve, and dispose of assets associated with the former President on behalf of the Government. According to his evidence, this permitted him to select, without recourse to any competitive or consultative process, the individual or entity he deemed appropriate to assume the receivership function. The Committee notes that this assertion, taken at its highest, amounts to a claim of exclusive executive discretion to handpick a receiver for the management and disposal of public assets of significant financial and national importance without regard to administrative propriety and compliance with established competitive public procurement and asset management norms.
531. The Committee received evidence from Mr. Alpha A. Barry, indicating that the initial discussions regarding his prospective appointment as Receiver/Trustee arose from a chance encounter with the then Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Hon. Abubacarr Ba Tambadou, whom he met in

Mecca while performing pilgrimage in 2019. According to Mr. Barry, it was during this meeting that Hon. Tambadou first raised the possibility of appointing him to assume the receivership responsibilities related to the assets associated with former President, Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh.

532. Following their return to The Gambia, Mr. Barry testified that he was contacted by the Ministry of Justice and invited to a formal meeting, which he attended alongside Mr. Abubacarr Tambadou and Mr. Binga D, former Director of Civil Litigation at the Ministry. At this meeting, the terms of the prospective engagement were discussed in greater detail, and Mr. Barry was subsequently provided with an engagement letter containing the proposed terms of reference for his appointment. This Honourable Committee notes that the Ministry of Justice could not produce any minutes of the said meeting or anything to that effect.
533. The Committee finds that the absence of an open and competitive process in appointing a Receiver/Trustee to manage assets of such substantial financial and national importance is a serious dereliction on the part of the then Attorney General and Ministry of Justice. Given the magnitude of the task, which requires transparency, the appointment was inconsistent with good administrative practice.
534. Despite attempts by a cabinet colleague pointing to irregularities in the appointment of Mr. Barry, the Attorney General would not heed. For example, in a letter dated the 16th day of December 2019, referenced MF/C/33/ (90), the former Minister of Finance, Mambury Njie, wrote to Mr. Tambadou, pointing to ***“the lack of transparency whatsoever with regards to the appointment of a receiver as well as the sale of assets. We will like to state that the Ministry is not apprised of the appointment terms and conditions, which is tantamount to the effective promotion of fiscal transparency neither has it been involved in any of the sales of some of the assets belonging to the government recovered from the Commission.”***
535. It appears to the Committee that Mr Barry’s appointment was structured in a manner that disproportionately benefited him as Receiver/Trustee rather than serving any demonstrable administrative or institutional necessity, given that his engagement entitled him to an initial commission of 10% on the proceeds derived from the sale of landed properties and 5% on the sale of companies and shares.
536. The evidence before the Committee demonstrates that Mr. Barry ultimately earned commissions in excess of GMD 115, 729,328.00, as of 2023, a level of remuneration that could only have been realised through the sale of several high-value assets, including properties acquired directly by Government institutions. This outcome is notable given that the management, custody, and disposal of State assets and liabilities are functions traditionally and institutionally vested in established public bodies, including but not limited to the Ministry of Finance and the Assets Management and Recovery Corporation (AMRC). These institutions exist precisely to perform such functions on behalf of the State and, in doing so, to safeguard the public interest.

- 537.** In these circumstances, the Committee finds it difficult to discern any compelling necessity for the interposition of a private individual as an intermediary between the Government and its own institutions, particularly where those institutions themselves became purchasers of the assets in question. The effect of this arrangement was that substantial commission was paid to an agent acting on behalf of the State, commissions which would otherwise have accrued to the public purse. While the overarching objective of the asset recovery process was to recoup losses occasioned to the State, the evidence suggests that the chosen modality of disposal resulted in additional and avoidable financial loss to the State in the course of that very process.
- 538.** The Committee further received evidence that the working relationship between the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce and the Receiver was such that he received instructions from the Attorney General on behalf of the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce on all matters relating to the decisions on which landed properties were to be sold. The Committee received evidence that on the 15th day of November, 2019, the Ministry of Justice, via letter referenced AG/C/369/01/Part 3/ (145), wrote to Mr. Alpha Amadou Barry forwarding a list of properties belonging to the former President to be disposed of by sale.
- 539.** The list is preceded by a short statement informing of an Inter-Ministerial Taskforce meeting held on the 13th day of November 2019, during which the Taskforce decided that the following twenty (20) properties are to be sold:
- (a) 34 Liberation Avenue, Banjul
 - (b) Brufut Heights A – located at the end of Bijilo
 - (c) Brufut Heights B
 - (d) Kanifing Industrial Estate – Garage
 - (e) Kerr Sering – located on the Senegambia Junction
 - (f) Kerr Sering – located off Kerr Sering/Sanchaba Road
 - (g) Kololi Village – located off Bertil Harding Highway
 - (h) 192 Kotu West Layout
 - (i) 188 Kotu West Layout
 - (j) 421 Kotu West Layout
 - (k) Kotu Extension Layout – on the main Palma Rima/Kololi Road
 - (l) Sukuta – located on the Kombo Coastal Road
 - (m) Plot 850 Salagi
 - (n) Sinchu Alhagie Garden – located on the Kombo Coastal Road
 - (o) Sinchu Alhagie – located just before Paradise Estate
 - (p) Soma – located on the main commercial corridor of Soma
 - (q) Yundum Jabang Strip – located at the rear of Paradise Estate
 - (r) Barra – located not far from the swampy mangrove area
 - (s) Kuloro – located near the local stone quarry
 - (t) Karantaba – located on the Soma/Basse Road

- 540.** Though the Inter-Ministerial Committee communicated its decision to sell the above-listed properties, some of them were not sold. The Committee equally observed that aside from the letter dated the 15th day of November, 2019, referenced AG/C/369/01/Part 3/ (145), in which the Ministry communicated the decision of the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce, the Committee did not receive any evidence that the Ministry of Justice further conveyed the decisions of the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce for the sale of any of the properties that were subsequently sold.
- 541.** The Committee received evidence suggesting that the Inter-Ministerial Committee prepared a report, dated the 23rd day of April 2020, for submission to the cabinet in which the Inter-Ministerial Committee sought to provide an update on its activities. The report came at a period in which the sale of most of the landed properties by the Receiver/Trustee had long been completed.
- 542.** In the said report, the Inter-Ministerial Committee explained the activities it had undertaken with the landed properties. Among other things, it explained that 32 landed properties were sold at the time of their report, that D855,000,000 was generated from these sales, and that the proceeds had been paid to a designated special recoveries account at the Central Bank of The Gambia.
- 543.** “ANNEX C”, the unsigned final report of the Inter-Ministerial Committee dated the 28th day of October 2020, which detailed the list of all the landed properties, the recommendation of the Janneh Commission, and the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce Committee’s recommendation, equally came long after the sale of most of the landed properties was completed.
- 544.** The Committee equally notes with concern that the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce, in selling landed properties, did not, in fact, follow the very recommendation they made as regards the properties they recommended for sale. When confronted with this fact, the former Attorney General and Minister for Justice, Mr. Abubacarr Tambadou, informed the Committee that indeed there are several recommendations on the unsigned report of the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce submitted to the Cabinet, which were later changed, and such a change was communicated to the Receiver/Trustee. On his part, the Receiver testified that though he was in receipt of the Inter-Ministerial Task Force’s Report, the said report was not the basis on which he proceeded to sell the landed properties; rather, he received direct instructions from the Attorney General.
- 545.** Testimonies received from both the Registrar General, Mr. Abdoulie Colley, and the Director of Lands and Surveys, Mr. Dawda Fatty, indicate that the administrative process for cancellation of leases granted by the State is guided by the State Lands Act and its regulations. Mr. Abdoulie Colley testified that once a need for cancellation arises, whether through forfeiture or revocation, the authority to initiate and effect the cancellation rests on the State through the Ministry of Lands, and its allied department, the Department of Lands and Surveys, by operation of law.
- 546.** Mr Colley testified that in initiating a cancellation process, the Department of Lands and Survey conducts an assessment to determine whether the leaseholder is entitled to remain a beneficial interest holder in the leased property, and whether conditions for cancellation exist under the State

Lands Act or, in this instance, whether the conditions exist by virtue of the authority of the State through the White Paper.

547. He explained further that the Office of the Registrar General does not cancel leases nor does the Ministry of Justice; rather, the Office of the Registrar General acts upon instructions issued to it by the Ministry of Lands, through the Department of Lands and Surveys, to remove leases that have been cancelled from the Register. These instructions are given once all due diligence required has been satisfied.
548. In his evidence, the Director of the Department of Lands and Survey, Mr. Fatty Cham, agreeing greatly with the evidence of Mr. Colley further explained that once the Department initiates cancellation process and carries out the necessary assessments, it prepares a formal recommendation to the Minister responsible for Lands, outlining the basis for cancellation and attaching supporting documentation such as survey plans, and title histories. He conceded that, in the instance of landed properties whose lease the Commission recommended to be cancelled, the administrative steps before formal cancellation should have been spearheaded by the Ministry of Lands on the directive of the Executive, through the White Paper.
549. The Committee notes from these testimonies that the cancellation of State leases is a crucial, structured administrative process designed to protect the right to property as provided for under section 22 of the 1997 Constitution, and to maintain the integrity of the land management regime, especially as it concerns its registry.
550. The Committee further notes that while the Registrar General is the custodian of the record on the land regime, and could make an entry, and deregister the lease of a landed property, he does not have the authority to unilaterally make a cancellation without the sanction of the Ministry of Lands. Therefore, the Committee established that the prerogative to cancel a lease lies with the Minister of Lands.
551. As regards the effective cancellation of landed properties, the Committee received evidence that the first instance of cancellation process commenced in April 2018 when one Saikou Sanyang, wrote to the Solicitor General and Legal Secretary, on behalf of the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Lands and Regional Government, via a letter 10th April 2018, referenced LA 110/112/07/(28), requesting the “*cancellation of Lease Sr No. K216/2013 belonging to the Kanilai Family Farm (KFF) at Brufut Sanimentereng, Kombo North District, West Coast Region*”. Per the said letter, the land in question measures 660.19m x 81.41m x 30.59 x 45 x 520.50 m x 83.92m or 11.57 hectares, and was leased to KFF on the 19th day of June 2013.
552. By a letter dated the 17th day of April 2018, referenced AG 406/443/01/TEMP/ (74), the Ministry of Justice replied to the letter of 10th April 2018 advising the Ministry of Lands that the “*cancellation of an existing lease is a prerogative of the Ministry of Lands*” and that the Ministry of Justice, through the Registrar General, will deregister the land once the cancellation has been effected.

553. While the Committee did not receive any further evidence on the process of cancellation of this landed property, evidence from the Registrar General shows that indeed the lease to the said property was cancelled on the Register by virtue of the letter of the 10th April 2018. No explanation was offered as to why this particular lease was cancelled.
554. The Committee notes with concern that evidence before it further shows that the lease to this property was cancelled during the pendency of the Commission's investigation into assets associated with the former President, notwithstanding that the mandate of the Commission was to make recommendations to Government in respect of such lease cancellations, and not for such cancellations to be effected contemporaneously with, or in advance of, the conclusion of the Commission's work. This insinuates a level of obstruction or dictation on the part of the Executive. The Commission would eventually investigate the said property as "**Brufut – Adjacent to Sheraton Hotel,**" measuring 11.84 Hectares, around the BRUFUT Fish landing Site, next to Sanimentereeng, and falls within the Bird Reserve (Tanji Bird Reserve) bearing **Lease No. 216/2013 BRUFUT** (see page 137 of Volume 3 of the Commission's Report). The Commission recommended that the lease to this particular property should be rescinded.
555. In the Final Inter-Ministerial Committee's report to Cabinet dated the 28th day of October, 2020, it was recommended that the landed property in question *should "be reserved and all existing leases on the property should be cancelled."* However, evidence received by the Committee shows that, in fact, before the Commission completed its investigation, the lease was cancelled, and new leases were issued to various persons and entities.
556. The Committee received evidence of the cancellation of the **lease SR. No. K176/2012**, located in Bijilo and described by the Commission as "**Green Boys at Bijilo**". The Committee notes a letter dated the 13th September 2018, reference SA 2/20/01/Part V/ (309) from the Department of Lands and Survey requesting the cancellation of the said lease, on grounds that it fell under the authority of the TDA by virtue of The Gambia Tourism Board Act, 2011. However, the Committee did not receive evidence of the Registrar General deregistering the property in 2018. Instead, the Committee received evidence that the property in question was de-registered by the Registrar General sometime in 2021 following receipt of another letter from the Department of Lands and Survey bearing REF NO. SA2/20/01 PART V (309) dated 24th June 2021.
557. The Committee observed that the Commission investigated this property as property occupied by the Green Boys at Bijilo, and which was leased to KFF. The Commission recommended that the lease to this property be "rescinded and lands restored to the State to be applied to the proper planning and development of the area." See page 110 of Vol. 3 of the Commission's Report. In its report of 28th October, 2020, the Inter-Ministerial Committee recommended that "The subsisting lease on the property should be cancelled. Revert to the State to be used for the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Residential Hotel."

- 558.** Furthermore, the evidence before the Committee establishes that Mr. Colley received a memo from Mr. Kimbeng Tah, then Deputy Director of Civil Litigation and International Law at the Ministry of Justice, dated 1st June 2020. The memo contained a list of properties registered in the name of the former President, his associates, and entities associated with him, directing Mr. Colley to cancel those properties in the Registry. Mr. Colley confirmed to the Committee that the list attached to the memo was prepared by Mr. Tah and that his role was to go through the list and cancel the titles in the Register, which he did.
- 559.** In response to Mr. Tah's memo, Mr. Colley prepared two internal memos of his own, one dated 10th December 2020 and another dated 21st December 2020, both addressed to Mr. Tah and reporting on the status of the cancellations. In those memos, Mr. Colley confirmed that he had gone ahead and cancelled the titles of the properties on the list that bore serial registration numbers, while noting that those without serial registration numbers could not be cancelled. He copied the Director of Lands and Survey in one memo and the Solicitor General in the other. Mr. Colley explained that he copied the Director of Lands in order to bring the matter to his attention and to signal that the Director needed to take “formal” action.
- 560.** When pressed on the authority of Mr. Tah to instruct the cancellation of the properties, Mr. Colley conceded that even the Attorney General could not instruct the Registrar General to cancel title, and that the proper authority to make such a request was the Director of Lands and Survey. He further acknowledged that no such letter from the Director of Lands and Survey had been received at the time the cancellations were carried out in June and December 2020, and that the formal letter from the Director of Lands and Survey only followed in June 2021, a full year later.
- 561.** Despite recognising the insufficiency of the memo, Mr. Colley proceeded to act on Mr. Tah's instructions. He sought to characterise his action not as a legal cancellation of title but as an “encumbrance”, arguing that there was no legal harm because the White Paper had already ordered the forfeiture of the properties. However, when confronted with his own written memos, which clearly stated that the titles had been “cancelled” and made no reference to any encumbrance, Mr. Colley acknowledged that his written communications did not reflect the distinction he was attempting to draw. He further conceded under persistent questioning that he should have responded to Mr. Tah's memo by referring the matter to the Director of Lands and Survey for proper action, rather than acting on it himself, and that he acknowledged doing something he should not have done.
- 562.** The Committee finds the circumstances of these instructions and the manner in which they were acted upon to be seriously irregular. Mr. Kimbeng Tah, as the Deputy Director of Civil Litigation and International Law, held no statutory or administrative authority over the Registrar General and was not empowered to direct the cancellation of registered land interests. Yet Mr. Colley, as the Registrar General, acted on those instructions without seeking independent verification of their legal basis, without obtaining a court order, and without awaiting a formal directive from the Director of Lands and Survey acting on the instruction of the Minister responsible for Lands.

563. The Committee is of the view that the Registrar General should only act on the cancellation of registered land interests pursuant to a court order or through the proper administrative chain. Acting on an internal memo from a subordinate officer, without any reference authority, represents a serious lapse on the part of Mr. Colley.

THE RELEASE OF LANDED PROPERTIES UNDER INVESTIGATION

564. The Committee received further evidence in the suit No. HC/168/17/MK/056/F1, The State vs Yahya AJJ Jammeh, that during the pendency of the Commission, the Attorney General's office, pursuant to an *ex parte* motion dated the 11th day of July 2018, which was converted to a motion on notice by the Order of the Court rendered on Tuesday 17th July 2018, asked the Court to unfreeze the following properties:

- (a) K1318/2008
- (b) K354/2009
- (c) K355/2009
- (d) K398/2010
- (e) K173/[20]12
- (f) K176/[20]12
- (g) K180/[20]12
- (h) K215/[20]13
- (i) K216/[20]13

And another set of landed properties as follows:

- a) 151/2013 Vol.76KD
- (b) 119/2012/Vol. 75 KD

565. The reason given by the Executive for seeking to release these properties was that they desired to allocate some of the properties for "urgent development of tourism facilities" to meet the needs of the Summit of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), which was planned to be hosted in The Gambia sometime in 2019. However, by a ruling delivered on the 30th day of July 2023, Justice Amina Saho Ceesay refused the application to release the properties, stressing that there were no compelling reasons to release the properties to the State since the properties were still the subject of investigations.

566. In its persistent effort to still release some of the landed properties from the custody of the Court, the Attorney General's Chambers filed another application during vacation, and a "*temporal file*" was opened to hear the application. The vacation Judge, Justice Ebrima Jaiteh, granted the application and released the following properties to the Executive:

1. K318/2008
2. K354/2009
3. K355/2009

4. K176/ 2012

567. In her report to the Hon. Chief Justice, Justice Amina Saho reported at page 23, that “at the time of the release of the properties to the Applicant [the State], the Affidavit in support of the Application surreptitiously failed to disclose that the presiding judge in the main suit had dismissed an earlier application regarding the same properties” for the reason that it was premature to release the landed properties because “no forfeiture or confiscation order had been made by the Commission of Inquiry” regarding the said properties.
568. As regards the above-listed properties that were released to the Government, the Committee considers it prudent to discuss the status of the said four landed properties released by the Court.
569. The Committee notes the following in the Commission’s report at Vol. 3, page 101, regarding property K318/2008 (Tanji River Side). The Commission reported that-
- a) The land size is **34.73 Hectares** and the property is within TDA Lands.
 - b) A lease **K180/2012** was issued to replace **Lease K318/2008** dated 20th June 2008 for **25.84 Hectares** issued by Ismaila Kabba Sambou to KFF.
 - c) That the same was cancelled and replaced by lease **K180/2012** dated 22nd June 2012 issued by Lamin Waa Juwara to Dr. Alhagie Yahya AJJ Jammeh covering the same area **but excluding land for the Immigration department, NIA, and YDP.**
 - d) The File does not contain the grounds for the allocation of the land to KFF. KFF did not apply for the land.
 - e) The Commission concludes that this is an illegal allocation of TDA land to the Ex-President and is an attempted land grab by him. Being an illegal acquisition of public land, the lease should be rescinded.
570. The Committee further notes that “Lease K318/2008” (Tanji River Side) is what has metamorphosed into lease No. K180/2008, and that even though the Government succeeded in releasing the said property during the pendency of the Commission’s investigation, allegedly for the construction of “tourism facilities”, evidence shows that the property was subleased to the following:
- (a) Precious Group Ltd
 - (b) M24
 - (c) Blue Ocean Property Ltd
 - (d) Immopromo Gambia Ltd,
 - (e) African Heritage,
 - (f) Transit Limited, and
 - (g) Ya Bouy Home Cooking
571. The Committee considered the registration documents of the companies and found, as discussed under the section on the Gambia Tourism Board, that all the companies, except M24 and African Heritage, are properly incorporated. However, the Committee, in examining the shareholding

details of Blue Ocean Properties Ltd as provided by the Registrar of Companies, found that one Ebrima Jaiteh is listed as a shareholder of the Company.

572. Upon examination of the materials provided, the Committee observed that while the biographical particulars and identification details of the other listed shareholders were available and traceable within the Companies Registry, the corresponding particulars of the shareholder listed as Ebrima Jaiteh were not reflected in the registry records made available to the Committee.
573. The Committee considers the absence of complete registry particulars in respect of one listed shareholder in circumstances where such information was available for all others to be an irregularity within the corporate record. Although no conclusion was reached on the underlying cause of this omission, the discrepancy remains unexplained on the face of the documentation received.
574. Due to the advanced stage of the Committee's mandate at the time this issue emerged, and the attendant time constraints, the Committee was unable to undertake a full verification exercise into the identity and associated filings of the said shareholder.
575. Consequently, the Committee considers it appropriate that the Registrar of Companies conduct a comprehensive administrative review of the incorporation and shareholding filings of Blue Ocean Properties Ltd, with a view to verifying, regularising, and updating the biographical and identification particulars of all listed shareholders in accordance with applicable statutory requirements.
576. As regards property **K354/2009**, which was investigated by the Commission under the name **Kololi- Village, KM**, the Commission found that it was sold to KFF by Mustapha Bojang and later gifted to Natalie Gomez by KFF. The Commission recommended "*The State shall take over possession of the property as part of the assets of KFF and sell by public auction and the proceeds credited to the liabilities of the Ex-President.*" See page 279 of Vol. 3 of the Commission's report. The Inter-Ministerial Committee accepted this recommendation.
577. Property K355/2008 was investigated by the Commission as follows:
- (a) The Commission found that the property is located on the road from the Djembe Beach road junction towards the Palma Rima Hotel.
 - (b) Lease K355/2009 dated 23rd June 2009 was issued to Kanilai Farms Cultural Centre of Kotu Point for a Cultural Centre for 99 years with effect from 1st May 2009, issued by Minister Ismaila Kabba Sambou.
 - (c) The land measures 6.10 Hectares.
 - (d) The lease was signed by the Ex-President.
 - (e) The Registrar does not have a record of an entity called Kanilai Farms Cultural Centre.
 - (f) The Commission concludes that this is an illegal lease of TDA land to the Ex-President at his own directive and is a land grab by him. Being an illegal acquisition of public land, the lease should be rescinded.

See page 92 of the Commission's Report, Vol. 3

- 578.** The Committee observed that, just as with Tanji River Side, this property was released to the State by the Court and allocated to several persons and or entities even before the Commission concluded its investigation, including the following: Game, Alkamba Tours, Kerr Gui, Palm luxury, Priority leisure, among others.
- 579.** The Commission subsequently recommended that the lease over this extensive area be rescinded. In the same vein, the Inter-Ministerial Committee recommended that the land 'revert to the Gambia Tourism Board and that the existing lease on the property be formally cancelled'.
- 580.** As regards K176/2012 (Bijilo (Green Boys), the Commission found that-
- (a) This property measures 17.70 Hectares and is situated within TDA,
 - (b) Lease K176/2012 dated 22nd June 2012 was granted to KFF for 99 years with effect from 1st December 2009 by Minister Lamin Waa Juwara.
 - (c) Part of this lease (9.07 hectares) was previously leased to Home of Medical Mission of Bijilo by lease S.R.No. K12/2007 dated 22nd January 2007,
 - (d) The Ex-President directed that the area should be given to the Home of Medical Mission, Bijilo. He subsequently directed that the area be taken from them. No re-entry process was followed,
 - (e) There is no record of how the lease came to be issued to the Ex-President.
- 581.** The Commission recommended that the "Lease should be rescinded and lands restored to the State to be applied to the proper planning and development of the area." The Inter-Ministerial Committee recommended that "*the subsisting lease on the property should be cancelled and reverted to the State to be used for the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Residential Hotel*".

**VALUATION, PRICING, AND PROCUREMENT METHODS USED
TO DETERMINE ASSET VALUE AND IDENTIFY ANY DISCREPANCIES OR
UNDERVALUATIONS:**

- 582.** Mr. Alpha Barry reported that he conducted sales of the landed properties in three phases. Mr Barry testified that he received authorization from the Office of the Attorney General for the sale of a total of 56 landed properties located in Banjul, Kanifing Municipal Council, West Coast Region, and in the North Bank Region.
- 583.** Of these 56 properties, 30 properties were successfully sold through public advertisement. This sale generated a cumulative sum of D294,040,100. Mr Barry reported that several properties were returned to their original owners or reverted to the Government in accordance with directives from the Attorney General's Office, and that some properties identified for sale remain with him.

584. Based on the evidence presented to the Committee by the Receiver, which included a report dated the 8th November 2025, the Committee observes the following as regards the bidding and sale process:

585. In **PHASE ONE (1)** of the sale, the Committee observes:

S/No.	Location	Narration
1	No. 78A Daniel Goddard Street (Hagan Street) Sale Price: D5.5m to AGIB	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of September 18th, 2019. 3. Three bids were received: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Mahadi Touray via email D2.9 million b) Mahadi Touray D2.9 million c) Mkha Ent Consulting via email, D0.6 million, Mahadi Touray was the highest bidder at D2.9 Million. 4. The Receiver was asked to put this property on hold pending a decision on a request received from the original owner for the second half – No.78B. 5. Once the No.78B was returned to the original owner, the property was put back on the market via the Trustee Website. 6. AGIB made an offer after the bid evaluation, and the property was sold for D5.5 million.
2	No. 78B Daniel Goddard Street (Hagan Street) Sale Price: 6,000,000. Returned to the original owner	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was not included in the approved list for sale, nor was it advertised in the newspapers or considered during the bidding evaluation process. 2. The original owner, Mr. Ebrima Jallow, had written to the Ministry of Justice appealing to repurchase the property, stating that it had been unlawfully sold to the former president. Following this appeal, the Ministry of Justice instructed the Receiver to negotiate with Mr. Jallow. Pursuant to this directive, the property was subsequently sold to him on 18 October 2019 for a sum of D6 million.
3	No. 13 Grant Street Sale Price:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for

	<p>D2,600,000 Guide Price: 2,500,000</p>	<p>sale and was duly advertised in the newspapers, with a submission deadline of 18 September 2019 at 16:00 GMT.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. A single bid was received from Makha Ent Consulting via email, offering D2.5 million. However, after being contacted, the bidder subsequently withdrew the offer. 3. The property was then re-listed on the Trustee website. Following this, Ms. Fanta Touray submitted an offer after the bid evaluation process, and the property was eventually sold to her for D2.6 million.
4	<p>No. 64 Lemman Street Sale Price: D5,000,000 Guide Price: D5,000,000</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale and duly advertised in the newspapers, with a submission deadline of 18 September 2019 at 16:00 GMT. 2. A total of ten bids were received as follows: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Lamin B. Gaye – D8.1 million b) Alasana Jallow – D9.5 million c) Momodou Korke Jallow – D10 million d) Mouhamadou Mouctar Jallow – D8.5 million e) Nandkishore Rajwani – D12 million f) Mamudou Bah – D5.3 million g) Karzain General Trading – D7 million h) Makha Ent Consulting (via email) – D0.3 million i) Fouta Enterprise – D12.5 million j) Manex Limited – D15 million 3. Manex Limited emerged as the highest bidder with an offer of D15 million. The property was awarded to them on 20 September 2019, and full payment was received, with a receipt issued on 25 September 2019. 4. Court Case - Two issues arose concerning the advertisement published on the website for this property: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) The picture used for No. 73A Lemman Street was incorrect. (b) The address listed as No. 64 Lemman Street was, in fact, No. 73A Lemman Street. (c) As a result of these errors, two separate bids and payments were received for No. 73 Lemman Street:

		<p>(d) Momodou Korka Jallow – D10.5 million (e) Manex Limited – D15 million</p> <p>5. The matter was subsequently resolved out of court. On 5 December 2022, Mr. Momodou Korka Jallow was re-offered the property at D15 million, the amount representing the highest bid originally submitted by Manex Limited. He paid an additional D4.5 million, covering the difference from his earlier payment of D10.5 million made in September 2019.</p> <p>26 Buckle Street</p> <p>6. Following this resolution, Manex Limited expressed interest in 26 Buckle Street, which was still on the market. The property was offered to him for D18 million, slightly above the reserve price of D17.5 million.</p> <p>7. He paid D3 million as the balance, reflecting the difference from his earlier D15 million payment related to the Lemman Street property.</p> <p>8. Subsequently, Mr. Abdoulie Jallow made an offer after the bid evaluation, and the property was sold to him at the guide price of D5 million.</p>
5	No. 15 Dobson Street Sale Price: D3,650,000 Guide Price: D3,500,000	<p>1. The property was included in the approved list for sale</p> <p>2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of September 18th, 2019 at GMT 16:00.</p> <p>3. Two bids were received: (a) Paul L Mendy D2,835,000 (b) Makha Ent Consulting via email D3.1 million</p> <p>1. Makha Ent Consulting was the highest bidder at D3.1 million. The contact person was informed but he withdrew his bid. That meant the property was still available on the website.</p> <p>2. Serign Gai made an offer subsequent to the bid evaluation and the property was sold for D3.650 million.</p>
6	No. 73A OAU Boulevard (Leman Street) Sale Price: D10,500,000	<p>1. The property was included in the approved list for sale and duly advertised in the newspapers, with a</p>

<p>Guide Price: D7,500,000</p>	<p>submission deadline of 18 September 2019 at 16:00 GMT.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. A total of six bids were received as follows: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Alasana Jallow – D10 million (b) Momodou Korka Jallow – D10.5 million (c) Mouhamadou Mouctar Jallow – D9 million (d) Mamudou Bah – D7.7 million (e) Minkailou Kaira – D4.48 million (f) Makha Ent Consulting (via email) – D0.5 million 3. Mr. Momodou Korka Jallow emerged as the highest bidder with an offer of D10.5 million. The property was awarded to him on 20 September 2019, and a receipt was issued on 25 September 2019 upon full payment. <p>Court Case</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Two issues arose regarding the advertisement published on the website for this property: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) The picture used for No. 73A Lemman Street was that of a different building. (b) The address listed as No. 64 Lemman Street was, in fact, No. 73A Lemman Street. 5. As a result of these discrepancies, two separate bids and payments were received for No. 73 Lemman Street: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Momodou Korka Jallow – D10.5 million (b) Manex Limited – D15 million 6. The matter was subsequently resolved out of court. On 5 December 2022, Mr. Momodou Korka Jallow was re-offered the property at D15 million, representing the highest bid received from Manex Limited. He paid an additional D4.5 million to cover the difference from his initial payment of D10.5 million made in September 2019. <p>26 Buckle Street</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Following this settlement, Manex Limited expressed interest in 26 Buckle Street, which remained available for sale. The property was offered to him for D18 million, slightly above the reserve price of D17.5 million. He paid an
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		<p>additional D3 million, representing the balance from his earlier D15 million payment associated with the Lemman Street transaction.</p> <p>Claim by the Mahoney Family</p> <p>8. A claim was later received by the Ministry of Justice from the Mahoney family, asserting ownership of a portion of this property.</p>
7	<p>No. 26 Buckle Street Sale Price: D18,000,000 Guide Price: D17,519,500 Sale Price: D18,000,000</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of September 18th, 2019 at GMT 16:00. 3. One bid was received from Makha Ent Consulting via email for D2.1 million. The contact person was informed but he withdrew his bid. The property was put back on the market. 4. Manex Limited made an offer subsequent to the bid evaluation and the property was sold for D18 million.
8	<p>No. 3 Daniel Goddard (Hagan Street) Sale Price: D5,000,000 Guide Price: D5,000,000</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of September 18th, 2019 at GMT 16:00. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Four bids were received: (b) IGI Gamstar D2.5 million (c) Mahadi Touray D3.75 million (d) Mahadi Touray via email D3.75 million (e) Makha Ent Consulting via email D3 million 3. Mahadi Touray was the highest bidder at D3 million. The contact person was informed that he was the highest bidder but short of the reserve price of D5 million, which he subsequently paid.
9	<p>Jengdula nightclub Sale Price: D1,600,000 Guide Price: D1,610,000</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale and duly advertised in the newspapers, with a submission deadline of 18 September 2019 at 16:00 GMT. 2. A single bid was received from Mr. Abdoulie Touray in the amount of D1.3 million. The property was offered to him accordingly. However, during the finalisation stage, Mr. Touray sought clarification regarding whether the property extended to the

		<p>beachfront at the rear. Upon confirmation of the actual dimensions, he decided to withdraw his offer. Consequently, the property was re-listed on the market.</p> <p>3. The property was subsequently valued by Francis Jones at D1.61 million.</p> <p>4. Following this, Mr. Muhammed Jah submitted an offer, and the property was sold to him for D1.6 million.</p>
10	<p>No. 60 Daniel Goddard street (Hagan Street) Sale Price: D6,200,000 Guide Price: D 2,000,000</p>	<p>1. The property was included in the approved list for sale</p> <p>2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of September 18th, 2019, at GMT 16:00.</p> <p>(f) Four bids were received: (g) Mahadi Touray D6.2 million (h) Mahadi Touray via email D6.2 million (i) Makha Ent Consulting via email for D2 million (j) Fanta Touray at D2.75 million</p> <p>3. Mahadi Touray was the highest bidder at D6.2 million.</p>
11	<p>No. 61 Daniel Goddard Street (Hagan Street) Sale Price: D5,100,000 Guide Price: D2,250,000</p>	<p>1. The property was included in the approved list for sale</p> <p>2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of September 18th, 2019, at GMT 16:00.</p> <p>Five bids were received: (a) IGI Gamstar at D2.5 million (b) Mahadi Touray D5.1 million (c) Mahadi Touray via email D5.1 million (d) Makha Ent Consulting via email for D2.5 million. (e) Fanta Touray D2.750 million</p> <p>3. Mahadi Touray was the highest bidder at D5.1 million. An offer was made and he paid D5.1 million toward the property.</p>
12	<p>No. 2 Fitzgerald street Sale Price: D4,000,000 Guide Price: D3,750,000</p>	<p>1. The property was included in the approved list for sale</p> <p>2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of September 18th, 2019 at GMT 16:00.</p> <p>3. Six bids were received: (a) Nandkishore Rajwani at D4 million (b) Falinkuta Int at D3 million (c) Falinkuta Int at D3.6 million</p>

		<p>(d) Falinkuta Int at D3.8 million (e) Bridget Mendy at D3,386,000 (f) Makha Ent Consulting via email for D3 million. Nandkishore Rajwani was the highest bidder at D4 million.</p>
13	No. 72 Gloucester Street Sale Price: D12,000,000 Guide Price: D7,500,000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of September 18th, 2019 at GMT 16:00. 3. Five bids were received: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Alasana Jallow D9 million (b) Momodou Korka Jallow D9.5 million (c) Mouhamadou Mouctar Jallow D8.5 million (d) Makha Ent Consulting via email for D4.5 million (e) Fouta Ent. at D12 million (f) Fouta Ent. was the highest bidder at D12 million.
14	No. 18A Picton street Sale Price: D1,550,000 Guide Price: D1,360,000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale and duly advertised in the newspapers, with a submission deadline of 18 September 2019 at 16:00 GMT. 2. A single bid was received from Makha Ent Consulting via email, offering D2.1 million. The contact person was informed accordingly; however, the bidder subsequently withdrew the offer. As a result, the property was re-listed on the market. 3. The property was later valued by Francis Jones at D1.36 million. 4. Following this, Mr. Serign Gai submitted an offer after the bid evaluation process, and the property was sold to him for D1.55 million.
15	No. 13 Picton street Sale Price: D3,600,000 Guide Price: D4,800,000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale It was advertised in the newspapers 2. One bid was received from Makha Ent Consulting via email D0.4 million. 3. As the bid received was below the guide price, the property was put back on the market. 4. Serign Gai made an offer subsequent to the bid evaluation and the property was sold for D3.6 million.
16	No. 57A Daniel Goddard (Hagan Street) Sale Price: D1,000,000 Guide Price: D1,000,000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of September 18th, 2019 at GMT 16:00. Three bids were received: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) IGI Gamstar D2.5 million (b) Makha Ent Consulting via email D2 million (c) Fanta Touray D2.5 million

		<p>(d) There was a tie between two bidders at D2.5 million.</p> <p>3. GPA had written to the MoJ with an appeal to buy the property for D1 million for its Port Expansion project. The Receiver was instructed by the MoJ to sell the property to GPA for D1 million.</p>
17	<p>Hamza Barracks Sale Price: D43,000,000 Guide Price: D41,000,000</p>	<p>1. The property was included in the approved list for sale</p> <p>2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of September 18th, 2019 at GMT 16:00.</p> <p>(a) Five bids were received: (b) MK Stores D41.2 million (c) Makha Ent Consulting via email D3 million (d) Serign Gai D43 million (e) Matasa Co. Limited D42 million (f) University of The Gambia D5.5 million</p> <p>3. Serign Gai was the highest bidder at D43 million and made an advance payment of D10 million</p> <p>4. Due to challenges to remove the army from the property for its handing over to the buyer, the MoJ instructed the Receiver to return the property back to Government and refund the buyer. Consequently, this sale was not executed.</p>
18	<p>11 Russel Street Highest Bid Price: D15,300,000 Guide Price: None</p>	<p>1. The property was included in the approved list for sale</p> <p>2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of September 18th, 2019 at GMT 16:00.</p> <p>3. Three bids were received: (a) Lamin B Gaye D15.3 million (b) Edi M.O.Faal D10.001 million (c) Makha Ent Consulting via email D6 million Lamin B Gaye was the highest bidder at D15.3 million.</p> <p>4. After consultations, the MoJ instructed the Receiver to return the property back to Government. Consequently, this sale was not executed.</p>

586. The Receiver reported making the following sales in **PHASE ONE (1)**:

No.	Location	Sale price GMD	Name of buyer
1	No. 78A Daniel Goddard Street (Hagan Street)	5,500,000	AGIB
2	No. 13 Grant Street	2,600,000	Fanta Touray
3	No. 64 Leman Street	5,000,000	Abdoulie Jallow
4	No. 15 Dobson Street	3,650,000	Serign Gai
5	No. 73A OAU Boulevard (Leman Street)	15,000,000	Momodou Korka Jallow
6	No. 26 Buckle Street	18,000,000	Manex Ltd
7	No. 3 Daniel Goddard (Hagan Street)	5,000,000	Mahadi Touray
8	Jengdula nightclub	1,600,000	Muhammed Jah
9	No. 60 Daniel Goddard Street (Hagan Street)	6,200,000	Mahadi Touray
10	No. 61 Daniel Goddard Street (Hagan Street)	5,100,000	Mahadi Touray
11	No. 2 Fitzgerald Street	4,000,000	Emkay Stores
12	No. 72 Gloucester Street	12,000,000	Fouta Enterprise
13	No. 18A Picton Street	1,550,000	Serign Gai
14	No. 13 Picton Street	3,600,000	Serign Gai
15	No. 57A Daniel Goddard (Hagan Street)	1,000,000	GPA
		89,800,000	

15 properties were sold for D89,800,000. The following two properties were sold and cancelled as the Government rescinded their offers and the payment refunded to the buyers:

No.	Location	Sale price GMD	Name of buyer
1	Hamza Barracks	43,000,000	Gai Enterprise Construction
2	No. 11 Russel street	15,300,000	Lamin Gaye
		58,300,000	

The property located in No. 78B Daniel Goddard street (Hagan Street) was returned back to its original owner (please see page 16).

587. The Committee made the following observations as regards the bidding and sale process of the underlisted landed properties in **PHASE II** of the sale:

S/NO.	LOCATION	NARATION
1	211 PARADISE ESTATE Sale Price: D4,500,000 Guide Price: D4,445,000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> The property was included in the approved list for sale. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of October 18th, 2019, at GMT 12:00 noon. Two bids were received: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Sirra John D4.5 million Alieu Dem D4.6 million Alieu Dem was the highest bidder at D4.6 million. The contact person was informed but he withdrew his bid. The property was put back on the website as available for

		<p>sale.</p> <p>6. Sankung Fatty made an offer subsequent to the bid evaluation, and the property was sold for D4.5 million.</p>
2	<p>214 PARADISE ESTATE Sale Price: D3,840,100 Returned to the original owner</p>	<p>1. The property was included in the approved list for sale and duly advertised in the newspapers, with a submission deadline of 18 October 2019 at 12:00 noon GMT.</p> <p>2. Ms. Alimatou Sallah, the original owner, submitted an appeal to the Ministry of Justice requesting the opportunity to repurchase the property. Following this appeal, the Ministry of Justice instructed the Receiver to enter into negotiations with Ms. Sallah.</p> <p>3. Pursuant to this directive, the property was subsequently sold to her in 2021 for a sum of D3.84 million.</p>
3	<p>300 BRUFUT GARDENS Sale Price: D7,050,000 Guide Price: D6,780,000</p>	<p>1. The property was included in the approved list for sale</p> <p>2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of October 18th, 2019 at GMT 12:00 noon.</p> <p>3. Two bids were received: a) Maila Touray D2.5 million b) Basadie Jabbie D7.050 million</p> <p>4. Basadie Jabbie was the highest bidder at D7.050 million.</p>
4	<p>381 BRUFUT GARDENS Sale Price: D3,900,000 Guide Price: D3,840,000</p>	<p>1. The property was included in the approved list for sale.</p> <p>2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of October 18th, 2019 at GMT 12:00 noon.</p> <p>3. One bid was received from Alieu Dem for D3.9 million. The contact person was informed, but he withdrew his bid. The property was put back on the website as available for sale.</p> <p>4. Lang Konteh made an offer subsequent to the bid evaluation, and the property was sold for D4.5 million.</p>
5	<p>16 KAIRABA AVENUE Sale Price: D41,750,000 Guide Price: D41,750,000</p>	<p>1. The property was included in the approved list for sale</p> <p>2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of October 18th, 2019 at GMT 12:00 noon.</p> <p>3. Three bids were received: a) Maila Touray D10,250,000 b) Salifu K Jaiteh D20,000,000</p>

		<p>c) Jah Oil D41,300,000</p> <p>4. Jah Oil was the highest bidder at D41.3 million. The offer was made at the reserve price of D41,750,000</p>
6	<p>Old Jeshwang Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D5,500,000</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of October 18th, 2019, at GMT 12:00 noon. 3. One bid was received from Maila Touray for D1.5 million. The contact person was informed, but he withdrew his bid. 4. The original owner, Sulayman Jallow, had written to the Ministry of Justice with an appeal to buy back the property as it was unlawfully sold to the previous president. 5. The Receiver was instructed by the MoJ to put the property on hold pending the litigation in the Courts on clarification of the rightful owner.
7	<p>YUNDUM CITRO PRODUCTS Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D40,000,000</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of October 18th, 2019 at GMT 12:00 noon. 3. Four bids were received: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Taf Africa Global D45,000,000 b) Mahadi Touray D45,700,000 c) Mahadi Touray via email D45,700,000 d) Assan Sosseh / RAKIT D46,000,000 4. The highest bid was received from Assan Sosseh / RAKIT for D46 million. 5. The Receiver was instructed by the MoJ to put the property on hold due to challenges with relocating the Army occupants. 6. The payments of D15,333,334 made towards the property were refunded.
8	<p>BAKAU KATCHIKALLY Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D1,485,000</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of October 18th, 2019, at GMT 12:00 noon. 3. One bid was received from Wanh Wei for D1,560,000. The

		contact person was informed, but he withdrew his bid. The property was put back on the website, and it is still available for sale.
9	BAKAU – FORMER CFAO Sale Price: D21,000,000 Guide Price: D18,100,000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of October 18th, 2019, at GMT 12:00 noon. 3. One bid was received from Muhammed Jah for D21,000,000. The property was paid for and the sale executed.
10	83 YARAMBAMBA Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D1,850,000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of October 18th, 2019, at GMT 12:00 noon. 3. Two bids were received: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Alagie Jeng via email D400,000 (b) Momodou Jabbie D1,850,000 4. Momodou Jabbie was the highest bidder at D1,850,000. 5. The contact person was informed, but he withdrew his bid. The property was put back on the website as available for sale.
11	85 YARAMBAMBA Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D1,970,000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of October 18th, 2019, at GMT 12:00 noon. 3. Two bids were received: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Mahadi Touray via email D2,650,000 b) Mahadi Touray D2,650,000 4. Mahadi Touray was the only bidder at D2,650,000. 5. Due to challenges with access to the property, he later withdrew his offer, and payments were refunded.
12	88 YARAMBAMBA Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D1,800,000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of October 18th, 2019, at GMT 12:00 noon. 3. Four bids were received: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Mahadi Touray via email D2,470,000 b) Mahadi Touray D2,470,000 c) Alagie Jeng via email D400,000 d) Momodou Jabbie D1,800,000 4. Mahadi Touray was the highest bidder at D2,470,000. Due to challenges with access to the property, he later withdrew his

		<p>offer, and payments were refunded.</p> <p>5. Subsequent to the bid evaluation, Manex Limited made an offer and paid for the property. The MoJ rescinded its decision to dispose of the property, and the payment was refunded as instructed.</p>
13	<p>89 YARAMBAMBA Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D1,800,000</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of October 18th, 2019, at GMT 12:00 noon. 3. Two bids were received: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Mahadi Touray via email D2,470,000 b) Mahadi Touray D2,470,000 4. Mahadi Touray was the only bidder at D2,470,000. Due to challenges with access to the property, he later withdrew his offer, and payments were refunded. 5. Subsequent to the bid evaluation, Manex Limited made an offer and paid for the property. The MoJ rescinded its decision to dispose of the property, and the payment was refunded as instructed.
14	<p>BIJILO Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D6,600,000</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of October 18th, 2019, at GMT 12:00 noon. 3. One bid was received from Alieu Dem for D6.7 million. The contact person was informed, but he withdrew his bid. The property was put back on the website as available for sale. 4. The Receiver was instructed by the MoJ to return the property for Government use.
15	<p>BIJILO Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: Not valued</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was not advertised in the newspapers. 3. A legal representative of the original owner, Aisha Fatty, had written to the Ministry of Justice with an appeal to buy back the property as it was unlawfully sold to the previous president. 4. The Receiver was instructed by the MoJ to put the property on hold pending the litigation in the Courts on clarification of the rightful owner.

16	<p>GUNJUR BEACH MOTEL Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: Not valued</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of October 18th, 2019, at GMT 12:00 noon. 3. Property has been returned to the Government.
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588. The Receiver reported making the following sales in PHASE II:

PHASE II

Clearance

We received the mandate and clearance from the office of the Attorney General (AG) to sell sixteen (16) properties located in the KMC and WCR to be sold to the public. This clearance was received in writing from the AG conveying the approval of the Ministerial Taskforce.

No.	Location	Sale price GMD	Name of buyer
1	Bakau - former CFAO	21,000,000	Muhammed Jah
2	No. 16 Kairaba Avenue	41,750,000	Jah Oil
3	No. 300 Brufut Gardens	7,050,000	Basadie Jabbie
4	No. B381/08 Brufut Gardens	3,840,100	Lang Conteh
5	No. 211 Paradise Estate	4,500,000	Sankung Fatty
		78,140,100	

The status of the remaining 11 properties are as follows:

No.	Location	Status
1	Bakau Katchikali	Unsold – On the website
2	Old Jeshwang	Returned back to Government
3	No. 83 Yarambamba Estate	Unsold – On the website
4	No. 85 Yarambamba Estate	Unsold – On the website
5	No. 86 Yarambamba Estate	Unsold – On the website
6	No. 88 Yarambamba Estate	Unsold – On the website
7	No. 89 Yarambamba Estate	Unsold – On the website
8	Bijilo Village	Returned back to Government
9	Gunjur Beach Motel	Returned back to Government

10. The property located in No. 214 Paradise Estate was returned back to its original owner (please see page 16).

11. The property named Yundum Citro Products was sold to Rakit Group for D46 million, the Government rescinded the offer and the payment made was refunded to the buyer.

589. The Committee makes the following observations and or analysis of the sale conducted by the Receiver under PHASE III of the sale of the landed properties, as follows:

S/NO	LOCATION	NARATION
1	<p>Brufut Heights A Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D15,000,000</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd 2019, at GMT 14:00. 3. There were no bids received for this property. Several requests were made to view the property.
2	<p>Brufut Heights B Sale Price: D7,150,000 Guide Price: D6,300,000</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd 2019 at GMT 14:00. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Three bids were received: b) Lamin Sisay D7.15 million c) Banta Jaiteh D10 million d) Ebrima Barry D6.5 million 3. Banta Jaiteh was the highest bidder at D10 Million. The contact person was called, and he withdrew his bid as the property is not a sea view location. Lamin Sisay, being the second highest, was contacted, and he made an offer of the bid amount, D7.150 million.
3	<p>Kanifing Garage Sale Price: D33,000,000 Guide Price: D41,500,000</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with

		<p>a deadline of December 3rd, 2019 at GMT 14:00.</p> <p>3. One bid was received from Shyben Madi for D31 million; the offer was made for D33 million.</p> <p>The Receiver was instructed by the MoJ to put the property on hold due to challenges with removing the Army occupants. The payments of D33 million made towards the property were refunded.</p>
4	<p>Kerr Serign / Senegambia Junction Sale Price: D50,000,000 Guide Price: D40,000,000</p>	<p>1. The property was included in the approved list for sale</p> <p>2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd, 2019 at GMT 14:00.</p> <p>Six bids were received:</p> <p>a) George Madi Snr D30 million b) Taf Africa Global D45 million c) Serign Gai D50 million d) Jah Oil D40.5 million e) BMG Enterprise D40.5 million f) MuhammeH Jah D48 million g) Serign Gai was the highest bidder at D50 Million.</p>
5	<p>Kerr Serign / Sanchaba Road Sale Price: D3,800,000 Guide Price: D3,750,000</p>	<p>1. The property was included in the approved list for sale.</p> <p>2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd 2019 at GMT 14:00.</p> <p>3. There were no bids received for this property.</p> <p>4. Subsequent to the bid evaluation, Habib Jeng made an offer of D3.8 million and paid for the property.</p>

6.	Kololi / Bertil Harding Highway Sale Price: D6,750,000 Guide Price: D6,750,000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd 2019 at GMT 14:00. 3. There were no bids received for this property. 4. Subsequent to the bid evaluation, Catherine Jabang made an offer at the guide price of D6,750,000 and paid for the property.
7	192 Kotu West Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D6,900,000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd 2019 at GMT 14:00. <p>There were no bids received for this property.</p>
8	188 Kotu West Sale Price: D2,800,000 Guide Price: D2,600,000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd 2019 at GMT 14:00. 3. There were no bids received for this property. 4. Subsequent to the bid evaluation, Ida Sarr made an offer for D2.8 million and paid for the property.
9	421 Kotu West Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D2,750,000	<p>The property was included in the approved list for sale</p> <p>It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd 2019 at GMT 14:00.</p>

		There were no bids received for this property.
10	Kotu Ext. Palmarima Road Sale Price: D4,250,000 Guide Price: D4,000,000	The property was included in the approved list for sale It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd, 2019 at GMT 14:00. One bid was received from Ebrima Sarr for D4.3 million. The contact person was informed, but he withdrew his bid. The property was put back on the website as available for sale. Subsequent to the bid evaluation, Catherine Jabang made an offer for D4,250,000 and paid for the property.
5	Kerr Serign / Sanchaba Road Sale Price: D3,800,000 Guide Price: D3,750,000	5. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 6. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd 2019 at GMT 14:00. 7. There were no bids received for this property. 8. Subsequent to the bid evaluation, Habib Jeng made an offer of D3.8 million and paid for the property.
11	SUKUTA KOMBO COASTAL Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D1,000,000	1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd 2019 at GMT 14:00. One bid was received from Abdoulie Jarra for D1.3 million. The contact person was informed, but he withdrew his bid. The property was put back on the website as available for sale.
12	850 SALAGIE Sale Price: D600,000 Guide Price: D550,000	1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd 2019 at GMT 14:00. 3. There were no bids received for this property. Subsequent to the bid evaluation, Momodou

		Sowe made an offer for D600,000 and paid for the property.
13	Sinchu Alagie Garden Sale Price: D xxxx Guide Price: D1,600,000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd 2019, at GMT 14:00. Four bids were received: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Mamudou Bah D2.2 million b) Muhammed Jah D2.050 million c) Lamin Sawo D1.9 million d) Hassan MB Jallow D1 million 3. Mamudou Bah was the highest bidder at D2.2 million.
14	SINCHU ALAGIE / PARADISE Estate Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D1,700,000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd 2019, at GMT 14:00. 3. There were no bids received for this property.
15	SOMA Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D15,500,000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd 2019 at GMT 14:00. 3. There were no bids received for this property. <p>The Receiver received instructions from the Ministry of Justice to return the property to the Government.</p>
16	YUNDUM JABANG STRIP Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D3,350,000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd 2019, at GMT 14:00. <p>There were no bids received for this property.</p>
17	BARRA Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D5,400,000	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd 2019 at

		<p>GMT 14:00.</p> <p>There were no bids received for this property. Returned to Government</p>
18	<p>KULORO A Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D3,000,000</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd 2019, at GMT 14:00. <p>One bid was received from Hassan MB Jallow for D200,000. The contact person was informed, but he withdrew his bid. Returned to Government</p>
19	<p>KULORO B Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D5,000,000</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd 2019, at GMT 14:00. <p>There were no bids received for this property. Returned to Government</p>
20	<p>KULORO C Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D5,000,000</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3rd 2019, at GMT 14:00. <p>There were no bids received for this property. Returned to Government</p>
21	<p>KARANTABA Sale Price: Not Sold Guide Price: D1,500,000</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The property was included in the approved list for sale. 2. It was advertised in the newspapers with a deadline of December 3r, 2019, at GMT 14:00. <p>There were no bids received for this property. Returned to the Government.</p>

590. The Receiver reported making the following sales in PHASE III

PHASE III

Clearance

We received the mandate and clearance from the office of the Attorney General (AG) to sell twenty-two (22) properties located in the Banjul, KMC, WCR and NBR to be sold to the public. This clearance was received in writing from the AG conveying the approval of the Ministerial Taskforce.

No	Location	Sale price GMD	Name of buyer
1	Kotu Extension Layout - on the main Palmarima / kololi road	4,250,000	Catherine Jabang
2	Kololi Village - Located off Berthil Harding Highway	6,750,000	Catherine Jabang
3	Sinchu Alaghie Garden - Located on the Kombo Coastal road	2,200,000	Mamudou Bah
4	Kanifing Industrial Estate - Garage	33,000,000	Shyben Madi
5	Kerr Serign - Located on the Senegambia Junction	50,000,000	Serign Gai
6	No. 34 Liberation Avenue	16,550,000	Fanta Touray
7	Kerr Serign - Located off kerr serign/sanchaba road	3,800,000	Habib Jeng
8	Brufut Heights B	7,150,000	Lamin Sisay
9	No. 850 Salagie	600,000	Momodou Sowe
10	188 Kotu West layout	2,800,000	Ida Sarr
		127,100,000	

Kanifing Garage, sold to Shyben Madi for D33 million was initially put on hold as instructed by the Ministry of Justice due to challenges with removing the Army occupants. This issue was subsequently resolved.

The status of the remaining 12 properties are as follows:

No	Location	Status
1	Brufut Heights A	Unsold – On the website
2	192 Kotu West	Unsold – On the website
3	421 Kotu West	Unsold – On the website
4	Sukuta Kombo Coastal	Unsold – On the website
5	Sinchu Alagie / Paradise Estate	Unsold – On the website
6	Yundum Jabang Strip	Unsold – On the website
7	Soma	Returned back to Government
8	Barra	Returned back to Government
9	Kuloro A	Returned back to Government
10	Kuloro A	Returned back to Government
11	Kuloro A	Returned back to Government
12	Karantaba	Returned back to Government

591. The Committee notes that the Kanifing Industrial Estate Garage was sold to Shyben Madi for the sum of D33,000,000.00. Although the transaction was initially placed on hold at the instructions of the Ministry of Justice due to difficulties encountered in removing the Army occupants, the Committee established during its physical inspection of the property that, notwithstanding the suspension of the transaction, the purchase sum paid by Shyben Madi were subsequently refunded to him, yet he continued to retain possession and control of the premises. In the view of the Committee, the retention of the property under such circumstances is not justified, and potentially confers an unjust enrichment to the purchaser at the expense of the State.

No.	LOCATION OF PROPERTY	PHASE	STATUS	PURCHASER
1	No. 78A Daniel Goddard Street (Hagan Street)	I	Sold	AGIB
2	No. 78B Daniel Goddard Street (Hagan Street) **	I	Returned to Owner at original Cost	Ebrima Jallow
3	No. 13 Davidson Carrol Street (Picton Street)	I	Sold	Serign Gai
4	No. 15 Dobson Street	I	Sold	Serign Gai
5	No. 73A OAU Boulevard (Leman Street)	I	Sold	Momodou Korka Jallow
6	No. 64 OAU Boulevard (Leman Street)	I	Sold	Abdoulie Jallow
7	No. 3 Daniel Goddard (Hagan Street)	I	Sold	Mahadi Touray
8	No. 57A Daniel Goddard (Hagan Street)	I	Sold	GPA
9	No. 18A Davidson Carrol Street (Picton Street)	I	Sold	Serign Gai
10	No. 61 Daniel Goddard street (Hagan Street)	I	Sold	Mahadi Touray
11	No. 60 Daniel Goddard street (Hagan Street)	I	Sold	Mahadi Touray
12	No. 2 Fitzgerald street	I	Sold	Emkay Stores - Nandkishore Rajwani
13	No. 72 Gloucester Street	I	Sold	Fouta Enterprise
14	No. 13 William Cole (Grant Street)	I	Sold	Fanta Touray
15	No. 26 Ecowas Avenue (Buckle Street)	I	Sold	Manex Ltd - Narendra Rajwani
16	Jengdula Night Club Bjl Serrekunda Highway(262sqm)	I	Sold	Muhammed Jah
17	16 Kairaba Avenue	II	Sold	Jah Oil
18	Bakau CFAO	II	Sold	Muhammed Jah
19	Fajara South Atlantic		Returned to Owner at Original Cost	Baboucar Sompou Ceesay
20	Bakau New Town		Returned to Owner at Original Cost	Momodou Bah
21	Paradise Estate Plot 211	II	Sold	Sankung Fatty
22	Paradise Estate Plot 214	II	Returned to Owner at Original	Alimatou Sallah

			Cost	
23	Brufut Heights - Plot No.75	III	Sold	Lamin Sisay
24	300 Brufut Gardens	II	Sold	Basadie Jabbie
25	381 Brufut Gardens	II	Sold	Lang Conteh
26	Barra – The Ndure family	III	Returned to Owner at Original Cost	Serigne Ndure
29	34 Liberation Avenue, Banjul	III	Sold	Fanta Touray
28	188 Kotu West Layout	III	Sold	Ida Sarr
29	Kololi Village - K92/1998 Baba Jobe	III	Sold	Gibriel Thomas / Catherine Jabang
30	Kololi Village K93/1998 Teeda Jaiteh	III	Sold	Gibriel Thomas / Catherine Jabang
31	Kotu Extension Layout - K12/1987	III	Sold	Gibriel Thomas / Catherine Jabang
32	Baba Jobe 1316 Kerr Serign Njagga- SR Nos 64 and 65/2002 Vol.21PD and other – (4 Plots) Baba Jobe/Children	III	Sold	Serign Gai
33	Kerr Serign - S.R. 67/1999 Vol.17PD Baba Jobe	III	Sold	Habib Jeng
34	Plot No.850 Salagi Layout	III	Sold	Momodou M Sowe
35	Sinchu Alagie	III	Sold	Mamudou Bah

592. The Committee finds that a significant number of purchasers of the landed properties purportedly sold through the receivership process have not received valid transfers, conveyances, or assignments evidencing lawful title to the properties they paid for. The evidence before the Committee indicates that, notwithstanding the completion of payments and the issuance of receipts in some cases, the requisite instruments of transfer were either delayed indefinitely or never executed at all.

593. In the Committee's view, the failure to regularise title in favour of purchasers reflects a deeper breakdown in accountability arising from the manner in which the Receiver and the Inter-Ministerial Committee handled the disposal of the landed properties. Consequently, there remains widespread uncertainty as to the true purchasers and or owners of the properties sold.

594. By letter dated 28th March 2022 from the Ministry of Lands and Regional Government to the Ministry of Justice, leases and purchases were recorded as having been issued in favour of the following persons:

- (a) Habibi Jeng – Kerr Serign Njagga lease No. K444/2021
- (b) Gabriel Thomas – Kotu Extension Layout with lease No. K443/2001
- (c) Gabriel Thomas – Kololi with lease no. K441/2021
- (d) Gabriel Thomas – Kololi with lease no. K442/2021
- (e) Sering Gai – Kerr Serign with lease no. K442/2021
- (f) Ida Sarr – Kotu Layout with lease no. K452/2021

595. The Committee observes that although Gabriel Thomasi was recorded as a beneficiary of the above-referenced lease(s), his or her name does not appear among the persons who participated in the bidding process for any property offered for sale.

596. Similarly, several persons, including the Solicitor General and Legal Secretary, Hussein Thomasi, appear in the Receiver’s Statement of Account as having paid substantial sums in respect of “properties”. However, their names do not appear on any list of approved bidders or purchasers. The same observation applies to Rougie Thomasi, spouse of the Solicitor General, who likewise made payments towards landed property despite not appearing on the list of bidders or successful purchasers.

597. The Committee equally observes notwithstanding that Ida Sarr did not participate in, nor submit any bid during, the advertised bidding process for the property, and after the bid evaluation had been concluded and the process formally closed, she subsequently made a private offer in the sum of D2.8 million, which was accepted and paid to the Receiver, following which the property was sold and leased to her under the Kotu Layout allocation.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The Committee recommends that criminal investigations be initiated against Alpha Amadou Barry and Alpha Kapital Advisory for, among other things, conspiracy to defraud the State.
2. That Mr. Barry be permanently prohibited from conducting any business whatsoever with Government.
3. That the Government conducts criminal investigations to ascertain whether the appointment of Alpha Amadou Barry by former Attorney General Tambadou involved any form of corrupt practices.
4. The Committee recommends that the former Secretary to the Cabinet, Mr. Ebrima Ceesay, be referred to the Public Service Commission for disciplinary action for permitting unsigned

reports from the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce to be tabled at Cabinet.

5. That all Cabinet conclusions on the Janneh Commission and the Inter-Ministerial Committee be submitted to the Assembly within thirty (30) days.

TRANSPARENCY, LACK OF IT THEREOF, AND REPORTING ON THE SALE OF LANDED PROPERTIES

598. Evidence received by the Committee shows that the Receiver/Trustee has not been providing information and or updates to the Inter-Ministerial Committee or the Ministry of Justice, as required by his letter of engagement. In a letter seen by the Committee dated the 3rd October 2023, referenced AG 49/307/01(Part (382)), the Attorney General’s Chambers and Ministry of Justice wrote to the Receiver/Trustee, requesting the following:
 - a) *List of assets disposed of*
 - b) *Copies of the receipts for the disposed assets*
 - c) *Bidding documents for the sale of the assets*
 - d) *Advertisements*
 - e) *Bank account statement of the Trustee*
 - f) *Detailed insights into the selection process utilised for appointing the values.*
599. The Committee observes the purpose of the request by the Attorney General’s Chamber to the Receiver was to satisfy a request by the Auditor General made via a letter dated the 25th October 2024 reference AG 27/530.02 (5) to the Attorney General “requesting information on sales of assets from the Janneh Commission from the year 2020 to 2022”. This request followed an earlier request made on the 13th February 2024 by the NAO, referenced HC 93/201/01/Part XVII (4), requesting “information on the sale of Ex-President Jammeh’s Assets”. There was no immediate response to the requests by the Auditor General.
600. Earlier, Resolution 36 of the National Assembly on FPAC’s Report 2023, resolved that:

“The Accountant General liaises with the Ministry of Justice to provide the Auditor General and the FPAC relevant documents, including Janneh Commission’s Treasury Receipts amounting to D22,319,957.92 and other information pertaining to the sale of assets of former President Jammeh on or before the 29th day of September 2023.”
601. The Committee further observed that no responses have been given to all these requests made to the Solicitor General & Legal Secretary, including the resolution of FPAC adopted by the Assembly. That in particular, the Ministry has requested for the National Audit Office to have a joint meeting with the Receiver, effectively holding brief for the Receiver/Trustee, whom the Auditor General is entitled to audit by virtue of Section 160 of the Constitution.
602. The Committee received evidence that the medium Malagen wrote to the Ministry of Finance on the 3rd day of July 2023, and by a letter dated the 6th July 2023, the Ministry of Finance forwarded

the letter to the Attorney General’s Chambers asking to be provided with information regarding the sale of, among other things, “landed properties and assets sold by Alpha Kapital Advisory, June 2019 to 2023”. The Committee observes that the Ministry of Finance could not provide the relevant information required by the media because it had been effectively excluded, almost entirely, from the disposal process of the assets belonging to the former President.

- 603.** There is no evidence that the Attorney General’s Chamber and the Ministry of Justice ever responded to the media. This is despite the fact that as of July 2022, the Accountant General’s Department, wrote to the Ministry of Justice via a letter dated 25th July 2022 reference DA 91/316/01/Part (125), requesting for information on the sale of the assets from Janneh Commission, and the Receiver was duly notified to provide information but to no avail.
- 604.** In his evidence before the Committee, the Receiver-/Trustee disclosed that the progressive report on the sale of the former President’s assets, including landed properties, was prepared only after what he described as “public noise” surrounding the sale process. The Committee notes with concern that this admission aligns with a broader pattern identified during its analysis of the evidence. In particular, following a detailed examination of the testimony of Alieu Jallow, the Committee and its investigation team found that certain reports attributed to him were either altered or generated in very recent times, rather than contemporaneously with the events to which they relate. This finding reinforces concerns that documentation was, in many instances, made in contemplation of public scrutiny and demands for accountability.
- 605.** The Committee further observes that records obtained from the Sheriff’s Office similarly reflect documentation prepared in recent years, including as late as 2023, which, while not conclusive in themselves, contribute to the overall picture of delayed reporting. Taken together, the evidence suggests a recurring trend, extending beyond this chapter, in which formal reports were created or refined well after the fact, often in the context of public pressure, rather than as part of a timely and systematic process of proper administrative measure, or in the process of asset management and accountability.

LANDS IN THE TOURISM DEVELOPMENT AREA

- 606.** The Committee observes that in dealing with the landed properties, the Commission dedicated a section in Volume 3 of its report on the Tourism Development Area (TDA). The Commission reported that the TDA is a land-use zone established to promote tourism, and that it was first created in 1970 along the Atlantic seafront from Kololi Point to the Allahein Bolong (Halahin) in Kartong, leased to the Government by Kombo North and South district authorities. While eight additional TDAs were identified under the 2007 Tourism Development Master Plan, they remain unplanned and unmapped.

- 607.** The Gambia Tourism Board Act 2011 establishes the Gambia Tourism Board (GT-Board) as the main institution that administers, coordinates, and regulates the TDA. The Committee observes that the Commission reported the following on page 109 of the Vol 3:
- “19 leases of land in TDA were granted to the Ex-President (11) and his companies – KFF (5), Kanilai Cultural Centre (1), and Operation Save the Children Foundation (1), Gambia Food and Feed Industry (1). 1 lease in Kanifing Municipality, 14 leases in Kombo South, and 4 leases in Kombo North.*
- These exclude leases granted within the TDA of land allocated for other uses, i.e., parks and wildlife dealt with in the next Part.”*
- 608.** The Commission recommended that all leases issued to the former President be cancelled and/or rescinded, and the lands restored to the State to be applied to proper planning and development of the Area (see page 109, Vol. 3 of the Commission’s report).
- 609.** The Government, in its White Paper, particularly at page 13, paragraph 33, accepted the Commission’s recommendations, and further ordered that ***“the leases of the said lands in the TDA be immediately cancelled and/or rescinded and the lands restored to the State.”***
- 610.** The Committee observes that the landed properties identified by the Commission to have belonged to the former President in the TDA **are beyond 19**. Some of the landed properties, such as in Batokunku are listed as one while in fact, they constitute three different leases and cumulatively measure **153.74 hectares**. The Committee makes the same observation in properties located in Gunjur. Therefore, the total number **of landed properties is 22**.
- 611.** The Committee received testimony from the Director General of GT-Board at the time, Mr. Abubacarr S Camara. In his evidence, he addressed the mandate of the GT-Board as outlined in the Act, land allocation processes within the TDA, and several specific property-related issues linked to the Commission’s findings.
- 612.** Before proceeding to issues relating to landed properties in the TDA, the Committee wishes to report a huge concern over the lack of record-keeping at the GT-Board. The Committee notes with concern that there seems to be a deliberate pattern of meddling with official records and declaring them missing. Even where the files are available, they are barely complete. These are facts that the Director, Mr. Camara, conceded to but blamed on past administrations. The Committee notes that the TDA is a high-profile area that attracts considerable interest from prominent business entities. It is therefore unacceptable that in the administration of a sector of this nature, proper documentation is not assured for the purpose of accountability, transparency, and probity.
- 613.** The Table below shows the landed properties reported by the Commission to have belonged to the former President. Except for properties 4, 7, and 10, which the Inter-Ministerial Committee claimed do not fall within the TDA. The Inter-Ministerial Committee recommended that the

properties revert to the GT-Board. They further recommended that some be returned to the community, as shown in **ANNEX E**.

NO.	PLOT NAME	LEASE NUMBER
1.	Cultural Center – Kotu Point	K355/2009 (6.1 hectares)
2.	Sanyang (abandoned quarry)	Lease processed (84.82 hectares)
3.	Tujereng	K173/2012 (89.63 hectares)
4.	Sanyang	Lease processed (1.16 hectares)
5.	Bijilo – TDA	Lease processed (3.75 hectares)
6.	Batokunku	S.R. No. K98/2002
	Batokunku	Lease processed
	Batokunku	K97/2002 (153.74 hectares)
7.	Brufut	S.R. No. K98/2009 (12.05 hectares)
8.	Sanyang (Howba)	S.R No. K217/2013 (41.92 hectares)
9.	Gunjur	K372/2015 (35.70 hectares);
	Gunjur Kajabang to KFF	K293/2012 (50.60 hectares);
	Medina Salam / Kenye Jamango	K373/2015 (35.64 hectares)
10.	Kartong Touray Kunda	K370/2015 (10.60 hectares)
11.	Kartong Folonko	K375/2015 (277.58 hectares)
12.	Kartong Jambaring	K377/2013 (12.36 hectares)
13.	Sambouya Madikuly	K371/2015 (34.05 hectares)
14.	Tanji River Side	K180/2012 (34.73 hectares)

15.	Bijilo (Anti-Crime Unit HQ)	K176/2012 (17.70 hectares)
16.	Operation Save the Children Foundation – Kololi (Senegambia)	Not registered
17.	Kanilai Family Farm	K181/2012
18.	Brufut Madam Nadiany Bamba	Lease dated 22nd August 2002 to Madame Ndianny Bamba of 11 B.P. 2020 Abdjan Cote D' Ivoire. Lease No. not recorded.

614. A letter seen by the Committee, dated the 30th April, 2020, from the Attorney General's Chambers, and Ministry of Justice, addressed to the Ministry of Tourism and Culture, raised concerns that at the time of the technical committee of the Inter-Ministerial Committee considering the properties forfeited to the State by the Commission, *“the Gambia Tourism Board has started allocating properties within the Tourism Development Area (TDA)”*, especially citing the Cultural Centre-Koto Point (6.1 hectares) and Bijilo-TDA (3.75 hectares).

Cultural Center - Kotu Point	K355/2009 (6.1 hectares)
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615. The property in question is located at Kotu Point, also identified as the Cultural Center, within the TDA. It is described as land with a fence line near the Duplex Junction between the former Dream Park and extending towards Palma Rima. In his evidence before the Committee, the Director General of the GT-Board characterized this property as having "a complex history."

616. Evidence received from the GT-Board shows that the following persons and or entities were issued sub-leases in the property named Cultural Centre- Kotu Point (6.1 hectares) between 2019 and 2021 for various projects.

No.	PROJECT NAME	PROMOTER(s)	ALLOCATION DATE, OTHER
	Gamex Resort Apartment & Villa Ltd	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Babourcarr Mbye, Latrikunda Sabiji 2. Assan Jallow, Manjai Kunda 3. Cherno Jallow, Manjai Kunda 	<p>The company was allocated two properties on the 13th May 2020, and another annex on the 15th September 2020, both in Kotu.</p> <p>The estimated size is 35m x174m x 67m</p>

			The Company was incorporated on the 2 nd of March 2021.
	Alkamba Travel & Tours	Saikouba Sisay, Brusubi Phase 1	The Company was allocated a sublease on the 4 th day of November, 2021. The business was incorporated on the 26 th day of March 2014.
	Kerr Gui	1. Amie Lette Ndow, Kanifing South 2. Haddy Ndow, Brusubi	The Company was allocated on the 27 th day of December 2019. The company was incorporated on the 11 th March 2019.
	Priority Leisure	1. Juka Fatou Jabang, Bijilo 2. Ramilaben Devshi Gondariya, Jimpex (Indian) 3. Vaishali Badhawan, Jimpex (Spain)	The Company was allocated a sublease on the 6 th November 2019. The Company was incorporated on the 24 th June 2019.
	Crestone Company Ltd (Crestone Hotel)	1. Mouhamadou Diaby, Manjai Kunda (Senegalese). 2. Sourakhata Tirera <i>(Incomplete)</i>	The Company was allocated a sublease on the 10 th day of March 2022. The Company was incorporated on the 28 th March 2018
	Sky Limit Investment Gambia Ltd	1. Alieu Badara Mbye, Kerr Sering 2. Amie Singhateh, Kerr Sering 3. Haddy Ceesay, Brusubi Phase 1 4. Njaga Sanneh, Yarambamba	The Company was allocated a sublease on the 24 th May 2022. The Company was incorporated on the <u>26th August 2021.</u>

617. The Committee observes that **Gamex Resort Apartment & Villa Ltd** was allocated two properties in 2020, yet the company was only incorporated in March 2021. No explanation was

offered. The Committee further observed that a concentration of allocations within a narrow timeframe between 2019 and 2022 was done involving this property. Files provided to the Committee concerning this allocation are largely not organised, scanty, and sometimes contain information unrelated to them.

618. In addition to the Companies listed above, the Committee is in receipt of evidence that the following Companies are also beneficiaries of allocation within the **Cultural Centre- Kotu Point (6.1 hectares)**. They are:

- (a) Palm Luxurious Suite Limited*
- (b) Ebrima & Ida Jacobson Drameh, and*
- (c) TK Motors (Sahara Resort).*

619. However, a search at the Companies Registry returns that the above purported companies or businesses do not exist.

ALLOCATION TO MOAB CAPITAL COMPANY G LIMITED

620. According to evidence submitted to the Committee by the GT Board, a provisional allocation of land within the Kotu Point area was issued to MOAB Capital Company G Limited on 24th December 2019, through its promoter, one Binta Sampo Ceesay. Mr. Abubacarr S. Camara explained that the property allocated comprised land measuring 75 meters by 100 meters, situated at the junction of Duplex, extending towards the area where **Sky Limits (Aziz Mall)** is currently located.

621. Mr. Camara testified that when he assumed office as Director General sometime in June 2020, he found that MOAB Capital had already received a provisional allocation but had not paid the 5% development levy. He stated, "before I work on their file or finalize their file for the final signature of the Chairman, they have to complete the payment." It is his evidence that he insisted MOAB Capital pay the required 5% levy before proceeding with the final allocation, which MOAB eventually did.

622. Subsequently, after MOAB Capital had paid the 5% development levy, Mr. Camara testified that he received communication from his then Permanent Secretary, Ms. Kodou Jabang, who was serving as Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Tourism. According to him, Ms. Jabang contacted him by telephone whilst she was attending a Permanent Secretary retreat. During this phone call, she informed him that the Minister of Lands had confirmed that the land should have reverted to the Ministry of Information because the land was leased to RASCON, which fell under the Ministry of Information and Communication. It is his evidence that: "She said that the Minister of Lands has confirmed that the land should have reverted back to the Ministry of Information, because the land was leased to the Ministry of Information through RASCON."

623. Mr. Camara stated that he proceeded to make further verbal confirmations by contacting Hon. Amat Bah, then Minister of Tourism, and Hon. Ibrahim Sillah, then Minister of Information and Communication, and Mr. Buba Sanyang, then Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Lands. All of these contacts and confirmations were conducted verbally by telephone. No written communications, letters, or documentary evidence were generated or exchanged regarding this matter. When questioned about the absence of documentation, the witness stated, "the reason why I did not worry is because it's like we did not even have to do with RASON; our job is to relocate MOAB, which actually, they agreed."
624. It follows that Mr. Camara immediately contacted MOAB Capital and informed them that they would need to be relocated to another plot of land. The witness testified that MOAB Capital initially agreed to the relocation. However, they subsequently changed their position and requested a refund of the 5% development levy they had paid. The GT-Board proceeded to refund the full amount of the 5% development levy to MOAB Capital.
625. It is noteworthy that the allocation to MOAB Capital was rescinded without any formal documentation being generated by the GT-Board, without any written correspondence with MOAB Capital regarding the cancellation, and without the matter being taken to the GT-Board's governing body for deliberation and decision. Mr. Camara explained that "when it comes to a land that has been allocated. If the investor so believe that she doesn't mind to be transferred to a valuable land, and she agreed there is no need to consult the board on that."
626. One of the most significant revelations in Mr. Camara's testimony was his admission that the Gambia Tourism Board has no file, documentation, or records whatsoever relating to any allocation or sublease of the Kotu Point property to RASCON. When asked whether the GT-Board had allocated the land to RASCON, the witness responded: ***"It was not GT-Board that allocated that land."***
627. The Committee finds the following exchange particularly revealing:
- Counsel:** "Did you ever see as DG or even before you were DG at the GT-Board, did you ever see any documentation allocating that property to RASCON?"
- Witness:** "That property to RASCON, no, I've not seen it before."
- Counsel:** "Before this property was allocated to MOAB. Did you ever see any documentation that that property was already allocated to RASCON?"
- Witness:** *"I did not see... No."*
628. Mr. Camara confirmed to the Committee that the GT-Board maintains a list of all subleases granted from 2016 to date, and RASCON does not appear anywhere on this list. Furthermore, the witness acknowledged that he does not even know the full name of RASCON, stating, **"No, honestly, I don't know. I just know it as RASCON."**

629. When pressed on who might have allocated the land to RASCON if not the GT-Board, the witness responded: "...*I don't know who [would have] done that allocation.*"

630. The witness had earlier testified that all allocations of land within the TDA must be approved by the GT-Board's governing body. However, the cancellation of MOAB's allocation and the implied recognition of RASCON's claim were never presented to the Board for deliberation or decision. In fact, the GT-Board could not tell who allocated the land to RASCON but deliberately sat idly by. The Committee finds it unacceptable that the GT-Board, charged with the administration of the lands within the TDA, cannot determine who allocated the said latter to RASCON, when in fact, this responsibility is squarely that of the Board.

Bijilo - TDA	Lease processed (3.75 hectares)
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631. As regards the property Bijilo-TDA (3.75 hectares), the Director General did not report any form of allocations being made therein. This, however, does not negate the fact that the said property may have been reallocated to other persons and other companies. The Committee observes that GT-Board does keep proper records, and this is why the Director could not guide the Committee in providing timely and accurate information regarding the said property.

Sanyang (abandoned quarry)	Lease processed (84.82 hectares)
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632. The Commission's report noted that property located at Sanyang, commonly referred to as the Sanyang Abandoned Quarry, comprises approximately 84.82 hectares. However, a registered copy of the lease to the Ex-President could not be located (see page 101 of Vol. 3 of the Commission's report). In his evidence before the Committee, the Director of GT-Board informed the Committee that a lease was duly processed for the Interstate Investment Company Ltd for the construction of a "**Mixed- Use-Resort**. However, the area is presently occupied by the supposed deep-sea port project.

633. The Committee notes, contrary to the testimony of the Director, that in fact, a sublease dated the 24th day of November, 2022, bearing Serial Registration No. 830/2020, on a GT-Board letterhead, *SRN: GTBoard/TDA1/SL 054* was granted to Interstate Investment Company Ltd following an application by its Director, Serign Hadim Gai. The portion of the property subleased to Interstate Investment Company Ltd measures 485m x 485m x 722m x 500m x 175m x 168m (appropriately 64 hectares). There is no evidence before the Committee to suggest that all or any part of the portion subleased to Interstate Investment Company Ltd has been taken over by the said deep-sea project.

Tujereng	K173/2012 (89.63 hectares)
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634. The Committee received oral evidence from the director that the property in Tujereng, bearing lease registration No. K173/2012, and measuring 89.63 hectares or thereabout, is partly subleased to the following:

No.	PROJECT NAME	PROMOTER(s)	ALLOCATION DATE, OTHER
1.	Mansaya Eco-Resort	NA	NA
2.	Light House Project	NA	NA

635. A search conducted by the Registrar of Companies, which evidence she submitted to the Committee, shows that there are no records on the purported companies or businesses listed above. Additionally, in a list of persons and or companies who benefited from allocation between the years 2017 and 2022, provided to the Committee by the then Director of the GT-Board and reproduced herein below, the above-listed Companies did not form part of the beneficiaries of properties within the TDA and associated with the former President and his associates in Tujereng.

636. According to the evidence of the then Director of the GT-Board, the following is the list of persons and or companies that benefited from the allocation within the TDA from 2017 to 2025:

NO.	PROJECT NAME	PROMOTER(S)	ALLOCATION DATE	LOCATION
1.	Bijilo Barala Company Ltd	Mamour Malick Jagne	15 June 2017	Bijilo
2.	Norrgam Leisure Group	Famara Colley	2 October 2018	Kartong
3.	Tanji Blue Ocean Resort	Abubakar Bensouda	12 December 2018	Tanji
4.	Lagoona Hotel and Apartment	Linu Rajwani	12 December 2018	Kotu
5.	Precious Group Limited	Devshi Shamji Gondariya	22 January 2019	Tanji
6.	Transit Service	Naandkishore Rajwani	16 January 2019	Tanji
7.	Myai Complex	Edrisa Cham	12 April 2019	Bijilo
8.	M24 Company Gambia Ltd	Mr. Benedict Njie (C/O Modou S. Jobe)	8 May 2019	Tanji / Sanyang
9.	Howba Eco Lodge	Mr. Seedia Kassama	25 June 2019	Sanyang

10.	Palms Luxurious Suite Ltd	Ali Exxeddine	30 October 2019	Kotu
11.	Priority Leisure Group	Juka Fatou Jabang	6 November 2019	Kotu
12.	Kerr GUI Company	Haddy Ndow	27 December 2019	Kotu
13.	K & M Atlantic Resort Corporation	Madi J. Ceesay	3 July 2019	Kartong
14.	Gamex Villa Apartment	Assan Jallow	13 May 2019	Kotu
15.	Abraxas	Baboucarr Ngum	19 March 2020	Bijilo
16.	Kaijang Holding Ltd	Yuhao Aixinjueluo & Chou Wen Chuang	9 September 2020	Kotu
17.	Gamex Villa Apartment Annex	Assan Jallow	15 September 2020	Kotu
18.	Matrix (New Gambia – The Smiling Coast of Africa Resort)	Essa M. Faal	February 2021	Brufut
19.	TANUSH Resort and Apartment	Deeana Rajwani	8 April 2021	Tanji
20.	HYA	Mrs. Haddy Jawara	11 April 2021	Tujereng
21.	Hydara Plaza	Sulayman Hydara	7 July 2021	Tujereng
22.	Ace Convention	Fatim Badjie	July 2021	Tujereng
23.	Gambia Hotel Association	C/O Francis Nje	4 November 2021	Senegambia
24.	Yabouy Home Cooking	Mrs. Ida Cham Njai	4 November 2021	Senegambia
25.	Alkamba Tours & Travel International	Mr. Saikouba Sisay	4 November 2021	Tujereng
26.	Samba Investment	Batch Samba Faye	2 December 2021	Tujereng
27.	Interstate Investment	Hadim Gai	11 February 2022	Tujereng
28.	Crestone Hotel	Sourakhata Tirera	10 March 2022	Tanji
29.	Sky Limit Investment (G)	Aliou Badara Mbye	24 May 2022	Sanyang
30.	Light House	Zdravko Volga	9 May 2022	Kotu
31.	Pa Dawda Njie	Pa Dawda Njie	1 June 2022	Kotu
32.	Premium Mixed Use	Modou S. B. Taal	5 July 2022	Tujereng
33.	Tanush Shopping Mall	Naandkishore Rajwani	5 July 2022	Tanji
34.	Midway Development Company Ltd	Antouman A. B. Gaye	14 October 2022	Tanji & Tujereng
35.	Sunnah Resort and Stable	Azaria Amaris	2 January 2023	Tujereng

	Rowlands & Co.			
36.	MJ Dutch Connection Beach Resort	Mariama Jallow & Richard William Kienstra	2 January 2023	Brufut
37.	Komodo Dragon Beach Club	Momodou Yelley Mbye Sanneh	7 March 2023	Mentereng
38.	Royal Recreational Board	Ebrima Tamba	15 March 2023	Tujereng
39.	Tayib Lobba Lodge	Tayib Lobba	15 March 2023	Tanji
40.	Papaya Resident (Holiday Home)	Jainaba Samba	15 March 2023	Tujereng
41.	Club E11VEN	Joyce Riley	15 March 2023	Sanyang
42.	Boki Diawe Ltd	Mr. Kalifa Wague	August 2023	Brufut
43.	Brufut Medical Center	Dr. Sulayman Jatta	27 September 2023	Sanyang
44.	D'nubian Seafood Garden Luxury Hotel	Harratou Jallow	27 September 2023	Mentereng
45.	Safora Complex	Adama Sambou	27 September 2023	Gunjur
46.	Moonlight Resort	Mbakey Sowe	12 October 2023	Medina Salam
47.	Immo Pro Mo Gambia Ltd	Mamodou Badjan	31 October 2023	Tanji
48.	Kasumai Annex (Bijilo)	Ebrima Tamaba	2 October 2018	Bijilo
49.	African Heritage Eco Cultural & Traditional Tourist Center	Muhammed B. Kabba & Co	31 October 2023	Tanji
50.	Mansaya Hotel Resort	Cheikh & Maimouna Sagna	21 November 2023	Tujereng
51.	Malika Resort Board	Augustus L. Prom Jr	1 February 2024	Tujereng
52.	Prime Holding Company Ltd	Sherriffo Suno	23 January 2024	Tanji
53.	Anta Sey Trading	Ousman A. E. Sey	23 April 2024	Tujereng
54.	Eco Tourism Retreat / African Elegance Boutique Hotel	Haddy Ceesay (Promoter)	23 April 2024	Tujereng
55.	Kruna Villa Gambia Ltd	Thomas Ing. Kronsteiner & Jakob Kronsteiner	24 April 2024	Gunjur (Medina Salam)
56.	IDA's Ideas Fashion Ltd	Ida Saine	23 February 2024	Bijilo
57.	AFROGAM	Fatoumatta Drammeh	21 March 2024	Tujereng
58.	TROBECCO Eco Tourism Resort	Lamin Fatajo	23 April 2024	Kartong
59.	Tujereng Lodge	Sheriff Marong	24 April 2024	Tujereng

60.	Millennium Company Ltd	Lara Arezki	28 March 2024	Tujereng
61.	Baabsi	Ndey Awa Ceesay	10 June 2025	Tujereng
62.	Atlantic Villas	Hadim Gai	10 June 2025	Tanji

637. It is the evidence of the then Director that the properties situated in Sanyang Village, Bijilo- TDA, and Batokunku have not been subleased to third parties.

BRUFUT	S.R. No. K98/2009 (12.05 hectares)
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638. The property in **Brufut**, bearing serial **No. K98/2009** measuring **12. 05 hectares** or thereabout, is allocated to the following:

No.	PROJECT NAME	PROMOTER(s)	ALLOCATION DATE, OTHER
1.	Tanush Resort Apartments	1. Narendra Nandkishore Rahwani (Indian) 2. Deeana Rajwani (Indian)	Allocated on the 8 th April, 2021. The Company was incorporated on the 17 th December 2019.
2.	Matrix property (New Gambia Resort)	Essa M. Faal	Allocated on the 9 th February 2021.

SANYANG (HOWBA)	S.R No. K217/2013 (41.92 hectares)	Tree House Lodge, ACE Convention, Club Eleven
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639. The property in **Sanyang (HOWBA)**, **S.R No. K217/2013**, measuring about **41.92 hectares**, is allocated to the following:

No.	PROJECT NAME	PROMOTER(s)	ALLOCATION DATE, OTHER

1.	Tree House Lodge	N/A	
2.	ACE Convention	Fatim Badjie	Allocated on the 7 th July 2021.
2.	Club Eleven Limited	Joyce Rilley Baboucarr Gillen	Allocated on the 15 th March 2023 Incorporated on the 22 nd of April 2021

640. According to the Registrar of Companies, there are no records of any company or business with the name Tree House Lodge. Additionally, the Committee notes that Tree House Lodge is not included in the list of beneficiaries of the allocation previously sent to the Committee by the former Director of GT-Board.

Gunjur	K372/2015 (35.70 hectares);
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641. The property in **Gunjur, K372/2015**, is partly allocated to the following:

No.	PROJECT NAME	PROMOTER (SHAREHOLDER)	ALLOCATION DATE, OTHER
1.	Brufut Medical Centre Ltd	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dr. Sulayman Jatta (German) 2. Musa Jatta 3. Emily Jatta (German) 4. Isatou Jatta Ceesay 5. Artem Golestian (American) 6. Gesine Ingrid Jatta (German) 7. Elaine Jatta 	<p>Allocated on 27th September, 2023</p> <p>The Company was incorporated on 19th December 2018.</p>
2.	Kruna Eco Lodge Kruna Villa Gambia Ltd.	<p>Thomas Ing. Kron Steiner</p> <p>Jakob Kron Steiner</p>	24 th April, 2024

642. There is no record of any company or business with the name Kruna Eco Lodge.

643. The Committee notes that, based on information provided by the DG, no allocations were made by the GT-Board in respect of the following properties:

- a) Gunjur, Kajabang - KFF (K373/2015);
- b) Medina Salam/Kenyekenye Jamango (S.R. No. 157/2012);
- c) Kartong Touray Kunda (K370/2015), measuring approximately 10.60 hectares;
- d) Kartong Folonko (K375/2015), measuring approximately 277.58 hectares;
- e) Sambouya Madikuly (K371/2015), measuring approximately 34.05 hectares; and
- f) Sambouya, where the lease remains incomplete, measuring approximately 4.8 hectares.

644. However, in providing the Committee with the above information, the DG made a disclaimer that he can only confirm to the best of his knowledge that the GT-Board did not make allocations in the named properties, but could not say whether or not allocations were made by any other authority.

Kartong Jambaring	K377/2013 (12.36 hectares)
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645. The property situated at **KARTONG JAMBARING**, bearing serial No. **K377/2013**, measuring **12.36 hectares** or thereabout, was partly allocated to the following:

No.	PROJECT NAME	PROMOTER(s)	ALLOCATION DATE, OTHER
1.	Norgam Leisure Group Ltd.	Famara Colley Alpha Badjie	Allocation done on the 2 nd October 2018 The Company was incorporated on the 20 th day of February, 2017.
2.	Trobbecco Eco Tourism Resort (Trobeco) Business	Lamin Fatajo	Allocation done on the 23 rd April, 2024 Registered on 23 rd August 2022

TANJI RIVER SIDE	K180/2012 (34.73 hectares)
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646. The Committee observes that the Commission provided details on this property in Vol. 3, pages 101 and 102. The Committee notes the Commission reports that lease K180/2012 was issued to replace Lease No. 318/2008, dated 20 June 2008, for an area measuring 25.84 hectares, which was

originally issued by Ismaila Kabba Sambou to KFF. The original lease was cancelled and replaced by Lease K180/2012 dated 22 June 2012, issued by Lamin Waa Juwara to Dr. Alhagie Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh, covering the same land area but excluding portions allocated to the Immigration Department, the NIA, and the YDP. The Committee observes that this property forms part of the properties released by Justice Ebrima Jaiteh.

647. The Committee further received evidence from the then Director of the GT-Board that subleases were issued to the following:

No.	PROJECT NAME	PROMOTER(s)	ALLOCATION DATE, OTHER
1.	Precious Group Limited	Bharat Kumar Devshi Hirani Devshi Shamji Gondariya Pankaj Kumar Badhawan Rahaul Peswani (Indian Nationals)	Allocated on the 22 nd January 2019 The company was incorporated on the 26 th of September 2018.
2.	M-24 Company Gambia Ltd.	Benedict Njie Amat Baba (American)	Allocated on the 8th day of May 2019 Incorporated on the 25 th of January 2017.
3.	Blue Ocean Resort	Amie N. D Bensouda Ebrima Jaiteh Abubakar Bensouda Abdul Aziz Bensouda	Allocation done on the 12 th December, 2018. The company was incorporated on the 6 th day of June 2011.
4.	Immopromo Gambia Ltd,	Elhadji Boubacarr Dia Frederic Marcel Michel Senac Mamadou Badiane (All Senegalese)	Allocation done on the 31 st October, 2023 The company was incorporated on the 15 th November, 2018.
5.	African Heritage Eco Cultural and Traditional Tourist Center	Muhammed B Kabba and Co...	Allocation done on the 31 st October, 2023
6.	Transit Service Limited	Narendra Rajwani (Indian) Nandkishore Rajwani (Indian) Versha Rajwani (Indian)	Allocation was done on the 16 th January 2019 The company was incorporated on the 23 rd day of April 2013.

7.	Ya Bouy Home Cooking	Mrs. Ida Cham Njai	Allocated on the 4 th November, 202X Registered on the 10th of March 2014
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Bijilo (Anti-Crime Unit HQ)	K176/2012 (17.70 hectares)
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648. The property known as **BIJILO (GREEN BOYS), K176/2012, leased to KFF**, was supposedly allocated to the following:

No.	PROJECT NAME	PROMOTER(s)	ALLOCATION DATE, OTHER
1.	Gem Water Front		
2.	Barala Company Ltd	Mamour Malick Jagne, Bakau	Allocated on the 15 th day of June 2017

649. Despite the evidence that the property was subleased to the abovementioned companies, Mr. Camara informed the Committee that this property was subsequently given to one Mr. Abdoulie Cham for a proposed OIC Radisson Blu Hotel, which project has still not materialized.

650. The property known as “Operation Save the Children” was also allocated to the following:

No.	PROJECT NAME	PROMOTER(s)	ALLOCATION DATE, OTHER
1.	Premium Mix Use	Modou S.B Taal	Allocated on the 5 th July 2022
3.	Tanush Shopping Center	1. Narendra Nandkishore Rahwani (Indian) 2. Deena Rajwani (Indian)	Allocation done on the 5 th July 2022

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Committee recommends that the entire Board of Directors of the Gambia Tourism Board be immediately dissolved and a new Board appointed.

2. Amend the GT-Board Act to require that all future TDA allocations exceeding two (2) hectares shall require Cabinet approval, Gazette publication, and compliance with the Tourism Development Master Plan.
3. The Committee recommends that the Auditor General conduct an independent forensic audit and a comprehensive examination of all landed property allocations made by the Gambia Tourism Board within the Tourism Development Area, from 2017 to 2025. The audit shall establish a complete inventory of all TDA properties, verify the basis and procedural compliance of every allocation, and confirm the status of all allocations, and determine whether fees were fully paid and properly remitted to the Consolidated Fund. The audit report shall be submitted to the National Assembly within six months of the adoption of this report.
4. The Gambia Tourism Board Act shall be amended to require public disclosure of all allocation decisions, mandate competitive allocation processes, establish criminal penalties for corruption, require regular audits by the Auditor General, and introduce term limits for Board members and senior management. A comprehensive records recovery programme shall be undertaken within six (6) months to reconstruct missing files, digitize all records, and establish proper records management systems.
5. The GT Board shall, within 30 days, cross-reference every allocation against the Companies Register maintained by the Registrar of Companies and compile a full list of all recipients of allocations that are unregistered, dissolved, or otherwise non-existent. The Committee recommends that all subleases and allocations granted by the GT-Board to entities that do not appear in the Companies Register or cannot otherwise demonstrate a valid legal existence be immediately rescinded.
6. The Committee further recommends that all subleases and allocations granted by the GT-Board be reviewed within 60 days to determine whether beneficiaries have developed and are using the properties for the specific purposes for which they were allocated. Where an occupant has failed to commence development within the period stipulated in their sublease, has abandoned the property, has converted it to a use inconsistent with its approved purpose, or has otherwise materially breached the terms of their allocation, the sublease shall be cancelled and the property recovered by the GT-Board without compensation.

OTHER LANDED PROPERTIES

1.3 HECTARES OF UNDEVELOPED LAND SITUATE AT African Union (AU)n GARDENS, BRUFUT

651. The Committee received evidence that in December 2023, the Ministry of Justice rendered a legal opinion advising the Government that TAF Africa Global Gambia Ltd ("TAF Africa Global") is the rightful owner of the remaining undeveloped land situated at the AU TAF Presidential Villas,

Brufut Heights. This opinion was communicated via correspondence referenced AG/C/364/01 Part 4(194), dated 8th August 2024.

- 652.** Notwithstanding the aforementioned legal opinion, by letter dated 30th September 2024, the Government directed the Ministry to expedite the transfer of "the remaining 41 African Union (AU) Presidential Villas situate at Brufut Gardens in Brufut, Kombo North District, West Coast Region" to the Government of The Gambia by way of Assignment to the Office of the Vice President of the Republic of The Gambia, with immediate effect. Prior to this directive, an earlier communication dated 20th August 2024 was sent directly from the Office of the President to Mr. Mustapha N'jie, Chief Executive Officer of TAF Africa Global, on the same subject.
- 653.** Notwithstanding TAF Africa Global's assertion of rightful ownership over the undeveloped property, the company subsequently complied with the Presidential directive and submitted 41 Assignment deeds to effect the transfer of the villas to the Government via the Office of the Vice President.
- 654.** It remains unclear to the Committee whether the Government has completed the transfer of the 41 undeveloped villas and, if such assignment has been executed, to whom these properties have ultimately been subleased or otherwise disposed of. The Committee notes that the correspondence dated 30th September 2024 suggests that the Government intended to "kick-start the release of the said parcel of undeveloped land." In the Committee's view, this matter warrants further inquiry and investigation to establish the current status and ownership of the properties, and the identities of any beneficiaries or sublessees.

ENGAGEMENT TO SELL LANDED PROPERTIES TO SSHFC

- 655.** By correspondence dated 18th May 2022, referenced AG/C/364/01/Part 4(102), the Ministry of Justice communicated the decision of the Inter-Ministerial Committee to dispose of certain landed properties to the Social Security and Housing Finance Corporation ("SSHFC"), and encouraged the Corporation to proceed with the purchase thereof.
- 656.** Subsequently, by letter dated 16th August 2022, referenced AG/C/369/01 Part 4(127), the Ministry of Justice communicated governmental approval for the payment of proceeds of sale to Alpha Kapital Advisory, acting in its subsisting capacity as Receiver/Trustee, in respect of the following properties:
- (a)** No. 6 July 22nd Square;
 - (b)** No. 46 William Cole Street; (both bearing Serial Registration No. 516/2008 Vol. 71KD)
 - (c)** Brufut Roundabout (bearing Serial Registration No. 660/2008 Vol. 71KD).
- 657.** The Committee did not receive evidence confirming that SSHFC remitted payment for the acquisition of these properties. Accordingly, it remains unclear whether the proposed sale was consummated, whether consideration was paid, and, if so, in what amount and to whom, or whether Alpha Kapital Advisory, as Receiver/Trustee, received the approved proceeds of sale.

658. The Committee recommends that further investigation be undertaken to clarify the status of these transactions and to ascertain compliance with applicable procedures governing the disposal of public assets.

PROPERTY AT FAJARA WATERFRONT OPPOSITE NAWEC OFFICE, THE CENTRAL BANK

659. During his appearance before the Committee, the Governor of the Central Bank of The Gambia, Mr. Buah Saïdy, testified unequivocally that the Bank had not acquired any other property beyond the Futurelec Building.
660. However, evidence that later came to the Committee's attention makes this assertion difficult to reconcile. A letter, seen by the Committee, dated 24th June 2021, bearing reference number Ag/C/364/01 Part 4(35), tells a materially different story. In that letter, the Attorney General, Hon. Dawda Jallow, acting in his official capacity as Chairperson of the Inter-Ministerial Committee, communicated a decision to provisionally allocate to the Central Bank of The Gambia a parcel of land situated at Fajara Waterfront, opposite the NAWEC Office, KMC. The said property measures 130m x 160m and was allegedly allocated to the Bank at no cost, purportedly for the purpose of constructing a Business Continuity Centre.
661. In the same letter, the Bank was advised *"to take immediate possession and liaise with the Ministry of Lands for proper documentation."*
662. In the Minutes of the Ministerial Taskforce Committee of 5th August 2021, the taskforce considered a request by the Central Bank of The Gambia for the said plot. The request was presented to the taskforce by the Chairman. **"The Committee agreed that the said property be given as per the Bank's request."**
663. Regrettably, despite these facts, the Committee has been unable to establish the current status of this property, whether the provisional allocation was ever converted into a substantive title, or whether the Central Bank has at any point exercised any rights over it.

VISIT TO PROPERTIES UNDER THE RECEIVERSHIP OF ALPHA BARRY FROM 22ND TO 25TH SEPTEMBER 2025

664. In furtherance of its mandate, the Investigation Team of the Committee undertook a four-day field inspection across various regions. The primary objective of the exercise was to physically verify and assess the status of properties and assets under the receivership of Mr. Alpha Barry of Alpha Kapital, including those that remain unsold and those earmarked for disposal under Phase IV of his scheduled sale.

665. The inspection covered properties located in Banjul, the Kanifing Municipality (KM), the West Coast Region (WCR), and the Lower River Region (LRR). The visits aimed to establish the physical condition, occupancy status, and management arrangements of these properties. This field verification exercise was designed to determine whether the actual status of the properties corresponded with official records relating to their sale, transfer, allocation, or retention by Government institutions.
666. A total of 47 properties were identified and visited across the four regions, distributed as follows:
- (a) *Banjul (20 properties),*
 - (b) *Kanifing Municipality (13 properties),*
 - (c) *West Coast Region (13 properties), and*
 - (d) *Lower River Region (1 property).*
667. In addition to the landed properties, the Team came by and inspected three tractors located in the Lower River Region under the possession of the Mansakonko Area Council. According to information from the Council, two of the tractors were initially functional upon delivery, while the third was in a state of disrepair. The latter had been cannibalised to provide spare parts for the maintenance of the functional ones as the need arose. At the time of the investigation, only one tractor remained operational, while the second was reported to be at a garage in Jenoi for repairs.
668. The Committee notes that some of the unsold properties have been earmarked for sale under Phase IV of the ongoing receivership process, while some properties were sold, but their sales were subsequently cancelled due to the refusal by the occupants to vacate the premises on the grounds that the properties belong to Kanilai Worni Family Farms (KFF) and not the former President himself.

BANJUL PROPERTIES

669. The first day of the site visits covered properties within Banjul. The inspection revealed a complex and varied pattern of transactions and the current status. The Team observed properties falling into several categories: completed sales, cancelled transactions, properties repossessed by the Government, and properties not approved for sale. Notably, several properties recorded as disposed of remained occupied by tenants. The properties inspected ranged from vacant plots without structures to developed premises housing commercial enterprises such as retail shops, printing presses, and residential tenants.
670. A substantial number of properties had been successfully sold to private individuals and corporate entities. **At No. 72 Gloucester Street**, the Team found a fenced and gated property purchased by **Fouta Enterprise**, though no structure had been erected. **No. 2 Fitzgerald Street**, sold to **Nandkishore Rajwani**, contained a structure occupied by tenants. Properties along Grant Street presented mixed circumstances: **No. 13 William Cole Street** was reported as sold to Fanta Touray, while **No. 49 William Cole Street** had not been approved for sale and was earmarked for Phase IV sales. Another property at **9 Fitzgerald Street** had an existing structure with tenants, but the current ownership status remained unclear.
671. Along Dobson Street and Picton Street, the Team documented sales **to Sering Gai**. **No. 15 Dobson Street** was fenced with corrugated sheets and inhabited by Hausa launderers. Two properties on

Davidson Carrol Street (Picton Street) sold to Sering Gai showed different stages of development: No. 13 contained a storey building under construction with work in progress, while **No. 18A** had a completed structure with shops occupied by tenants.

- 672.** The concentration of properties along **Daniel Goddard Street (Hagan Street)** revealed particularly active commercial activity. **No. 78A**, sold to the **Arab Gambian Islamic Bank (AGIB)**, contained a storey building occupied by tenants. The adjacent property at **No. 78B** had been purchased by AGIB but was subsequently returned to its original owner, Ebrima Jallow. The Gambia Ports Authority acquired **No. 57A** for port expansion purposes. Three additional properties (Nos. 61, 60, and 3) were sold to Mahadi Touray and contained existing structures housing a printing press, a vulcanizer's workshop, and residential tenants, respectively.
- 673.** Along **OAU Boulevard, No. 73A**, sold to **Momodou Korka Jallow**, was a corrugated fenced property with a small structure, while **No. 64**, sold to Momodou Alieu Jallow, contained an existing structure opposite the Immigration Department headquarters, housing a printing centre under the care of one Batch Njie. The property at 34 Liberation Avenue, sold to Fanta Touray (Mahadi Touray), had an existing structure with shops.
- 674.** The **Jengdula Night Club**, opposite Mile 2, formerly a nightclub for soldiers, had been sold to Muhammed Jah. Hamza Barracks was confirmed to have reverted to Government control and remained occupied by the Gambia Armed Forces. The Team noted one property near Mile 2 that could not be located despite Alpha Barry's indication of its existence, as he could not establish the exact location or dimensions.

KANIFING MUNICIPALITY PROPERTIES

- 675.** On the second day, the site visits continued to properties within the Kanifing Municipality area. The Team encountered a significant number of properties that had not been approved for sale and which remained occupied by families allegedly settled on the premises during the tenure of the former regime. In certain compounds, occupants asserted claims of historical possession connected to the former President's family members or some other associates.
- 676.** At **Bakau Cape Point 1**, the Team found families living in the property who were allegedly brought in by one Mr. Lamin Jallow, who also resides there but was not present during our visit. At the adjacent **Bakau Cape Point Plot 14**, which contained an existing structure, the Team met one occupant by the name Sisawo Bojang. He stated that he was brought to the compound by his aunt, the mother of former President Jammeh, and that one Pa Bojang is responsible for the compound. The property at Bakau Sanchaba, originally owned by Ablie Kujabi and currently claimed by his son Musa Kujabi, was possessed by one Bakary Bojang and had not been sold.
- 677.** The Team also received evidence that several sales were completed within this jurisdiction. The Bakau CFAO property opposite Trust Bank was sold to Muhammed Jah, who had already commenced construction therein. At 16 Kairaba Avenue near the traffic light, Jah Oil Company had purchased the property and established a gas filling station opposite Alliance Française. The property at Bakau New Town on Garba Jahumba Road was returned to its original owner, Momodou Bah, at the original cost; it remained a fenced and gated compound without structures.

- 678.** The **Fajara South Atlantic property on Garba Jahumba Road** (Junction opposite Yosh) is allegedly sold to Baboucarr Sompou Ceesay and Binta Ceesay, and contained a newly built storey building nearing completion. The Fajara Booster Station (Kissima Kaba Exchange) near the Vice President's residence had not been approved for sale and was originally owned by Kissima. The property contained a three-storey building structure yet to be completed, as well as a line-house with occupants.
- 679.** **At 72 Kairaba Avenue, next to Bloom Bank from the traffic light, Kalidou Wague had purchased an empty**, unfenced plot of land on the express road that was originally owned by one Jobe Dollar. The beachfront land formerly associated with Royal Atlantic was sold to Balafon Company Limited and consisted of empty land or space at the beachfront. Four plots allegedly belonging to Baba Jobe and Children on Kololi new road opposite GT-Bank were sold to Serign Gai; the property is located on the highway with fenced and gated vast land, including shops for commercial purposes.
- 680.** One property, formerly the home of the mother of the former President, had not been approved for sale and was currently monitored by soldiers of the Armed Forces. Another Kotu residence (Residence 3, opposite Khair Umma Foundation, marked A/B) had not been sold and was reportedly possessed and watched by an unnamed individual who was not found during the visit.

WEST COAST REGION PROPERTIES

- 681.** The third day's site visit covered properties under Alpha Barry's receivership in the West Coast Region. The Team verified disposals to private individuals but also documented serious disputes concerning possession and occupancy.
- 682.** The Royal Atlantic beachfront property at Palma Rima Junction was sold to Balafon Group. Mr. Alpha Barry could not immediately state the exact amount for which it has been sold. At Senegambia Junction on Kololi new road, Hadim Gaye had purchased property containing small shops occupied by tenants in the front areas of the land.
- 683.** **At Brufut Heights, Plot No. 13**, formerly belonging to Saul Badjie, remained unsold. The property contained a solid structure nearing completion, but the keys to the compound were nowhere to be found. The Police Intervention Unit (PIU) personnel present at the property stated that the keys were held at the Ministry of Justice. The adjacent Brufut Heights No. 75 was sold to Lamin Sisay and contained a small structure with occupants.
- 684.** Particularly troubling was the situation at **300 Brufut Gardens, sold to Basadie Jabbie**. According to reports received, PIU personnel who were occupying the property refused to leave after it was purchased by the current owner. Frustrated by the police's occupation, Mr. Jabbie resorted to removing the roof of the main building and some of his valuables. Nevertheless, at the time of the Committee's visit, PIU personnel and squatters allegedly from Guinea Conakry were still occupying the property. The Team could not **locate Plot 381 Brufut Gardens**, which was reportedly sold to Lang Conteh.
- 685.** **In Paradise Estate, Plot 211, sold to Sankung Fatty** was a built, fenced, and gated compound. The adjacent Plot 214 was returned to its original owner, Alimatou Sallah, at the original cost and was similarly gated and fenced with a structure in place.

686. The situation at **Yarambamba Estate** revealed a pattern of failed transactions. The Team received information showing five properties (**Plots 83, 85, 86, 88, and 89**) that were previously sold. However, monies had been refunded to prospective buyers following the refusal of occupants to vacate the premises.

LOWER RIVER REGION – JARRA SOMA

687. On the fourth day of the exercise, the Team proceeded to **Jarra Soma in the Lower River Region**, where they met with the management of the Mansakonko Area Council. Discussions during the engagement centred on two key issues: the shopping mall previously belonging to the late Baba Jobe, now forfeited to the State, and the three tractors that had been handed over to the Council by the Commission.

688. During interactions with the Investigation Team, the Council's executive confirmed that they had indeed received three tractors from the Commission. Out of these, two were functional at the time of receipt, while the third was not. Subsequently, one of the functional tractors developed a mechanical fault and was sent to the garage in Jenoi for repairs. The third, which had been non-functional from the outset, was cannibalised to provide spare parts for the maintenance of the remaining operational ones. The Team was able to physically verify the third, non-functional tractor, which was parked within the premises of the Council.

689. With regards to the **Baba Jobe Shopping Mall**, the Team gathered that before 2021, the property was under the management of Kanilai Group International (KGI) (part of the Companies under the receivership of Mr. Barry), which was responsible for collecting all rent and related rates from the tenants. However, following a deed of transfer issued by the Ministry of Justice sometime after 2021, ownership and management of the Shopping Mall were formally transferred to the Mansakonko Area Council. The Council now directly collects rental income previously administered by KGI.

GENERAL FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

690. The field inspection revealed a consistent and troubling pattern of discrepancies between official records and actual circumstances on the ground. Several properties officially recorded as sold remained occupied by former occupants, state security personnel (including PIU and military personnel), or squatters. In the most troublesome case at 300 Brufut Gardens, the lawful purchaser was driven to the desperate measure of dismantling portions of his own property due to the failure of the authorities to deliver vacant possession.

691. Numerous sales transactions had been reversed, with properties returned to original owners at cost, including **No. 78B Daniel Goddard Street (Ebrima Jallow), Bakau New Town (Momodou Bah), and Paradise Estate Plot 214 (Alimatou Sallah)**. In multiple instances, particularly at Yarambamba Estate (five properties), purchase monies were refunded to buyers due to the failure to secure vacant possession, with occupants refusing to vacate on the grounds that the properties belonged to Kanilai Worni Family Farms (KFF) rather than the former President.

692. The Team further encountered several properties that had not been approved for sale but were nonetheless inhabited, including properties at Bakau Cape Point (with families settled by Mr. Lamin Jallow), properties with occupants claiming family connections to the former President, and

properties under military surveillance. Certain properties presented challenges relating to unclear physical location (unknown land near Mile 2, Plot 381, Brufut Gardens) or deficient documentation. In at least one instance (Plot No. 13 Brufut Heights), keys to sold premises were held by the Ministry of Justice rather than delivered to purchasers, preventing lawful possession. Some properties were formally transferred to Government institutions, including Hamza Barracks to the Armed Forces, the Kotu property monitored by soldiers, and the Baba Jobe Shopping Mall to the Mansakonko Area Council.

- 693.** Overall, the physical status of a significant proportion of the assets inspected did not correspond with the documentary records of their disposal.

KANILAI, THE FORMER PRESIDENT'S RESIDENCE

- 694.** As part of its inquiry, the Committee undertook a three-day site visit from 1st to 3rd September 2025 to various locations across the country, including the former President's home residence in Kanilai. The purpose of the visit was to verify the current state of assets previously catalogued by the Janneh Commission and to assess the condition and security of the properties.
- 695.** There is no evidence before the Committee that the Commission investigated the assets in the home of the former President, except for vehicles, which were merely identified and later sold.
- 696.** In its visit, the Committee found the condition of the former President's residence to be appalling and extremely degraded. The properties visited, particularly his residences, exhibit unmistakable evidence of looting, with the majority of fixtures, fittings, and furnishings having been removed. Moreover, the premises have been left in a state of utter neglect, with no indication of maintenance or preservation efforts by any authority.
- 697.** The Committee inspected what are commonly referred to as the "four houses" within the compound. Each structure showed evidence of having been previously furnished to standard. However, the Committee found these properties in a state of extreme deterioration and neglect. The vast majority of fittings and valuable household items have disappeared, including mattresses from beds and floor carpets. What little furniture remains has been severely compromised by extensive termite infestation, with the bathroom facilities suffering particularly acute damage.
- 698.** The Committee observed clear and disturbing signs that beds, household fittings, tables, doors, and windows have been deliberately removed and allegedly sold. Physical markings on certain doors indicate they were designated for removal and sale, but were ultimately left in place. The scale and systematic nature of these removals point unmistakably looting.
- 699.** The Committee wishes to report with particular concern that the former President's personal belongings, including his beds, clothing, and other effects, have been left to deteriorate without the slightest indication of care or oversight from any authority. The deterioration is advancing daily, with clothing and personal articles left exposed to the elements and progressive degradation. The

Committee expresses serious doubt that the former President's family has been granted access to the property, given the complete absence of any effort to preserve or protect these personal items.

700. Of grave concern to the Committee is the discovery of numerous books, official correspondence, and handwritten notes in the former President's personal quarters. These documents have been left entirely unattended and cannot reasonably be described as secure. Given that some of this correspondence may potentially contain State secrets or sensitive governmental information, the Committee finds it inexplicable and deeply troubling that such materials have been abandoned in this manner, accessible to any person who might enter the premises.

701. In the view of the Committee, this represents a serious security breach and a failure on the part of the State to effectively ensure that this sensitive issue is handled with the care it deserves. Pictures captured from this visit are contained in Annex E of this report.

PROPERTIES IN THE PROVINCES

702. The Committee wishes to draw the attention of the Assembly to the fact that while its investigation with respect to properties located within the Greater Banjul Area and its environs was thorough, it did not extend with equal depth to properties attributed to the former President in the provinces. Evidence before the Committee shows that several landed properties allegedly owned by, or connected to, former President Jammeh are situated in various regions of the country, including but not limited to the North Bank Region, the Lower River Region, the Central River Region, the Upper River Region, and the West Coast Region.

703. The Committee regrets to report that, owing to several factors, including limited field presence, a comprehensive investigation of these properties was not achievable within the time available to the Committee to complete its work.

704. The Committee further notes that the challenge of fully investigating these properties was compounded by the fact that a substantial number of them, if not all, are not registered with the Registrar General and therefore do not appear in any formal or certified land registry.

705. It is thus the finding of this Committee that the investigation into the former President's landed properties must be pursued further, with greater resources, broader geographic coverage, and a more structured investigative methodology than was possible during this phase of the Committee's work.

706. To achieve this objective, the Committee recommends that the National Assembly authorise the Committee on Local Government to carry out a targeted investigation into the lands situate at provincial properties. The investigation should include the physical verification and site inspection of all properties identified by the Commission, conduct engagement with local administrative authorities, Alkalolu, Seyfolu, Ward Councillors, and community leaders who possess direct and firsthand knowledge of land ownership and property developments attributable to the former

President in their respective areas; and formal coordination with the Department of Lands and Surveys, the Registrar General's Department, to document, and where necessary regularize or flag, all relevant land transactions, whether formal or customary in nature.

OTHER ITEMS

1. The committee, in its investigations, found that there are items that belong to the former president and his associates. These items are mainly arms and ammunition found in the former president's home in Kanilai, ivory located at his home in Kanilai, jewellery and coins currently secured in a safe at the Ministry of Justice, and assets belonging to Muhammed Bazzi that were sold by the receiver, Alpha Barry.
2. The Jewellery and precious stones - the committee could not ascertain the value of these items, which include necklaces, and neither could the commission of inquiry do so. They are described as precious by the assistant secretary of the commission of inquiry in her handing over notes for the items to the then Solicitor General, Mr. Cherno Marenah. Following the opening of the safe, the following items were found:
 - a) Mont Blanc ink (2 pieces)
 - b) Michael Kors wristwatch (1 piece)
 - c) 5 bututs coins (28 pieces)
 - d) 10 butut coin (1 piece)
 - e) West African coin (1 piece)
 - f) Gam Petroleum hard drives (2)
 - g) DVDs belonging to the former President (11, with descriptions)
 - h) University of The Gambia medal (1)
 - i) PEGEP keys (4), accompanied by a handing-over note
 - j) Precious metal necklaces (2 pieces)
 - k) Gold coins (2 pieces)
 - l) Enveloped marked Geo 7 (4 pieces of stones)
 - m) Samples of sand (2 types/colours)
3. According to the handing-over note originally submitted by Ms. Ramatoulie Sarr, all listed items were found in the safe except for an ITEL mobile phone, which was not found among the items found in the safe at the Ministry of Justice.

4. The committee, in its visit to Kanilai, found many pieces of ivory in the former president's home. The commission of inquiry had also reported on the ivory and recommended that it be sold.
5. A few arms and ammunition were found at the former president's home at Kanilai and were handed over to the IGP at the time. The committee has confirmed that these arms are still with the IGP and is of the view that it is an appropriate authority to be in custody of the said arms.
6. Part of the assets sold by the Receiver/Trustee includes used construction equipment that was located at Brikama. According to Alpha Barry, Hamidou Jah of Jah Oil Company Ltd, approached him shortly after he was appointed as Receiver to inform him that he had assets from a NAWEC project that was being run by Muhammed Bazzi relating to a power plant located in Brikama.
7. According to Mr Barry, his team inspected various types of equipment, machinery, and vehicles at the Power Station. Most of the assets are not fully functional. Mr. Barry further informed the Committee that Mr. Jah had expressed concern that moving the machinery and equipment out of the site would severely affect operations at the Power Project. He further stated in his testimony that a valuation of all the assets was done at D8.3 million, and they were sold to Jah Oil for the sum of GMD 7 million. Mr. Barry informed the Committee that he informed the then Attorney General about these assets and Mr. Jah's proposal to purchase them.
8. The Committee finds it concerning that Mr. Jah did not inform the Commission of Inquiry about these assets and the project, nor did he ever approach the Minister of Justice or the Government about the said assets. He chose to keep custody of the assets until the Commission of Inquiry concluded its investigations and then revealed the assets to the Receiver, who in turn informed Mr. Tambadou and was given the authority to sell the said assets to Mr. Jah below the valuation price.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Government shall take steps to ascertain the value of the stones and the jewellery. If they are of high value, the committee recommends that the jewellery be sold.
2. The ivory stored at the former president's home should be sold to enable the state to recover the loss it incurred due to his financial dealings. The committee further recommends that some pieces of ivory be given to the national museum for exhibition.
3. The arms and ammunition should remain in the custody of the Inspector General of Police.

CHAPTER FOUR

COMMISSION'S REPORT AND WHITE PAPER

- 707.** Having examined the operational environment in which the Commission conducted its work, it is necessary to turn to the phase that followed the submission of its Report. Pursuant to section 203 of the Constitution, once a Commission of Inquiry lays its findings before the Executive, the President is expected, within six months, to declare, through a White Paper, comments on the report accompanied by a statement of actions taken or reasons for inaction.
- 708.** This moment is fundamental: it marks the transition from investigative fact-finding to executive adoption as policy. During its mandate, the Commission exercised limited and situational authority to dispose of certain perishable or deteriorating assets, such as vehicles, cattle, and other items that risked rapid loss of value if left unmanaged. These actions were preservative and incidental to its broader mandate of inquiry. The more consequential assets identified in the Report, including luxury vehicles, aircraft, shares/private equity interests, real property (Land), and high-value machinery such as the gold refinery, were not disposed of by the Commission. Instead, their disposition was expressly left to the Government, contingent upon the Government's acceptance of the relevant recommendations in its White Paper.
- 709.** Once the White Paper was issued, the Executive established a Cabinet-level Ministerial Committee, chaired by the Minister of Justice and comprising the Ministers responsible for Agriculture, Tourism, Lands and Regional Government, as well as the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs (the substantive holder of which had to recuse himself for want of conflict of interest). This Committee was tasked with guiding the implementation of the White Paper. It was supported by a Technical Committee composed of the corresponding Permanent Secretaries, who undertook the administrative groundwork: reviewing valuation reports, examining the feasibility of disposals, collating asset inventories, and preparing advice for ministerial decision-making.
- 710.** Through this two-tier structure, the Government possessed the machinery through which accepted recommendations, particularly those relating to post Commission disposals of significant assets, were meant to be operationalised. While some progress was achieved, especially regarding assets expressly selected for sale after the Commission's tenure, large categories of accepted recommendations remained without coordinated execution, and several assets identified for disposal, regularisation, or recovery lingered without clear administrative outcomes.
- 711.** It is in this context that the mandate of this Special Select Committee assumes its full meaning. Once more, the National Assembly did not constitute this Committee to reinvestigate the entire scope of the Commission's work. Rather, it entrusted the Committee with a more focused yet crucial task, which includes inquiring into the sale and disposal of the assets identified by the Commission, scrutinising the processes and administrative structures through which those sales were conducted, and ascertaining the status of assets or the proceeds realised from the sale of assets.

712. This mandate situates the Committee at the intersection of oversight/scrutiny and policy advisory, enabling it to evaluate whether the Executive has fulfilled its commitments under the White Paper and whether the mechanisms it established, namely the Ministerial Committee and its Technical arm, functioned with the coherence and diligence required to protect public value.

713. The Committee therefore approaches this chapter not merely as an assessment of stated policy positions, but as an examination of governmental performance against those positions. Acceptance in the White Paper is only an initial declaration. For purposes of accountability and public interest, the impending question is whether ministries were assigned responsibilities, whether timelines were set, whether disposals complied with lawful and transparent procedure, and whether accepted recommendations translated into concrete administrative action. In this sense, the Committee evaluates the White Paper as both a statement of intent and a benchmark against which implementation can and must be measured.

714. The analysis that follows proceeds through the Commission’s Report volume by volume, assessing the relationship between each recommendation, the Government’s response, and the degree of actual follow-through. The accompanying tables distil this assessment into a structured format, setting out the recommendations by the Commission, the Government’s stated responses, the Committee’s analysis of progress or deficiency, and the further action required of the responsible ministries or institutions.

NO.	COMMISSION’S RECOMMENDATIONS	WHITE PAPER RESPONSE	COMMITTEES’ FINDINGS	COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATIONS
VOLUME 1				
1	That the following persons be immediately declared persona non grata and be specifically banned from The Gambia: (a) Mohammed Bazzi (b) Fadi Mazegi (c) Manhal Oueidat (d) Bilal Bazzi (e) Tony Ghattas (f) Buzainou Dragos (g) Nicolai Dragos (h) Gabriel McAram Naklaeh (i) Iliya Reymond	The Government accepted the Commission’s recommendation that Mr Mohamed Bazzi be declared persona non grata, and he was accordingly declared persona non grata by the Government of The Gambia and specifically banned from entering Gambian territorial jurisdiction. 108. The Government also accepts the Commission’s	The White Paper accepts persona non grata and procurement ban measures for key non-resident actors and orders immediate review and forfeiture for named Bazzi companies. This is a clear, actionable policy position. The practical challenge is execution: border control measures, debarment registers (GPPA), contract cancellation and	AG / Ministry of Interior / GPPA: (a) publish and circulate persona non grata orders to relevant agencies and international partners; (b) list and flag all contracts with named companies and cancel where appropriate; (c) commence

	<p>(j) Ali Charara (k) Martin Keller (l) Ahmed Hodroj</p> <p>(Commission Report Volume 1, page 33)</p>	<p>recommendation that the following companies associated with Mr Mohamed Bazzi should be permanently banned, and they are hereby permanently banned, from participating in any Government procurement:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Euro Africa Group Ltd • Global Trading Group NV • Global Power Systems • Multi Shipping Company Ltd. • GAMICO • Gammobile • Gamveg • Royal Residence • GEG • Votrag • Las Services • GMS • Ibrahim Bazzi and Sons • Gamilo • Gamcon • SPL • WARD • Africard • Royal Atlantic Residence. <p>109. All existing contracts of Government with any of the said companies shall be reviewed forthwith and immediately cancelled where appropriate, and all shares belonging to Mr Mohamed Bazzi in these companies are hereby forfeited to the State.</p>	<p>corporate share transfer/forfeiture require rapid, coordinated legal and administrative steps; absence of detailed implementation timetables in the White Paper risks delay.</p>	<p>forfeiture procedures and appoint a Receiver to secure and liquidate forfeited assets; (d) report to Parliament on enforcement actions within 60 days.</p>
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		(White Paper, pp. 38–40.)		
2	<p>The Government accepts the recommendations of the Commission that Mr Mohamed Bazzi’s properties including his assets, companies, shares and other acquisitions be forfeited to the State or confiscated by the State and sold. The proceeds of sale shall be applied to the payment of monies for which Mr Mohamed Bazzi, and all companies associated with him, are found to be liable in the Report. The said properties are hereby forfeited to the State. The Government also accepts the Commission’s recommendations that the large parcel of land along the Bertil Harding Highway in the TDA allocated by Government to Royal Atlantic Residence Ltd be re-entered and sold — Commission Report Volume 1 (finding and recommendation), reflected in White Paper acceptance.</p>	<p>The Government accepts the Commission’s findings in so far as they relate to Mr Mohamed Bazzi. Accordingly, the Government accepts the recommendations of the Commission that Mr Mohamed Bazzi’s properties including his assets, companies, shares and other acquisitions be forfeited to the State or confiscated by the State and sold. The proceeds of sale shall be applied to the payment of monies for which Mr Mohamed Bazzi, and all companies associated with him, are found to be liable in the Report. The said properties are hereby forfeited to the State. 104. The Government also accepts the Commission’s recommendations that the large parcel of land along the Bertil Harding Highway in the TDA allocated by Government to Royal Atlantic Residence Ltd be re-entered and sold, and to negotiate with the Islamic Corporation for Development, a subsidiary of the Islamic Development Bank, a portion of their investment that could be refunded on</p>	<p>The White Paper’s language is direct and commits to forfeiture and sale. To convert this into recoveries requires immediate identification of titles, registration of forfeiture, appointment of custodians/receivers, market valuation and transparent disposal. The additional instruction to negotiate with IDB-related parties introduces a conditional commercial element that requires specialist negotiation capacity.</p>	<p>Ministry of Lands / AG / Receiver / Ministry of Finance: (a) compile a certified register of Bazzi-linked assets; (b) effect forfeiture by registering State interest and appoint Receiver; (c) obtain independent valuations and conduct transparent sale processes; (d) where foreign creditors/investors are implicated (e.g., IDB/ICD), instruct MoF to lead negotiations and obtain legal opinions. Report progress to Parliament within 90 days.</p>

		equitable grounds in the continued mutual interest of the IDB and The Gambia. — White Paper, pp. 37–38.		
3	<p>Kanilai Water Tank:</p> <p>We recommend that this tank be transferred by Government and its value be reckoned as part liquidation of Government's debt to NAWEC, if any. Government should then negotiate the compensation to SSHFC for the tank since as already held, SSHFC has a lien on the Tank. — Commission Report Volume 1 (Kanilai water tank).</p>	No Government Response (White Paper silent) — no explicit decision on transfer of the Kanilai water tank recorded in the White Paper.	The Commission's recommendation is administratively sensible and low-cost. The White Paper's silence leaves a simple value-preserving opportunity unaddressed; the tank's continued idleness risks further deterioration or loss of public benefit	Ministry of Works / Ministry of Energy / NAWEC / Treasury: commission an immediate technical and legal feasibility note (21 days) on transfer; resolve lien issues with SSHFC; if viable, formalise transfer and record asset value in recovery account.
4	The Mansion in Bujinga stands idle in a poor Village of Foni. We recommend its conversion into a school under the Education Department. — Commission Report Volume 1 (Bujinga Mansion).	No Government Response (White Paper silent) — no explicit instruction recorded in the White Paper regarding conversion of Bujinga Mansion.	Converting idle State property for public benefit is consistent with maximising social value. The White Paper's silence suggests either low priority or oversight. Failure to act perpetuates underutilisation of State property.	Ministry of Education / Ministry of Lands: prepare feasibility and rehabilitation plan (30 days); seek Cabinet approval and allocate minimal capital or donor support for conversion.
5	SSHFC Kanilai Housing Layout: We recommend that at the end of the ECOMIG mission, the entire layout be returned to SSHFC. — Commission Report Volume 1 (SSHFC Kanilai Housing Layout).	White Paper notes disposition of certain Kanilai properties and directs review where necessary; specific instruction on SSHFC layout is recorded as Government to review and	White Paper acknowledges Kanilai property issues but does not set a concrete handover timetable for SSHFC. Without clear handover instruments and registry updates, custody	Ministry of Lands / SSHFC / MoJ: prepare transfer/handover instruments and effect registration changes; Cabinet to approve

		take necessary steps (White Paper partial/conditional response).	and management remain uncertain.	transfer; publish timeline and handover confirmation.
6	All existing contracts of Government with any of the said companies shall be reviewed forthwith and immediately cancelled where appropriate, and all shares belonging to Mr Mohamed Bazzi in these companies are hereby forfeited to the State. — Commission Report recommendation (volume 1 reflected in Commission and in White Paper).	All existing contracts of Government with any of the said companies shall be reviewed forthwith and immediately cancelled where appropriate, and all shares belonging to Mr Mohamed Bazzi in these companies are hereby forfeited to the State. — White Paper (directive	The White Paper duplicates the Commission’s directive and provides a clear legal basis for contract review and share forfeiture. The missing element is operational sequencing (who will execute, timelines, oversight).	AG / MoF / GPPA / Registrar of Companies: (a) publish list of contracts under review; (b) instruct contracting ministries to suspend payments; (c) initiate share forfeiture and corporate transfer processes; (d) update Parliament quarterly on recoveries

VOLUME 2

7	The Commission recommends that Mr. Ali Y. Sharara be declared persona non grata and banned from entering The Gambia and that all monies owed by TELL to the Government of The Gambia be recovered in full. — Commission Report Vol. 2, Gateway Section.	The Government accepts the findings of the Commission in so far as they relate to Mr Ali Y. Sharara. Accordingly, the Government accepts the recommendation of the Commission that Mr Ali Y. Sharara be declared persona non grata, and Mr Ali Y. Sharara is hereby declared persona non grata by the Government of The Gambia and specifically banned from entering Gambian territorial jurisdiction. The Government further	The White Paper’s acceptance is clear and comprehensive. However, the absence of a designated enforcement mechanism for recovery (civil suit, MLA action, or negotiated settlement) leaves the obligation unexecuted. No evidence was provided to the Committee of recoveries, demand notices, or actions initiated	AG / MoF / Central Bank: issue formal demand notices; commence civil recovery; file MLA requests if foreign assets are implicated; publish recovery status within 60 days.
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		accepts the recommendations of the Commission that all monies owed by TELL to the Government be recovered. — White Paper, p. 56.		
8	The Commission recommends that Mr. Fadi Mazegi refund the sum of USD 100,000 within thirty (30) days failing which his property at Bijilo shall be forfeited to the State. The Commission further recommends that Mr. Mazegi be declared persona non grata and banned from Government procurement. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	The Government accepts the recommendation of the Commission that Mr Fadi Mazegi refund the sum of USD100,000 within 30 days failing which his property at Bijilo shall be forfeited to the State. The Government also accepts the recommendation that Mr Fadi Mazegi be banned from participating in any Government procurement for five (5) years. However, the Government does not accept the recommendation that Mr Fadi Mazegi be declared persona non grata. — White Paper, p. 60.	The Government's acceptance of repayment and procurement ban is significant, but failure to adopt the persona non grata recommendation weakens the enforcement regime. No implementation documents were provided to confirm that the repayment order, forfeiture contingency, or procurement ban was enforced.	AG / GPPA / Registrar General: issue repayment directive; place lien on Bijilo property pending compliance; enforce procurement ban; report enforcement actions to Parliament within 45 days.
9	The Commission recommends that the judgment in the case of Ansumana Jammeh be fully executed including the forfeiture of his properties at Bijilo and Old Yundum and the recovery of D24,647,028 found due from him. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	The Government accepts the findings of the Commission in respect of Mr Ansumana Jammeh. Accordingly, the Government accepts the recommendation that the judgment in the said case be executed forthwith by the Sheriff of the High Court including the forfeiture of his properties at Bijilo and Old Yundum and the recovery of the sum of D24,647,028. —	Execution of judgment is a matter of court enforcement, yet no evidence was provided to the Committee of any steps taken by the Sheriff. Delay exposes the State to deterioration or encumbrance of assets.	Sheriff of the High Court / AG / Registrar General: execute judgment immediately; register forfeiture; advertise assets for sale; pay proceeds into designated account; AG to report execution progress to Parliament

		White Paper, p. 62.		
10	The Commission recommends that improper withdrawals from Central Bank, Office of the President and related accounts be recovered from those responsible and that disciplinary action be taken against officers who facilitated the said withdrawals. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	The Government accepts the findings of the Commission relating to the misuse of funds and takes note of the need for recovery of monies improperly withdrawn. The Government will take necessary action to recover such funds and to take appropriate steps in respect of responsible officers. — White Paper, p. 72	Although the White Paper accepts the findings, it does not name responsible officers, set disciplinary timelines, or specify recovery actions. The lack of operational steps has resulted in no documented recovery or discipline for the period examined.	MoF / Central Bank / PSC / AG: undertake forensic audit; identify officers for sanction; issue recovery directives; initiate disciplinary processes; publish implementation schedule within 60 days.
11	The Commission recommends that ministries, departments and agencies from which funds were misapplied recover the said funds from responsible officials and institute disciplinary measures to deter future infractions. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	The Government accepts the Commission's findings in principle and will take steps to improve financial governance in ministries and parastatals. — White Paper, p. 75.	The White Paper's position is broad and non-committal; it does not specify any actual recovery mechanism or disciplinary framework. Evidence before the Committee indicates no implementation action.	PSC / MoF / AG / Internal Audit Directorate: conduct internal investigations; issue surcharge notices; commence civil recovery; train ministry accountants on compliance; report implementation outcomes quarterly.
12	The Commission recommends that freezing orders be maintained until all investigations are concluded and that custodial agencies maintain full inventories of all affected assets. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	The Government notes the freezing orders made by the High Court and will ensure that assets remain under proper custody pending their final determination. — White Paper, p. 80.	While the White Paper acknowledges freezing orders, it does not set reporting requirements, inventory standards or audit obligations. Evidence indicates gaps in inventories, deterioration of assets and lack of periodic verification.	MoJ / Registrar General / Custodian Agencies: produce harmonised inventories certified by an independent auditor; update every 30 days; submit to

				Parliament and Cabinet subcommittee.
13	The Commission recommends that the sum of GMD600,000 paid from the APAM account to KGI in 2011 be recovered from KGI or in the alternative from Mr Ansumana Jammeh. — Commission Report Vol. 2 (APAM/KGI section).	The Government accepts the recommendation of the Commission that the sum of D600,000 paid from APAM to KGI in 2011 be recovered from KGI or, in the alternative, from Mr Ansumana Jammeh. — White Paper, p. 62	The White Paper expressly accepts this recommendation but provides no details on the enforcement mechanism or officer responsible for initiating recovery. No documentation before the Committee indicates that demand notices or recovery actions were commenced.	AG / MoF: issue recovery demand; register the liability as a debt owed to the State; pursue civil recovery; garnish relevant accounts; report recovery progress in 45 days.
14	The Commission recommends that Mr. Ousman Badjie refund the sum of €23,000 withdrawn in cash from Gambia’s Embassy in Paris during his tenure as Ambassador. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	The Government accepts the findings of the Commission in so far as they relate to Mr Ousman Badjie and accordingly accepts the recommendation that Mr Ousman Badjie refund the sum of €23,000. — White Paper, p. 67.	The acceptance is clear; however, the Government did not provide evidence of enforcement. No recovery steps or demand notices were documented. There is no indication the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or MoF executed recovery processes.	AG / MFA / MoF: jointly issue recovery notice; pursue surcharge; initiate civil recovery if unpaid; publish compliance certificate or escalate to enforcement.
15	The Commission recommends that Mr. Ousman Badjie be held responsible for the misapplication of visa and resident permit revenues and that all misappropriated sums be recovered. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	The Government accepts the findings of the Commission and will take steps to ensure that any misappropriated sums identified in the Commission’s Report are recovered. — White Paper, p. 67.	Acceptance is general and does not identify the amount owed, the enforcement officer, or the recovery mechanism. The Committee received no evidence of any actual recovery or administrative sanction.	Ministry of Interior / MoF / AG: investigate revenue flows; quantify misappropriated sum; surcharge responsible officials; commence civil recovery; improve revenue controls.
16	The Commission recommends that Mr.	The Government accepts the recommendation of the	Despite this explicit acceptance, there is no	AG / Registrar General / MoF:

	Sillaba Samateh refund the sum of GMD7,000,000 received from State House funds and failing refund, the State should take steps to recover this sum from his properties. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	Commission that Mr Sillaba Samateh refund the sum of D7,000,000 received from State House funds failing which steps be taken to recover the sum from his properties. — White Paper, p. 70.	evidence of enforcement. No demand letters, caveats, or seizure actions were presented to the Committee. The risk increases that assets may be encumbered or alienated over time.	place caveats on all properties; issue refund demand; commence civil recovery; proceed with attachment and sale if unpaid within statutory timeframe.
17	The Commission recommends that monies improperly paid from the Ministry of Petroleum accounts be recovered and that disciplinary action be taken against the responsible officials. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	The Government accepts the findings of the Commission in principle and will take measures to improve financial management practices within ministries. — White Paper, p. 75.	White Paper acceptance is non-specific and does not identify sums, individuals, disciplinary mechanisms, or recovery steps. No ministry records indicate that follow-up occurred.	MoF / PSC / AG / Internal Audit: quantify losses; issue surcharge; implement disciplinary proceedings; refer cases for prosecution where warranted.
18	The Commission recommends that GCAA recover all funds diverted to State House requests and ensure strict adherence to its financial regulations. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	The Government accepts the findings of the Commission and notes the need for stronger financial control in GCAA and other SOEs. — White Paper, p. 75.	Again, acceptance lacks operational detail. GCAA did not provide evidence of recovery or disciplinary actions. Weaknesses in SOE governance remain unaddressed.	Ministry of Transport / AG / GCAA Board: implement recovery plan; adopt strengthened internal controls; enforce accountability for officers who authorised irregular payments.
19	The Commission recommends that revenues diverted from GAMTEL/GAMCEL to State House and related accounts be fully recovered and that GAMTEL's internal	The Government accepts the findings and will take steps to recover diverted funds and strengthen controls within GAMTEL/GAMCEL. — White Paper, p. 76.	The White Paper indicates policy acceptance, but no operational follow-through was demonstrated. Without formal recovery procedures, the passage	MoICT / AG / GAMTEL Board: undertake audit reconciliation; issue recovery demands; enforce compliance measures;

	control deficiencies be addressed. — Commission Report Vol. 2.		of time risks loss of audit trails and recoverability.	strengthen procurement and treasury controls.
20	The Commission recommends the recovery of all payments made by GPA on instructions from State House which were not related to GPA's core mandate. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	The Government accepts the recommendation and notes the need for SOEs to adhere strictly to their mandate and financial regulations. — White Paper, p. 76.	Acceptance is high-level but incomplete: no recovery actions or accountability measures for officers involved were presented to the Committee.	Ministry of Transport / AG / GPA Board: audit irregular transactions; surcharge responsible officers; recover diverted sums; update SOE governance protocols.
21	The Commission recommends that SOEs recover funds diverted to State House or other unauthorised uses and apply proper financial controls, and that responsible officers be sanctioned. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	The Government accepts the Commission's findings in principle and will work towards strengthening financial governance within SOEs. — White Paper, p. 76.	White Paper does not commit to specific actions for each SOE, leaving gaps in implementation. No SOE presented evidence of funds recovered or sanctions imposed.	Line ministries / AG / SOE Boards: undertake SOE-specific audits; issue surcharge and recovery notices; strengthen financial controls; implement oversight by SOE Commission/Ministry of Finance.
22	The Commission recommends that Mr. Momodou Sabally refund the sum of D900,000 withdrawn from public funds and that appropriate administrative action be taken against him. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	The Government accepts the findings of the Commission in respect of Mr Momodou Sabally and accepts the recommendation that the sum of D900,000 be refunded. — White Paper, p. 73.	The White Paper acceptance is unequivocal. However, the Committee received no evidence of a refund, enforcement action, or recovery proceedings, despite the clear monetary figure involved.	AG / MoF / PSC: issue refund demand; register debt owed to the State; commence civil recovery if unpaid; update Parliament on compliance status.
23	The Commission recommends that Mr. Basiru Njie refund the sum of USD 10,000 withdrawn	The Government accepts the recommendation of the Commission that Mr Basiru Njie refund the sum	No evidence was provided to the Committee of repayment or enforcement. Delay	AG / MoF: issue demand notice; pursue recovery through civil

	without authority from State House funds. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	of USD10,000 withdrawn from State House funds. — White Paper, p. 74.	risks dissipation of assets and weakens deterrence.	action if unpaid within statutory period.
24	The Commission recommends that Mr. Momodou Bah refund the sum of USD 10,000 withdrawn without authority from State House funds. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	The Government accepts the recommendation of the Commission that Mr Momodou Bah refund the sum of USD10,000 withdrawn from State House funds. — White Paper, p. 74.	As with similar protocol-officer cases, acceptance has not been followed by evidence of enforcement or recovery.	AG / MoF: commence recovery proceedings; publish consolidated recovery schedule for protocol officers.
25	The Commission recommends that Mr. Njogu Bah be held responsible for facilitating unauthorised withdrawals from Central Bank accounts and that appropriate action be taken. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	The Government accepts the findings of the Commission in respect of Mr Njogu Bah and will take appropriate action. — White Paper, p. 71.	The White Paper response is vague and does not specify whether “appropriate action” means disciplinary measures, recovery, or prosecution. No such actions were evidenced before the Committee.	Central Bank / PSC / AG: determine disciplinary liability; initiate surcharge or prosecution where warranted; publish outcome.
26	The Commission recommends that ministers who authorised irregular withdrawals be held administratively accountable and that corrective measures be instituted within the Ministry of Finance. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	The Government takes note of the findings and will strengthen internal controls and financial oversight mechanisms. — White Paper, p. 78.	The White Paper avoids individual accountability and limits its response to systemic reform. This leaves personal responsibility unresolved.	PSC / AG / MoF: conduct accountability review; determine administrative or legal responsibility; report findings to Parliament.
27	The Commission recommends that all unauthorised withdrawals from embassy accounts be recovered and that accounting controls be tightened. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	The Government accepts the findings of the Commission and will take steps to improve controls over embassy accounts. — White Paper, p. 79.	White Paper acceptance is general and does not specify recovery actions for past losses. Embassy accounts remain a known vulnerability.	MFA / MoF / AG: audit embassy accounts; recover unauthorised withdrawals; implement stricter financial

				reporting requirements.
28	The Commission recommends that the Office of the President cease operating as a parallel treasury and that all public funds be channelled through lawful budgetary and accounting processes. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	The Government accepts the findings of the Commission and affirms its commitment to ensuring fiscal discipline and adherence to public financial management laws. — White Paper, p. 81.	Acceptance is declaratory. The Committee heard no evidence of formal closure of parallel funding mechanisms or retrospective regularisation of accounts.	MoF / Auditor General: certify closure of parallel accounts; audit compliance; report findings publicly.
29	The Commission recommends that all recovered monies be paid into a designated Government account and properly accounted for. — Commission Report Vol. 2.	The Government accepts the recommendation and will ensure that recovered funds are properly accounted for. — White Paper, p. 82.	No single, transparent recovery account was demonstrated to the Committee. Fragmentation increases risk of misreporting.	MoF / Treasury: establish a single recovery account; publish quarterly statements; Auditor General to audit annually.

VOLUME 3

30	The Commission finds that the property located at Buckle Street, Banjul, though purchased, was acquired using funds whose provenance could not be satisfactorily established. The Commission recommends that the ownership of the said property be reviewed and appropriate steps taken to recover any public funds used in its acquisition. — Commission Report Vol. 3 (Banjul – Purchased Properties).	The Government accepts the findings of the Commission relating to properties acquired with unexplained funds and directs that appropriate steps be taken to recover public funds where established. — White Paper (Land & Properties section).	The White Paper accepts the principle of recovery but does not specify whether this property was subjected to valuation, recovery proceedings, or consideration for sale. No evidence was presented to the Committee that this property entered any disposal pipeline.	Ministry of Lands / AG: conduct forensic funding review; determine State interest; if public funds are established, register interest and determine whether recovery is best achieved by sale or restitution; report outcome to Parliament.
31	The Commission recommends that the property at Half Die,	The Government accepts the recommendation of the Commission that properties	Acceptance is broad and not property-specific. The absence of a	Ministry of Lands / Receiver: publish

	Banjul, acquired through purchase but linked to proceeds of office, be forfeited to the State and sold. — Commission Report Vol. 3.	acquired through abuse of office be forfeited to the State. — White Paper.	published list of forfeited Banjul properties creates uncertainty as to whether this property was included in post-Commission disposal actions.	consolidated list of forfeited urban properties; conduct valuation; subject property to transparent sale if still held by the State.
32	The Commission finds that the property at Kotu acquired in the name of a close associate was purchased with funds traceable to public office. The Commission recommends forfeiture of the property and its disposal by sale. — Commission Report Vol. 3 (Kanifing – Purchased Properties).	he Government accepts the Commission’s recommendation on forfeiture of properties acquired through abuse of office. — White Paper.	Although the White Paper accepts forfeiture in principle, no documentary evidence was provided to the Committee indicating that this property was inventoried, valued, or disposed of by the Ministerial Subcommittee.	Ministry of Lands / Cabinet Subcommittee: verify status; include property in forfeiture inventory; proceed to valuation and sale if not already disposed
33	The Commission recommends that properties purchased in Kanifing but held in trust for the former President be treated as State assets and sold. — Commission Report Vol. 3.	The Government accepts the findings and will take steps to recover properties held in trust for the former President. — White Paper.	The White Paper does not clarify whether “recovery” entails sale, retention, or regularisation. Lack of clarity impedes oversight of proceeds.	AG / Ministry of Lands: determine disposal policy for trust-held properties; if sale is appropriate, ensure transparent process and publication of proceeds.
34	The Commission finds that multiple properties in the West Coast Region were purchased using funds whose source could not be reconciled with lawful income. The Commission recommends that such properties be subjected to forfeiture and sale. —	The Government accepts the Commission’s findings relating to properties purchased with unexplained funds and will take appropriate action. — White Paper.	The Government’s response lacks specificity. The Committee was not provided with a list of WCR properties forfeited or sold, nor with proceeds realised.	Ministry of Lands / MoF: compile and publish list of WCR properties affected; indicate whether sold, retained, or pending; disclose proceeds where sales occurred.

	Commission Report Vol. 3 (WCR – Purchased Properties).			
35	The Commission recommends that rural properties acquired through purchase but linked to proceeds of office be regularised only where no public funds were used; otherwise they should be forfeited and sold. — Commission Report Vol. 3 (NBR/CRR – Purchased Properties).	The Government accepts the Commission’s findings and will act in accordance with the law. — White Paper.	The White Paper response is generic and does not show whether any rural purchased properties were assessed for sale or regularisation. This is material given the scale of landholdings in rural regions.	Ministry of Lands / Regional Administrations: conduct region-by-region assessment; determine regularisation vs forfeiture; publish outcomes and any sales proceeds.
36	The Commission finds that the properties seized from the late Baba Jobe were unlawfully appropriated and recommends that the said properties be restituted to the rightful heirs or, where restitution is not practicable, that appropriate compensation be paid. — Commission Report Vol. 3.	The Government accepts the findings of the Commission relating to the properties of the late Baba Jobe and will take steps to ensure that justice is done in accordance with the law. — White Paper.	The White Paper response is framed in general terms and does not specify whether restitution, compensation, or sale was pursued. No evidence was provided to the Committee of completed restitution, compensation arrangements, or valuation exercises.	Ministry of Justice / Ministry of Lands: identify all Baba Jobe properties; determine current status and occupation; commence restitution or compensation process; report outcomes to Parliament.
37	The Commission finds that several properties in Banjul and the Kanifing Municipality were seized without lawful process and recommends that such properties be returned to their rightful owners or otherwise dealt with in accordance with law. — Commission Report Vol. 3.	The Government accepts the Commission’s findings on unlawfully seized properties and will take necessary steps to address them. — White Paper.	The White Paper does not distinguish between properties to be restituted and those to be retained or sold. The absence of a published action plan has resulted in uncertainty as to ownership and custodial responsibility.	Ministry of Lands / AG: prepare and publish a schedule of seized urban properties indicating restitution, retention, or sale; regularise titles accordingly; disclose any proceeds realised.
38	The Commission finds that	The Government accepts	The White Paper	Ministry of Lands

	land in Lower Niumi was seized without compensation from customary owners and recommends restitution of the land or compensation where restitution is not feasible. — Commission Report Vol. 3.	the Commission’s findings relating to seized land and will act in accordance with the law. — White Paper.	response does not identify affected communities, the quantum of land involved, or the modality of restitution or compensation. The Committee received no evidence of engagement with customary owners.	/ Regional Authorities: conduct community consultations; demarcate affected lands; implement restitution or compensation; publish implementation report.
39	The Commission recommends that properties seized and held without clear title be regularised where lawful, forfeited where appropriate, or sold in order to prevent continued uncertainty and abuse. — Commission Report Vol. 3.	The Government accepts the recommendation and will ensure that properties are dealt with lawfully. — White Paper.	Despite acceptance, the Committee found no consolidated inventory of seized properties awaiting regularisation or sale. This has perpetuated uncertainty and undermined transparency.	Ministry of Justice / Ministry of Lands: compile comprehensive inventory; classify properties by outcome (restitution, forfeiture, sale); implement within defined timelines.
40	The Commission finds that several farms were acquired or controlled through abuse of office and recommends that such farms be forfeited to the State and either sold or allocated for public agricultural use. — Commission Report Vol. 3.	The Government accepts the Commission’s findings on farms acquired through abuse of office and will act in accordance with the law. — White Paper.	The Government’s response does not indicate which farms were earmarked for sale and which, if any, were retained for public use. The absence of a published disposition plan has left many farms idle or informally exploited.	Ministry of Agriculture / Ministry of Lands: compile a definitive list of farms; classify each for sale or public use; where sale is chosen, conduct valuation and transparent disposal; where retained, assign management responsibility.
41	The Commission recommends that agricultural equipment and	The Government accepts the Commission’s recommendation and will	The Committee received evidence that equipment at several farm sites	Ministry of Agriculture / Custodian

	infrastructure associated with seized farms be inventoried, secured, and sold where no longer required for public use. — Commission Report Vol. 3.	ensure that such assets are dealt with appropriately. — White Paper.	deteriorated or was cannibalised during periods of inactivity. No consolidated inventory or sales record was presented.	Agencies: conduct immediate inventory and condition assessment; recover missing items where possible; proceed to the sale of non-essential equipment; publish proceeds.
42	The Commission authorised the sale of certain agricultural assets during its proceedings in order to preserve value and prevent loss. — Commission Report Vol. 3.	The Government notes the sales conducted during the Commission’s proceedings and accepts the rationale for such sales. — White Paper.	Evidence before the Committee showed that initial sales were justified by preservation concerns, but subsequent interruptions and delays undermined continuity. Assets left unsold during the hiatus suffered deterioration and loss.	Ministry of Agriculture / MoF: reconcile assets sold versus those left unsold; account for proceeds; review whether remaining assets should now be sold to arrest further depreciation.
43	The Commission recommends that farms and ranches not disposed of during its lifetime be dealt with by Government following acceptance of its Report. — Commission Report Vol. 3.	The Government accepts the recommendation and will take steps to implement it. — White Paper.	Despite acceptance, the Committee found no comprehensive post-Commission strategy for agricultural assets. In several cases, uncertainty over custody and purpose allowed deterioration, informal occupation, or unauthorised use.	Cabinet Ministerial Subcommittee / Ministry of Agriculture: adopt a clear agricultural asset disposition policy; set timelines for sale or allocation; submit implementation report to Parliament.
44	The Commission finds that	The Government accepts	The White Paper	Ministry of Trade

	<p>certain industrial plants were established or operated through abuse of office and recommends that such facilities be forfeited to the State and disposed of in accordance with law. — Commission Report Vol. 3.</p>	<p>the Commission’s findings relating to industrial facilities and will take appropriate action in accordance with the law. — White Paper.</p>	<p>acceptance does not indicate whether forfeited plants were valued, mothballed, sold, or transferred to any public institution. The Committee received no evidence of inventories, technical assessments, or disposal decisions.</p>	<p>/ AG / Ministry of Lands: commission technical and financial assessments; determine feasibility of sale versus transfer; where sale is chosen, conduct transparent disposal; disclose outcomes and proceeds.</p>
45	<p>The Commission recommends that heavy machinery and specialised equipment acquired or held through abuse of office be inventoried and either sold or deployed for public benefit. — Commission Report Vol. 3.</p>	<p>The Government accepts the recommendation of the Commission and will ensure that such machinery is dealt with appropriately. — White Paper.</p>	<p>The Committee heard evidence of deterioration, cannibalisation, and loss of heavy machinery during periods of inactivity. No consolidated inventory or utilisation plan was presented.</p>	<p>Ministry of Works / MoF: conduct inventory and condition audit; recover missing parts; sell non-essential machinery promptly; redeploy viable equipment to public projects.</p>
46	<p>The Commission finds that the gold refinery project lacked transparency and was linked to abuse of office and recommends that the asset be forfeited to the State and dealt with in accordance with law. — Commission Report Vol. 3.</p>	<p>The Government accepts the Commission’s findings relating to the gold refinery and will take appropriate steps to address the matter. — White Paper.</p>	<p>Given the specialised nature of the asset, inaction carries heightened risk of value loss and technical obsolescence. The Committee received no evidence of valuation, environmental assessment, or decision on sale or transfer.</p>	<p>Ministry of Petroleum & Energy / AG: commission independent valuation and environmental assessment; decide on sale, lease, or decommissioning; ensure compliance with environmental and mining</p>

				regulations.
47	The Commission recommends that commercial enterprises acquired or operated through abuse of office be forfeited and either sold or regularised under lawful ownership. — Commission Report Vol. 3.	The Government accepts the Commission's findings on commercial enterprises and will act in accordance with the law. — White Paper	The White Paper response lacks specificity as to which enterprises were sold, retained, or regularised. The Committee did not receive records of dividends, proceeds, or management arrangements.	Ministry of Trade / AG / Registrar General: compile list of affected enterprises; determine ownership outcomes; where sold, disclose proceeds; where retained, appoint competent management and report performance.
48	The Commission recommends that specialised assets not disposed of during its proceedings be dealt with by Government following acceptance of its Report. — Commission Report Vol. 3.	The Government accepts the recommendation and will take steps to implement it. — White Paper.	The Committee found no evidence of a coordinated post-Commission strategy for specialised assets. This gap increased the likelihood of deterioration and diminished public accountability.	Cabinet Ministerial Subcommittee / MoF: adopt asset-specific implementation plans with timelines; monitor execution; submit progress reports to Parliament.
49	The Commission recommends that all shares held by the former President and his associates in companies identified in this Report be forfeited to the State. — Commission Report Vol. 3.	The Government accepts the recommendation of the Commission that shares belonging to the former President and his associates in the identified companies be forfeited to the State. — White Paper.	The White Paper acceptance establishes State ownership in law, but the Committee found no evidence of follow-up actions such as registration of the State as shareholder, appointment of directors, or receipt of dividends.	Registrar of Companies / MoF / AG: ensure registration of State shareholding; appoint interim directors or custodians; require audited accounts; determine whether shares should be retained

				or sold.
50	The Commission recommends that companies acquired or operated through abuse of office be reviewed and either regularised or disposed of in accordance with law. — Commission Report Vol. 3.	The Government accepts the findings of the Commission and will take steps to review the identified companies. — White Paper.	The White Paper does not specify which companies were reviewed, the criteria applied, or the outcomes of any such review. The Committee received no evidence of structured review reports or decisions on disposal.	MoF / Ministry of Trade / AG: prepare company-by-company review reports; decide on sale, liquidation, or retention; publish outcomes and timelines.
51	The Commission recommends that all dividends and profits accruing from forfeited shares be paid into Government accounts and properly accounted for. — Commission Report Vol. 3.	The Government accepts the recommendation and will ensure that any proceeds from forfeited shares are properly accounted for. — White Paper.	The Committee was not provided with records showing dividends received by the State from forfeited shareholdings. This raises concern as to whether value continued to accrue to private actors after forfeiture.	MoF / Auditor General: identify dividend-yielding companies; demand remittance of accrued dividends; audit past financial flows; report recoveries.
52	The Commission recommends that contracts and concessions awarded to companies linked to abuse of office be reviewed and cancelled where appropriate. — Commission Report Vol. 3.	The Government accepts the recommendation and directs that existing contracts be reviewed and cancelled where necessary. — White Paper	Acceptance is clear; however, the Committee received no consolidated list of reviewed or cancelled contracts, nor evidence of enforcement across sectors.	MoF / GPPA / Line Ministries: compile and publish list of affected contracts; confirm cancellations or renegotiations; report savings or recoveries achieved.
53	The Commission recommends that companies not disposed of during its proceedings be dealt with by Government following acceptance of its Report. — Commission Report Vol. 3.	The Government accepts the recommendation and will take steps to implement it. — White Paper.	The Committee found no evidence of a coordinated post-Commission corporate asset strategy. The absence of timelines or custodial arrangements undermines accountability and value preservation.	Cabinet Ministerial Subcommittee / MoF: adopt a corporate asset management framework; set timelines for disposal or

				retention; submit periodic reports to Parliament.
VOLUME 4				
54	The Commission recommends that immovable properties held by companies identified in this Report and acquired through abuse of office be forfeited to the State and dealt with in accordance with law. — Commission Report Vol. 4	The Government accepts the Commission’s findings relating to company-owned properties and will take appropriate action in accordance with the law. — White Paper.	Acceptance is general and does not identify specific properties, valuation status, or disposition pathway. The Committee received no consolidated inventory showing which company-owned properties were taken into custody or prepared for sale.	Ministry of Lands / AG / Receiver: compile a verified inventory of company-owned properties; register State interest; obtain valuations; decide sale versus retention within set timelines; report to Parliament.
55	The Commission finds that properties and interests held through nominees were effectively controlled by the former President and recommends that such assets be treated as his assets for purposes of forfeiture and disposal. — Commission Report Vol. 4.	The Government accepts the Commission’s findings relating to assets held through nominees and will take steps to recover such assets. — White Paper.	While acceptance establishes legal footing, nominee arrangements require prompt court action to perfect State title. Delay risks dissipation and litigation challenges.	AG / Solicitor General: initiate declaratory proceedings to vest title in the State; secure interim injunctions; proceed to valuation and disposal where appropriate.
56	The Commission recommends forfeiture to the State of shares held by the former President and his associates in companies identified in this Report. — Commission Report Vol. 4.	The Government accepts the recommendation of the Commission that such shares be forfeited to the State. — White Paper.	Legal forfeiture does not equate to economic benefit absent shareholder registration, board control, and dividend capture. The Committee saw no evidence of interim governance arrangements.	Registrar of Companies / MoF: register State shareholding; appoint interim directors; require audited accounts; determine sale or retention strategy.
57	The Commission	The Government accepts	Acceptance is clear, but	GPPA / MoF /

	recommends that contracts and concessions awarded to companies linked to abuse of office be reviewed and cancelled where appropriate. — Commission Report Vol. 4.	the recommendation and directs that such contracts be reviewed and cancelled where necessary. — White Paper.	no comprehensive list of reviewed or cancelled contracts was provided to the Committee, limiting oversight of outcomes and savings.	Line Ministries: publish contract review outcomes; quantify savings or recoveries; report quarterly to Parliament.
58	The Commission recommends that assets not disposed of during its proceedings be dealt with by Government following acceptance of its Report. — Commission Report Vol. 4.	The Government accepts the recommendation and will take steps to implement it. — White Paper.	The absence of timelines and asset-specific plans led to prolonged dormancy and value erosion in several company-held assets.	Cabinet Ministerial Subcommittee / MoF: adopt asset-by-asset disposition plans with timelines; monitor execution; submit progress reports to Parliament.

VOLUME 5

59	The Commission finds that the continued storage of seized vehicles without adequate security exposes them to deterioration and loss and recommends that such vehicles be sold expeditiously to preserve value. — Commission Report Vol. 5.	The Government accepts the Commission's recommendation relating to the sale of seized vehicles in order to prevent dissipation and preserve value. — White Paper.	The White Paper accepts the rationale for sale. However, evidence before the Committee showed that after an initial phase of sales, a prolonged interruption occurred, during which vehicles were left exposed, leading to theft, cannibalisation, and depreciation.	Ministry of Justice / Sheriff / MoF: reconcile vehicles identified, sold, and remaining; account for proceeds; where vehicles remain, conduct immediate valuation and sale; report outcomes to Parliament.
60	The Commission recommends that heavy equipment and machinery be inventoried, secured, and sold where no longer required for public use. —	The Government accepts the Commission's recommendation and will ensure that such machinery is dealt with appropriately. — White Paper.	The Committee received evidence that several items of machinery deteriorated or were stripped of parts during periods of inactivity. No	Ministry of Works / Custodian Agencies: conduct inventory and condition

	Commission Report Vol. 5.		comprehensive inventory or sale record was produced.	assessment; recover missing items; sell non-essential equipment promptly; publish proceeds and disposal records.
61	The Commission recommends that office equipment and miscellaneous movable assets be inventoried and disposed of in accordance with Government regulations. — Commission Report Vol. 5.	The Government accepts the recommendation and will ensure compliance with applicable disposal procedures. — White Paper.	The White Paper response is procedural but non-specific. The Committee was not provided with inventories or disposal records for such assets.	MoF / GPPA: standardise inventory templates; ensure disposal through approved auction or transfer; submit disposal reports for audit.
62	The Commission authorised the sale of certain movable assets during its proceedings to prevent loss of value. — Commission Report Vol. 5.	The Government notes the sales conducted during the Commission's proceedings and accepts the rationale for such sales. — White Paper.	Early sales were consistent with value-preservation objectives. However, the interruption of sales undermined continuity, leaving remaining assets exposed and reducing overall recoveries.	MoF / AG: prepare consolidated statement of assets sold during the Commission; reconcile proceeds; assess whether remaining assets should now be sold without delay.
63	The Commission recommends that custodial agencies maintain accurate inventories and provide adequate security for all movable assets pending disposal. — Commission Report Vol. 5.	The Government accepts the recommendation and will ensure proper custody of assets. — White Paper.	Evidence before the Committee demonstrated inconsistent custodial practices, lack of consolidated inventories, and insufficient security at several storage sites.	Ministry of Justice / Custodian Agencies: implement uniform inventory and security standards; conduct periodic audits; hold custodians

				accountable for losses.
64	The Commission recommends that all improperly withdrawn funds be recovered from those responsible and that disciplinary action be taken against officials who facilitated the transactions. — Commission Report Vol. 6	The Government accepts the findings of the Commission and will take necessary steps to recover such funds and take appropriate action in respect of responsible officers. — White Paper.	The White Paper acceptance is clear, but the Committee saw limited evidence of targeted recovery action, structured enforcement plans, or accountability outcomes. In several cases, delays diminished the likelihood of full recovery.	AG / MoF / Central Bank / PSC: establish recovery task team; serve demand notices; initiate civil recovery; impose administrative sanctions; publish implementation status.
65	The Commission recommends that loans and advances issued without lawful authority be recovered and that responsible officials be surcharged. — Commission Report Vol. 6.	The Government accepts the Commission's recommendation in principle and will take steps to improve loan governance and recover improperly issued loans. — White Paper.	Acceptance was framed broadly. The Committee received no detailed record of recoveries achieved, outstanding amounts, or enforcement actions to compel repayment.	MoF / Auditor General / AG: prepare schedule of all irregular loans; recover sums; surcharge responsible officials; issue quarterly updates to Parliament.
66	The Commission recommends that international transfers linked to abuse of office be investigated and that recoverable sums be pursued in accordance with law. — Commission Report Vol. 6.	The Government accepts the recommendation of the Commission and will take steps to pursue international recoveries where possible. — White Paper.	International recoveries require timely cooperation, mutual legal assistance, and diplomatic engagement. The Committee saw little evidence of sustained international recovery efforts or outcomes.	Ministry of Justice / MoF / MFA: activate MLA processes; engage foreign authorities; track repatriation efforts; publish periodic reports of sums pursued and recovered.
67	The Commission recommends that all recovered monies be paid into designated Government recovery accounts and properly	The Government accepts the recommendation and will ensure that recovered funds are properly accounted for. — White Paper.	The Committee found that proceeds were not consistently channelled through a single transparent account, and comprehensive audited	MoF / Treasury / Auditor General: designate a single recovery account; reconcile deposits; conduct

	accounted for. — Commission Report Vol. 6.		statements were not made available.	annual audits; publish statements.
68	The Commission recommends disciplinary and, where appropriate, legal action against officials who facilitated financial abuses. — Commission Report Vol. 6.	The Government accepts the recommendation and will ensure that appropriate action is taken. — White Paper	The Committee was not presented with evidence of systematic disciplinary or criminal action arising from Volume 6 findings. Absence of consequences risks normalising impunity.	PSC / AG / Central Bank / MoF: conduct case-by-case accountability review; pursue sanctions or prosecutions; report outcomes publicly.
VOLUME 7				
69	The Commission recommends that funds diverted from parastatals and public institutions be recovered and that responsible officials be held accountable. — Commission Report Vol. 7.	The Government accepts the recommendation and will ensure that appropriate steps are taken to recover such funds and hold responsible persons to account. — White Paper.	Acceptance was clear but implementation weak. The Committee did not receive comprehensive records of recoveries achieved, outstanding liabilities, or sanctions imposed on officials of affected institutions.	MoF / AG / Auditor General / PSC: prepare institution-by-institution recovery schedules; enforce repayment; impose disciplinary or legal sanctions; publish outcomes.
70	The Commission recommends that transactions entered into by State enterprises under undue influence be reviewed and annulled or regularised where necessary. — Commission Report Vol. 7.	The Government accepts the Commission's recommendation and will take steps to review such transactions. — White Paper.	The Committee received limited evidence of systematic transaction reviews. There was no consolidated record of contracts annulled, renegotiated, or enforced, nor quantification of financial impact.	GPPA / MoF / Line Ministries: conduct structured review; document outcomes; quantify losses avoided or recovered; submit report to Parliament.
71	The Commission recommends that assets	The Government accepts the recommendation and	The Government's position is supportive but	MoF / Line Ministries /

	held or controlled through public institutions on behalf of the former President be identified and either returned to public use or disposed of lawfully. — Commission Report Vol. 7.	will ensure lawful disposition of such assets. — White Paper.	non-specific. The Committee received no inventory of such assets nor clarity on whether they were sold, retained, or reassigned.	Custodian Agencies: compile inventory; determine disposition (sale or retention); implement decisions promptly; disclose proceeds.
72	The Commission recommends reforms to strengthen governance, accountability, and financial controls within affected public institutions. — Commission Report Vol. 7.	The Government accepts the recommendation and commits to strengthening institutional governance and accountability systems. — White Paper.	While reforms were acknowledged, the Committee was not provided with a structured reform implementation matrix or timelines. Institutional vulnerabilities therefore risk persisting.	MoF / Auditor General / Line Ministries: introduce reforms; update internal control frameworks; provide Parliament with implementation progress reports.
73	The Commission recommends that all recoveries related to public institutions be paid into Government-designated accounts and subjected to audit. — Commission Report Vol. 7.	The Government accepts the recommendation and will ensure that recoveries are properly accounted for. — White Paper	Consistent with earlier Volumes, the Committee observed fragmentation in reporting, absence of comprehensive audited recovery statements, and lack of clarity regarding receipts from institution-related recoveries.	MoF / Treasury / Auditor General: centralise institution-related recoveries; ensure audit; publish periodic statements.
	VOLUME 8			
74	The Commission recommends that properties unlawfully seized from individuals and entities be restored to their rightful owners or heirs. — Commission Report Vol. 8	The Government accepts the recommendation of the Commission and will take steps to ensure that properties wrongfully seized are restored to their lawful owners. — White Paper.	The White Paper provides supportive acceptance; however, the Committee did not receive a consolidated schedule of restitutions completed, ongoing, or outstanding. Delays leave affected citizens in legal	Ministry of Justice/Ministry of Lands: compile a definitive restitution register; identify status of each property; expedite outstanding

			and economic limbo.	restitutions; publish outcomes to ensure transparency.
75	The Commission recommends that where restitution is not feasible, affected persons should be compensated in accordance with law. — Commission Report Vol. 8.	The Government accepts the recommendation of the Commission to compensate persons where restitution is not possible. — White Paper.	Acceptance is clear, but no structured compensation framework or funding mechanism was presented to the Committee. Many claimants reportedly received neither restitution nor compensation.	MoF/Ministry of Justice: establish a defined compensation framework; set eligibility criteria and timelines; allocate budgetary provision; provide Parliament with implementation updates.
76	The Commission recommends remedial measures for communities deprived of land or other communal resources through executive overreach. — Commission Report Vol. 8.	The Government accepts the findings of the Commission regarding affected communities and will take steps to address them in accordance with law. — White Paper.	Community-level dispossession presents broader socio-economic consequences. The Committee did not receive evidence of structured community engagement, land restoration, or compensation schemes targeting affected communities.	Ministry of Lands/Regional Authorities: undertake community consultations; demarcate affected lands; implement restitution or collective compensation; document and publish outcomes.
77	The Commission recommends that beyond recovery of assets, Government should ensure fairness, redress, and justice to those adversely affected by unlawful takings. — Commission Report Vol. 8.	The Government accepts the spirit of the Commission's recommendations regarding justice to affected persons. — White Paper.	The White Paper acknowledgment was broad and lacked specific operational measures or deadlines. Corrective justice initiatives remained largely aspirational in the absence of structured implementation.	Ministry of Justice: design and operationalise a remedial justice framework linked to Commission outcomes; ensure transparency, fairness, and timely delivery.

VOLUME 9

78	The Commission recommends that the Government take urgent and comprehensive steps to implement all recommendations contained in this Report, including the recovery of assets, restitution of unlawfully seized properties, accountability of responsible officials, and reform of governance systems. — Commission Report Vol. 9.	The Government accepts the recommendations of the Commission and commits to implementing them in accordance with law and within available resources. — White Paper.	The Government's acceptance establishes a binding policy commitment; however, urgency was not reflected in execution. Implementation was fragmented, slow, and insufficiently structured, undermining confidence in the government's commitment to the letter and spirit of the Commission's findings.	Cabinet/Ministry of Justice/MoF: adopt a formal implementation framework with timelines, responsible institutions, and public reporting obligations; treat implementation as a matter of national accountability and public interest.
79	The Commission emphasises that implementation of its recommendations requires structured Government coordination to ensure timely action and accountability. — Commission Report Vol. 9.	The Government notes the need for structured implementation and accordingly has established a Cabinet Ministerial Subcommittee supported by a Technical Committee. — White Paper.	The establishment of these bodies was a necessary and positive step. However, there was insufficient transparency, incomplete documentation of activities, and no comprehensive implementation reporting to Parliament or the public	Cabinet Subcommittee/Technical Committee/MoJ: institutionalise structured reporting; maintain detailed implementation registers; submit periodic progress reports to the National Assembly.
80	The Commission recommends reforms to strengthen public financial management, governance frameworks, accountability mechanisms, and institutional integrity to prevent recurrence. — Commission Report Vol. 9	The Government accepts the recommendation and expresses commitment to reforms that enhance governance and accountability. — White Paper.	Acceptance existed at policy level, but the Committee was not presented with a comprehensive reform matrix detailing specific reforms enacted, underway, or pending as a direct consequence of the Commission.	MoF/Auditor General/PSC/Line Ministries: adopt a structured reform matrix; identify legal amendments, regulatory changes, and administrative

				reforms; report measurable implementation progress.
81	The Commission recommends that assets forfeited to the State should either be sold transparently or lawfully retained for public benefit, with full accountability for proceeds. — Commission Report Vol. 9.	The Government accepts that forfeited assets shall be dealt with in accordance with law and that proceeds shall be accounted for. — White Paper.	This represents the heart of the Committee’s mandate. Yet, implementation fell short of expectations: not all assets were clearly categorised; many were neither sold nor properly managed; and proceeds accounting remained fragmented and inadequately reported.	Cabinet Subcommittee/MoF/Auditor General finalise categorisation of assets (sold/retained/restituted); ensure all proceeds flow into designated accounts; publish verified recovery statements; submit to Parliamentary oversight.
82	The Commission stresses that implementation of its recommendations is essential to restoring public trust, demonstrating accountability, and entrenching the rule of law. — Commission Report Vol. 9.	The Government accepts the importance of public confidence and accountability in implementing the Commission’s findings. — White Paper.	Public trust ultimately depends not on acceptance, but on visible execution , fairness, and transparency. Prolonged delays, incomplete reporting, and lack of clarity on outcomes weakened the credibility of the post-Commission process.	adopt a communication and reporting framework; demonstrate conclusively that justice and accountability have been pursued to their logical conclusion.

CHAPTER FIVE
POST COMMISSION’S SALE, DISPOSALS, AND THE INTER-MINISTERIAL
TASKFORCE

THE RECEIVER/TRUSTEE AND POST COMMISSION SALES

(Alpha Kapital - Receiver/ Trustee Statement of Account)

- 715.** Following the recommendations of the Commission, the Ministry of Justice appointed Alpha Barry of Alpha Kapital as the Receiver/Trustee in 2019 to manage, sell, and dispose of assets forfeited to the State by the former President and his associates. Therefore, the Receiver was responsible for the sale of landed properties, vehicles, machinery, hotels, equipment, and other forfeited assets, as well as collecting revenue from active companies placed under his receivership.
- 716.** To facilitate the handling of these funds, the Receiver operated three bank accounts:
- (a)** A GMD-denominated account at Ecobank, used as the primary operational account;
 - (b)** Euro and GMD-denominated account at Mega bank, used for receiving payments made in foreign currency.
- 717.** The Committee’s review revealed funds received in the Euro account, specifically from the Balafon group, were first deposited into the Megabank Euro account, and subsequently converted into Dalasi and transferred to the Ecobank GMD account. We also noted that once funds are consolidated in Ecobank, the Receiver transfers the accumulated proceeds to the Government’s designated Asset Recovery Account at the Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG).
- 718.** The Asset Recovery Account held at the Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG) serves as the primary repository for funds derived from the disposal of assets associated with the former President and his associates for the Receiver. Throughout the period under review, the Committee noted that this account received various deposits from the Receiver/Trustee between June 2019 and November 2025.
- 719.** As a result, the Committee examined the movements of funds in the Receiver’s account, the Asset Recovery Account, and reviewed reports to perform analysis on the fees and charges due for the Receivership of assets and Trustee of shares, dividends, and businesses.
- 720.** The objective was to present a consolidated picture of all funds received from the activities of the Receiver/Trustee, confirm the amount the Receiver reported as deposited into the Central Bank, and confirm that the Receiver managed funds received based on the Receivership Agreements that binds The Government of the Republic of The Gambia through the Ministry of Justice (“the Government”) and Alpha A Barry (“the Receiver”).

ECOBANK GMD ACCOUNT MOVEMENTS

721. Based on the analysis of the Ecobank statement for the period June 2019 to November 2025, the Committee established the following balances:

- a) Total Credits (Inflows): GMD 1,672,025,187.21
- b) Total Debits (Outflows): GMD 1,671,708,806.46
- c) Closing Balance as at November 2025: GMD 316,380.00

MEGA BANK GMD ACCOUNT MOVEMENT

722. The Committee's review of the Megabank statements revealed that an amount of GMD 47,430,000.00 was directly transferred via RTGS to the Central Bank Asset Recovery Account dated 1st December 2021. All other funds received at Megabank were channelled through the Receiver/Trustee Ecobank GMD account, making up the total credits in Ecobank.

TOTAL FUNDS RECEIVED BY RECEIVER/TRUSTEE

723. The Committee's analysis of the Receiver/Trustee's account revealed that an amount of GMD 1,719,455,187.21 represents the cumulative proceeds derived from the disposal of assets, funds received from businesses, dividends, and shares placed under the Receiver for the period June 2019 to December 2025.

FUNDS PAID INTO THE CENTRAL BANK ASSET RECOVERY ACCOUNT BY THE RECEIVER

724. Part 4(d) of the Receivership Agreement between The Government of The Republic of The Gambia Ministry of Justice ("the Government") and Alpha A. Barry ("the Receiver") states "where the Receiver concludes a sale of any assets, to pay net proceeds of sale within 72 hours of receipt of funds paid into a designated account with the central Bank of The Gambia". As such, the Committee reviewed the Central Bank Asset Recovery Account statement against the Receiver/Trustee account statements to ensure compliance with this agreement.

725. Therefore, the amount identifiable as total deposits originating from the Receiver/Trustee accounts to the Central Bank Asset recovery account for the period of the Receivership (June 2019 to December 2025) is a total of GMD 1,253,430,000.00. Details of these deposits are reproduced below:

	Posted Date	Description	Reference	InFlows
1	2019-12-03	RTGS Inwar RTGS TRANS RTGS TRF TO CBG ASSET RECOVERY FRO M JANNE H COMM. 6240 00759 ALPHA KAPI TAL ADVISOR	FT1933761559	60000000.00
2	2019-12-05	Transfer T TRF OF FUNDS FR OM ECO BANK IFO ASSET RECOVERY FROM JAN EH COMMISSI BEIN G FINAL PYT	FT1933976113	75000000.00
3	2020-02-10	RTGS Inwar RTGS TRANS ASSET RECOVERD FROM JANNEH COMMISSI 6240000 759 ALPHA K PITAL ADVISORY L	FT2004103607	340000000.00
4	2020-03-04	RTGS Inwar RTGS TRANS ASSET RECOVERY FROM JANNEH COMMISSI 6240000 759 ALPHA K PITAL ADVISORY L	FT2006407073	210000000.00
5	2020-03-18	RTGS Inwar RTGS TRANS BEING TRANSFER OF FUNDS TO ASSET RECOVERY FROM JANNEH OMISSION 62400 00759 ALPHA	FT2007886900	120000000.00
6	2020-06-26	Transfer T FUND TRF FROM E COBANK BEING RTGS B/O RECEI VER TRUSTEE EING TRF OF FUND IFO ASSET	FT2017823614	60000000.00
7	2021-01-25	RTGS Inwar RTGS TRANS BEING TRF OF FUN DS BO ALPHA KAPITAL IFO ASSE T RECOVERY FROM JANNEH CO MMISSION 6240	FT2102536953	75000000.00
8	2021-12-01	RTGS Inwar RTGS TRANS FUNDS TRANSFER BY ALPHA KAP ITAL AD VISORY (R ECEIVERTRU TEE 012202510200 026663 ALPH	FT2133545908	47430000.00
9	2022-01-04	RTGS Inwar RTGS TRANS COMMISSION BEIN G TRF OF FUN DS TRU RTGS BO ALPHA KAPITA RECEIVER TRUSTE E IFO ASSET	FT2200401317	100000000.00
10	2023-02-10	RTGS Inwar RTGS TRANS COMMISSION BEIN G TRF OF FUN DS TRU RTGS BO ALPHA KAPITA L ADVISORY IFO A SSET RECOVE	FT2304101032	25000000.00
11	2025-05-16	RTGS Inwar RTGS TRANS BEING RTGS FUND S TRANSFER P YMT INFO ASSET R ECOVERY FOR JANNEH COM BO R ECEIVER TRU	FT2513602035	105000000.00
12	2025-09-02	RTGS Inwar RTGS TRANS BNG RTGS TRF BO RECEIVER TR USTEE 6293500029 RECEIVER T USTEE	FT2524512728	15000000.00
13	2025-10-28	RTGS Inwar RTGS TRANS BEING RTGS FUND S TRANSFER P YMT INFO ASSET R ECOVERY FOR JANNEH COMMISS BO ALPHA K	FT2530110081	11000000.00
14	2025-11-10	RTGS Inwar RTGS TRANS ASSET RECOVERY FROM JANNEH 6240000759 RECEI VER TRUSTEE Balance at Period S tart Balance at P...	FT2531432426	10000000.00

726. Comparison of the total funds received against the funds moved to the Asset Recovery Account

- (a) Total funds received - GMD 1,719,455,187.21
- (b) Total moved to CBG - GMD1,253,430,000.00.

727. Therefore, the Committee notes a difference of GMD466,025,187.21 between the total funds received by the Receiver and the total funds paid into the Central Bank Asset Recovery Account. The outstanding balances consist of funds paid to the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) Victim Support Fund, the receivership fees, administrative costs, salaries, and unidentified transactions

**VARIANCE BETWEEN THE FUNDS RECEIVED AND
THE REPORT OF THE RECEIVER/TRUSTEE
*Payments made to the Receiver as Receivership fees***

728. Sections 5 and 6 of the Agreement between the Government of The Republic of The Gambia Ministry of Justice (“the Government”) and Alpha A. Barry (“the Receiver”) state that the Government shall give the Receiver a commission Fee of 4% in respect of each dividend received and 5% gross on all other assets sold by the Receiver.

729. The Receiver shall be entitled to deduct from the monies generated from the said sale transaction the agreed commission fee and all approved costs incurred by the Receiver in conducting the said

sale transactions. This Agreement was preceded by the 2019 Agreement, which highlighted that the Receiver “will be paid a fee of 10% of all transactions in respect of the said companies and 5% in respect of transactions relating to the management and disposal of the shares of former President Jammeh and Mohammed Bazzi held at the Guaranty Trust Bank and Gam-Petroleum, respectively.”

730. The 2020 Agreement also states the Receiver “will be paid a fee of 5% commission on all transactions in respect of the said companies, assets and properties; and 5% in respect of transactions relating to the management and disposal of the shares of the former President Jammeh and Mohammed Bazzi held at the Guaranty Trust Bank and Gam Petroleum respectively, and in other companies in The Gambia. All other charges for reasonable expenses, including operational costs, can be deducted by you from monies generated from the said transactions.”

GENERAL OBSERVATION

- (a)** Instead of calculating a fee based on each individual sale, the Committee notes that the Receiver takes a post-determined, fixed amount from the account periodically. This contravenes the agreement and terms of engagement of the Receivership.
- (b)** Although the receiver reports the amounts he has deposited in the Central Bank Asset Recovery Account, the Committee notes the Receiver has not indicated the total funds received from 2019 to 2025. This undermines transparency in the reporting process.
- (c)** The Committee's review of the bank statements revealed the Receiver fails to transfer funds to the Central Bank Asset Recovery Account after 72 hours as agreed, especially at year's end, thus, violating the Receivership Agreement.
- (d)** The Committee also notes the Receiver made fixed term deposit investments and incurred expenses above GMD50,000.00 without authority from the Ministry of Justice. This contravenes part 10 of the Receivership Agreement dated 12th day of August 2022 between The Government of The Republic of The Gambia Ministry of Justice ('the Government') and Alpha A. Barry (“Receiver”), which states the Receiver shall first seek and obtain the Consent of Government before incurring any cost in excess of GMD 50,000.00 per property.

YEARLY ANALYSIS OF THE RECEIVER/TRUSTEE IS REPORTED BELOW:

Receiver/Trustee for the Year 2019

731. The Committee’s analysis of the Receiver/Trustee account for the year 2019 revealed that the account had a debit opening balance of GMD 345.00 as at 28 June 2019 and a closing balance of GMD 94,216,183.99 as at 31 December 2019. The closing balance indicates that the

Receiver/Trustee withheld proceeds from sales in the Receiver/Trustee account, contrary to the requirements set out in the Letter of Engagement.

- 732.** The total funds received from the date of appointment in June 2019 to December 2019 amounted to GMD 556,603,447.03. These funds were generated from the sale of properties in Phases I–III, the sale of vehicles, the disposal of equipment from the Brikama Power Plant, and revenues from the management and trusteeship of KGI rental incomes. Additional sources included income from the Central Abattoir (prior to its reversion to the Ministry of Agriculture), dividends and shares from Gampetroleum and GTBank, Comium shares, among others. Details of all funds received are provided in Annexure I.
- 733.** On the other hand, total outflows amounted to GMD 462,462,263.04, representing funds transferred to the Asset Recovery Account domiciled at the Central Bank of The Gambia, as well as fees, charges and expenses incurred between 11 July 2019 and 31 December 2019.
- 734.** The Committee’s review and analysis revealed that the Receiver paid a total of GMD 150,000,000.00 into the designated Central Bank account. This represents only 27% of funds received for the year 2019. This indicates the Receiver did not comply with point (v) of the Letter of Engagement dated 13 June 2019, signed by Binga D., Director of Civil Litigation, for the Attorney General. Point (v) states that the Receiver shall “pay into a designated Central Bank of The Gambia account all dividends and other monies generated from the liquidation and sale of the said companies and shares after deductions of your fees and charges as stipulated below;” Details of the relevant transactions are as follows:
- (a)** 27 November 2019 – REF: I61RTGS193310005, amount GMD 75,000,000
 - (b)** 22 November 2019 – REF: I61RTGS193260002, amount GMD 60,000,000
- 735.** The Committee further notes that the Receiver invested funds into fixed-term deposits without authority from the Ministry of Justice. These investments were made through three transactions: GMD 100,000,000 on 15 September 2019, GMD 70,000,000 on 19 December 2019, and GMD 75,000,000 on 27 December 2019, totalling GMD 245,000,000.00. Although these investments were prematurely terminated at the request of the Attorney General, this action still indicates non-compliance with the duties outlined in the Letter of Engagement dated 13 June 2019.
- 736.** The Committee’s review of the 2019 Receivership activity also revealed that GMD 50,000,000.00 was transferred to the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) Victim Support Fund as disclosed in the Receiver/Trustee activity report.
- 737.** From the outflows, the Committee noted an amount of GMD 15,333,334.00 was reverted to Taf Africa Global IRO Ref to IRO REF YUNDUM CITRO LAND (1/3) payment.

738. Regarding the fees of the Receiver/Trustee, Part VI of the 2019 Receivership Agreement states that the Receiver shall be paid a fee 10% of all transactions in respect of the said companies; and 5% in respect of transactions relating to the management and disposal of the shares of former President Jammeh and Mohammed Bazzi held at the Guaranty Trust Bank and Gam-Petroleum, respectively, and in other companies in The Gambia. The Committee notes that the Receiver deducted and transferred a total of GMD 25,660,065.00 to his personal account (Alpha Kapital Advisory), including proceeds from the sale of foreign currency in his name. These deductions were done cumulatively rather than per transaction. Thus, the committee faced a limitation in identifying the percentages. Details are below:

DATE	PAYEE	DETAILS	AMOUNT
17-Oct-19	Alpha Kapital	REF: I64FXSA192900001 FX CURRENCY SALE-SALE OF USD3000 TO ALPHA KAPITAL	153,450
14-Aug-19	Alpha Kapital	REF: I61RTGS192260001 BEING ACCOUNT FUNDING BO ALPHA KAPITAL ADVISORY	500,000
15-Oct-19	Alpha Kapital	REF: I61FTRQ192880551 FUNDS TRANSFER - DIFF CUSTOMERS-BEING FUNDS TRANSFER INFO ALPHA KAPITAL ADVISORY	3,500,000
20-Dec-19	Alpha Kapital	REF: I61FTRQ193540504 FUNDS TRANSFER - DIFF CUSTOMERS-FUNDS TRANSFER FROM RECEIVER TRUSTEE - ALPHA KAPITAL ADVISORY	5,500,000
30-Oct-19	Alpha Kapital	REF: I61IFTR193030006 BEING FUNDS TRF B/O RECEIVER/TRUSTEE IFO ALPHA KAPITAL ADVISORY	5,500,000
22-Nov-19	Alpha Kapital	REF: I61FTRQ193260545 FUNDS TRANSFER - DIFF CUSTOMERS-BEING FUNDS TRANSFER FROM RECEIVER TRUSTEE TO ALPHA KAPITAL ADVISORY	6,500,000
13-Aug-19	Alpha Barry	REF: I61CQWL192250030 CHEQUE WITHDRAWAL-EGM CHQ NO.19 PAID TO ALPHA A BARRY	200,000
17-Oct-19	Alpha Kapital	REF: I64FXSA192900001 FX CURRENCY SALE-SALE OF USD3000 TO ALPHA KAPITAL	153,450
17-Oct-19	Alpha Barry	REF: I64FXCH192900502 FX CURRENCY PURCHASE	153,165.09
19-Sep-19	Alpha Kapital	Transfer to 6240024094-Alpha Kapital	3,500,000.00
Total	25,660,065.00		

739. Additional expenses incurred by the Receiver include a GMD 805,000 payment to DT Associates, salary payments totalling GMD 630,693.57, allowances paid to Chillel Jawara from September to

December 2019 amounting to GMD 250,725, and several cheque payments issued to Mary Manga, Mohammed Gillen, and others totalling GMD 2,385,582.00. Details are provided in Annexure III.

740. Our review further indicated that an amount of GMD 1,200,000.00, dated 18 November 2019, was transferred back to GAI Enterprise. These funds relate to the sale and subsequent cancellation of the Hamza Baraks' property.

RECEIVER/TRUSTEE FOR THE YEAR 2020

741. The opening balance as at 1 January 2020 was GMD 94,216,183.99, being the turnover from 2019 funds that were received from the sale and trusteeship of the former President's assets. This again indicates that the Receiver/Trustee did not transfer the entire funds as required.

742. Our review of the Receiver's bank account for 2020 indicated total inflows amounting to GMD 742,992,396.05, representing funds received from both trustee activities (rents, dividends, shares) and receivership proceeds (sale of landed properties, shares, and assets). Details are provided in Annexure IV. Total outflows amounted to GMD 820,295,605.97, including the utilisation of funds carried over from 2019. The closing balance as at 31 December 2020 was GMD 16,912,974.07, again indicating that the Receiver withheld funds instead of transferring them to the designated Central Bank account as obligated.

743. As required under the Receiver/Trustee agreement, the Receiver transferred a total of GMD 730,000,000.00 to the Asset Recovery Account domiciled at the Central Bank of The Gambia during 2020. This consisted of the following:

- a) 2 October 2020 – GMD 340,000,000.00
- b) 3 April 2020 – GMD 210,000,000.00
- c) 18 March 2020 – GMD 120,000,000.00
- d) 26 June 2020 – GMD 60,000,000.00

744. Regarding fees and charges, the Committee found that the Receiver deducted a total of GMD 35,100,000.00 for the year 2020. The Receiver deducted these fees in accumulated figures; he also did not indicate which sale these fees are attached to, causing limitations to the Committee's ability to establish the fees for the sale. Details are provided below.

DATE	DETAILS	AMOUNT (GMD)
14/Jan/2020	REF: I61FTRQ200140577 FUNDS TRANSFER - DIFF CUSTOMERS-FUND TRANSFER FROM - RECEIVER TRUSTEE 6240000759 - TO - ALPHA KAPITAL ADVISORY 6240024094	2,500,000
27/Feb/2020	REF: I61FTRQ200580019 FUNDS TRANSFER - DIFF CUSTOMERS-FUND TRANSFER FROM - RECEIVER TRUSTEE- TO - ALPHA	16,500,000

	KAPITAL ADVISORY	
19/Mar/2020	REF: I61FTRQ200790533 FUNDS TRANSFER - DIFF CUSTOMERS-FUND TRANSFER FROM - RECEIVER TRUSTEE- TO - ALPHA KAPITAL ADVISORY	8,500,000
26/Jun/2020	REF: I61FTRQ201780064 FUNDS TRANSFER - DIFF CUSTOMERS-BEING FUNDS TRANSFER FROM RECEIVER TRUSTEE TO ALPHA KAPITAL ADVISORY	6,000,000
25/Aug/2020	REF: I61FTRQ202380035 FUNDS TRANSFER - DIFF CUSTOMERS-FUND TRANSFER FROM - RECEIVER TRUSTEE- TO - ALPHA KAPITAL ADVISORY	350,000
07/Dec/2020	REF: I61FTRQ203420535 FUNDS TRANSFER - DIFF CUSTOMERS-BEING FUNDS TRANSFER FROM RECEIVER TRUSTEE TO ALPHA KAPITAL ADVISORY	1,250,000
		35,100,000.00

745. A payment of GMD 237,360.00 was made to DT Associates during the year. The Receiver, in his statement, claimed all payments to DT Associates are due to the valuation of shares held at GTBank, Comium, and Gam Petroleum.

RECEIVER/TRUSTEE FOR THE YEAR 2021

746. The opening balance as at 1 January 2021 was GMD 16,912,974.07, being the turnover from 2020 funds that were not fully transferred. The Committee’s review revealed total inflows for 2021 amounting to GMD 201,162,618.71, and total outflows of GMD 102,545,359.33. The closing balance as at 31 December 2021 stood at GMD 115,530,233.45, again indicating the retention of funds contrary to the terms of engagement.

747. The Receiver/Trustee transferred a total of GMD 75,000,000.00 to the Central Bank on 25 January 2021. However, a review of the Central Bank account showed only GMD 75,000,000.00. Additionally, a payment of GMD 47,430,000.00 was made from the Mega Bank account to the Central Bank account, bringing total lodgements for 2021 to GMD 122,430,000.00. A review of the Receiver's account, Alpha Kapital, showed a total of GMD 5,900,000.00 was paid as fees to the Receiver/Trustee for the year 2021.

748. Funds received during 2021 included proceeds from the sale of land, shares, and other assets under the Receiver’s management. However, there were limitations in determining expenses as certain payments lacked clear descriptions, with references listed as “REF: 000ARCH000000002 INTERFACE TRANSACTION: ATM”, making it difficult to determine their purpose. Details are attached in the relevant annexure.

RECEIVER/TRUSTEE FOR THE YEAR 2022

- 749.** The opening balance as at 1 January 2022 was GMD 115,530,233.45. This amount represents the turnover of funds from 2021 that remained lodged in the Receiver's account from the sale and trusteeship of the former President's assets by Alpha Kapital (the Receiver/Trustee). The opening balance indicates that the Receiver/Trustee did not transfer the entire funds received from the previous year as required. Our review of the Receiver/Trustee bank account for the year 2022 indicated that the total inflow of funds (being funds received relating to the sale and disposal of assets) amounted to GMD 17,524,670.03.
- 750.** Total outflows for the year amounted to GMD 107,729,097.19, which includes fees of GMD 5,300,000.00 paid to the Receiver, utilisation of funds for expenses at GMD 2,427,175.85. Consequently, the closing balance as at 31 December 2022 was GMD 25,325,806.29.
- 751.** Total funds transferred into the Central Bank account for the year 2022 amounted to GMD 100,000,000.00. This payment was made on 4 January 2022. A review of the Central Bank account confirms receipt of this amount on 26 April 2022.

RECEIVER/TRUSTEE FOR THE YEAR 2023

- 752.** The opening balance as at 1 January 2023 was GMD 25,325,806.29. Total inflows for the year amounted to GMD 2,965,768.48, while total outflows amounted to GMD 26,493,938.37.
- 753.** Regarding the outflow for 2023, the committee noted that the Receiver made a single payment to the Central Bank Asset Recovery Account; an amount of GMD 25,000,000.00 dated 10 February 2023. Other outflows relate to payment of allowance to one Chillel Kaba Jawara, a total amount of GMD 635,000, and various expenses such as surveys for phase IV, legal fees to Ida D. Drammeh for KGI vs Futurelec, and payment of tax rates to Kanifing Municipal Council, totalling GMD 857,027.37. The closing balance for the year 2023 is GMD 1,797,636.40.

RECEIVER/TRUSTEE FOR THE YEAR 2024

- 754.** The opening balance for the year 2024 was GMD 1,797,636.40. Total inflows for the year amounted to GMD 31,683,099.16, while total outflows amounted to GMD 3,501,104.00. During the year, an amount of GMD 19,950,000.00 was transferred from the Receiver/Trustee's MegaBank account to the Ecobank account as proceeds from the sale of assets under Receivership. A payment of GMD 2,500,000.00 was also made to Alpha Kapital. As at 31 December 2024, the closing balance stood at GMD 29,979,631.56.

RECEIVER/TRUSTEE FOR THE YEAR 2025

755. The opening balance as at 1 January 2025 was GMD 29,925,252.66. Total inflows for the year amounted to GMD 119,018,187.75, while total outflows as at 28 November 2025 amounted to GMD 148,681,438.56. Additionally, commission payments to Alpha Kapital totalling GMD 2,750,000.00 were recorded for the year. A total of GMD 141,000,000.00 was paid into CBG between 16th May 2025 and 10th November 2025.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS:

1. An in-depth investigation into the accounts of the receiver must be conducted jointly by the Accountant General, the Auditor General, and the Financial Intelligence Unit. The said investigation must commence within five weeks of the tabling of this report, and the report of the said investigation must be submitted to the national assembly within three months after the commencement of the investigations.
2. The Receivership contract must be terminated immediately, and all advertised sales must be put on hold. All adverts on the receivership website and any other platform must be taken down within two days of the tabling of this report.
3. Alpha Barry must handover all keys, documentation of all warehouses, houses, and other properties to the Minister of Justice within two weeks of the tabling of this report. The handing over must be accompanied by a detailed handing over report and notes. The minister of justice must forward the said report and update the assembly.
4. The former president's shares held by KGI at the Guaranty Trust Bank must be immediately transferred to the Minister of Finance to hold on behalf of the Government until the Government makes a concrete decision to sell the said shares or to continue to hold the said shares as a way to earn income. The shares must be transferred to the Government of the Gambia and not remain in the name of KGI.
5. The Government must update the National Assembly on whatever decision it takes with regard to the shares at GT Bank.
6. Alpha Barry must submit a report detailing the status of the receivership, sales made since his last appearance before the committee on 10th November 2025 to the 10th of March 2026. The report must be submitted to the Assembly within a week of the tabling of this report.

CHAPTER SIX

CONTEMPT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

756. During the public hearing, the Committee encountered two serious incidents that amounted to contempt of the National Assembly. These incidents did not merely reflect reluctance or administrative difficulty; they constituted conduct that obstructed, interfered with, and undermined the mandate of the Committee in a manner striking at the very authority and dignity of the National Assembly.
757. In assessing the broader context within which these proceedings were conducted, it is important to observe that this inquiry significantly tested the authority, resilience, and institutional standing of the National Assembly's oversight mandate. The Committee records, with appreciation, that in the vast majority of instances, individuals, public institutions, and Government entities complied with summonses, appeared when required, produced documents, and engaged with the process in good faith. There was, in many respects, compliance, including cooperation from the Office of the President, which demonstrated a clear acknowledgment of the constitutional role of the Committee and the broader legitimacy of the National Assembly by the highest level of the Executive.
758. The Committee also notes that in a few cases, certain ministries submitted documents belatedly, which imposed avoidable constraints and affected the timely progression of aspects of the inquiry. However, such delays, while regrettable, appeared administrative rather than wilfully defiant. This Chapter therefore, concerns not mere procedural shortcomings, but clear, deliberate, and egregious instances of contempt, where conduct moved beyond inconvenience into wilful obstruction and affront to the authority of the National Assembly.
759. The powers of the National Assembly to deal with such conduct are firmly grounded in section 110 of the Constitution and Standing Order 140, both of which are reproduced below:

Section 110 of the 1997 Constitution of The Gambia

“Any Act or omission which obstructs or impedes the National Assembly in the performance of its functions or which obstructs or impedes any member or officer of the National assembly in the discharge of his or her duties of affronts the dignity of the National Assembly shall be a contempt of the National Assembly and, in addition to any liability in respect thereof under the criminal law, the offender shall be liable to reprimand or admonition by the National assembly, and if the offender is a member of the National Assembly, suspension or expulsion from the National Assembly.”

Standing Order 140, Standing Orders of the National Assembly

“Any act or omission which obstructs or impedes the Assembly in the performance of its functions or which obstructs or impedes any Member or officer of the Assembly in the discharge of his or her duties or affronts the dignity of the Assembly shall be a contempt of the Assembly and, in addition to any liability in respect thereof under the criminal law, the offender shall be liable to reprimand or admonition by the Assembly, and if the offender is a Member of the Assembly, suspension or expulsion from the Assembly.”

760. In applying this framework, the Committee remained acutely mindful that contempt is a serious sanction and therefore proceeded in accordance with fairness, natural justice, and procedural propriety. Both witnesses, alleged to have engaged in contemptuous conduct, were informed of the matters implicating them, apprised of the substance of evidence against them, and provided an opportunity to respond, explain themselves, or otherwise react to the allegations before any decision was taken. In effect, they were afforded sufficient opportunity to be heard and to “show cause” in a manner consistent with due process and established parliamentary practice. The measures ultimately taken, therefore, flowed not from impulse, displeasure, or convenience, but from necessity in defence of institutional integrity.

THE CASE OF SERGEANT ADAMA JAGNE

761. Sergeant Adama Jagne appeared before the Committee on multiple occasions and testified under oath concerning his role in the custody and disposal of vehicles forming part of the assets under review. His consistent position was one of categorical denial: that he did not sell vehicles, receive proceeds, or participate in any unauthorised disposal outside the lawful auction process. As the inquiry advanced, however, the Committee obtained substantive testimonial and documentary evidence fundamentally contradicting Sergeant Jagne’s account of events. Multiple witnesses implicated him directly, confirming that he personally sold vehicles, received payments, and in some instances supervised the dismantling and sale of vehicles as scrap without resort to authorised auction arrangements.

762. Additionally, audio recordings obtained by the Committee revealed communications in which Sergeant Jagne instructed witnesses on how to respond to the Committee’s investigators so as to mislead the Committee and conceal material evidence. Despite the Committee being in possession of this proof, when the allegation was subsequently put to him, Sergeant Jagne denied any involvement, thereby further misleading the Committee.

763. Taken cumulatively, this conduct constituted deliberate obstruction, interference with witnesses, and knowingly providing false evidence under oath. It therefore fell squarely within the meaning of contempt contemplated by section 110 of the Constitution and Standing Order 140.

764. It must, as a preliminary matter, be noted that prior to the taking of any witness testimony before the Committee, it was the settled and consistent practice of the Chairperson to formally brief each

witness on the mandate of the Committee and the governing rules applicable to the proceedings. In particular, witnesses were expressly reminded of the duty to give truthful evidence and warned against any conduct calculated to mislead the Committee or impede the work of the National Assembly, with it being made clear that any breach of this duty could attract sanctions, including a finding of contempt.

765. Following this briefing, Learned Counsel to the Committee proceeded to question the witness on the basis of evidence already in the possession of the Committee, which indicated that Sergeant Adama Jagne had engaged in conduct aimed at deliberately influencing witnesses by instructing them on what to say and how to present their testimony. This evidence included a recorded voice call made by a witness, capturing such conduct. When confronted with these allegations during questioning, Sergeant Adama Jagne remained dismissive and failed to meaningfully engage with the substance of the evidence before the Committee. Consequently, Learned Counsel made an application to the Committee for his arrest. Before determining the application, the Chairperson afforded Sergeant Adama Jagne a further opportunity to respond to the allegations, thereby ensuring that, in addition to the matters already put to him through questioning by Counsel, he was expressly invited by the Chairperson to address the allegations in his own words.
766. Importantly, before any adverse decision was made, Sergeant Jagne was informed of the allegations and afforded a clear opportunity to respond, offer clarification, or present any mitigating explanation. He was expressly invited to react to the evidence against him. He declined to do so, indicating that he had nothing to add and leaving the matter entirely to the Committee. See below;

Counsel: *“Honourable chair, I have an application to make. It would, it seems the witness wants to say something, but I would suggest that I make my application first, and then the witness can say anything he wants to say to the chair. If the chair would allow.”*

Chairperson nods

Counsel: *“All right. Very well.”*

“Honourable Chair, pursuant to section 12 of the National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act. Apologies. Honourable Chair, pursuant to sections 109 and 110 of the Constitution of the Republic of The Gambia 1997, the National Assembly Powers and Privileges Act, and Orders 102 and 140 of the Standing Orders of the National Assembly. I am making an application for the sergeant of arms or sergeant at arms of this national assembly to arrest Mr. Adama Jagne for violating section 12 of the National Assembly (powers and privileges) Act and all these other laws that I have mentioned in the beginning and then be cited for contempt of the National Assembly by concealing information, deliberately tampering with witnesses after having the chance

severally to correct the record or be honest and truthful to the National Assembly and this committee. This is my application, Honourable Chair.”

Chairperson - “Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Counsel. Uhhh, Sergeant Jagne! Granted, application granted Counsel. Sergeant, do you have anything to say before we continue?”

Witness - “What I wish to say is that I am not seeing that as if you are witch-hunting me.”

Chairperson - “Can I interject now? I'm giving you only one minute to say something that will be beneficial to the Committee. Okay.”

Witness – “I have nothing to say. The only thing that I can say is, as long as it has happened, I'm with you people. Whatever you said, let me take.”

Chairperson - “All right. Thank you so very much. Thank you. Thank you, honourable Members of the Committee. Good. Uhm, thank you, honourable Members of the Committee, and our investigation team staff of the National Assembly are present. Counsel, application is granted and pursuant to section 109 and 110 of the Constitution of the Republic of the Gambia, the 1997 Constitution and the National Assembly (powers and privileges) Act and Order 102 and 140 of the Standing Orders of the National Assembly. I hereby order as follows: that the sergeant at arms of the National Assembly arrest Sergeant Adama Jagne and deliver him to the custody of the Gambia Armed Forces, the military police, for further investigation and detention pending his appearance before this Committee pass to section 102, section 12 of this of the National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act. The Honourable Minister Attorney General and Minister for Justice is hereby notified of this Order and is directed to take all legal and necessary steps to initiate criminal proceedings against Sergeant Adama Jagne for contempt of the National Assembly. All law enforcement and public officers are required to cooperate fully in the execution of this Order, and any failure to fully comply with this Order shall constitute contempt of the National Assembly.

Signed 29th day of October 2025. Sergeant at arms, you can effect the arrest, please.”

767. Following this, and based on the strength of evidence before it, the Committee resolved to order Sergeant Jagne’s arrest under lawful authority and to hand him over first to the Military Police and subsequently to the Inspector General of Police for further investigation. In compliance with the National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act, the matter was also referred to the Honourable Attorney General for consideration of criminal prosecution. The Committee issued a formal communication to the IGP outlining the factual basis and legal justification for the decision. The action taken was not punitive for its own sake; it was necessary to protect the credibility of the

National Assembly's proceedings, deter future obstruction, and strengthen the Assembly's clear commitment to preserving the integrity of its proceedings against interference.

THE CASE OF MR. ALIEU JALLOW

768. Mr. Alieu Jallow appeared before the Committee in relation to livestock and related assets. Throughout his testimony, he offered evasive responses, contradicted documentary records without adequate explanation, and displayed sustained reluctance to cooperate. His conduct was dismissive and plainly inconsistent with the oath he had taken. Mr. Jallow's testimony, in effect, hindered the Committee's ability to clarify material facts and undermined the seriousness of the inquiry.
769. The Committee's examination revealed that Mr. Jallow submitted documents purporting to be genuine records of earlier events, yet at least two inconsistent versions of the same report were identified from the records of the Committee, and the document further purported to speak to events which pre-dated its purported date. Consequently, the laptop used by Mr. Jallow during the relevant period was subjected to forensic examination, which established that the report had been edited immediately prior to his testimony.
770. Consistent with principles of fairness, Mr. Jallow was repeatedly reminded of his obligation to be truthful, invited to cooperate, and afforded full opportunity to respond directly to allegations made against him. He was given every reasonable chance to present his position, clarify inconsistencies, and explain himself.
771. Despite being confronted with the forensic findings, Mr. Jallow denied responsibility. Fabricating and altering documents submitted to the National Assembly or a committee thereof constitutes a deliberate attempt to mislead and obstruct the Committee in the discharge of its mandate.
772. The Committee began by reminding Mr Jallow of his duty to answer all lawful questions put to him. The Committee emphasized that he was under a duty to respond fully to all questions, noting that the Committee was exercising the powers of the National Assembly. The Chairperson reinforced this obligation, stating that the witness was required to assist the Committee fully and truthfully and that failure to do so could attract consequences under the Powers and Privileges Act. See below:

Chairperson - *“You took an oath before this Committee to speak the truth, and you were expressly warned that giving false evidence or producing falsified documents constitutes contempt of the National Assembly.”*

773. Despite this clear reminder, the witness continued to provide explanations that were inconsistent with the evidence before the Committee. He maintained that he had not prepared or altered any

reports relating to the sale of assets and that his laptop contained only notes he had typed in preparation for his appearance. The Committee pointed out that forensic analysis of his laptop showed that documents related to these matters had been created and modified during the relevant period, and that additional documents existed which contradicted his prior statements. When confronted with these discrepancies, the witness insisted that he did not intend to mislead the Committee yet offered no explanation that reconciled his testimony with the objective evidence. See below:

Honourable Mbowe, Member for Upper Soloum - *“Ummm, Counsel Jallow, I think you've remembered this conversation...”*

Witness - Yeah. Very well.

Honourable Mbowe, Member for Upper Soloum – *“yes and I was very specific in asking whether there are additional files on the laptop, but he said absolutely not. Yeah. So, the question I asked was very clear and very straightforward. Whether there could be additional files on your laptop, but you categorically said that no there are no additional files.”*

Witness - yeah, I said I cannot remember.

Honourable Mbowe, Member for Upper Saloum - *now if you hear this discussion we've been discussing this this morning, is in relation to the files that we found in your laptop, so which means essentially what you told us actually was inaccurate they were and they were in the sense that they were deleted but we see now there are files in the particular laptop which you said here in very clear terms that nothing is there.?”*

Witness - “Honourable, with all honesty, no, whatever I have presented is what is in my laptop. The laptop is available. Maybe the forensic should help with my laptop, they can put it on and check.”

Hon. Mbowe, Member for Upper Saloum,- *“That is not true. I am being very blunt with you. That is untrue. There are files on your laptop that you have not submitted to us.”*

FURTHER...

Honourable Sarr, Member for Jeshwang - *“Just a quick one, Mr. Jallow,*

Witness - “yeah”

Honourable Sarr, Member for Jeshwang - *“Just a quick one. Did you delete anything from your laptop before submitting it to the Committee?”*

Witness- “*This one?*” (Referring to his laptop, which the committee conducted a forensic analysis on)

Honourable Sarr, Member for Jeshwang - “*Yes*”.

Witness- “*No, nothing. These are hard copies. I retrieved them from the Ministry?*”

Honourable Sarr, Member for Jeshwang - “*No, your laptop, before submitting your laptop, did you modify anything before submitting your laptop?*”

Witness - “*modify no!..... Maybe I may have lifted something in fear that my laptop can be tampered with. I may have lifted something to my flash drive, but in terms of flash drive deleting.*”

Honourable Sarr, Member for Jeshwang - “*tampered by who?*”

Witness- “*Well, whoever might deal with my laptop. The fear I have is what has happened? My laptop is spoiled.*”

Honourable Sarr, Member for Jeshwang - “*So, what do you what do you take out from the laptop?*”

Witness- “*No, maybe I, and I haveme I do a lot of typing, and I do a lot of academic work. So I have lifted those things there on my flash drive. Those ones are there. But in terms of what is available....*”

Honourable Sarr, Member for Jeshwang - “*My question is, before submitting your laptop, was anything deleted or modified from you from the laptop?*”

Witness- “*Modified? No, I cannot remember that. No*”

Honourable Sarr, Member for Jeshwang - “*but you deleted something from the laptop.*”

Witness- “*Delete! something relevant to this committee? No.*”

774. Before concluding the examination, the Chairperson provided the witness with a final opportunity to explain the inconsistencies between his oral testimony and the documentary and forensic evidence. The witness responded by maintaining that he had not created or altered any reports with the intention to mislead the Committee. See below:

Chairperson - *“Before I grant the application, Mr. Jallow, you’ve been given time to explain yourself.”*

Witness - *“Yes.”*

Further...

Chairperson - *“You came, you explained a lot of things, questions were asked, and you responded. Today we gave you an opportunity again to come and clarify some of those things, but when we laid our hands on the evidence, especially when we laid our hands on the forensic analysis on your laptop.”*

- a. *“Members did ask you about the forensic report conducted on your laptop, whether you believe the technology, and that you tampered with some of the documents in your laptop, you categorically denied that you did not touch any document in your laptop and for this Committee, that amounts to misleading the Committee and contempt of the National Assembly because what you have said because what we have said we think it was relevant for the Committee. You could have just retrieved them and submitted them to the Committee. You did not do that. But yet you ...you gave an access but you said you don't have document in your laptop. We conducted a forensic we got the documents that we wanted of course but you tampered with that. So, for that being the case, the application made by Counsel is a very relevant application, and this Committee will grant the application and they will exercise its powers on you, and without wasting time, since we gave you the opportunity to explain and you denied, I wouldn't be giving you any more chances to explain again. because I think that time has passed.”*

775. Having carefully considered the foregoing exchanges, the Committee finds that the witness was repeatedly reminded of his duty to answer lawful questions fully and truthfully, yet persisted in providing explanations that were inconsistent with objective evidence placed before the Committee. Despite being confronted with clear contradictions between his oral testimony and documentary and forensic material, the witness-maintained positions that the Committee found to be implausible and unconvincing.
776. Notwithstanding a final and explicit opportunity to clarify or correct his evidence, the witness failed to provide a satisfactory explanation. The Committee is therefore satisfied that its concerns were not the result of misunderstanding or inadvertence but arose from a pattern of responses that undermined the integrity of the Committee’s proceedings and impeded its work.
777. The Committee acted within the scope of its authority in the cases of Adama Jagne and Alieu Jallow. Section 110 of the Constitution and Standing Order 140 exist to ensure that the National Assembly can perform its functions with authority, dignity, and credibility. Where witnesses deliberately mislead, interfere with proceedings, or refuse lawful direction, the Assembly is not merely empowered, but duty-bound, to respond firmly. By proceeding fairly, cautiously, and

lawfully, the Committee upheld both the rights of the individuals concerned and the institutional dignity of the National Assembly.

CHAPTER SEVEN

INSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES AND POLICY ISSUES

- 778.** It is trite that the National Assembly exercises oversight over the Executive, and that this oversight function is ordinarily discharged through its committee system as well as other such mechanisms. Acting on the authority of the Assembly, committees examine executive conduct, assess institutional performance, and ensure accountability in the management of public affairs. It is within this settled constitutional and procedural framework that this Committee undertook its inquiry and now proceeds to examine the institutional handling of public assets.
- 779.** In the course of exercising this oversight mandate, including through public hearings and the review of documentary evidence submitted to the Committee, it became evident that there are significant systemic weaknesses across several institutions of the Executive. The evidence placed before the Committee revealed recurring anomalies in administrative practice, most notably in record keeping, but also in the documentation of decisions, clarity of institutional roles, coordination between agencies, and preservation of official records. These weaknesses were not isolated incidents but reflected broader structural challenges within the civil service.
- 780.** Considering these observations, the Committee considers it both necessary and appropriate to dedicate this Chapter to a detailed examination of institutional performance, with a view to strengthening accountability, improving administrative discipline, and underscoring the need for meaningful civil service reform.
- 781.** Against this background, the Committee considers it necessary to examine the conduct of each institution individually. While the weaknesses identified are systemic in nature, accountability must also be understood at the institutional level. The sections that follow, therefore, assess each institution based on its mandate, its role in the events under review, and the extent to which it met the standards of accountability, documentation, and administrative discipline expected of it.

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

- 782.** The Committee finds that the Ministry of Justice was the central institutional actor on behalf of the Government throughout the life of the Commission of Inquiry. The Ministry negotiated contracts, facilitated the appointment of commissioners, the Lead Counsel, and the Secretary to the Commission, and served as the primary interface between the Government and the Commission. In practical terms, the Ministry was the face of the process, of course, all of which was done on behalf of the Government.
- 783.** It is therefore of particular concern that the Ministry's records were unable to provide a coherent and complete account of how the Commission was established, how it functioned, and how critical

decisions were taken. While weaknesses in record keeping were observed across several institutions, they are most serious in the case of the Ministry of Justice because of its prominence and centrality in the affairs concerning the commission. The Ministry's records ought to have told the story of the Commission. Instead, they left fundamental gaps.

- 784.** The Committee notes that the very establishment of this Special Select Committee is itself a testament to those failures. Matters that should have been readily ascertainable from ministerial records required reconstruction through witness testimony and secondary documentation. Even after extensive inquiry, certain questions that would ordinarily have been answered through a functional and reliable record-keeping system remain unresolved.
- 785.** The Committee further finds that the Ministry's document management practices are deeply inadequate. Evidence confirmed that official records are kept in a physical backroom without a modern, indexed, or searchable system. The Committee considers this wholly undesirable. In an institution entrusted with safeguarding the legal memory of the State, such arrangements amount to administrative incompetence. Poor record-keeping at this level undermines transparency, weakens accountability, and erodes public confidence.
- 786.** Beyond record management, the Committee finds that the Ministry failed to ensure functional clarity within the Commission's administrative structure. Several staff members of the Commission operated without formal letters of appointment, written terms of reference, or clear role descriptions. This resulted in uncertainty over responsibilities and weakened internal accountability. While the Commission of Inquiry Act places organisational responsibility on the Commission itself, the Ministry of Justice maintained a close working relationship with the Commission and should have ensured that these basic administrative safeguards were in place.
- 787.** The Committee also finds that the manner in which the Government, through the Ministry of Justice, interfaced with the Commission was often undesirable. Communications touching on governance or policy were not consistently conducted through formal, transparent channels. The Committee is of the view that where the Government must engage a commission on matters affecting its work, such engagement should, as far as possible, be formal and on the record. Informal or opaque interaction risks compromising both the independence and perceived integrity of commissions of inquiry.
- 788.** The Committee acknowledges that the Commission was established during an exceptional period of political transition and that prevailing circumstances influenced how certain decisions were taken. However, those circumstances do not excuse systemic failures in record keeping, administrative clarity, or institutional discipline, particularly within the policy institution that is constitutionally responsible for justice.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1.** The Committee recommends that the Ministry of Justice undertake comprehensive reform of its records management systems, including the establishment of a secure, indexed, and digitised archival framework. The MoJ should collaborate with the National Records Service to streamline its record-keeping.
- 2.** Mandatory documentation standards should be adopted for all commissions of inquiry, including written terms of reference, appointment letters, and role descriptions.

3. The Committee further recommends that all engagements between the Government and commissions of inquiry on matters of policy or governance be conducted through formal, documented channels.

REGISTRAR GENERAL

789. The Committee considers it important to underscore the institutional significance of the Office of the Registrar General, formally known as the Registrar General's Department under the Ministry of Justice. The Office is a statutory office of longstanding importance within common law systems and has historically been regarded as the central authority responsible for the custody and integrity of official public registries. Traditionally, the Registrar General serves as the custodian of the State's formal records relating to civil marriages, property instruments, and other legally significant documents. The Office exists to ensure that legal rights can be traced through reliable documentary history, and that public records remain accurate, secure, and capable of being relied upon by courts, Government, and the general public alike.
790. Historically, within the English common law tradition from which much of the modern registry system developed, the establishment of the Registrar General was intended to centralise and standardise the custody of public records, moving away from fragmented and informal systems. The enduring significance of that model lies in the principle that registry systems must preserve continuity of record, accuracy of information, and long-term accessibility of legal documents. It is against this historical and institutional backdrop that the Committee assesses the performance of the Registrar General's Department, recognising that weaknesses in such an office have consequences not only for administration, but for legal certainty, public trust, and the protection of citizens' rights.
791. The Committee finds that the record keeping practices within the Registrar General's Department fall significantly below the standard expected of an institution entrusted with maintaining some of the most important legal records of the State. The Registrar General is responsible for maintaining official registers relating to civil marriages, deeds and land instruments, intellectual property, and other legal documents that directly affect the personal rights and property interests of citizens. Given the nature of these functions, the Department is expected to operate at the highest standard of record management, accuracy, preservation, and historical continuity.
792. The Committee considers this issue to be more than a technical administrative weakness. The Registrar General's Department is, in effect, the legal memory of many aspects of civil and commercial life in The Gambia. If historical continuity is not preserved in registry records, the integrity of property rights, contractual enforcement, and legal certainty is weakened.
793. The Committee is further concerned by the physical condition of record storage within the Department. Evidence before the Committee confirmed that a substantial portion of registry records is stored in conditions that do not meet basic archival or preservation standards. Documents

were observed stored in boxes contained in deteriorating rooms, exposed to dust, and rainfall due to a leaky roof, with some records showing visible signs of mould. The Committee notes that documents in such condition risk becoming unusable over time, which may permanently deprive the public and the State of legally significant historical records.

- 794.** The Committee emphasises that the Registrar General’s Department is entrusted with documents of lifelong and generational importance, including marriage records, land title documentation, and other instruments that define legal identity and ownership. The current state of record preservation is inconsistent with the importance of these responsibilities and presents a serious risk to institutional credibility and public trust.
- 795.** In the context of the Preservation Order of the 22nd day of May 2017, the Committee also finds that the Department did not demonstrate the level of custodial discipline expected of an institution charged by a court with safeguarding assets. The absence of structured custody registers and contemporaneous reporting further reflects systemic weaknesses in record management culture. In this respect, the Committee notes that during the pendency of the Commission, in and around the year 2018, the Registrar General’s Office experienced a change in leadership when the holder of the office at the time was redeployed to another portfolio. The Committee observed that, following this redeployment, responsibilities relating to custody and control of assets which had been vested by the Court in the Registrar General were not clearly or formally transitioned in a manner consistent with the intent of the Preservation Order. The Committee emphasises that where custody and control are vested in a statutory office by a court, those responsibilities attach to the office itself and not to the individual office holder. Accordingly, upon the redeployment of Mr. Alieu Jallow (the Registrar General at the time) and the appointment of a successor, it was incumbent upon the institution to ensure that the incoming Registrar General formally assumed the custodial responsibilities associated with the office.
- 796.** The Committee finds that the failure to clearly and formally transition these responsibilities created avoidable uncertainty regarding custodial authority and weakened institutional compliance with the Court’s directive. This episode further reflects broader weaknesses in institutional continuity, succession planning, and interdepartmental coordination. The Committee considers that where court mandated responsibilities are attached to a statutory office, internal administrative movements should not interrupt or dilute the legal obligations attached to that office.
- 797.** Furthermore, a particularly serious concern identified by the Committee relates to the cancellation of leases, and the issuance of new instruments. The evidence before the Committee suggests that when a lease is cancelled, a new record is issued. The new record does not reference the historical record that preceded it. The Committee finds this practice deeply flawed. Cancellation of a lease should not erase historical traceability. Rather, cancellation should itself form part of the permanent record, supported by clear annotations and cross referencing. Where this is not done, the registry risks creating the false impression that no prior history exists. Over time, this undermines

legal certainty, weakens the integrity of land administration, and exposes the State and private parties to avoidable disputes.

- 798.** The Committee further finds that, upon completion of the Commission's hearing, the Registrar General cancelled leases on the instruction of the then Deputy Director of Civil Litigation, Mr. Kimbeng Tah. The evidence indicates that these instructions were acted upon without independent verification of legal authority and without reference to a court order or other competent statutory directive. The Committee considers this highly irregular. The Deputy Director of Civil Litigation is not an authority empowered to direct the cancellation of registered land interests. The Committee is of the view that the Registrar General should only act on such matters pursuant to a court order or through the lawful land administration chain, namely, through the Director of Lands and Surveys acting on the lawful instruction of the Minister responsible for Lands. The Committee finds that acting on instructions from a subordinate officer in this context reflects serious weaknesses in professional judgment, procedural discipline, and adherence to administrative hierarchy.
- 799.** The Committee also finds that, having been vested with custody and control of certain assets, including land, under the 2017 Preservation Orders, the Registrar General subsequently acted in contradiction to that custodial obligation. Evidence before the Committee shows that, in and around 2018, during the pendency of the Commission, the Registrar General received instructions from the Director of Lands and Surveys to cancel certain leases and proceeded to act on those instructions. In doing so, the Registrar General effectively undermined the legal effect of the Preservation Order, which had placed the assets under judicial protection.
- 800.** The Committee considers this particularly serious. Where custody and control of assets are vested by a court order, administrative instructions cannot override that judicial authority unless authorised by the court itself. The Committee finds that the Registrar General's actions in this regard demonstrate a combination of poor judgment, institutional negligence, and lack of coordination within Government. The Committee further finds, with great concern, that this episode either reflects a broader weakness in the interinstitutional understanding of the binding nature of court orders and the limits of administrative authority or an intentional disregard and a lack of respect for the authority of the courts.
- 801.** These failures are not merely technical lapses. They go to the core of the rule of law, the separation of administrative and judicial authority, and the integrity of asset preservation mechanisms put in place by the courts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1.** The Committee recommends that the Registrar General's Department undertake urgent and comprehensive reform of its record management and archival systems. This should include the establishment of modern registry systems that preserve historical continuity of records, mandatory cross-referencing of cancelled and replacement instruments, and digitisation of legacy records.

2. The Committee further recommends the immediate upgrading of physical storage facilities to meet minimum archival preservation standards and the introduction of professional records management protocols supported by trained archival personnel.

REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES

802. The Office of the Registrar of Companies is the statutory authority responsible for the incorporation, registration, and regulation of companies, as well as the maintenance of official corporate records, including company formation documents (Memorandum and Articles of Association), shareholder information, etc. The Office serves as the Government's primary repository of corporate legal identity and ownership information and is central to ensuring commercial certainty, regulatory oversight, and transparency in corporate governance.
803. The Committee finds that the Office of the Registrar of Companies did not adequately discharge its institutional responsibility to maintain reliable, accessible, and legally authoritative corporate records. As the statutory custodian of company formation documents, shareholder registers, governing instruments, and beneficial ownership information, the Office plays a central role in maintaining commercial certainty, regulatory oversight, and legal traceability of corporate entities.
804. The Committee also finds that the physical storage and record management conditions within the Office of the Registrar of Companies are deeply concerning and fall significantly below the standard expected of a registry institution. Evidence before the Committee indicates that corporate records are stored in a confined storage room that is poorly maintained and filled beyond reasonable capacity. Documents are not arranged sequentially, chronologically, or according to any discernible registry order, making retrieval, verification, and cross-referencing extremely difficult.
805. The Committee notes with particular concern that evidence presented during hearings indicated that the storage environment presented health and safety risks. The Committee was informed that entry into the storage room posed a hazard and that access to stored records was therefore restricted. The Committee considers this situation wholly unacceptable. A statutory registry charged with maintaining legally operative corporate records cannot operate in circumstances where those records cannot be safely accessed, verified, or produced when required by lawful authority.
806. The Committee recalls a specific instance where it requested details relating to shareholders of several companies, as well as company formation and governing documents. The Registrar of Companies responded that entry into the storage facility posed a health and safety hazard, and that retrieval of the requested documents was therefore not possible at the time. The Committee does not treat this matter lightly. Corporate registry records form the evidentiary foundation of corporate ownership, governance structure, and regulatory compliance. Where such records cannot be accessed due to unsafe or disorganised storage conditions, the integrity of the registry system itself is compromised.

- 807.** The Committee finds that the current storage and record management conditions create an unacceptable risk to the preservation, accessibility, and reliability of corporate records. The Committee is of the firm view that such conditions should not exist within a statutory registry and must be addressed as a matter of urgency.
- 808.** Taken together, these failures reflect deeper systemic weaknesses in registry management, institutional discipline, and administrative transformation. The Committee considers that the Office of the Registrar of Companies, given its importance to the national commercial infrastructure, must operate at a level consistent with best practice registry standards.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1.** The Committee recommends that the Office of the Registrar of Companies undertake urgent and comprehensive reform of its record management and storage systems. This should include immediate remediation of unsafe storage conditions, proper cataloguing and organisation of existing records, and accelerated digitisation of corporate registry records.
- 2.** The Committee also recommends that the Government treat the modernisation of the corporate registry as a priority institutional reform measure, given its central role in supporting economic governance, regulatory enforcement, and investor confidence.
- 3.** The Hon. Attorney General and Minister for Justice should report to the Assembly on all reforms implemented to enhance the company registry within four months of the tabling of this report.

MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

- 809.** The Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs is the Government's principal authority responsible for public financial management, fiscal policy, and oversight of Government assets and revenues. Through its statutory and policy functions, the Ministry plays a central role in ensuring that public resources are properly accounted for, managed in accordance with law, and protected in the national interest.
- 810.** The Committee finds that the Ministry of Finance did not take a major role in matters relating to the Commission and the subsequent handling of assets and proceeds. The absence of the Ministry's institutional oversight and technical input was evident throughout several aspects of the process. The Committee is of the view that the involvement of the Ministry, particularly at the policy level, would likely have mitigated many of the anomalies later observed in asset management, financial traceability, and accountability of proceeds.
- 811.** The Committee notes with concern that the Ministry was omitted from participation in the interministerial committee. Evidence before the Committee suggests that this omission arose because the Minister responsible at the time was adversely mentioned in matters under investigation. While the Committee recognises the importance of managing conflicts of interest, it

finds that the complete exclusion of the Ministry was neither necessary nor consistent with sound governance practice.

- 812.** The Committee is of the view that Ministers serve as principal advisers to the President within their respective portfolios. Ensuring that each Ministry is able to perform its statutory and advisory functions strengthens executive decision making and reduces the risk of administrative anomalies. The Committee considers that stronger institutional participation by the Ministry of Finance would likely have improved policy coordination, financial oversight, and accountability mechanisms during the period under review.
- 813.** The Committee notes, however, that following the conclusion of the Commission and the subsequent establishment of the interministerial committee, the Ministry of Finance was represented at the technical level. Evidence before the Committee confirms that the Ministry participated in the technical committee composed of Permanent Secretaries drawn from five ministries, which operated as a subcommittee of the interministerial committee. The Committee acknowledges that this technical level participation contributed to certain aspects of coordination and implementation during the post-Commission phase.
- 814.** Notwithstanding this later participation, the Committee maintains that earlier and more consistent institutional involvement at the policy and decision-making level would likely have strengthened coordination, financial governance, and oversight during the critical stages of asset management and disposal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Committee recommends that the Government, beyond the existing statutory provisions, institutionalise a structured administrative and operational regime governing the recovery, management, disposal, and accounting of public assets. This regime should;
 - (a) Clearly define the procedures, institutional responsibilities, financial controls, and reporting obligations across all relevant Ministries and Departments.
 - (b) Position the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs at both policy and technical levels in all coordination arrangements relating to public asset recovery and disposal to ensure fiscal discipline and proper reconciliation of proceeds.
2. The Committee further recommends that the Government adopt a formal conflict of interest mechanism applicable to Ministers and senior officials. Such protocols should provide for structured recusal, delegation of authority, or temporary reassignment of oversight responsibilities, while preserving the full operational involvement of the relevant Ministry as an institution.
3. The Government should ensure that all relevant laws and regulations relating to public finance are respected, including the Public Finance Act and the AMRC Act.
4. The Committee recommends that the Government institutionalise the participation of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs in all future national coordination structures dealing with public asset recovery, asset disposal, or proceeds management. This

participation should be embedded at both policy and technical levels to ensure continuity between decision-making and implementation.

ACCOUNTANT GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT

- 815.** The Accountant General's Department serves as the Government's central accounting authority responsible for the recording, reconciliation, and reporting of public funds. The Department plays a critical role in ensuring that Government revenues and receipts are properly documented, accurately recorded, traceable through the accounting system, and capable of independent verification.
- 816.** The Committee notes that the Accountant General's Department was not directly involved in the execution or financial documentation of certain transactions during the initial stages of asset sales arising from the Commission's work. Evidence before the Committee indicates that the Department was not present during the earliest sales of tractors conducted by the Commission and was similarly not involved during the cattle sales. As a result, those transactions were conducted without the full benefit of public accounting oversight mechanisms. In several instances, there were no formally raised receipts, no supporting vouchers, and limited structured documentation to support later financial reconciliation.
- 817.** While the Committee notes that certain early sales processes, particularly the initial sales of tractors, were operationally organised, the absence of accounting oversight created gaps in financial checks and balances and significantly complicated retrospective accountability.
- 818.** The Committee considers this to be a serious anomaly. Large scale asset sales involving Government property should, as a matter of best practice, include accounting oversight from the outset. Early involvement of the Accountant General's Department would have strengthened financial documentation, ensured proper receipt generation, and supported later reconciliation and audit processes.
- 819.** The Committee further finds that although the Accountant General's Department later became involved in aspects of the asset disposal process, weaknesses remained in transaction documentation and financial traceability. Evidence before the Committee indicated that during Phase II of the tractor and vehicle sales, several receipts relating to vehicle sales were duplicated, while in other instances supporting documentation was incomplete or missing. These weaknesses affected the Committee's ability to fully trace certain transactions and raised concerns regarding the reliability of the records.
- 820.** The Committee notes that proceeds from asset sales were generally paid into public accounts in accordance with existing financial practice. However, the absence of the Department in several sale exercises made it difficult to directly link individual asset disposals to specific accounting entries and deposits due to the lack of a functional accounting system. The Committee is of the view that large scale asset recovery or disposal exercises require enhanced accounting controls beyond

routine revenue recording practices, particularly where transactions occur across multiple phases and institutions. To this end, the sales of cattle conducted by the Office of the Sheriff are of particular concern to the Committee as it was smeared with irregularities and non-conventional practices. There was a non-existent accounting framework, and the occurrence of basic administrative blunders.

- 821.** Taken together, these weaknesses reflect systemic gaps in accounting frameworks for asset recovery and disposal processes, rather than routine Government accounting failures. However, the Committee emphasises that such gaps must be addressed to ensure full financial traceability and accountability in future exercises.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Committee recommends that the Government establish a mandatory framework requiring the early and continuous involvement of the Accountant General's Department in all future public asset disposal, asset recovery, or large-scale public asset management exercises. This involvement should begin at the planning stage and continue through execution, accounting, reconciliation, and reporting phases.
2. The Committee recommends that the Government establish transaction traceability standards requiring that all asset disposal proceeds be linked through identifiable accounting trails from the point of sale to deposit into Government accounts and final recording in Government financial statements.
3. The Committee further recommends the establishment of dedicated ledger codes or accounting classifications for asset recovery and asset disposal proceeds, in order to prevent the loss of traceability where funds are deposited into consolidated accounts.
4. The Committee recommends that the Government establish a formal mechanism to ensure that the Accountant General's Department maintains continuous accounting oversight over all Government institutions that exercise asset disposal or asset management functions. This may include the physical deployment of designated accounting officers, the appointment of liaison accounting agents, or the establishment of integrated financial reporting mechanisms to ensure real-time documentation, verification, and recording of all asset disposal transactions across Government institutions. In particular, the Committee notes that the Office of the Sheriff performs functions that directly involve the disposal of assets pursuant to judicial processes. A more specific and direct recommendation in respect of accounting oversight of the Office of the Sheriff is set out in the relevant section below.

DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT

- 822.** The Committee finds that the Department of Parks and Wildlife Management failed to fulfil its custodial responsibilities under the Preservation Order. This, of course, was due to the fact that the Department was not notified nor served with a copy of the preservatory order.

- 823.** The Committee further finds that there was limited evidence of structured coordination between the Department and other institutions, including the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Environment, Climate Change, and Natural Resources. As a result, there was no reliable institutional record demonstrating the condition or status of wildlife assets under preservation. This failure weakened asset preservation mechanisms and deprived this Committee of the necessary records for effective oversight.
- 824.** The Committee further finds that there was limited evidence of structured coordination between the Department and other institutions, including the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Environment, Climate Change, and Natural Resources. As a result, there was no reliable institutional record demonstrating the condition or status of wildlife assets under preservation. This failure weakened asset preservation mechanisms and deprived this Committee of the necessary records for effective oversight.
- 825.** Beyond the specific custodial failures identified, the Committee finds that the Department appears to have experienced prolonged institutional marginalisation within Government structures, including limited strategic and operational support from its line Ministry, the Ministry of Environment, Climate Change and Natural Resources. Evidence before the Committee suggests that the Department operates with significant resource and administrative constraints that limit its ability to discharge its statutory mandate effectively.
- 826.** The Committee finds that the Department requires substantial institutional strengthening. This includes capacity building, organisational restructuring where necessary, and improved administrative and operational support. The Committee further notes that the Department lacks adequate operational resources, including mobility resources necessary for field inspection, wildlife monitoring, and protected area management. The absence of adequate vehicles, field logistics, and operational funding significantly undermines the Department's ability to carry out surveys, patrol protected areas and enforce conservation measures.
- 827.** The Committee further notes evidence that the Department has faced severe operational resource constraints affecting its ability to maintain and care for wildlife under its supervision. Testimony before the Committee indicates that the Department does not maintain a consistent feeding programme and is, in some instances, only able to provide feed intermittently based on resource availability. The Committee considers this situation deeply concerning given the Government's responsibility to ensure humane and sustainable wildlife management.
- 828.** The Committee also notes evidence that external support has at times supplemented wildlife feeding requirements. In particular, the Committee was informed that the Horse and Donkey Trust have periodically donated carcasses of deceased horses and donkeys, which have been used to feed certain wildlife species, including hyenas and crocodiles. While the Committee acknowledges the contribution of external partners, it considers it inappropriate for core wildlife sustenance systems

to rely primarily on ad hoc external donations rather than structured Government supported conservation management systems.

- 829.** The Committee further notes evidence relating to the wildlife previously located in Kanilai. Evidence before the Committee indicates that, at the time of the former President’s departure from office, several wild and exotic animals were present within the area. The Committee notes with concern that the current status of several of these animals appears uncertain, and that some animals may have dispersed into surrounding forest areas, including areas approaching the border with the Republic of Senegal. The Committee considers that this situation reflects serious weaknesses in wildlife management and monitoring.
- 830.** The Committee emphasises that wildlife management, particularly where animals have previously been maintained in relatively controlled environments, requires structured monitoring, tracking, and conservation planning. The Committee considers that the Government must take proactive steps to account for, track, and where appropriate safely recover wildlife populations that were previously under managed care.
- 831.** The Committee further notes evidence presented during the Committee’s site visit to Kanilai, indicating that several exotic snakes were released into the wild due to the inability to sustain feeding requirements. The Committee considers this evidence to be indicative of critical resource and planning deficiencies within wildlife management structures and underscores the urgent need for strengthened conservation resource planning.
- 832.** Taken together, these findings demonstrate the need for significant strengthening of wildlife management systems, including resource planning, conservation logistics, monitoring systems, and emergency response capacity.
- 833.** The Committee emphasises that The Gambia is endowed with significant natural land resources, forests, and wildlife ecosystems that require active and sustained protection. Weak institutional capacity within the Department responsible for wildlife and conservation management poses long-term risks to environmental sustainability, biodiversity protection, and national ecological heritage.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1.** The Committee recommends that the Ministry of Environment, Climate Change and Natural Resources undertake a comprehensive institutional strengthening programme for the Department of Parks and Wildlife Management. This should include capacity building in conservation management, environmental monitoring, asset documentation, and institutional administration.
- 2.** The Committee recommends that the Government prioritise the provision of adequate operational resources to the Department, including mobility resources such as field

vehicles, surveillance and monitoring equipment, and sufficient operational funding to support field inspections, wildlife surveys, and protected area management.

3. The Committee further recommends that the Government establish a structured wildlife sustenance and conservation resource framework to ensure consistent feeding, veterinary care, and monitoring of wildlife under the Government's responsibility, supported by dedicated budgetary allocations and operational planning mechanisms.
4. The Committee recommends that the Government undertake a comprehensive wildlife status assessment, including identification, tracking, and, where appropriate, recovery or conservation management planning for wildlife populations. This initiative should include a wildlife register that captures all wildlife within The Gambia.
5. The Committee recommends that the Government undertake organisational and administrative reforms necessary to strengthen the Department's effectiveness as the principal national authority for wildlife and conservation management.
6. The Committee recommends that Government explore the designation and preservation, for conservation or environmental management purposes, of any portions of land in Kanilai that do not form part of the former President's recognised traditional or customary residential and family areas, where such designation is consistent with applicable land laws, environmental laws, and public interest considerations.
7. The Committee recommends that the Government consider making the Department of Parks and Wildlife an agency and explore the revenue-generating possibilities the Department can achieve.

THE GAMBIA LIVESTOCK MARKETING AGENCY (GLMA)

834. The Gambia Livestock Marketing Agency (GLMA) is mandated to support the livestock sector development, including livestock marketing and livestock management support functions. The Committee notes that GLMA was notified of the existence and essence of the High Court preservatory order, though not served with a copy of the Order itself.
835. The Committee finds that GLMA failed to comply with its custodial obligations under the High Court Order. Although the Agency was designated as custodian of livestock assets, the Agency did not take custody promptly and instead raised capacity concerns as a basis for noncompliance.
836. The Committee emphasises that custodianship under a court order is mandatory and not discretionary. Institutional capacity constraints should be addressed through Government support mechanisms, but such constraints do not suspend obligations imposed by a court. GLMA's failure to assume custody in a timely manner weakened the protection afforded to perishable livestock assets and contributed to uncertainty regarding livestock numbers, movement patterns, mortality, and eventual disposition.

- 837.** The Committee further finds that GLMA did not maintain reliable and contemporaneous livestock records. Evidence before the Committee indicates that livestock registers were inconsistent, incomplete, and in some instances reconstructed retrospectively. The Committee considers this particularly serious given that livestock assets are mobile and require continuous monitoring to preserve value, ensure traceability, and prevent loss or diversion.
- 838.** The Committee further notes with serious concern evidence that the Agency lacked basic technical equipment necessary to conduct livestock valuation. Evidence from the current Board Chair (who previously served as Director of Technical Services) and from the Secretary to the Commission indicated that, in certain instances, livestock valuation relied on what was described as an “eye test” method. The Committee finds this approach wholly unacceptable for purposes of Government asset valuation. The Committee considers that livestock valuation must be supported by recognised technical valuation methodologies, supported by trained personnel and appropriate tools.
- 839.** The Committee further finds that the Agency’s institutional capacity constraints extended beyond equipment shortages to broader structural issues relating to human resource capacity and technical expertise. The Committee is of the view that the Agency requires structured capacity strengthening to ensure that its personnel possess the technical competence required to discharge its statutory mandate, particularly in areas involving asset custody, valuation, and monitoring.
- 840.** The Committee also finds that coordination between GLMA and its line Ministry, the Ministry of Agriculture, requires strengthening. Effective livestock asset management requires clear policy direction, operational support, and technical oversight from the line Ministry to ensure that agencies are properly supported and supervised.
- 841.** Taken together, the Committee finds that the weaknesses observed reflect systemic institutional capacity and resourcing deficiencies that must be addressed if GLMA is to effectively perform its mandate.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1.** The Committee recommends that the Government undertake a comprehensive institutional needs assessment of GLMA, covering technical capacity, equipment requirements, operational resources, staffing competence, and organisational structure, with a view to developing a structured capacity-building programme for the Agency.
- 2.** The Committee recommends that the Government ensure that GLMA is equipped with appropriate technical tools and equipment necessary for livestock valuation, monitoring, and asset management, and that livestock valuation methodologies used by Government agencies conform to recognised technical and professional standards.
- 3.** The Committee further recommends that the Government strengthen human resource development within GLMA through targeted technical training, professional development, and competence-based recruitment and deployment aligned with the Agency’s statutory mandate.

4. The Committee recommends that GLMA establish reliable livestock record-keeping systems capable of supporting tracking, documentation, and reporting of livestock assets under Government control.
5. The Committee further recommends that the Government strengthen coordination mechanisms between GLMA and the Ministry of Agriculture to ensure that policy direction, operational support, and technical supervision are aligned and capable of supporting effective livestock asset management.

MINISTRY OF LANDS, REGIONAL GOVERNMENT AND RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

842. The Committee finds that the Ministry of Lands, Regional Government and Religious Affairs, as the principal policy authority responsible for land administration in The Gambia, did not exercise sufficient coordination and supervisory control over land-related processes that arose during and after the Commission's work. While certain technical functions are lawfully vested in the Department of Lands and Surveys and other allied institutions, the Ministry retains overarching responsibility for policy direction, interinstitutional coordination, and the integrity of the national land administration framework. In this regard, the Ministry's role ought to have been central, structured, and directive.
843. Evidence before the Committee demonstrates that significant actions affecting landed properties, including lease cancellations, reallocations, subleases, and reversions to the State, occurred within a fragmented administrative environment. The Committee finds that there was no clearly articulated central coordination mechanism led by the Ministry to ensure that decisions arising from the White Paper, court proceedings, and interministerial engagements were implemented in a coherent and legally sequenced manner. This institutional gap created uncertainty, inconsistencies in execution, and weakened accountability.
844. The Committee further observes that the Ministry did not assert sufficient supervisory oversight to ensure that land administration processes strictly complied with the State Lands Act, applicable regulations, and constitutional safeguards relating to property rights. In some instances, leases were cancelled, reallocated, or otherwise dealt with during the pendency of the Commission's investigations and even judicial proceedings, without clear demonstration of structured ministerial oversight. Given that the prerogative to cancel State leases ultimately rests with the Minister responsible for Lands, the absence of demonstrable centralized control represents a governance deficiency.
845. Beyond the specific properties examined and in light of the third-party claims, the Committee notes more broadly that the current land administration system in The Gambia reflects structural weaknesses, including fragmented institutional mandates, inconsistent documentation practices, weak registry integration, and insufficient digitalization. These weaknesses are not confined to the matters reviewed in this inquiry but point to systemic challenges within the national land governance framework.

846. The Committee is therefore of the considered view that there is an urgent need for a comprehensive overhaul of land administration in The Gambia. As the policy lead institution, the Ministry of Lands must spearhead this reform process to restore coherence, transparency, and legal certainty in land governance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Committee recommends that the Ministry of Lands, Regional Government and Religious Affairs urgently initiate and lead a comprehensive national land administration reform programme. This reform should include a review of the State Lands Act and related legislation, clarification of institutional mandates, strengthening of supervisory mechanisms, modernization of land registries, and the introduction of integrated digital land management systems to ensure transparency, traceability, and legal certainty.
2. The Committee recommends that the Ministry establish a formal land coordination framework to ensure that all actions affecting State lands, including cancellations, forfeitures, reallocations, and disposals, are centrally reviewed, legally vetted, and properly documented before implementation. This mechanism should ensure structured communication between the Ministry, the Department of Lands and Surveys, the Registrar General, the Ministry of Justice, the Gambia Tourism Board, and any other relevant institutions.
3. The Committee recommends that the Auditor General undertake a nationwide audit and reconciliation of State leases, allocations, and sales of land by the State. The outcome of such an audit should be formally reported to the National Assembly within six months to enable effective oversight.

DEPARTMENT OF LANDS AND SURVEYS

847. The Department of Lands and Surveys is the technical authority responsible for administering State lands. Its mandate includes processing leases, maintaining cadastral records, initiating cancellations and re-entries under the State Lands Act, and preserving the integrity of land documentation. The reliability of the national land regime depends fundamentally on the accuracy and continuity of the Department's records.

848. The Committee finds, with particular concern, a serious structural weakness in the manner in which cancellations of leases are recorded and sequenced. Evidence before the Committee shows that when a lease is cancelled and a new lease subsequently issued, the new lease is often assigned a fresh sequence without clear and systematic reference to the historical chain of title. As a result, when a file is searched under the new sequence, the prior history, including the original lease, the grounds for cancellation, and all intermediate transactions, are not readily apparent.

849. The Committee underscores that a cancellation is not the erasure of history. It is itself an event that must form part of the historical record of the land. Proper land administration requires that cancellations, re-entries, revocations, and subsequent reallocations be chronologically recorded

within a single traceable chain. The current practice, whereby cancellations effectively disrupt continuity of record, impairs transparency and makes it difficult to reconstruct the full transactional history of a property. This deficiency weakens oversight, exposes the system to manipulation, and undermines legal certainty.

- 850.** Beyond the structural issue of sequencing, the Committee finds that the Department’s record keeping practices are gravely deficient. During public hearings, the Committee issued several summonses for specific land files and supporting documentation. In numerous instances, the Department was unable to produce complete records. The documentation provided was incomplete, often limited to bits and pieces that did not give a full administrative picture of the properties in question. Critical correspondence, survey documents, internal memoranda, and historical entries were missing.
- 851.** Officials of the Department informed the Committee, on record, that several files had been “lost.” The Committee finds this explanation wholly unacceptable for an institution whose core mandate is the custody and preservation of land records. The loss of land files does not merely constitute administrative inefficiency; it creates uncertainty over property rights, frustrates accountability, and weakens public confidence in the land administration system.
- 852.** The Committee further notes a highly irregular occurrence during its proceedings: in response to a summons, the Department submitted original copies of an entire file to the Committee. That file has remained in the custody of the Committee for several months. The Committee finds it anomalous and institutionally unsafe for a department to surrender original records without retaining certified copies or maintaining a reliable archival backup. This raises a fundamental concern relating to how the Department continues to operate on a daily basis without secure and complete custody of its own primary records.
- 853.** These findings demonstrate yet again systemic weaknesses in documentation, archival indiscipline, and altered historical continuity within the Department’s land administration processes.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Department must establish a mandatory system whereby every lease, cancellation, re-entry, revocation, and reallocation form part of a single continuous and traceable historical chain. New lease numbers should expressly reference prior sequences to preserve transactional continuity.
2. The Ministry of Lands, Regional Government and Religious Affairs should develop and implement a digitisation and archival reform programme within the Department, including the creation of a secure Land Information Management System with indexed historical records and off-site backups.

3. The Committee recommends that the Government make budgetary allocations for the Department of Lands and Survey to undertake and implement a digitisation and archival programme for the department.
4. A formal protocol must prohibit the release of original files without certified duplication and recorded custody logs. The Department must at all times retain complete documentary control of its primary records.
5. A comprehensive needs assessment should be undertaken to evaluate staffing, archival infrastructure, technical capacity, and internal controls, followed by targeted reforms to strengthen the Department as part of a general Civil Service reform programme.

THE GAMBIA TOURISM BOARD

- 854.** The Gambia Tourism Board is the statutory authority responsible, under the Gambia Tourism Board Act, 2011, for the administration, regulation, and coordination of activities within the Tourism Development Area (TDA). By law, all land within approximately 800 metres from the high-water mark of the Atlantic coastline falls within the TDA and is therefore subject to the Board's regulatory and allocative authority. The TDA constitutes some of the most economically strategic land in the Republic. Its administration demands the highest standards of probity, documentation, and technical discipline.
- 855.** The Committee finds that the Board's record-keeping practices are profoundly inadequate. During the public hearings, the Committee encountered incomplete files, missing lease documentation, unstructured records, and instances where key information could not be produced. In some cases, files relating to high value coastal allocations were either partially assembled or could not be located. The Director General conceded deficiencies in documentation, attributing them to past administrations. The Committee does not consider this explanation sufficient. Institutional continuity requires preservation of records regardless of changes in leadership.
- 856.** The Committee further finds troubling inconsistencies between the Board's allocation records and the Companies Registry. In multiple instances, subleases were granted to entities whose corporate existence could not be verified. Certain companies were allocated land before their incorporation dates. In other cases, the names of beneficiaries listed in internal records did not correspond with any registered corporate entity. This reflects either inadequate due diligence or deliberate administrative indiscipline. Both scenarios are unacceptable.
- 857.** The Committee also observes a concentration of allocations within a narrow timeframe between 2019 and 2023 involving properties previously investigated by the Commission. The pattern of allocations, particularly within high value areas such as Kotu Point, Tanji River Side, Brufut, and Tujereng, raises serious concerns about the absence of a transparent, competitive, and publicly verifiable allocation framework.

- 858.** With respect to specific TDA properties identified by the Commission as having been illegally allocated and recommended for re-entry, the Committee finds that reallocation activities occurred contemporaneously with or shortly after cancellation processes. In certain cases, subleases were issued notwithstanding the ongoing policy or legal considerations surrounding those properties. This demonstrates weak internal controls and inadequate coordination between the Board and other executive institutions.
- 859.** The Committee is particularly concerned by the lack of clarity regarding the total number and measurement of TDA properties associated with the former President. The Commission identified 19 leases; the Committee's own analysis indicates that the number is in fact higher due to multiple lease segmentation of large tracts (e.g., Batokunku and Gunjur). The Board did not provide a consolidated, reconciled, and authoritative TDA inventory. This absence of a definitive registry undermines land governance within the TDA.
- 860.** The Committee further finds that, in certain instances, subleases were processed without clear evidence of comprehensive valuation, environmental assessment, or verification of the developmental capacity of the promoters. Given the environmental sensitivity and commercial value of coastal lands, such omissions are grave.
- 861.** Overall, the Committee finds systemic weaknesses in documentation, due diligence, verification of corporate beneficiaries, archival integrity, and institutional coordination. These weaknesses materially affect transparency in the management of Tourism Development Area lands.
- 862.** The Committee emphasises that the Tourism Development Area is a national economic asset of strategic importance. Its management must reflect discipline, transparency, and institutional maturity commensurate with that status. The weaknesses identified herein require urgent systemic reform to restore confidence in the governance of coastal lands.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1.** The Auditor General should conduct an immediate audit of all land within the Tourism Development Area, including verification of lease numbers, measurements, subleases, beneficiaries, and current status, and report to the Assembly within six months after the tabling of this report.
- 2.** The Committee also recommends that the GT Board develop and maintain a definitive, reconciled digital TDA land register containing lease histories, sublease records, corporate details of beneficiaries, allocation dates, and development status.
- 3.** No allocation or sublease within the TDA should be granted without prior verification from the Registrar of Companies confirming incorporation status, shareholding structure, and beneficial ownership. Allocations to non-existent or improperly constituted entities must be reviewed and revoked with immediate effect.

4. All future allocations within the TDA must follow a transparent, competitive, and publicly advertised process with clearly defined evaluation criteria. Direct or discretionary allocations should be strictly prohibited except in circumstances expressly authorised by law and documented in writing.
5. A formal coordination mechanism must be established between the GT Board, Ministry of Lands, Registrar General, and Ministry of Justice to ensure that cancellations, re-entries, and reallocations are lawfully sequenced and fully documented before new allocations occur.
6. The GT Board should undergo an institutional capacity assessment, focusing on archival systems, land administration procedures, compliance monitoring, and internal controls.

THE JUDICIARY

- 863.** The Committee encountered significant challenges in obtaining complete judicial administrative records relevant to asset preservation and disposal processes under review. Judicial records form a critical component of institutional accountability and legal traceability, particularly in matters involving court orders relating to asset preservation, custody, and enforcement. The availability of complete judicial administrative records is essential to ensuring that oversight bodies are able to fully understand and account for matters involving the judiciary.
- 864.** The Committee notes with serious concern that the Court of Appeal did not submit records to the Committee despite formal written requests addressed through the court registry and brought to the attention of the Judicial Secretary. The Committee further notes that the Supreme Court similarly did not submit records to the Committee. In both instances, the respective registries indicated that no records were available. The Committee expresses severe disappointment at this outcome. The Committee notes that, through witness testimony and documentary evidence obtained from other sources, it relied on judicial proceedings conducted in both courts in the course of its evidentiary analysis. These materials were not provided directly by the courts themselves.
- 865.** The Committee further notes that the High Court provided only partial records. Evidence before the Committee indicates that multiple files existed in relation to the suit against the former president (*supra*), and that not all relevant files were produced. As a result, gaps remained in the Committee's ability to fully reconstruct the procedural and enforcement history of certain processes.
- 866.** The Committee emphasises that while judicial independence must be fully respected, this principle does not remove the institutional responsibility to maintain proper administrative records or to cooperate, within the bounds of law and the constitutional principle of separation of powers.
- 867.** The Committee is of the view that the issues observed appear to relate primarily to administrative record management and institutional record retrieval systems rather than judicial decision-making processes. The Committee considers that strengthening judicial administrative systems would

enhance institutional transparency, support inter-institutional coordination, and strengthen public confidence in the justice system.

RECOMMENDATION

1. The Committee recommends prioritising the transformation and digitisation of judicial registry systems to improve accessibility, preservation, and transmission of institutional records.
2. The Committee further recommends that, as a matter of administrative practice, the judiciary should ensure that all vacation judges are given full and complete case files, as well as a liaison administrator to the substantive court for better coordination.

OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF

- 868.** The Committee finds that several serious issues arose in relation to the operations of the Office of the Sheriff during the relevant period. The first and most immediate issue relates to the state of record-keeping within the Office. When the Committee requested records relating to the execution of court orders and asset sales, the records produced were extremely limited in volume and detail. The documentation provided contained minimal referencing and did not allow for clear tracing of processes, decisions, or transaction history. In other words, the records could not enlighten any accountability initiative, such as the task bestowed upon this Committee.
- 869.** The Committee had the benefit of hearing evidence from both the current Sheriff and the Sheriff who held office during the relevant period. The Committee observed that, in several instances, the files maintained by the Office contained only a small number of documents, which were insufficient to provide a complete institutional record of enforcement actions undertaken. While the former Sheriff subsequently provided additional documentation, the Committee noted variances between documents produced at different stages, further complicating efforts to reconstruct a reliable audit trail.
- 870.** The Committee notes that record-keeping deficiencies were observed across multiple institutions. However, the Committee emphasises that the Office of the Sheriff occupies a unique institutional position as an enforcement arm of the courts and therefore must operate at the highest standards of record integrity, documentation, and procedural transparency. The Committee considers that the standards expected of the Office of the Sheriff must reflect the sensitive and independent nature of its functions. It is worthy to note that the Office of the Sheriff is a statutory office within the Judicial Service with great historical significance. The office is placed to ensure that all enforcement orders are effected per the court direction and in accordance with law, essentially bringing dignity and authority to court directives that require enforcement.
- 871.** The Committee further finds that serious procedural anomalies occurred during asset sales conducted under the authority of the Office of the Sheriff. Evidence before the Committee indicated that third parties, including individuals from outside public service, influenced

operational processes relating to asset sales. The Committee heard evidence suggesting that an official from the Ministry of Justice influenced aspects of the Sheriff's operational work. The Committee also heard evidence suggesting that a private individual who was not a public servant played an operational role in aspects of the sales process. The Committee considers this highly irregular and inconsistent with the proper execution of court-ordered enforcement functions.

- 872.** The Committee further finds that the Office of the Sheriff did not fully exercise control over the execution process. Evidence suggests that the required preparatory steps, including prior asset valuation in accordance with court directives, were not completed. The Committee notes that valuation responsibilities were expected to be carried out with technical support from the Gambia Livestock Marketing Agency (GLMA), but evidence before the Committee indicates that valuation was not conducted prior to sales. In fact, the evidence shows that the Office of the Sheriff did not contact or notify the Agency.
- 873.** The Committee further notes evidence suggesting that sales were conducted without sufficient transparency and without the level of procedural openness expected in Sheriff-supervised disposal processes. The Committee considers that such practices undermine public confidence in judicial enforcement mechanisms.
- 874.** The Committee further notes evidence relating to a bank account opened by the Office of the Sheriff, with signatories reportedly including the Sheriff and the Judicial Secretary. Evidence before the Committee indicated that at a later stage, the Ministry of Justice requested account details from the Office of the Sheriff and was provided with such details. Evidence further suggests that funds were subsequently transferred from the account without clear evidence of authorisation or action by the Sheriff or the Judicial Secretary. The Committee notes that this raises serious institutional concerns. The Committee is unable to definitively determine the origin of the transfer based on available evidence, but notes that if funds were transferred by an institution without appropriate authorization from within the Judiciary, this would raise serious concerns regarding the integrity and independence of the judiciary.
- 875.** The Committee further notes that receipt documentation associated with sales transactions was absent, further weakening financial accountability.
- 876.** The Committee expresses serious concern regarding the operational integrity, procedural discipline, and institutional accountability structures within the Office of the Sheriff during the relevant period. The Committee notes that these weaknesses have negatively affected institutional confidence in the Office, which extends to the Judiciary.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Committee recommends that a special independent audit be conducted into the operational, financial, and administrative systems of the Office of the Sheriff, including

execution processes, auction procedures, account management practices, and recordkeeping systems.

2. The Committee further recommends that the Judicial Service Commission undertake a comprehensive institutional review and restructuring of the Office of the Sheriff, including review of operational processes, reporting structures, and accountability frameworks.
3. The Committee recommends that the Judicial Service Commission undertake a legislative review of the legal framework governing the Office of the Sheriff to ensure that statutory provisions clearly define operational independence, financial accountability, recordkeeping obligations, and enforcement procedures.
4. The Committee further recommends that structured financial oversight support be attached to the Office of the Sheriff. This may include permanent or designated personnel from the Accountant General's Department and the Directorate of Internal Audit, in order to strengthen financial controls, improve transaction traceability, and ensure compliance with public financial management standards.
5. The Judicial Service Commission should appoint an independent internal auditor to the Sheriff's Office.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND CABINET SECRETARIAT

- 877.** The Office of the President, including the Cabinet, serves as the central coordinating authority for public policy implementation, interministerial coordination, and high-level executive decision making. The effective functionality of this Office is therefore critical to ensuring coherent Government action, lawful execution of policy decisions, and proper coordination between Ministries, Departments, and Agencies.
- 878.** The Committee notes that its early concerns regarding the Office of the President related primarily to record keeping and document production. Following the issuance of summonses, the Office initially failed to provide adequate records to assist the Committee in understanding key decisions and events relevant to the inquiry. This limited the Committee's ability to obtain timely and complete institutional accounts of matters under review. The Committee notes, however, that this situation was subsequently addressed following a subsequent appearance of the Secretary to Cabinet and Head of the Civil Service before the Committee. Following that engagement, more comprehensive documentation was provided, which assisted the Committee's work.
- 879.** Notwithstanding this later cooperation, the Committee finds that broader coordination weaknesses were evident within the Office of the President. Evidence before the Committee indicates that several of the difficulties encountered by the Government during the relevant period were linked to insufficient coordination between and among Ministries at the Cabinet level. The Committee is of the view that stronger coordination mechanisms within the Government through the Office of the President would likely have reduced institutional conflict, improved information flow, and mitigated several of the anomalies observed across Government institutions.

- 880.** The Committee further notes with concern evidence suggesting attempts by senior executive officials to influence or direct aspects of the Commission’s proceedings. The Committee emphasises that commissions of inquiry operate as independent fact-finding bodies established under law, and any attempt to influence their operational or decision-making processes is inconsistent with the principles of institutional independence and the rule of law governance. The Committee considers that such conduct reflects weaknesses in internal executive coordination and insufficient clarity regarding the constitutional and legal boundaries between the Executive and independent investigative bodies, albeit such bodies forming part of the Executive.
- 881.** The Committee also notes with concern the exclusion of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs from aspects of asset management coordination following the conclusion of the Commission, despite such matters falling squarely within the Ministry’s statutory and policy responsibilities. The Committee considers it undesirable for any Ministry to be effectively sidelined from performing its statutory functions, particularly in areas central to Government financial governance and asset management.
- 882.** The Committee further observes that exchanges between senior Ministers responsible for key portfolios during the relevant period reflected institutional tensions that were not resolved at Cabinet level. The Committee notes that stronger intervention and coordination by the Office of the President may have mitigated these tensions and promoted more coherent Government action.
- 883.** Taken together, these issues reflect systemic coordination and governance challenges rather than isolated administrative lapses. Given its central coordinating role, the Office of the President carries a heightened responsibility to ensure lawful, coherent, and well-coordinated Government action across all Ministries, Departments, and Agencies.

RECOMMENDATION

- 1.** The Committee recommends that the Office of the President ensure that all Ministries are enabled to perform their statutory and policy functions fully, and that institutional participation in major national processes is not limited or excluded except where strictly required by law or formal conflict-of-interest protocols.
- 2.** The Committee recommends that the Government undertake and implement comprehensive civil service reform as a matter of urgency, with particular focus on strengthening record management systems, institutional coordination frameworks, accountability mechanisms, and administrative professionalism across Government Ministries and Departments. The Committee considers such reform essential to strengthening institutional resilience, improving governance standards, and preventing the recurrence of systemic administrative weaknesses identified during this inquiry.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

- 884.** The Committee addresses this matter with a measure of institutional restraint. However, in keeping with its duty to present a truthful and complete account of the issues arising from this inquiry, the Committee finds that the National Assembly did not, during the relevant period, exercise structured and sustained oversight over the implementation of the White Paper and the recommendations arising from the Commission.
- 885.** The Committee notes that the absence of a structured and institutionalised mechanism within the National Assembly to track, scrutinise, and follow up on White Paper implementation created an oversight gap. While individual oversight activities were undertaken at various times, including several questions for oral answers to Ministers, there was no formalised or continuous system to monitor executive implementation of Commission recommendations and public policy decisions arising from those recommendations.
- 886.** The Committee finds that this gap reduced the National Assembly's ability to maintain consistent scrutiny of executive action during a period of significant national asset management and policy implementation. The Committee emphasises that effective oversight requires not only reactive scrutiny, but also structured and continuous institutional monitoring mechanisms.
- 887.** The Committee underscores that the National Assembly possesses established committee structures designed to support oversight of executive action. However, in this instance, those structures were not utilised in a manner that created a sustained institutional review framework for monitoring the implementation of White Paper decisions and Commission-related actions.
- 888.** The Committee therefore notes, with respect for the institution but with necessary sincerity, that the National Assembly did not fully exercise its oversight role in relation to the post-Commission implementation process. The Committee expresses this finding in the spirit of institutional strengthening and with the expectation that future Assemblies will build stronger and more structured oversight systems.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1.** The Committee recommends that the National Assembly establish a formal and institutionalised framework for the oversight of White Paper implementation and Government decisions arising from commissions of inquiry and similar national investigations.
- 2.** The Committee further recommends that the National Assembly develop structured post inquiry oversight procedures requiring periodic reporting by the Executive on implementation status, including measurable implementation milestones and timelines.
- 3.** The Committee recommends that the National Assembly develop standard operating procedures for post-inquiry legislative oversight to ensure continuity of scrutiny across legislative terms and to strengthen institutional memory within the Assembly.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

- 889.** The Inquiry established that the sale and disposal of assets belonging to former President Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh and his close associates were not conducted within a coherent, disciplined, and fully accountable system of public asset governance. What emerged before the Committee was not merely a series of administrative errors, but a pattern of structural weakness, including fragmented custodial arrangements, inconsistent enforcement of court orders, defective valuation processes, incomplete reconciliation of proceeds, and blurred lines of institutional responsibility.
- 890.** These failures are not incidental. They reveal that while the nation undertook some important legislative reforms after the change of regime in 2016, the deeper systems that enable transparency, discipline, and accountability were only partially reformed. Several statutes have been amended. Oversight frameworks have been strengthened. Yet fragments of the old administrative culture, including informal decision-making practices, insubstantial documentation standards, limited technical capacity in corresponding portfolios, and insufficient professional orientation, continue to manifest within parts of the public service framework. The issue is therefore not solely one of law, but of institutional competence and culture.
- 891.** This Report is therefore not merely retrospective. It is diagnostic. It demonstrates that asset recovery does not end with freezing orders, commissions of inquiry, or White Papers. Without a structured post-forfeiture regime anchored in strict financial controls, professional standards, traceable procedures, competent oversight, and real-time reconciliation of proceeds, the objective of safeguarding public resources can be undermined at the final stage of disposal.
- 892.** In carrying out its mandate, the Committee conducted a comparative analysis of the amounts established in evidence as having been embezzled and the amounts recovered through asset tracing, forfeiture, and disposal processes. The assessment considered recoveries across the currencies in which the embezzlement occurred, namely the Gambian Dalasi, United States Dollar, Pound Sterling, and Euro. The table below presents the Committee's reconciliation of these figures and provides a clear account of the recovery outcomes arising from the process. The results are reflected below.

Currency	Amount Alleged to Have Been Embezzled	Amount Recovered	Variance / Difference
Gambian Dalasi (GMD)	1,065,021,512.00	1,730,716,875.08	665,695,363.08
United States Dollar (USD)	304,718,071.00	2,636,676.87	302,081,394.13
Pound Sterling (GBP)	2,250,000.00	20,250.00	2,229,750.00

Euro (EUR)	29,475,269.00	15,965.66	29,459,303.34
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- 893.** The analysis indicates that recoveries denominated in Gambian Dalasi exceed the amounts alleged to have been embezzled in that currency, resulting in a positive variance. Conversely, recoveries in foreign currencies remain substantially below the amounts reported as having been embezzled. These disparities demonstrate that, based on the evidence before the Committee, a significant portion of the alleged foreign currency assets remains unrecovered, underscoring the continuing necessity for strengthened recovery mechanisms, financial tracing capacity, and international asset cooperation.
- 894.** The Assembly cannot ignore these lessons. Under the Constitution, the National Assembly carries not only a law-making function, but an oversight and representation mandate. It is entrusted to hold the Executive to account, to guard the public purse, and to ensure that governmental authority is exercised within lawful bounds. This Inquiry is an affirmation of that constitutional duty. It demonstrates that oversight is not ceremonial but rather foundational to democratic equilibrium.
- 895.** It must also be acknowledged, candidly and respectfully, that this exercise did not originate solely within the walls of the National Assembly. It was the young people of this country, exercising their democratic rights peacefully, lawfully, and with civic resolve, who raised their voices and demanded clarity. Their engagement compelled national introspection. Their insistence on transparency prompted this process. In that sense, this Report stands not only as a committee document, but as a response to a call for accountability.
- 896.** The systemic deficiencies exposed by this Inquiry should therefore serve as a decisive moment. They are a call to the Government to complete the reform process it began in 2017, moving beyond legislative amendments and undertaking deeper administrative restructuring; to strengthen technical capacity within public institutions; and to decisively eliminate all residual practices incompatible with modern democratic governance.
- 897.** The Committee respectfully submits this Report to the National Assembly with the conviction that its recommendations, if implemented in full, will not merely address past deficiencies, but will fortify the Republic’s accountability mechanisms for generations to come. This is not simply an administrative reckoning; it is an opportunity for institutional consolidation.
- 898.** The work before us now is to translate these findings into reform and to ensure that never again will the management and disposal of public assets occur without the discipline, transparency, and professional integrity.

APPENDIX

ANNEX A: TECHNICAL TEAM/SUPPORT STAFF TO THE SPECIAL SELECT COMMITTEE

1. Mr. Kalipha MM Mbye - Clerk of the National Assembly
2. Mr. Daniel Cardoso - Deputy Clerk (Legislative Business & Programme)
3. Mr. Buba ME Jatta - Deputy Clerk (Admin & Finance)
4. Mr. Abubakarr S Kabbah - Director of Legal Affairs
5. Mr. Lamin M Dibba - Principal Legal Draftsperson (Lead Counsel)
6. Mr. Toney Mendy - Senior Table Clerk
7. Ms. Ndey Ngoneh Jeng - Legislative Drafting Fellow
8. Ms. Aji Sainey Kah - Legal Research Fellow/Deputy Lead Counsel
9. Mr. Amadou Bah - Legal Officer
10. Mr. Marabi S Hyudara - Director of Committees (Secretary)
11. Mr. Lamin E Manneh - Principal Committee Clerk (Deputy Secretary)
12. Mr. Ebrima Jawo - Assistant Senior Committee Clerk (Asst. Secretary)
13. Ms. Isatou Sonko - Committee Clerk (Asst. Secretary)
14. Mr. Alhagie Dumbuya - Director of Research
15. Mr. Gibairu Janneh - Director of Communications
16. Ms. Naffisatou Njie - Principal Budget Officer
17. Ms. Fatou Darboe - Principal Internal Auditor
18. Mr. Ebrima Jeng - Senior Internal Auditor
19. Mr. Omar Fofana - Budget Officer
20. Ms. Mary T. Mendy - Research Officer
21. Mr. Kawsu Jatta - Editor I
22. Ms. Fatou Sanyang - Table Clerk
23. Ms. Musukuta Faal - Communications Officer
24. Ms. Ramatoulie Jawo - Asst. Communications Officer
25. Mr. Musa Ceesay - ICT Officer
26. Mr. Lamin AJ Sanneh - Hansard reporter
27. Baboucarr Badjie - National Audit Office
28. Modou Gassama - National Audit Office
29. Isatou Jallow - National Audit Office
30. Yunusa Njie - National Audit Office
31. Ousman Kassama - National Audit Office
32. Modou Marega - National Audit Office
33. ASP Malang Badjie - Gambia Police Force
34. ASP Gikiba Sanneh - Gambia Police Force
35. Mr. Modou Lamin Saidykhan - Gambia Police Force
36. Mr. Ebrima Jammeh - Gambia Police Force
37. Mr. Sheikh Salif Badjie - Gambia Police Force

ANNEX B: LIST OF WITNESSES

LIST OF WITNESSES FROM WHOM STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN TAKEN

1. Hon. Dawda Jallow, Attorney General and Minister of Justice
2. Hon. Hamat N.K. Bah, Minister of Lands
3. Hon. Seedy K.M. Keita, Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs
4. Hon. Abubacarr Marie Tambadou, former Minister of Justice
5. Buah Saïdy, Governor, Central Bank of The Gambia
6. Hon. Muhammed Kanteh, National Assembly Member, Busumbala Constituency
7. Sourahata BS Janneh, former Chairman of Janneh Commission
8. Abioseh George, Commissioner
9. Bai Mass Saine, Commissioner
10. Alhagie Mamadi Kurang, former Executive Secretary to the Janneh Commission
11. Amie Bensouda, Lead Counsel to the Commission
12. Ramatoulie Sarr, Assistant Secretary to the Commission
13. Kebba Bojang, Assistant Secretary to the Commission
14. Fatou Drammeh, Assistant Secretary to the Commission
15. Alpha Barry, Receiver General
16. Louis Prom, initial Receiver
17. Alieu Jallow, former Registrar General
18. Abdoulie Colley, Registrar General
19. Marie Therese Gomez, Registrar of Companies
20. Hussein Thomasi, Solicitor General & Legal Secretary
21. Chernu Marena, former Solicitor General & Legal Secretary
22. Abubacarr S. Camara, Director General, Gambia Tourism Board
23. Agnes Macaulay, Accountant General
24. Abdoulie Bah, AGD
25. Mam Kucha Jatta, AGD
26. Alieu Njie, Secretary to Cabinet & Head of Civil Service
27. Nfamara Saïdybah, Government Vehicle Controller
28. Bakary Sanyang, Foresight Accountancy
29. Sergent Adama Jagne, MSA
30. Alhagie Amadou Kora, Cattle Dealer
31. Hamidou Jah, Jah Oil, Buyer
32. Seedy Muhtarr Touray, Inspector General of Police
33. Kalilu Njie, Commissioner of Licensing
34. Ismaila Fatty, Sub Inspector, GPF Licensing
35. Yankuba Colley, Officer Commanding, Vehicle Registration
36. Dawda Fatty, Director, Department of Lands and Survey
37. Dr. Adama Sallah, Buyer
38. Ebrima Ceesay, former Secretary to Cabinet
39. Momodou Darboe, Director General, GLMA
40. Habib S. Drammeh, former Secretary General & Head of Civil Service

41. Omar Jabang, Sheriff of the High Court
42. Sheriff B. Tabally, former Sheriff of the High Court
43. Mariama Drammeh, sister to Fatou Drammeh
44. Modou Lamin K. Suso, Warrant Officer, GPF
45. Mamadou L Kassama, Director, Department of Parks and Wildlife Management
46. Ebrima Cham, former Deputy Director General, GLMA
47. Mustapha Abdou Rahman Jobe, Auctioneer
48. Saidou Jallow, Buyer
49. Lt Col. Salifu Corr, Director, Department of Forestry
50. Seedy Kanyi, General Manager, GTSC
51. Yaya Camara, Assistant Farm Manager, Farato Farms
52. Sgt Barra Barry, GPF
53. Rabia Bourdib, Jamra Service, Buyer
54. Doudou Sano, Deputy Political Adviser to the President
55. Musa Keita, Buyer
56. Mohammed Hydara, Buyer
57. Modou Mbye, Buyer
58. Sutay Jammeh, GAF
59. Sait Njie, GAF
60. Muntaga Momodou Sallah, Buyer
61. Alieu Jawo, Director of Geological Department
62. Lamin Gajigo, Buyer
63. Gibril Colley, formerly GAF
64. Abdou Ceesay, GPF
65. Haruna Jallow, Nova Scotia Gambia Association
66. Hadim Gaye, Buyer
67. Momodou Turo Darboe, Buyer
68. Binta Sompo Ceesay
69. Baboucarr Sompo Ceesay
70. Modou Musa Ceesay, Sheriff's Division

LIST OF WITNESSES FROM WHOM STATEMENTS WERE TAKEN AND HAVE APPEARED FOR PUBLIC HEARING

1. Hon. Dawda Jallow, Attorney General and Minister of Justice
2. Hon. Hamat N.K. Bah, Minister of Lands
3. Hon. Seedy B.K. Keita, Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs
4. Hon. Abubacarr Marie Tambadou, former Minister of Justice
5. Buah Saidy, Governor, Central Bank of The Gambia
6. Sourahata BS Janneh, former Chairman of the Janneh Commission
7. Abioseh George, Commissioner
8. Alhagie Mamadi Kurang, former Executive Secretary to the Janneh Commission
9. Amie Bensouda, Lead Counsel to the Commission
10. Ramatoulie Sarr, Assistant Secretary to the Commission

11. Kebba Bojang, Assistant Secretary to the Commission
12. Fatou Drammeh, Assistant Secretary to the Commission
13. Alpha Barry, Receiver General
14. Louis Prom, initial Receiver
15. Alieu Jallow, former Registrar General
16. Abdoulie Colley, Registrar General
17. Marie Therese Gomez, Registrar of Companies
18. Chernu Marena, former Solicitor General & Legal Secretary
19. Abubacarr S. Camara, Director General, Gambia Tourism Board
20. Agnes Macaulay, Accountant General
21. Alieu Njie, Secretary to Cabinet & Head of Civil Service
22. Nfamara Saidybah, Government Vehicle Controller
23. Sergeant Adama Jagne, MSA
24. Alhagie Amadou Kora, Cattle Dealer
25. Dawda Fatty, Director, Department of Lands and Survey
26. Dr. Adama Sallah, Buyer
27. Ebrima Ceesay, former Secretary to Cabinet
28. Momodou Darboe, Director General, GLMA
29. Habib S. Drammeh, former Secretary General & Head of Civil Service
30. Omar Jabang, Sheriff of the High Court
31. Sheriff B. Tabally, former Sheriff of the High Court
32. Modou Lamin K. Suso, Warrant Officer, GPF
33. Mamadou L Kassama, Director, Department of Parks and Wildlife Management
34. Ebrima Cham, former Deputy Director General, GLMA
35. Seedy Kanyi, General Manager, GTSC

LIST OF WITNESSES FROM WHOM ONLY STATEMENTS WERE TAKEN BUT HAVE NOT APPEARED FOR PUBLIC HEARING

1. Hon. Muhammed Kanteh, National Assembly Member, Busumbala Constituency
2. Bai Mass Saine, Commissioner
3. Hussuin Thomasi, Solicitor General & Legal Secretary
4. Abdoulie Bah, AGD
5. Mam Kucha Jatta, AGD
6. Bakary Sanyang, Foresight Accountancy
7. Hamidou Jah, Jah Oil, Buyer
8. Seedy Muhtarr Touray, Inspector General of Police
9. Kalilu Njie, Commissioner of Licensing
10. Ismaila Fatty, Sub Inspector, GPF Licensing
11. Yankuba Colley, Officer Commanding, Vehicle Registration
12. Mariama Drammeh, sister to Fatou Drammeh
13. Mustapha Abdou Rahman Jobe, Auctioneer
14. Saidou Jallow, Buyer

15. Lt Col. Salifu Corr, Director, Department of Forestry
16. Yaya Camara, Assistant Farm Manager, Farato Farms
17. Sgt Barra Barry, GPF
18. Rabia Bourdib, Jamra Service, Buyer
19. Doudou Sano, Deputy Political Adviser to the President
20. Musa Keita, Buyer
21. Mohammed Hydera, Buyer
22. Modou Mbye, Buyer
23. Sutay Jammeh, GAF
24. Sait Njie, GAF
25. Muntaga Momodou Sallah, Buyer
26. Alieu Jawo, Director of Geological Department
27. Lamin Gajigo, Buyer
28. Gibril Colley, formerly GAF
29. Abdou Ceesay, GPF
30. Haruna Jallow, Nova Scotia Gambia Association
31. Hadim Gaye, Buyer
32. Momodou Turo Darboe, Buyer
33. Binta Sompou Ceesay
34. Baboucarr Sompou Ceesay
35. Modou Musa Ceesay, Sheriff's Division

**ANNEX C: LANDED PROPERTIES INVESTIGATED AND REPORTED BY THE
COMMISSION, VOLUME 3**

CATEGORY 1: OWNED PROPERTIES (NOS. 1–62)

No.	Property	Location	Size	Serial No.	Type of Ownership	Date Acquired	Purchase Price (GMD)
1	78A Daniel Goddard Street (former Hagan St)	Banjul	210.105 M2	S.R. 442/2011	Freehold	2011-06-16	2,500,000
2	78B Daniel Goddard Street	Banjul	548.45 M2	SR 174/2005	Freehold	2013-06-19	3,000,000
3	26 ECOWAS Avenue (former Buckle St)	Banjul	1000 M2	S.R. 524/2010	Freehold	—	9,600,000
4	13 Davidson Carrol Street (former Picton)	Banjul	666 M2	No. 605/2014 Vol. 77KD	Freehold	2014-07-23	4,000,000
5	15 Dobson Street	Banjul	717.7 M2	S.R. 699/2010	Freehold	25 Dec. 2010	3,000,000
6	73A OAU Boulevard (former Leman St)	Banjul	998.90 M2	—	Freehold	—	—
7	64 OAU Boulevard (Leman St)	Banjul	405.5 M2	S.R.517/2011 Vol.14/CD	Freehold	2011-07-02	4,100,000
8	Jengdula Night Club (former Cape Road), Serekunda Highway	Banjul-Serekunda	262.78 M2	102/2012 Vol. 13 CD	Leasehold	—	750,000
9	3 Daniel Goddard (former Hagan) Street	Banjul	323.70 M2	SR 423/2001 Vol.64KD	Freehold	—	—
10	57A Daniel Goddard (formerly Hagan) Street	Banjul	402.89 M2	S.R. 229/2012 Vol. 75KD	Freehold	—	900,000
11	49 William Cole (former Grant) Street	Banjul	255.6 M2	—	—	—	—

No.	Property	Location	Size	Serial No.	Type of Ownership	Date Acquired	Purchase Price (GMD)
12	6A 22nd July Square (former MacCarthy Square)	Banjul	360.75 M2	S.R.516/2008 Vol.71KD	Freehold	2008-06-03	—
13	9 Fitzgerald Street	Banjul	715 M2	S.R. 122/2012 Vol. 7 KD	Freehold	27 Feb. 2012	1,200,000
14	18A Picton Street	Banjul	216 M2	S.R. 158/2008 Vol 71 KD	Freehold	—	2,100,000
15	Hamza Barracks	Banjul	2,145 Hectares	314/1995 Vol.58 KD	Leasehold	5 Nov. 2010	£500,000
16	61 Daniel Goddard Street	Banjul	224 M2	—	Freehold	13 Oct. 2019	1,500,000
17	60 Daniel Goddard Street	Banjul	347.70 M2	S.R.295/2015 Vol. 78 CD	Freehold	28 Oct. 2013	1,500,000
18	34 Liberation Avenue	Banjul	779.93 M2	S.R. 66/2008 Vol. 71 KD	Freehold	18 Jan. 2008	£650,000
19	2 Fitzgerald Street	Banjul	452.235 M2	—	Freehold	17 Feb. 2010	2,200,000
20	72 Gloucester Street	Banjul	1,107.10 M2	No. 58/2011 Vol.74 KD	Freehold	24 Jan. 2012	1,500,000
21	13 William Cole Street	Banjul	318 M2	S.R.121/2012 Vol.75CD	Freehold	5 Mar. 2012	1,500,000
22	No. 16 Kairaba Avenue	Kanifing Municipality	2096.35 M2	S.R. 485/2013	Leasehold	16 Jul. 2013	20,000,000
23	Fajara M Section (Kanilai Family Farms)	Kanifing Municipality	1255 M2	S.R. 324/2015 Vol.78 KD	Leasehold	13 Apr. 2015	5,000,000
24	Fajara South Atlantic	Kanifing Municipality	812.90 M2	S.R. 654/2008 Vol. 71 KD	Leasehold	8 Aug. 2008	3,000,000
25	Bakau CFAO Supermarket	Kanifing Municipality	2120.25 M2	S.R.601/2011	Leasehold	25 Aug. 2011	8,000,000

No.	Property	Location	Size	Serial No.	Type of Ownership	Date Acquired	Purchase Price (GMD)
26	Bakau Ndemban Clinic	Kanifing Municipality	3.05 Hectares	K246/1994	Leasehold	30 Jul. 2010	\$150,000
27	Fajara South Atlantic — 4 Baker Street	Kanifing Municipality	1321.375 M2	S.R.407/2013 Vol.76KD	Leasehold	14 May 2013	3,000,000
28	Bakau Newtown	Kanifing Municipality	1079.5 M2	S.R. 14/2012 Vol.75 KD	Leasehold	20 Dec. 2011	2,000,000
29	Fajara South Atlantic	Kanifing Municipality	1380 M2	S.R. 210/2012 Vol.75 KD	Leasehold	5 Apr. 2012	2,700,000
30	Fajara M Section (Kanilai Family Farms) Plot 190	Kanifing Municipality	1350 M2	—	Leasehold	—	—
31	Bakau Capepoint	Kanifing Municipality	1498.63 M2	—	Leasehold	15 Sep. 2011	4,500,000
32	Cape Point, Bakau Plot No. 14 Cape St Mary	Kanifing Municipality	20787 sq ft	S.R. 659/2008 Vol.71 KD	Leasehold	26 Mar. 2008	800,000
33	Dunes Hotel & Resort	Kotu	11,960 M2	SR.882/2014 Vol. 77KD	Leasehold	22 Oct. 2013	\$650,000
34	Kanifing Industrial Area	Kanifing Municipality	1912.50 M2	S.R.663/2008 Vol.71KD	Leasehold	25 Apr. 2008	6,500,000
35	Bakau Katchikali	Bakau	Various M2	S.R.174/2013 Vol.76 KD	Leasehold	5 Mar. 2013	50,000
36	Abuko Abattoir	Abuko	12.06 Hectares	K139/1992, K27/1988, K71/1984	Leasehold	17 Jan. 2008	16,000,000
37	Old Jeshwang	—	N/A	S.R. 80/82 Vol.46K.D	Leasehold	—	—
38	Farato Farms	Yambai Forest	13.14 + 17.64	Lease DI.34/L28	Leasehold	31 Dec. 2008	7,600,000

No.	Property	Location	Size	Serial No.	Type of Ownership	Date Acquired	Purchase Price (GMD)
			Hectares				
41	Gunjur Beach Motel (5M Africa)	Gunjur	3500 M2	SR 157/2012 Vol.75KD	Leasehold	13 Mar. 2012	9,000,000
42	Santanba (2)	Sanyang	3.00 Hectares	K399/2010	Leasehold	21 Jun. 2012	—
43	Banjulinding Gardens	Banjulinding	7.95 Hectares	K400/2010 K399/2010	Leasehold	29 Dec. 2010	—
45	83 Yarambamba Estate	Yundum	300 M2 each	160/2008	—	28 Feb. 2008	200,000
46	85 Yarambamba Estate	Yundum	—	161/2008	—	—	200,000
47	86 Yarambamba Estate	Yundum	—	162/2008	—	—	200,000
48	88 Yarambamba Estate	Yundum	—	163/2008	—	—	200,000
49	89 Yarambamba Estate	Yundum	—	164/2008	—	—	200,000
50	Bijilo Village	Bijilo	1217 M2	SR 119/2012 Vol 75 KD	Leasehold	22 Feb. 2012	10,000,000
52	Busumbala Poultry / Busumbala Village	Busumbala	1.50 Hectares	S.R. 653/2008 Vol.71 KD	Leasehold	8 Aug. 2008	5,000,000
53	Las Vegas Block 214	Paradise Estate	17.5 x 35 M2	S.R.157/2015 Vol.76KD	—	5 Mar. 2013	7,000,000
54	Las Vegas Block 211	—	—	—	—	—	—
55	Plot No.75	Brufut Heights	3000 Hectares	S.R. 285/2010 Vol.73KD	Leasehold	22 Feb. 2012	3,000,000
56	Plot No. B/300/04	Brufut Taf Garden	25x30 M2	S.R.455/2011	Leasehold	27 Jun. 2012	6,000,000
57	Plot No. B381/08	—	—	S.R.450/2011	—	—	4,000,000

No.	Property	Location	Size	Serial No.	Type of Ownership	Date Acquired	Purchase Price (GMD)
58	Citro Product	Yundum	7.811 Hectares	S.R.94/2013 Vol.32	Leasehold	30 Aug. 2006	1,681,600
59	Barra	Lower Niumi	2,142 M2	Lease P129/1979	Leasehold	2 Mar. 2006	1,000,000
60	JanJangbureh	Jangjanbureh District	—	—	—	—	—
61	Kumba Ngerr Garden	Jangjanbureh District	62.25 Hectares	—	—	7 Nov. 2008	1,000,000
62	Janjangbureh District	Janjangbureh District	1671.67 M2	SR 57/2016	Leasehold	3 Feb. 2012	1,500,000

CATEGORY 2: SEIZED OR APPROPRIATED PROPERTIES (NOS. 63–91)

No.	Property	Location	Size	Serial No.	Type of Ownership	Date Acquired
63	11 Russel Street	Banjul	1243.60 M2	S.R. 502/2009	Freehold	22 May 2009
64	Fajara Booster Station	Fajara	2129.55 M2	S.R.51/2010 Vol.73 KD	Leasehold	25 Jan. 2010
65	Kanifing Industrial Estate — Garage Mbye Njie and Sons Ltd	Kanifing Industrial Estate	8361.28 M2	S.R. 233/2008 Vol.71/KD	Leasehold	18 Mar. 2008
66	Kanifing Industrial Estate	Kanifing	9,543.66 M2	S.R. 232/2008 Vol.71 KD	Leasehold	2002-04-11
67	Kotu West Layout 192	Kotu	651 M2	S.R. 658/2008	Leasehold	27 Dec. 2007
68	Kotu Layout Kololi Plot 188	Kotu West	690 M2	S.R.661/2008 Vol.71 KD	Leasehold	27 Dec. 2007
69	Kotu Layout Kololi Plot 189	Kotu West	—	—	Leasehold	—

No.	Property	Location	Size	Serial No.	Type of Ownership	Date Acquired
70	Kotu Silo	Kotu West Layout	713 M2	Lease K70/1987	Leasehold	—
71	Former Local Treatment	Kololi Village	750 M2	S.R. 657/2008 Vol.71	Leasehold	27 Dec. 2007
73	Kotu Extension Layout	Kotu West	9543.66 M2	S.R.3/2000 Vol.63KD	Leasehold	—
74	Brusubi Phase 2	Brusubi	8255.06 M2	S.R.660/2008 Vol.71	Leasehold	—
75-78	Kerr Serign Njagga (4 plots)	Kerr Serigne	750.08 M2	SR 64 and 65/2002 Vol.21PD	Leasehold	—
79	Kerr Serign Njagga	Kerr Serigne	—	S.R.70/2000 Vol.18PD	Leasehold	—
80	Kerr Serign (Njagga)	Kerr Serigne	817.50 M2	—	—	—
81	No. 907 - Bijilo	Bijilo	—	S.R. 660/2008 Vol.71KD	Leasehold	—
82-83	Kuloro Village (2 properties)	Kuloro	17.40 Hectares	—	—	—
84-88	Karantaba (5 Properties)	Jarra West	2,314.13 Hectares	—	—	—
89	Soma Town	Soma	1600 M2	—	—	—
90	Essau	Lower Niumi	398.15 sq metres	—	—	—
91	Barra	Barra	1,379.70 M2	P20/2007	Leasehold	8 Apr. 2008

CATEGORY 3: PROPERTIES GRANTED BY STATE (NOS. 92–110)

No.	Property	Location	Size	Serial No.	Type of Ownership	Date Acquired	Purchase Price (GMD)	Est. Value 2018 (GMD)
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No.	Property	Location	Size	Serial No.	Type of Ownership	Date Acquired	Purchase Price (GMD)	Est. Value 2018 (GMD)
92	Djembe Hotel Junction (Kanilai Cultural Centre)	Kanifing Municipality	6.10 Hectares	K355/2009	Granted by State	—	—	—
93	Kartong Touray Kunda	Kartong	10.60 Hectares	K370/2015	Granted by the State	—	—	—
94	Kartong Folonko	Kartong	277.58 Hectares	K375/2015	Granted by State	—	—	—
95	Kartong Jambaring	Kartong	12.36 Hectares	K377/2013	Granted by State	—	—	—
96	Gunjur Kenyekenye Jamango	Gunjur	35.7 Hectares	K372/2015	Granted by State	—	—	—
97	Gunjur Kajabang (KFF)	Gunjur	50.6 Hectares	K293/2012	Granted by State	—	—	—
98	Medina Salam / Kenye Kenye Jamango	—	35.7 Hectares	K373/2015	Granted by State	—	—	—
99	Sambouya Madikuly	—	34.05 Hectares	K371/2015	Granted by State	—	—	—
100	Hawba Sanyang (KFF)	—	—	K217/2013	Granted by State	—	—	—
101	Sanyang Old Quarry	Sanyang	84.82 Hectares	—	Granted by State	—	—	—
102	Tanji River Side	—	34.73 Hectares	K180/2012	Granted by State	—	—	—
103-105	Batokunku (3 properties)	Batakunku	153.74 Hectares	—	Granted by State	—	—	—
106	Tujereng (KFF)	Tujereng	89.63 Hectares	K173/2012	Granted by State	—	—	—

No.	Property	Location	Size	Serial No.	Type of Ownership	Date Acquired	Purchase Price (GMD)	Est. Value 2018 (GMD)
107	Brufut Heights Football Field (KFF)	Brufut	12.05 Hectares	K68/2009	Granted by State	—	—	—
108	Bijilo Quarry (GFFI)	Bijilo	3.75 Hectares	—	Granted by State	—	—	—
109	Bijilo (Green Boys)	Bijilo	17.7 Hectares	S.R. K176/2012	Granted by State	—	—	—
110	Operation Save the Children Foundation (OSCF) — Zineb Jammeh, Kololi	Kololi	—	—	Granted by State	—	—	—

CATEGORY 4: OTHER STATE DISTRICTS (NOS. 111–227)

No.	Property	Location	Size	Serial No.
111	Sarro Garden to KFF — Banjul	Banjul	62.68 Hectares	Lease K175/2012
112	Jengdula Extension	Banjul	5750.68 sq metres	Lease K175/2012
113	Kotu — Bertil Harding Highway (KFF)	Kanifing Municipality	20.64 Hectares	—
114	Kotu Point (between Palma Rima Hotel and Dunes Hotel) KFF	Kanifing Municipality	21.39 Hectares	—
115	Kotu Quarry (KFF)	Kanifing Municipality	19.7 Hectares	—
116	Old Cape Road — Old Jeswang (KFF)	Kanifing Municipality	3.69 Hectares	—
117	Bakau — Mile 7 (Coastal Road) KFF	Kanifing Municipality	1.25 Hectares	SR K67/2009

No.	Property	Location	Size	Serial No.
118	Fajara Water Tank — Atlantic (KFF)	Kanifing Municipality	1.1 Hectares	SR K353/2009
119	Fajara M Section — Coastal Highway (KFF)	Kanifing Municipality	0.18 Hectares	SR K537/2007
120	Fajara M Section — Coastal Highway	Kanifing Municipality	0.312 Hectares	SR K536/2007
121	Tallinding Island (incl. Mangrove Swamps)	Kanifing Municipality	16.07 Hectares	SR K177/2012
122	Cape Point Bakau Sea Front	Kanifing Municipality	11.9 Hectares	SR K181/2012
123-124	Cape Point Bakau Extension Layout Plot 1-6	Kanifing Municipality	—	—
125	JFP Land	West Coast Region	1610 sq metres	—
126	Abuko Abattoir	West Coast Region	—	—
127	Farato Farms Extension — Nyambai Forest	Kombo South	55.46 Hectares	—
128	Siffoe Garden (1)	Kombo South	452.83 Hectares	K179/2012
129	Siffoe Garden (2)	Kombo South	452.83 Hectares	K379/2015
130	Siffoe Garden (3)	Kombo South	192.57 Hectares	K374/2015
131	Tujereng (1)	Kombo South	38.17 Hectares	K178/2012
132-133	Tanji Bird Reserve	Kombo South	414.21 Hectares	K215/2013
134	Brufut Sanneh Mentereng	Kombo South	7.65 Hectares	—
135	Brufut — Adjacent to Sheraton Hotel	Kombo South	11.84 Hectares	—
136	Brufut Fish Landing Site	Kombo South	7.76 Hectares	TDA Lease 216/2013
137	Brufut — Madam Nadiany Bamba	Kombo South	4150 sq metres	—
138	Bijilo Triangle — Sangtanba	Kombo South	1.16 Hectares	—
139	Busura (1)	Kombo South	—	K27/2008
140	Busura (2)	Kombo South	192.21 Hectares	K28/2008

No.	Property	Location	Size	Serial No.
141	Seyoni Village (1)	Kombo South	40.45 Hectares	—
142	Seyoni Village (2)	Kombo South	63.87 Hectares	—
143	Darsillameh	Kombo South	246.82 Hectares	K376/2015
144	Dimbaya Village	Kombo South	23.71 Hectares	—
145	Duwasu	Kombo South	—	SR P27/2010
146	Kampassa Village	Kombo South	34.24 Hectares	Lease P25/2013
147	Kayaborr, Jifonni and Kalimou Farms	Kombo South	593.42 Hectares	Lease P61/2015
148	Bantanjang, Jifonni and Kalang Farm	Kombo South	205.76 Hectares	Lease P49/2015
149	Alla Kunda Park	Kombo South	666.55 Hectares	Lease P67/2015
150	Sangtanba	Kombo South	1486.16 Hectares	Lease P18/2003
151	Kanilai Village	Kombo South	1867.98 Hectares	Lease P19/2003
152	Kanilai	Kombo South	161 Hectares	Lease DI.29/L27
153	Bujinga	Kombo South	411.72 Hectares	Lease P32/2013
154	Kanfenda Farm	Kombo South	320.45 Hectares	Lease P53/2015
155	Burrock	Kombo South	28.92 Hectares	Lease P54/2015
156	Ngiffi Farm	Kombo South	899.31 Hectares	Lease P55/2015
157	Kanilai Cashew Garden	Kombo South	72.18 Hectares	Lease P56/2015
158	Kanilai None Garden	Kombo South	47.6 Hectares	Lease P57/2015
159	Kanilai Animal Park	Kombo South	706.68 Hectares	Lease P58/2015
160	Bunuborr Park	Kombo South	1352.02 Hectares	—
161	Tintiba Farm	Kombo South	6.70 Hectares	Lease P59/2015
162	Kanilai Airport Park	Kombo South	1199.58 Hectares	Lease P68/2015
163	Dobong Residence	Kombo South	15.08 Hectares	Lease P69/2015
164	Bujinga Farm	Kombo South	555.36 Hectares	Lease P70/2015
165	Santangba Park	Kombo South	2506 Hectares	Lease P71/2015
166	Jomo Kunda and Jonier Farm	Kombo South	128.69 Hectares	Lease P75/2015
167	Nyangit	Kombo South	34.22 Hectares	Lease P31/2007

No.	Property	Location	Size	Serial No.
168	Sita Farms	Kombo South	408.64 Hectares	Lease P44/2015
169	Bintang Katakore Kassange	Kombo South	187.89 sq metres	P45/2015
170	Bintang Lewoto	Kombo South	43.93 Hectares	Lease P51/2015
171	Jalalo Island	Kombo South	181.69 Hectares	—
172	Batending Kajara Farm	Kombo South	528.94 Hectares	Lease P47/2015
173	Kaw Kaw Island	Kombo South	654.73 Hectares	Lease P50/2015
174	Bintang Island	Kombo South	1324.1 Hectares	Lease P52/2015
175	Bulangorr Islands	Kombo South	776.9 Hectares	Lease P72/2015
176	Bulangorr Lewoto	Kombo South	171.67 Hectares	Lease P73/2015
177	Bulangorr Island (2)	Kombo South	724.37 Hectares	Lease P74/2015
178	Bulangorr Village (3)	Kombo South	8.03 Hectares	Lease P22/2013
179	Bulangorr Village (New)	Kombo South	33 Hectares	Lease P23/2013
180	Ndemban Foni Brefet	Kombo South	59.925 Hectares	Lease P30/2007
181	Elephant Island — Jassong	Lower River Region	1079 Hectares	Lease P25/2008
182	Dumbutu — Kiang West National Park	Lower River Region	21348.15 Hectares	P80/2013 Vol.20
183	Gissay Manduar and Bankuling — Kiang Park	Lower River Region	3649.71 Hectares	Lease P48/2015
184	Burong/Bantasu — Santangba/Taborang/Jula Kunda and Missara Park	Lower River Region	2946.19 Hectares	Lease P60/2015
185	Barra Ginack Island	North Bank Region	169.34 Hectares	Lease P9/2010
186	Essau	North Bank Region	493 sq metres	Lease P16/2008
187	Essau	North Bank Region	1274 sq metres	—
188	Essau	North Bank Region	300 sq metres	Lease P14/2008
189	Essau	North Bank Region	1,507 sq metres	Lease P19/2008

No.	Property	Location	Size	Serial No.
190	Essau	North Bank Region	1216 sq metres	Lease P25/2008
191	Essau	North Bank Region	875 sq metres	Lease P29/2008
192	Mayamba	North Bank Region	755.44 sq metres	Lease P15/2008
193	Sami Village	North Bank Region	1547.68 sq metres	Lease P18/2008
194	Bangali	North Bank Region	1200 sq metres	Lease P17/2008
195	Essau	North Bank Region	1274 sq metres	Lease P13/2008
196	Dog Island — Sitanunku	North Bank Region	4.40 Hectares	Lease P26/2008
198	Balanger Kerr Ndare	Central River Region	17.68 Hectares	Lease P11/2015
199	Balanharr	Central River Region	3600 sq metres	Lease P4/2009
200	Kaur Hill	Central River Region	19.65 Hectares	Lease P3/2009
201	Kerr Isab	Central River Region	206.7 Hectares	Lease P17/2015
202	Bati Hai	Central River Region	222.27 Hectares	Lease P13/2015
203	Chamen	Central River Region	97.53 Hectares	Lease P24/2013
204	Kai-Sabi Passo Island	Central River Region	809.24 Hectares	—
205	Sinchu Jenung	Central River Region	7.08 Hectares	Lease P18/2015
206	Wassu	Central River Region	5.71 Hectares	Lease P8/2015
207	Pallang Mandinka	Central River Region	9.69 Hectares	Lease P9/2015

No.	Property	Location	Size	Serial No.
208	Kuntaur Fulla Kunda	Central River Region	4.70 Hectares	Lease DI17/L233-P12/2015
209	Njoben Fula Kunda Farm	Central River Region	121.7 Hectares	P65/2015
210	Madina Nfally	Central River Region	12.35 Hectares	—
211	Janjangbureh	Central River Region	62.25 Hectares	Lease P1/2009
212	Pacharr Rice Field	Central River Region	1372.8 Hectares	Lease P14/2015
213	Sankulay Kunda	Central River Region	—	P64/2015
214	Sapu	Central River Region	660.06 Hectares	Lease P36/2015
215	Dankunku	Central River Region	4258.55 Hectares	Lease P16/2005
216	Kudang Maku Nyama Field	Central River Region	6.40 Hectares	—
217	Kudang	Central River Region	947.81 Hectares	Lease DI18/L2A
218	Jareng Village	Central River Region	251.65 Hectares	Lease P35/2015
219	Kessel Kunda	Central River Region	190.1 Hectares	Lease P63/2015
220	Fatoto	Upper River Region	363.31 Hectares	Lease P7/2013
221	Badari Mining Site	Upper River Region	363.31 Hectares	Lease P6/2013
222	Basse Santa Su	Upper River Region	3.20 Hectares	Lease P11/2013
223	Bana Tenda	Upper River Region	237 Hectares	Lease P8/2013
224	Jarga Jerreh	Upper River Region	—	P31/2014

No.	Property	Location	Size	Serial No.
225	Sotuma Suma Koi	Upper River Region	663.98 Hectares	P10/2013
226	Changally	Upper River Region	—	P32/2014
227	Passama	Upper River Region	—	—

CATEGORY 5: COMMUNITY ALLOCATIONS (NOS. 228–234)

No.	Property	Size	Type of Ownership	Means of Allocation	Date
228	Madianna — Brufut	—	—	Issued by the community	10 Apr. 2004
229	Farato Farms Extension	11.14 Hectares	Deemed Leasehold	Purchased then community extension allocated	5 Jan. 2010
230	Kubune Village	21.94 Hectares	Deemed Leasehold	Community of Kubuneh village	10 Dec. 2009
231	Manduar Village	51,493 M2	Deemed Leasehold	Transferred from Omar Manneh	13 Apr. 2010
232	Jambur Santang Jubba Kabilo	50 Hectares	Deemed Leasehold	Allocated by community leaders	20 Oct. 2003
233	Kassa Kunda Village	Various dimensions	Deemed Leasehold	Stamped by Alkalo of Kassa Kunda Village	12 Jan. 2010
234	Soma	—	Deemed Leasehold	Seyfo Alh. Yaya Jarjusay	—

CATEGORY 6: LAND IN PROCESS OF BEING LEASED (NOS. 235–264)

No.	Property	Size	Notes / Means of Allocation
235	Sambouya	4.8 Hectares	TDA — Incomplete lease to KFF. Cartography plan CK 0662 May 2012. Signed by Pa Ousman Bojang.
236	Santangba — Sanyang	3 Hectares	TDA, 16 May 2013. Transfer of ownership — Gibba Jabang. Certificate of Occupancy dated 26 Oct 2004.
237	Sanyang Village	1.16 Hectares	Lease incomplete. Signed only by lessee — KFF. Cartography plan CK0887 May 2012.

No.	Property	Size	Notes / Means of Allocation
238	Brufut (Ghana Town)	1,126.50 M2	No record of how Aja Asombi Bojang acquired this property.
239	Banjul International Airport	69.92 Hectares	—
240	Both wings of Sheraton Hotel	8.66 Hectares	Seized by Ex-President. SR K307/2004
241	Mayork	182.48 Hectares	Approved in name of Ex-President
242	Kanfenda & Burrock	374.73 Hectares	Approved in name of Ex-President
243	Kanfenda	24.32 Hectares	Approved for preparation of lease in name of KFF
244	Bullenghat	86.16 Hectares	Approved for preparation of lease in name of Ex-President
245	Sangajor Giramba Farm	5.21 Hectares	Approved for preparation of lease in name of Ex-President
246	Kampanti Gibangarr and Kabong	108.66 Hectares	Approved for preparation of lease in name of Ex-President
247	Kanilai Airport Extension	14.72 Hectares	Approved for preparation of lease in name of KFF
248	Bujiling and Kanilai Farm	174.64 Hectares	Approved for preparation of lease in name of Ex-President
249	Kanilai and Kujenjeng	3.29 Hectares	Approved for preparation of lease in name of KFF
250	Kampanti and Bajagarr Farm	—	Approved for preparation of lease in name of KFF
251	Kambong Gebangarr Santangba	705.99 Hectares	Approved for preparation of lease in name of Ex-President
252	Kujenjeng Kanilai Farm	32.50 Hectares	Approved for preparation of lease in name of KFF
253	Kanuma and Jakoi	2012.61 Hectares	Approved for preparation of lease in name of Ex-President
254	Bajilo, Sibanor, Jakoi, Kanjer, Kassagn and Jaki Bintang Farm 271	966.21 Hectares	Approved for preparation of lease in name of Ex-President
255	Buram Farm	319.10 Hectares	Approved for preparation of lease in name of KFF
256	Ndemban Farm	513.21 Hectares	Approved for preparation of lease in name of Ex-

No.	Property	Size	Notes / Means of Allocation
			President
257	Missira Tenda	566.12 Hectares	Approved for preparation of lease in name of Ex-President
258	Karantaba Jula	120.31 Hectares	Approved for preparation of lease in name of Ex-President
259	Jali Farm	944.83 Hectares	Approved for preparation of lease in name of Ex-President
260	Jangjangbureh Rice Field	149.03 Hectares	Cartography survey plan CK2396 December 2015 in name of Ex-President
261	Sapu Residential	251.91 Hectares	Cartography survey plan CK2396 December 2015 in name of Ex-President
262	Damkunku and Pakaliba	7173.55 Hectares	Cartography survey plan CK6205 December 2015 in name of Ex-President
263	Kosemar	547.62 Hectares	Cartography survey plan CK2396 December 2015 in name of Ex-President
264	Dampha Kunda	—	Land said to be allocated by community leaders

CATEGORY 7: THIRD PARTY CLAIMS (NOS. 265–284)

No.	Property	Size	Claim Details	Financial Information
265	Albert Market — State House Extension	—	Omar Boudib, Alhaji Jawara, Janko Ceesay, Samba Jallow, Salifu Jaiteh, Shyben A. Madi & Sons Ltd, Livestock Department & Banjul City Council	—
266	Kotu Strand — Destinies Nightclub	2,143.30 M2	Ex-President sold property to Sulayman Sowe for D16,000,000. Subject of litigation between Mega Bank and Timeless Company Ltd.	—
267	Kotu Bertil Harding Highway — Futurelec Building	1.78 Hectares	Sold to KFF by Sheriff of High Court (GTB vs Futurelec Ltd). Property in litigation between Futurelec and Receiver of KFF.	—

No.	Property	Size	Claim Details	Financial Information
268	Kololi Village	750 sq metres	Nathalie Gomez to KFF	14,225,000 purchase; 15,647,500 AK sale
269	72 Kairaba Avenue — Fajara M Section	1000 sq metres	Mrs. Isatou Faal Jobe claims she was forced to give up property while in detention. SR 166/2004 Vol.77 KD	—
270	Kairaba Avenue — Fajara M Section	1,297 sq metres	Property seized by Ex-President as wrongly taken by Baba Jobe. In litigation between Banta Kaira and Receiver of KFF. SR K136/2000	—
271	Kairaba Avenue — Fajara M Section	2,694.47 sq metres	In litigation between Banta Kaira and Receiver of KFF. Lease SR K197/1999	—
272	Kanifing Industrial Estate — Portion of lease K221/1985 & K308/1999	7752 sq metres	Saihou Ceesay to AMRC. In litigation between Trans Sahara Trading and AMRC. S.R.232/2008 Vol.71KD	—
273-280	Cape Point — 7 Plots (Nos. 89-95)	—	No evidence plot nos. 90-95 belonged to Ex-President. Plot No. 89 released to GTB.	—
281	Busumbala	145x96x106x157.09 sq metres	Bakary Barrow claims Ex-President forced him to sell.	—
282	Brufut — CSE Camp, Kombo Coastal Road	1.65 Hectares	Yankuba Sano claims property wrongly seized by Ex-President.	—
283	Kerr Serign Njagga	1691.155 sq metres	Seized from Baba Jobe. Mr. H.J. Mousa claims property. Lease P/6/1978-DI/L675	—
284	Sukuta — Edward Gomez	—	Purportedly gifted to Ex-President. Gift not perfected. P60/1986 DI.35/L656	—

CATEGORY 8: SB PROPERTIES (NOS. 285–291)

No.	Property	Size	Purchase Amount (GMD)	Owner
285	Bijilo	610 M2	450,000	Occupied by one Aisha Fatty
286	Brufut Heights Plot No.13	875 M2	—	Owned by Saul Badjie
287	Sinchu Alagie	1,550 M2	—	—
288	Sinchu Alagie (2)	510 M2	—	—
289	Old Yundum	3000 M2	—	—
290	Sukuta	925 M2 and 800 M2	—	—
291	Salagie Layout Plot No. 850	542 M2	—	—

ANNEX D:**LIST OF LANDED PROPERTIES ANNEXED IN THE HIGH ORDERS OF 22ND
MAY 2017, and 21st JULY 2018, RESPECTIVELY.**

No.	Serial Registration No.	Lessee / Registered Name	Location / Situation of Land	Area / Additional Details
PART A: PROVINCIAL LEASES — P-SERIES REGISTRATIONS (Serial Nos. 1–93)				
1	P18/2003	Yahya Jammeh	Santangba Foni	—
2	P19/2003	Yahya Jammeh	Kanilai Village	—
3	P11/2007	Yahya Jammeh	Barra	—
4	P30/2007	Yahya Jammeh	Ndemban Foni Brefet	—
5	P31/2007	Yahya Jammeh	Nyagit	—
6	P12/2008	Yahya Jammeh	Barra	—
7	P12/2008	Yahya Jammeh	Essau	—
8	P15/2008	Yahya Jammeh	Mayamba	—
9	P16/2008	Yahya Jammeh	Eassau	—
10	P14/2008	Yahya Jammeh	Eassau	—
11	P17/2008	Yahya Jammeh	Bangali	—
12	P18/2008	Yahya Jammeh	Sami	—
13	P19/2008	Yahya Jammeh	Essau	—
14	P20/2008	Yahya Jammeh	Barra	—
15	P25/2008	Yahya Jammeh	Elephant Island, Jassong Village	—
16	P26/2008	Yahya Jammeh	Dog Island, Sitanunku	—
17	P29/2008	Yahya Jammeh	Essau	—
18	P44/2008	Yahya Jammeh	Barra, Ginack Island	—
19	P1/2009	Yahya Jammeh	Janjanbureh	—
20	P2/2009	Yahya Jammeh	Balanharr	—
21	P3/2009	Yahya Jammeh	Kaur	—

No.	Serial Registration No.	Lessee / Registered Name	Location / Situation of Land	Area / Additional Details
22	P4/2009	Yahya Jammeh	Balangharr	—
23	P25/2009	Yahya Jammeh	Essau	—
24	P9/2010	Yahya Jammeh	Kanuma (Ginack)	—
25	P27/2010	Yahya Jammeh	Duwasu	—
26	P9/2013	Yahya Jammeh	Basse	—
27	P10/2013	Yahya Jammeh	Sotuma	—
28	P11/2013	Yahya Jammeh	Basse Santosu	—
29	P17/2013	Yahya Jammeh	Kaur Lower Saloum	—
30	P22/2013	Yahya Jammeh	Balanfor Foni Bintang District	—
31	P23/2013	Yahya Jammeh	Balangfor Foni Bintang	—
32	P24/2013	Yahya Jammeh	Chamen	—
33	P25/2013	Yahya Jammeh	Kampassa	—
34	P31/2013	Yahya Jammeh	Kallimu Foni	—
35	P32/2013	Yahya Jammeh	Bujinga	—
36	P14/2014	Yahya Jammeh	Barra Ginack Island	—
37	P30/2014	Yahya Jammeh	Bana Tenda, Jimara District	—
38	P31/2014	Yahya Jammeh	Jarga Jarreh, Sandu District	—
39	P32/2014	Yahya Jammeh	Changally, Sandu District	—
40	P33/2014	Yahya Jammeh	Fatoto	—
41	P34/2014	Yahya Jammeh	Basse Santosu & Dampha, Fuladu East District	—
42	P35/2014	Yahya Jammeh	Pasamas, Wulli East District	—
43	P42/2014	Yahya Jammeh	Bana Tenda, Jimara District	—
44	P8/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Wassu Niani	—
45	P9/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Pallang Mandika	—
46	P10/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Pallang Mandika	—
47	P11/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Ballanghar Kerr Ndare	—

No.	Serial Registration No.	Lessee / Registered Name	Location / Situation of Land	Area / Additional Details
48	P12/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Kuntaur Fula Kunda	—
49	P13/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Batihai Lower Saloum	—
50	P14/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Pacharr Lower Fuladou	—
51	P15/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Kudang, Niani District	—
52	P16/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Nyamina Dankunku, Niani	—
53	P17/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Kerr Isab Lower Saloum	—
54	P18/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Sinchu Jennung, Niani	—
55	P31/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Dankuku Nyamina	—
56	P32/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Dankuku	—
57	P33/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Dankuku	—
58	P34/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Elephant Island, Jarra East	—
59	P35/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Jareng Naimina, East District	—
60	P36/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Sapu Lower Fuladu	—
61	P37/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Janjanbureh	—
62	P44/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Sitafarm, Foni Bintang District	—
63	P45/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Bintang Katakore	—
64	P46/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Jlaloisland, Foni Bintang	—
65	P47/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Bantending Kayara Farm, Foni Bintang	—
66	P48/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Kiang Park, Gissay Manduar	—
67	P49/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Bantang Jifonni & Kalang Farm, Foni Bondali	—
68	P50/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Kaw Kaw Island, Foni Bintang	—
69	P51/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Bintang Lewoto	—
70	P52/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Bintang Island	—
71	P53/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Dobong Kanfenda	—

No.	Serial Registration No.	Lessee / Registered Name	Location / Situation of Land	Area / Additional Details
72	P54/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Burock, Foni Kansala	—
73	P55/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Ngiffi Farm, Foni Kansala	—
74	P56/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Kanilai Cashew Garden, Foni Kansala	—
75	P57/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Kanilai None Garden	—
76	P58/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Kanilai Animal Park	—
77	P59/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Bunuborr Park, Foni Kansala	—
78	P60/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Burong Babtasu, Santanba	—
79	P61/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Kayaborr, Jifonni	—
80	P62/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Alla Kunda Park, Foni Bondali	—
81	P63/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Kasel Kunda Farm, Upper Fuladou	—
82	P64/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Sankulay Kunda Farm	—
83	P65/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Ngoben Fula Kunda Farm	—
84	P66/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Kanilai Cashew Garden	—
85	P67/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Tintiba Farm, Foni Kansala	—
86	P68/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Kanilai Airport Park	—
87	P69/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Dobong Resident, Foni Kansala	—
88	P70/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Buginga Farm, Foni Kansala	—
89	P71/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Santanba Park, Foni Kansala	—
90	P72/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Bulangorr Island, Foni Bintang	—
91	P73/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Bulangorr Lawooto	—
92	P74/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Bulangorr Island	—
93	P75/2015	Yahya Jammeh	Jomo Kunda & Jonter Farm, Foni Kansala	—

PART B: GREATER BANJUL AREA LEASES — K-SERIES REGISTRATIONS (Serial Nos. 94–

No.	Serial Registration No.	Lessee / Registered Name	Location / Situation of Land	Area / Additional Details
107)				
94	K145/1987 805/2014 Vol. 77 KD	Kanilai Family Farms Ltd	Kanilai Family Farms Ltd	—
95	K133/2009 882/2014 Vol. 77 KD	Kanilai Group International Ltd	Kanilai Group International Ltd	—
96	295/2015 Vol. 78 CD	Kanilai Family Farms Ltd	60 Hagan Street, Banjul	—
97	K235/1981 324/2015 Vol. 78 KD	Kanilai Family Farms	[Not specified]	—
98	K318/2008	Yahya Jammeh	Tanji, Kombo South	—
99	K67/2009	Yahya Jammeh	Mile 7	—
100	K68/2009	Yahya Jammeh	Brufut	—
101	K353/2009	Yahya Jammeh	Fajara Water Tank	—
102	K354/2009	Yahya Jammeh	Kololi KSMD	—
103	K355/2009	Yahya Jammeh	Kotu Point KSMD	—
104	K356/2009	Yahya Jammeh	Busumbala	—
105	K398/2010	Yahya Jammeh	Coastal Layout	—
106	K399/2010	Yahya Jammeh	New Yundum	—
107	K400/2010	Yahya Jammeh	New Yundum	—
PART C:				
108	K173/2012	Kanilai Family Farms	Tujereng, Kombo South	89.63 Hectares
109	K174/2012	Kanilai Family Farms	Mile 2, Banjul	5,750.69 sq metres
110	K175/2012	Kanilai Family Farms	Banjul	62.67 Hectares
111	K176/2012	Kanilai Family Farms	Bijilo, Kombo North	17.70 Hectares
112	K177/2012	Kanilai Family Farms	Tallinding, KSMD	16.07 Hectares

No.	Serial Registration No.	Lessee / Registered Name	Location / Situation of Land	Area / Additional Details
113	K178/2012	Sheikh Prof. Dr. Alhagie Yaya A.J.J. Jammeh	Tujereng, Kombo South	38.17 Hectares
114	K179/2012	Sheikh Prof. Dr. Alhagie Yaya A.J.J. Jammeh	Sifoe, Kombo South	38.17 Hectares
115	K180/2012	Sheikh Prof. Dr. Alhagie Yaya A.J.J. Jammeh	Tanji, Kombo South	34.73 Hectares
116	K181/2012	Kanilai Family Farms Limited	Cape Point, KSMD	11.90 Hectares
117	K215/2013	Kanilai Family Farms	Sanneh Mentereng, Brufut	7.65 Hectares
118	K216/2013	Kanilai Family Farms	Sanneh Mentereng, Brufut	11.57 Hectares
119	K217/2013	Kanilai Family Farms	Hawba (Sanyang)	42.92 Hectares
120	K293/2013	Kanilai Family Farms	Gunjur (Kajabang)	52.60 Hectares
121	K370/2015	Sheikh Prof. Dr. Alhagie Yaya A.J.J. Jammeh	Kartong Toura, Kombo South District	10.60 Hectares
122	K371/2015	Sheikh Prof. Dr. Alhagie Yaya A.J.J. Jammeh	Sambouya Madikuly, Kombo South District	34.05 Hectares
123	K372/2015	Sheikh Prof. Dr. Alhagie Yaya A.J.J. Jammeh	Gunjur Madina Salam, Kombo South District	34.70 Hectares
124	K373/2015	Sheikh Prof. Dr. Alhagie Yaya A.J.J. Jammeh	Gunjur Madina Salam, Kombo South District	35.64 Hectares
125	K374/2015	Sheikh Prof. Dr. Alhagie Yaya	Sifoe Garden Extension, Kombo South District	192.57 Hectares

No.	Serial Registration No.	Lessee / Registered Name	Location / Situation of Land	Area / Additional Details
		A.J.J. Jammeh		
126	K375/2015	Sheikh Prof. Dr. Alhagie Yaya A.J.J. Jammeh	Kartong Folono Farm Kunda, South District	277.57 Hectares
127	K376/2015	Sheikh Prof. Dr. Alhagie Yaya A.J.J. Jammeh	Dansliameh Farm, Kombo Central District	246.82 Hectares
128	K377/2015	Sheikh Prof. Dr. Alhagie Yaya A.J.J. Jammeh	Kartong Jabarin, Kombo South District	12.35 Hectares
129	K378/2015	Sheikh Prof. Dr. Alhagie Yaya A.J.J. Jammeh	Brufut Town, Kombo North	11.84 Hectares
130	K379/2015	Sheikh Prof. Dr. Alhagie Yaya A.J.J. Jammeh	Sifoe Village, Kombo South	452.83 Hectares
131	K380/2015	Sheikh Prof. Dr. Alhagie Yaya A.J.J. Jammeh	Brufut Village, Kombo North	7.76 Hectares

SECOND COURT ORDER

S/N	Name of Property	Serial Registrar No.	Location
1	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	409/2013 Vol. 76 KD	78 B Hagan Street, Banjul
2	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	210/2012 Vol. 76 KD	Kairaba Avenue, Fajara
3	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	648/2011 Vol. 74 KD	Cape Point, Kombo Saint, Mary Division
4	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	442/2011 Vol. 74 KD	Kairaba Avenue, Kombo Saint, Mary Division
5	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	103/2012 Vol. 75 KD	Kairaba Avenue, Kombo Saint, Mary Division

S/N	Name of Property	Serial Registrar No.	Location
6	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	102/2012 Vol. 75 KD	Kairaba Avenue, Kombo Saint, Mary Division
7	KANILA FAMILY FARMS	699/2010 Vol. 73 KD	15 Dobson Street, Banjul
8	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	158/2010 Vol. 73 KD	2 Fitzgerald Street
9	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	999/2008 Vol. 71 KD	Nyambia Forest, Farato Village
10	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	654/2008 Vol. 71 KD	Fajara South
11	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	653/2008 Vol. 71 KD	Busumbala Village
12	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	517/2011 Vol. 74 KD	Kairaba Avenue, Kanifing
13	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	295/2015 Vol. 78 CD	60 Hagan Street, Kanifing
14	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	659/2008 Vol. 71 KD	Kanilai Village
15	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	658/2008 Vol. 71 KD	Kanilai Village
16	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	661/2008 Vol. 71 KD	Kanilai Village
17	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	660/2008 Vol. 71 KD	Kanilai Village
18	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	233/2008 Vol. 71 KD	Pipe Line
19	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	232/2008 Vol. 71 KD	Pipe Line
20	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	14/2012 Vol. 95 KD	Kairaba Avenue
21	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	436/2010 Vol. 75 KD	Bakau
22	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	611/2010 Vol. 73 KD	61 Hagan Street
23	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	456/2011 Vol. 74 KD	Kairaba Avenue
24	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	657/2008 Vol. 74 KD	Kanilai Village
25	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	656/2008 Vol. 71 KD	Kanilai Village
26	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	708/2003 Vol. 71 KD	Kanilai Village
27	YAHYA JAMMEH	51/2010 Vol. 73 KD	Fajara
28	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	707/2003 Vol. 71 KD	Kanilai Village
29	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	66/2008 Vol. 71 KD	34 Wellington Street, Banjul
30	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	998/2003 Vol. 71 KD	Farato
31	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	164/2003 Vol. 71 KD	Yarambamha

S/N	Name of Property	Serial Registrar No.	Location
32	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	163/2003 Vol. 71 KD	Yarambamba
33	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	162/2003 Vol. 71 KD	Yarambamba
34	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	160/2003 Vol. 71 KD	Yarambamba
35	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	161/2003 Vol. 71 KD	Yarambamba
36	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	272/2015 Vol. 78 KD	Fajara
37	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	605/2014 Vol. 77 KD	13 Picton Street, Banjul
38	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	455/2011 Vol. 74 KD	Brufut
39	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	373/2001 Vol. 74 KD	18 Picton Street
40	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	601/2011 Vol. 74 KD	Bakau
41	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	609/2011 Vol. 74 KD	Cape Point
42	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	89/2012 Vol. 74 KD	Burufut
43	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	119/2012 Vol. 75 KD	Bijilo
44	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	157/2012 Vol. 75 KD	Gunjur
45	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	229/2012 Vol. 75 KD	57 Hagan Street
46	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	151/2013 Vol. 76 KD	Coastal Layout
47	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	174/2013 Vol. 76 KD	Kanifing East
48	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	407/2013 Vol. 76 KD	South Atlantic Fajara
49	KANILAI FAMILY FARMS	485/2013 Vol. 76 KD	Sukuta Central